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Discusses Finland's defense policy. Three circles of national security interest; Basing of Finnish defense policy and development plans on Defense White Paper of 2001; Transformation of Finnish national defense based on the Defense White Paper of 2004.

With a strategic defence review expected to begin in 2010, this article reflects upon the history of the review in British defence policy and planning. The authors argue that for decades successive defence reviews have followed a process in which policy development moves through four phases: failure, inertia, formulation and misimplementation. This has resulted in a cycle of defence reviews that have proved to be incomplete and unsustainable: a cycle in which each review leaves so much unfinished business that another radical reappraisal of defence policy is soon thought necessary, and a cycle from which a succession of governments have so far proved unable or unwilling to escape. The article suggests that the strategic defence (and security) review promised for the next parliament is in danger of continuing this pattern of policy deficiency. The authors contest that this need not be the case. With a close understanding of the pattern of past reviews it should be possible for the 2010 review finally to break the mould and produce a coherent and above all sustainable defence policy and strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the security documents of 2000 compared with the Defense White Paper (DWP) of 2003 concerning the security policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Analysis of the factors affecting Russian international relations, national interests, and national security; Assessment of the DWP and the priority tasks in the development of the Armed Forces; Prospects and outlook on the Russian security policies.

The article reports on issues and topics related to the armed forces and defense industry in the U.S. The Defense Department announced a new draft and reserve plan designed to overcome inequalities in the method of recruiting men. The Office of Defense Mobilization plans to have trained skeleton staffs in some secret headquarters outside Washington. A Defense Department directive was issued to procurement officials to avoid concentrating orders in the plants of a few suppliers in order to insure a sound mobilization base by a broad geographical spread.

The article focuses on the civil defense proposals in the U.S. Accordingly, it should prove useful to discuss here the wide range of questions civil defense raises concerning our national strategy and the arms interaction process. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of a civil defense program might be to pile a civil defense race upon the arms interaction process and thus open up, as it were a new cold war front in an area in which there has been something approaching tacit agreement. There would be an increased risk inherent in adding this new dimension to the arms race. A substantial civil defense program would be inordinately tension heightening because it would involve large scale community action.

The article describes the procedures and conceptual underpinnings of the three basic budgeting processes used in the U.S. Department of Defense since its unification in 1947 and evaluate theft strengths and weaknesses. The first period was that of U.S. President Harry S. Truman-Dwight D. Eisenhower years, and the system of fixed allocations to each service used pleased no one, its only advantage being the early imposition of a spending ceiling. The second, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Period, is best characterized by the complete control exercised by the Secretary of Defense and by the introduction of the planning programming and budgeting system (PPBS). The third system is that in use since 1968; its most important aspects are the decentralization of power and modified retention of PPBS. Despite the improvements in the system, there are still serious shortcomings in the budgeting process. The author concludes that while much progress has been made in the budgetary process, there is still considerable room for improvement. Two primary constraints, however, will remain its inherent political nature, and the near irrelevancy of planning.

The article examines the peacetime defense preparations, plausible supplies and demands in the U.S. economy after a nuclear war. It says that although deterrence of general war is the primary goal of defense preparations, deterrence may fail in a variety of circumstances. To meet this residual risk of war, some insurance measures to ameliorate its consequences if it occurs are a sensible secondary goal. Moreover, many patterns of military action are conceivable which permit one to envisage a severely damaged postwar society, but with enough resources surviving to permit economic recovery over an extended period of time. Finally, individual industries might differ significantly in their contribution to economic recovery. The measure of importance is based on a comparison between estimated postwar supplies and estimated postwar demands for the products of some twenty individual manufacturing industries. In essence, the article explores the implications of using the ratios of prospective demand to prospective supply as a first approximation to postwar values.

The article reports on policies and programs concerning the national security in the U.S. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has reviewed the Classification of Nuclear Weapons. In a report prepared by the AEC, a complete review was being made in classifying the weapons field with the aim of the revising the basic policy. There are several factors prompting the review, including the widespread knowledge today of weapons technology, the information exchange with Britain approved by Congress, and the distribution of atomic weapons within the military forces with the consequent increase in the numbers of persons familiar with them.