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Discusses the history of the civil defense program of the U.S., from 1944 to 1984. Reason given by the government on the establishment of a civil defense program; Studies conducted on the potential impact on a typical American city of the hydrogen bomb; Creation of the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration; Ways used to educate the public on civil defense; Implementation of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.

The article focuses on the reorganization of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) under the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower. The author provides an analysis on the performance of NSC under the administration of former president Harry S. Truman and identifies its weakness. Some of which is the informal nature of NSC proceedings during that time and that NSC had been always late in the policy-making process in matters concerning national security. But with the powerful tandem of Robert Cutler and Eisenhower, several significant changes occurred in the NSC. The NSC structure was strengthened and the Council mechanism was implemented for all major foreign and military policy-making.

The article cites U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's unique approach to the formulation of security policy. It highlights the failure of most presidents to fully comprehend the process of formulating grand strategy, particularly the utilization of the National Security Council (NSC) in formulating security policy. It highlight's Eisenhower's commitment to a studied development of U.S. national security strategy and his relevance for today's national security professionals and strategists.

The central concern of this paper is with what factors give momentum to the chain of decisions which result in a weapon that goes against the standards of performance. The defense policy literature suggests that the variations in the performance of American military hardware are tied to the government's difficulties in resolving fundamental disagreements on strategic and doctrinal matters, variations in the technological demands of military projects, and the need for bargaining and coalition building. These relationships yield three hypotheses which are tested using simple bivariate analysis. With the caveats appropriate to a small sample of cases, the hypotheses are stated as relations between conditions rather than as correlations, and the findings are suggestive. The data support all three of the primary hypotheses. The study concludes with reform recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The determination that strategy should have a long-term predictive quality has left strategy seemingly wanting when having to address what are currently called 'strategic shocks', such as the recent Arab Spring and the NATO commitment to Libya. The focus on grand strategy, particularly in the US, is responsible for this trend. Its endeavour to mitigate risk in the national interest is inherently conservative, rather than opportunistic, and it is favoured and probably required by powers that are committed to the status quo, that need to manage diminishing resources, and that are dealing with relative decline. Strategy as traditionally but more narrowly defined by generals for use in a military context, is much more exploitative and proactive. Precisely because it is designed to be used in war it presumes that its function is offensive, that it will have to deal with chance and contingency, and that its aim is change. Its task is to deal with the uncertainties of war, and to respond to them while holding on to long-term perspectives. Clausewitz addressed the issue of 'war plans' in book VIII of On war, but the thinker who did most to inject planning into European strategic thought was Jomini. His influence has permeated much of American military thinking. The effect of nuclear planning in the Cold War was to ensure that strategy at the operational level became conflated with broader views of grand strategy-not least when the Cold War itself provided apparent continuity to strategic thought. Since 1990 we have been left with a view of strategy which fails to respond sensibly to chance and accident. Strategy needs context, and a sense of where and against whom it is to be applied. Its core task is to embrace contingency while holding on to long-term national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The establishment of a military command for Africa (US AFRICOM) symbolizes the radical repositioning of the US military. Facilitated by the consensus in contemporary Western foreign policies - that there can be no development without security - over the last ten years the US military has expanded its activities into civilian domains including development and conflict prevention. As a reaction to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, recent US military doctrines on counterinsurgency and stability operations have singled out the need for more civilian and long-term activities as a precondition for success. AFRICOM has put most of these „military innovations" into practice. Due to the command's focus on development activities, on civil-military coordination and its proposed engagement in non-war situations, in military circles AFRICOM is seen as a role model for future military practices. This paper problematizes the military's expanding mandate and discusses its implications. It argues that the military's increasing engagement in issues of governance and development deeply blurs the normative boundary between the military and the civilian and exposes development as a technology of security. Furthermore, the military's repositioning follows the dominant securitization of so- called „fragile states" and classifies social spaces along Western strategic interests. As a consequence, targeted communities find it hard to separate development efforts aimed at countering poverty and those aimed at countering insurgency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military's inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle's practical wisdom and Machiavelli's virtú. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the civil defense program of the Soviet Union, and suggests conclusions that the United States can draw from it. It surveys the supposed program to train citizens for military deployment, evacuation and sheltering plans, assumptions held about the nature of a U.S. attack, and post-attack recovery estimates, and concludes that much of these are unrealistic, inadequate in the face of large-scale nuclear attack, or spurious. It notes that there is little evidence that Soviet leaders have planned their economy with civil defense in mind, and that there is not much basis for claiming that Soviet leaders would risk war with the U.S., which has more than sufficient capability to nullify whatever passive-defense measures may have been taken by the Soviet Union.

The article reports on issues and topics related to the armed forces and defense industry in the U.S. The Defense Department announced a new draft and reserve plan designed to overcome inequalities in the method of recruiting men. The Office of Defense Mobilization plans to have trained skeleton staffs in some secret headquarters outside Washington. A Defense Department directive was issued to procurement officials to avoid concentrating orders in the plants of a few suppliers in order to insure a sound mobilization base by a broad geographical spread.

The article focuses on the civil defense proposals in the U.S. Accordingly, it should prove useful to discuss here the wide range of questions civil defense raises concerning our national strategy and the arms interaction process. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of a civil defense program might be to pile a civil defense race upon the arms interaction process and thus open up, as it were a new cold war front in an area in which there has been something approaching tacit agreement. There would be an increased risk inherent in adding this new dimension to the arms race. A substantial civil defense program would be inordinately tension heightening because it would involve large scale community action.

The article discusses how the spread of conventional weapons in the U.S. has influenced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons. Topics mentioned include the role of geographic deployment of military forces on threat perceptions, assumption that global disarmament disproportionately benefits the states, and the notion that eliminating nuclear weapons may reduce perceived risks and increase perceived gains from fighting.

This article addresses the current inadequacies of the civil-military relations model advanced by Samuel Huntington and embraced by the US military, the tensions and realities of security policy development, and the professional responsibilities military leaders have for providing the best military advice possible to political leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the objectives of the Central Asian states on national security. Topics discussed include the importance of continuous balancing of Russian, U.S., and Chinese regional security agendas in ensuring Central Asian militaries, the multi-vector foreign policy of Kazakhstan, and the military-to-military cooperation of the U.S. with the Central Asian states.

The article discusses whether the role of military is limited to national security and stabilization. It is stated that the U.S. military is already substantially engaged in both stability and development activities in Afghanistan and other conflict and post-conflict zones. It is stated that in the U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, foreign assistance played a key role in stability and reconstruction efforts.

This article argues that risk is central in (re)producing the unaccountable commercial military/security markets that are a normal part of our political reality. The argument is twofold: first it is suggested that risk rationalities and the associated ‘preventive imperative’ has a depoliticising effect – accentuated by the impersonal spread of risk rationalities and the strategies of risk professionals – which lowers the eagerness to seek accountability. However, and second, depoliticisation is significant above all as a serious obstacle to the innovative thinking that is the sine qua non of effective accountability. The enmeshed, ‘hybrid’, nature of the market places it in the ‘blind spot’ of law and is as such fundamental to the current lack of accountability. Consequently, moving beyond established regulatory frameworks and technical understandings of accountability (that is, politicising the market) is a precondition for more effective accountability. Failing to do so, will leave the current rapid legal innovation impotent while reinforcing impunity as the focus on and confidence in established regulatory frameworks grows. The failure to politicise creates an ‘accountability paradox’ where the pursuit of accountability diminishes it. The article develops this argument with reference to Blackwater's (now Xe) role in the so called CIA ‘Killing Program’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the theory of realism and its relationship to national security policy in the U.S.. It outlines the realist argument which focuses on four premises including states, anarchy, interests, and power. It evaluates the usefulness of realism in terms of framing enduring security issue and discusses the future of realist thought with respect to framing emerging security issues.

At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo-American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy-making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the political interplay of foreign policy, military intervention, and Founding Father's visions on the U.S. and global political culture. It discusses the imbalance of power in the American government that was created by the interventionist foreign and military policy. The military roles of the American government in the utilization of force in the international community are cited including the interest of the national security, national consensus on the military intervention, and as a consequence of last recourse to warfare. It mentions the Congressional control over war struggles of the U.S. Moreover, the necessity to restructure the U.S. military focus based on the interest of the national security is mentioned.

The article discusses the principle of deterrence in terms of using conventional weapons rather than nuclear weapons. It is noted that this was a major topic of interest for national security strategists during the cold war, and is likely to become a significant issue again in the early 21st century. The distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial is addressed and their role in U.S. military policy is analyzed.

The article discusses the deployment of conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) by the United States military. CBMs are distinguished from ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. An argument is presented that CBMs should be deployed as part of the prompt global strike (PGM) mission, a policy which is designed to ensure that the U.S. can respond rapidly, with precision and sub-nuclear force, to threats from terrorists or other states. Topics addressed include cost-benefit ratios, and the risk of a CBM strike being misperceived as a nuclear attack.

For the last two decades the US has pursued what some analysts have called the ‘fantastical idea’ of military transformation that would enable the US to change the very nature of war. Known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’, this process would use technology to provide the US with battlefield dominance that no opponent could overcome. Motivated by the politics of the Cold War, however, this exit from reality has proved less than effective in what has become known as the ‘war on terror’. The US has been pulled into nasty, ‘small’ wars, against enemies utilizing asymmetric tactics. The Bush administration has tried to destroy these groups through the use of military force, failing, or even worse refusing, to recognize that these enemies feed off the economical, political and social rot of weak and failing states. For the last eight years the US government has addressed the symptoms of a problem rather than the actual disease. If America wants to make serious progress with the most pressing national security risks, the next American president must enact a revolution in foreign affairs that sees a massive overhaul and substantial investment in the State Department and USAID. A critical mass of research exists to illustrate the links between development and security—it is time Washington gets serious and embraces a conception of security that is more holistic, and ultimately, more effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. national security debate and argues that references to former Nazi leader Adolph Hitler and policies of appeasement surrounding World War II should be stopped. According to the article, references the World War II appeasement distort national security threats. The use of Hitler appeasement analogies by U.S. neo-conservatives and other politicians is also explored.

The article focuses on the Bush Doctrine by U.S. President George W. Bush. It notes that the doctrine has been called as national security liberalism, messianic universalism, and democratic realism. It also mentions that the doctrine intends to put an end to tyranny and aims to create peace. It also reveals on the argument of several critics that the doctrine is a form of imperialism that utilizes language of democracy to hide imperial intentions. Relative to this, it uses the language of the tradition of just war in its defence for arising threats and disseminating democracy and freedom.

The article critically examines the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. U.S. policymakers are seen as drawing on the lessons of the Vietnam War rather than more recent and relevant examples of insurgency from the 21st century, such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone.

An effective terrorism alert system in a federal government has one central task: to motivate actors to take costly protective measures. The United States' color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) failed in this mission. In federal systems, national leaders cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they must convince constituent governments and private parties that the desired actions are worth the costs. Such beliefs can be generated either by sharing the information behind an alert or by developing enough confidence in the alert system that the government's word alone suffices. The HSAS did neither, largely because it was not designed to generate confidence. Rather, the system's creators assumed that the public would trust the national leadership and believe in the utility of the system's information. Over time, as the HSAS became increasingly perceived as politically manipulated, there was no built-in mechanism to recover confidence in the system. An alternative, trust-based terrorist alert system could solve this problem. Building on the notion of "procedural fairness" from the psychological and legal traditions, this system would retain the political advantages of the HSAS, facilitate greater compliance among the requisite actors, and ameliorate many of the strategic problems inherent in terror alert systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1986, presidents have been required to submit an annual National Security Strategy (NSS). Recent years have seen a proliferation of national strategies of other kinds, linked in part to the NSS. The National Security Council, led by the national security advisor and employing its committee system and the interagency process, develops the NSS. The integration of all the necessary elements within the NSS involves an opaque and irregular set of rolling negotiations among national security principals. The 2006 NSS is best viewed in comparison to the 2002 version, which was issued in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It stipulates that the United States is at war with transnational terrorism fueled by a perversion of Islam and proposes stable democracy as the primary solution, supported by aggressive efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the option of taking preemptive military action. Criteria for assessing national security strategies can be process oriented or results based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the small weapon's policy of the U.S. which is said to have a good standard in export control. According to the article, the country went on to undertake efforts in promoting security, reconciliation and peace among conflicting regions by closing the unlawful arm sector. However, a grave issue has been determined which alleges the U.S. Department of Defense of transporting several firearms to security forces in Iraq without registering its serial numbers. Furthermore, the author states that the evident contradictions have brought confusion about the factual content of the nation's firearm regulation.

The article discusses the nature and virtues of preemptive deterrence based on related laws adopted in the U.S. The country has long relied upon preemption to assure its national security. Preemption's necessity is further reinforced by Islamist terrorists who, unlike the U.S. Cold War enemies, cannot be reliably deterred. The delicate logic of deterrence is also discussed.

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force—a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the American foreign policy of U.S. President George W. Bush. Calibration of national interests that are essential to wise policy decisions; Consideration of American militarism as one of the most dramatic and consequential legacies of the Cold War; Assessment of the unprecedented centralization of power within the executive branch.

This article traces the evolution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) since its establishment in 1971 to the present day. It details the evolution of the FPDA's three main pillars: the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), the architecture for political-military dialogue, and the exercise programme. In addition, the article tries to place the FPDA in the context of the security roles played by ASEAN, the ARF, intra-regional bilateral military ties, and the defence relationship with United States. It argues that, while the FPDA's role in upholding regional security cannot be equated to the military contribution of the United States, and the grouping certainly faces significant challenges, it nevertheless contributes positively and innovatively to the ability of Malaysia and Singapore to address not only conventional threats, but increasingly asymmetric and non-conventional security challenges as well, thereby contributing to the overall maintenance of regional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Absent a clear case of an armed attack, the UN Charter severely restricts the ability of individual states to react to what they perceive as their national security risks, relegating such a task to the collective decision-making of the Security Council. Contemporary global security risks pose serious challenges to this regime. Stopping terrorist groups and rogue regimes from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or ending incidents of mass atrocities against civilian populations often require swift and resolute collective responses. Not all those who can respond to such threats are willing to do so, and the collective response of the Security Council frequently proves ineffective. As the stronger military power, the US has both the ability and the motivation to provide the public good of global security unilaterally, while other countries rely on international law to explain their inaction. The so-called 'Bush Doctrine', which asserts an authority to act unilaterally and pre-emptively, can thus be understood as an earnest effort to respond to these security challenges. But this doctrine upsets the existing UN regime, and in turn creates other risks to global stability. This essay seeks to lay out the prevailing global security risks as a collective action problem. It assesses the tensions that exist between existing legal constraints on the use of unilateral force and the proposals for their modification, and evaluates the ramifications of such proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the implications of the shift in U.S. national security strategy using legal and ethical perspective. Importance of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) statement issued by each U.S. president; Legal and ethical framework for assessing the use of military force; Implication of the U.S. security situation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the justification of the NSS of U.S. President George W. Bush; Emergence of international order.

Assesses the legality of the security strategies employed by the U.S. in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. U.S. vision of the international security milieu as reflected in official U.S. government publications; Security strategies developed by the U.S. to address security threats; Appropriateness of military force against terrorists; Cases when a country can act preemptively against terror threats, attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or WMD transfer to terrorists.

The historical trend toward greater media-military cooperation and the increase in information transparency are both harbingers of the next step, granting selected journalists access to the operational planning and execution of the next war. Failure to get out ahead of this trend and position the media within the operational level could, in the case of military setbacks in the next conflict, bring public relations disaster upon the Pentagon and the U.S. White House. Similar to the trust the U.S. Department of Defense placed in the embedded reporters at the tactical level knowing that the soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines would make a great story so should trust be proffered at the operational level. Giving the best reporters the chance to observe such planning and execution will be rewarded with great stories.

Presents a study that examined the actions of organized labor's approach to defense policy in the U.S. Background on labor campaign to protect the national security of the U.S.; Information on the war Korea in June 1950; Details on Operation Booster.

Examines the response of Japan to U.S. security policies. Key markers of progress toward the U.S.-Japan alliance; Obstacles to the reorientation of Japan's national security priorities; Background on Japan's political system; Contribution of Japan to the U.S.-led war against terrorism.

Reviews the American national security state, from its origins in the National Security Act of 1947 to the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Government that resulted from the Cold War; National interests; National security policy; Reevaluation of grand strategic functions.

What are the implications of the war on terrorism for the progress made to date and the likely future of environmental security efforts in the national security state? To put the evolving post-September 11th environmental security challenge facing the U.S. military in perspective, this article begins with a synopsis of the doctrinal, tactical, operational, and regulatory dilemmas faced by the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era. Next, the article reviews how and why the 1990s bequeathed a set of misaligned administrative systems that make existing and future progress in balancing national security with environmental and natural resources protection extremely vulnerable to shifts in the political economy surrounding this issue in the post-September 11th era. The article concludes with a review of how September 11th has affected the patterns of politics surrounding this issue since those tragic events. Despite recent increases in the defense budget, this analysis suggests that conflict over this issue will continue, rendering structural realignment a daunting challenge and further complicating the integration of national security and environmental and natural resources responsibilities in the post-September 11th era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on the protocol set for news media personnel in covering the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Media coverage of the Operation Enduring Freedom group deployed in the Middle East; Regulations on press freedom; Effect of the media coverage on the issue of national security.

A reiteration of the concluding section of ‘The paradigm that lost its way’ (International Affairs, October 2001) explains that the attitudes which shape Western behaviour and its approach to international relations are a product of the circumstances that prevailed from 1945 to 1953, which became entrenched by the Cold War. The article argues that this ‘adversarial national security paradigm’ is increasingly dysfunctional; it is ill-suited to the global problems that lie ahead and the West should shift to a ‘cooperative global security paradigm’. The reflexive aspects of international relations are highlighted and the utility of attitudinal paradigms is discussed, before turning to consider how a paradigm shift might be engineered. Drawing on recent examples, the prerequisites are shown to be: an impulse for change (common fears, a shared vision); the removal of obstacles to change (usually the most difficult); an engine of change; and a precipitating event or agency. The rest of the article discusses how these prerequisites could be met and shows how Britain could act as precipitator. A postscript considers the relevance of 11 September 2001 to these ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expounds on the debate concerning the United States' use of force. Reservation of use of force for defense of the country's interests; Promotion of values; Coercive diplomacy; Legitimacy of use of force for promoting democracy, halting genocide and restoration of order in conditions of anarchy; Historic roots of the argument over interests versus values.

The article examines the impact of civil-military relations on the national security decision-making process in the U.S. It has been argued that whether the U.S. military is too influential at higher levels of U.S. political-military decision-making. According to social researchers, the debate over U.S. civil-military relations took place on two levels, "power" and "ideology." The crux of the issue has been the compatibility of certain ideology with the ethics of armed forces. The approach taken in the post-Cold War academic literature, which primarily treats the issue of power under the rubric of "civilian control," has been discussed in detail.

This article is concerned with the ability of the U.S. policy organization to support national security objectives and how to improve that ability. Special attention is given to the development of this organization and to forms of policy making over the last 30 years. The author outlines five major ways in which national security policy making affects American security interests and evaluates their effectiveness. The article then proceeds with a survey of policy making since World War II, focusing on the U.S. National Security Council and its development. Organizational politics will always play a large role in national security decision-making, the author concludes. Further, the five noted criteria have been unequally served. Social scientists must determine not only whether organizational elaboration is an effective response to national security problems, but also whether these national security policy-making organizations themselves fulfill the purposes for which they were created.

The article describes the procedures and conceptual underpinnings of the three basic budgeting processes used in the U.S. Department of Defense since its unification in 1947 and evaluate theft strengths and weaknesses. The first period was that of U.S. President Harry S. Truman-Dwight D. Eisenhower years, and the system of fixed allocations to each service used pleased no one, its only advantage being the early imposition of a spending ceiling. The second, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Period, is best characterized by the complete control exercised by the Secretary of Defense and by the introduction of the planning programming and budgeting system (PPBS). The third system is that in use since 1968; its most important aspects are the decentralization of power and modified retention of PPBS. Despite the improvements in the system, there are still serious shortcomings in the budgeting process. The author concludes that while much progress has been made in the budgetary process, there is still considerable room for improvement. Two primary constraints, however, will remain its inherent political nature, and the near irrelevancy of planning.

This article is a discussion of how ideological paradigms shaped during the Cold War might be adapted in high schools to explore critically the roles played by the United States in world affairs during the last half century. The author focuses on two specific paradigms, represented respectively by the work of Paul Gagnon and Noam Chomsky. Whereas Gagnon asserts that examination of flaws in American foreign and military policies must be tempered by recognition of the legitimate national security concerns of policymakers and the difficult dilemmas they face, Chomsky argues that the rela objective of American policies has been geopolitical dominance and that the methods used to realize that objective have been ruthless. The author concludes with the argument that allowing students to stand outside of both paradigms and explore them in light of historical evidence will help them to develope a meaningful perspective on the roles played by the U.S. during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]