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The article analyzes the Amherst papers in relation to development of Parsons' theory. A careful analysis of the Amherst papers reveals that the basic ideas and philosophical principles that Parsons followed throughout his life were already in place, some more fully developed than others, yet forming an integrally coherent pattern to a surprising degree. The clear existence in Parsons's Amherst papers of a metatheoretical framework predating his later professional writing calls into question some still existing myths about radical breaks in the development of Parsons's theory. In one version of this mythology, Parsons began his theory as a voluntarist, then became a structural-functionalist, later moved on to become a systems-theorist and ended up as a social evolutionist. Despite such claims, Parsons always was a voluntarist, even during his so-called structural-functionalist middle period. The Amherst papers reveal an amazingly complex and logically coherent theoretical system-in the mind of a twenty-year-young man-and testify to an extraordinary scope of philosophical depth, and intellectual maturity.

The article discusses economic and social theory of Talcott Parsons. Parsons's persistent attention to economic theory has been relatively neglected by critics of Parsons who, in attacking the alleged functionalism of Parsonian sociology, concentrated on the issues of value consensus and normative integration, believing that Parsons had relatively little interest in the economic base of society. This neglect of Parsons's economic sociology was probably intensified by the Marxist undercurrent of much so-called conflict theory. In recent years there has fortunately been considerable interest shown in Parsons's analysis of economic theory and more specifically in his economic sociology. At Amherst, Parsons came under the influence of the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, who prompted his students to consider broad questions relating to alternatives to industrial capitalist society and who created an educational environment within which students were involved in a general analysis of the social sciences. It was this engagement with institutional economics that marked Parsons's departure from biology into the social sciences as an academic career. Parsons was introduced to a broad spectrum of social theory relating to cultural and biological dimensions of human existence as explanations of social differentiation.

In the course of research using Talcott Parsons's papers at the Harvard University Archives, Charles Camic read "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions" in manuscript form. Given sociologists' continuing interest in Parsons's ideas, Camic suggested that ASR make the paper widely available. We are pleased to do so in this issue. Camic's prologue places "Prolegomena" in the historical context of Parsons's work. Both James Coleman and Jeffrey Alexander have previously written about Parsons and were asked to comment on the implications of "Prolegomena" for our understanding of his theoretical contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place of Georg Simmel in the thought of Talcott Parsons has come under increasing scrutiny, a concern fuelled by a "Simmel Renaissance" on the one hand, and by a resurgence of interest in Parsons's early writings on the other. This paper raises some question, about Parsons's interpretation of Simmel in light of the discovery of a second manuscript on Simmel that Parsons wrote in 1939. This document (which was unknown until quite recently) may best be seen as an elaboration and reworking of the fragment on Simmel that had been left out of The Structure of Social Action (1937). After summarizing and comparing the two documents, the paper demonstrates that Parsons blurred them in his recollections. This means that interpretations of his engagement with Simmel--which have often drawn on Parsons's later testimony (19681979)--need to be reconsidered. The discovery of the second manuscript also underscores the importance of examining how Simmel fit into Parsons's evolving thought, rather than narrowly focusing on why he left Simmel out of the convergence in European social thought that he traced in Structure. Taking the former approach as a point of reference, the paper outlines some interpretive issues that arise from the discovery of Parsons's second Simmel document. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article relates the details of a meeting between sociologists Talcott Parsons and Ken'ichi Tominaga in 1978. The discussion between Talcott Parsons and Ken'ichi Tominaga took place at the Iwanami Shoten publishers office in Tokyo, Japan on the afternoon of December 12, 1978. Parsons arrived in Tokyo at mid-day, after having taken the train that had departed from Osaka around 9:00 a.m. that morning. In a letter written to Parsons, a few weeks before the Parsons' visit to Tokyo, Professor Tominaga described the Iwanami Shoten session as a colloquy with himself concerning the retrospection of Parsons on the formation of his own sociological thought. What Tominaga had in mind was something along the lines that Parsons had written for Daedalus. Iwanami Shoten had already shown some interest in Parson's work, having published in 1958 a Japanese translation of Economy and society, with an introduction by Tominaga. Parsons was paid an honorarium of 50,000 yen for the discussion, the same amount that he was given for his lecture later in the day. A few days prior to the discussion, Tominaga had supplied Parson with the following list of provisional questions: voluntarism vs. utilitarianism, motivation vs. value orientation, nature of system theory, relation between the Theory of Action and the Structural-functional theory, phenomenological approach.

The following section presents several papers focused on Talcott Parsons and Georg Simmel. The first is the fragment on Simmel of Ch. XVIII, Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Toennies. This chapter has been the subject of scholarly discussion since Parsons revealed in 1968 that he had drafted it for his early major work, The Structure of Social Action (1937), but had ultimately decided not to include it. The second, Simmel and the Methodological Problems of Formal Sociology, is a previously unpublished manuscript by Parsons--apparently written in 1939--that continues his engagement with Simmel's approach. The third is a commentary on the second Simmel manuscript that Edward Shils sent Parsons, in response to the latter's request. Finally, there is William Buxton's paper, From the Missing Fragment to the Lost Manuscript: Reflections on Parsons' Engagement with Simmel, which compares the two Parsons manuscripts and reflects on their significance. In addition, Simmel's second manuscript is also published for the first time along with ore famous missing fragment on Simmel, thereby facilitating scholarly analysis and comparison. Buxton's careful and searching analysis identifies as series of issues that merit further examination.

This short article pleads for research rather than rumor regarding Parsons' alleged role regarding the admittance to United States of an ex-Soviet citizen in 1948 or 1949. Some evidence on background issues that could be found among the Parsons papers at Harvard University Archives is being presented verbatim. I argue that the point is to refrain from fabrications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article comments on the paper Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, by Talcott Parsons. In his paper, Talcott Parsons addresses a problem on which little headway has been made since 1934 when he submitted the paper for publication to the Journal of Social Philosophy. This problem is the development of a theory of institutions, or a basis for such a theory. Parsons called his paper a prolegomena to a theory; but the prolegomena never led to the development of the theory itself either by Parsons or by others. The surfacing of Prolegomena now provides an opportunity to ask just how that theory might most profitably be developed. Prolegomena can be seen as an attempt by Parsons to establish a footing for the subjective approach to institutions based on a theory of rational action, opposing the objective approach. What Parsons calls the objective approach defines an institution as a set of social relations, a concrete social structure or organization. Parsons never explicitly defines institution in his subjective approach, but it seems clear that he means the set of regulatory norms that give rise to a concrete social structure or organization. Parson's subjective institution thus constitutes a way-station between the micro level of individual actors and the macro level of structures of relations or systems of action. In Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, a product of the early Parsons, there is a flawed but rich introduction to a theory of institutions.

In this article, the author presents his comments to the paper "On the Concept of Influence," by Talcott Pearson. The author confines his remarks to an expansion of what he takes to be the major thesis of this seminal paper. Communications in Western society is a transactional process, a major element in which is a widespread sense of trust. This notion, on the one hand, crystallizes a lot of what one has learned from communications research but have not fully articulated, and it adds, on the other hand, an ironic twist to the pervasive concern with "manipulation" and deception. For the author, the most novel insight offered by Parsons' paper is so simple that, once stated, it sounds trivial: Deception is based on trust. The Parsonian "channel variables" may seem like needless verbal distinctions. But if social scientists had firmly implanted in their skulls the distinction between affecting a man's intent and controlling his situation, much less nonsense would have been written about "brainwashing." The intention of this commentary is to reinforce the reader in the belief that it is worth the effort, and to encourage him to return to it for additional mulling.

The article discusses the creation of an intellectual biography of the U.S. sociologist Talcott Parsons. The researcher discusses Parsons' doctoral dissertation dealing with capitalism that was analyzed by sociologist Max Weber, and how Parsons' work delivered sociology from social Darwinism at the turn of the twentieth century. The author supports Parsons' work on the basis that he was a thinker and academician who did not use inconsistent analysis. The author utilized Parsons' archives at Harvard University, such as Parsons' paper "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change."

This section introduces the articles featured in the summer 2000 issue of The American Sociologist. As a new millennium unfolds, a global dialogue in sociology is underway that promises to enrich and renew culture-bound sociological imaginations. As Gary Marx notes, by 1911 Edward A. Ross, a towering figure in his day, had published a book for popular audiences about China as seen by a sociological traveler. Karl Marx brings this commentary up to date, and provides insight into a reality that Ross did not experience, namely, the teaching of sociology in Chinese universities. William Buxton has gathered together a fascinating set of materials about U.S. interest in Asia, with particular reference to Talcott Parsons, Harvard University and Japan. As he notes, these materials call into question simplistic views of Parsons as a Eurocentric thinker by documenting an ongoing encounter with Asia that extended from the 1940s through the late 1970s. One product of events at Harvard was a graduate-seminar paper written in 1941 by Marion Levy and rediscovered by him a half century later. In addition to its relevance for the emergent sociology of Asia, Levy's paper is a most interesting example of early functionalist analysis in U.S. sociology.

The introduction focuses on the work of sociologist and economic theorist, Talcott Parsons, who is featured in this issue of "The American Journal of Economics and Sociology," and the development of economic sociology. The taping of Parsons' March 1973 seminar at Brown University was directed by Alan Sondheim of the Rhode Island School of Design; a follow-up seminar was also videotaped. An edited transcript of the event is published in this issue. The archived copy is in the Parsons Papers collection which is housed at Harvard University.

The article consists of a commentary by the author to reciprocate to the writers, Jeffrey Alexander and Giuseppe Sciortino, who took his article published in the 1992 issue of the journal "American Sociological Review," as an occasion to mount a critique of tendencies that they discern throughout his recent writings on the early intellectual career of socio-scientist Talcott Parsons. The author has used this commentary only to address specific objections that they raise, but to step back from these criticisms to examine their connection to Alexander's work more generally. The author's claim is that as a tool for analyzing the development of ideas, the development, that is, of various intellectual products or kinds of social-scientific knowledge, Alexander's work is fundamentally antisociological. Since his own goal has been to work out a sociology of ideas, he necessarily clashes with Parson, in more serious and consequential ways than identified by Alexander and Sciortino.

This article focuses on Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, an essay by Talcott Parsons first published in the American Sociological Review. Parsons's Prolegomena is an object lesson for those who would read past theoretical work in terms of present-day conceptual categories. Written more than a half century ago, before it became standard sociological practice to differentiate the micro from the macro, a voluntaristic approach from a functionalist approach, a focus on action from an emphasis on social system and social structure, the paper escapes latter-day pigeonholes. Prolegomena shows that the early Parsons upheld a package of ideas that circumvents such polarities by combining what he terms a voluntaristic conception of human action in which the factors of will and effort are central, with a functionalist analysis that views economic, political, educational, and other social institutions as constituting a system that regulates action in relative conformity with the ultimate common values. The goal of the essay is to arrive at social institutions and certain aspects of social structure by beginning with human action, understood subjectively in terms of the means-end schema, and proceeding from there to action systems composed of long and complex [means-end] chains--chains analytically divisible into the conditional factors of heredity and environment, an intermediate sector made up of technological, economic, and political elements, and the sector of ultimate values.

In this paper, the authors discuss the history of correspondence with the well-known sociologist, Talcott Parsons, in 1977 and again, just before his death in May 1979. A prolegomenon introduces Parsons, contextualizes the correspondence, and explains how the authors came to collaborate on this project, which seeks to preserve the history of this correspondence with a leading school of social work. The discussion begins with a brief introduction to Parsons, followed by each of the other's reflections on the project. There follows a section on Parsons himself and a note on the collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social network analysis has been one of the most influential scientific revolutions of the past century. Its success has been due, in part, to its methodological sophistication and the emphasis it places on identifying and clearly depicting features of social structure. As such, social network analysis is often viewed in stark contrast to the structuralist paradigm that dominated the social sciences prior to its rise – structural-functionalism – in the mid-20th century. In this paper, we highlight important connections that exist between the key assumptions of social network analysis and the key tenets of some of the most influential structural-functional theories – especially those of Robert K. Merton and Talcott Parsons and their collaborators and followers. We reveal a substantial affinity between some of their most influential ideas and contemporary analysis of social network dynamics, in particular, and several ways in which their work could inform promising advances in this line of research. Our ultimate goal is to highlight the prospect of using these theories to guide future analyses of the dynamics of large social systems and the sequences of real-time action that compose them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In several of his analyses, Talcott Parsons describes the establishment of modern societies as a differentiation process across spheres of mutual recognition. In this paper, I use Parsons' social theory of recognition to examine features of recent social conflicts. I begin with Parsons' description of the struggles for recognition that took place during his lifetime in the highly industrialized societies of the west (1). I then use Parsons' view of normatively ordered recognition conflicts to point out societal trends that led, in the final third of the twentieth century, to a gradual undermining of the pacification structures postulated by Parsons (2). An initial outcome of this apparent disintegration I describe as a "barbarization" of social conflict. By this I mean a state of society where struggles for social recognition escalate and become anomic because resolution can no longer be found in the existing systemic spheres of negotiation (3). This paper shows the importance of the term recognition to social theory by following Parsons' theory in analyzing structural transformations that are currently emerging in response to social conflicts. Editors abstract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on scholarly exchanges between Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz, two sociologists. Parsons and Schutz met for the first time at Harvard in April, 1940, where Parsons, had invited him to read a paper entitled "Rationality and the Structure of the Social World" at a seminar on rationality. These two men, despite a great deal of similarity in their approaches to key problems in the social sciences, tended to talk past each other and never reached a basis for a meeting of minds. The importance of subjective categories in the analysis of social action is at the center of the exchanges between Parsons and Schutz. At the time these exchanges took place, Schutz was a refugee intellectual, as yet without any foothold in the American academic World; white Parsons, having already produced a considerable body of work and was solidly ensconced at Harvard University and had already helped train a number of brilliant younger sociologists.

This paper addresses Habermas's critique of the sociological theory of Talcott Parsons. It treats Habermas as exemplary for a form of critique that sought to utilise Marxian themes in order to overcome what have been widely seen as Parsons' problems in handling issues of conflict and social change. The paper argues that these problems derive from the characteristics of general theory conducted within an action frame of reference. The ambition for this type of theory is something that Habermas shares with Parsons and the paper demonstrates how the elaboration of his own theory comes to converge with that of Parsons and reproduces its problematic features. In conclusion, it is suggested that these problems can only be overcome by rejecting general theory as a mode of sociological theorising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does one identify a phenomenon as radically new or "unprecedented"? Do, in fact, "unprecedented" phenomena exist at all, as presumably some degree of continuity marks every state of affairs? If however, the idea of continuity is taken too far, are we not at risk of domesticating a radical tendency by conceptually transmuting it into something that is already known? These questions are of pressing importance since September 11th, as commentators warn that America and its allies face radically new enemies in the guise of "rogue" states, movements, and terrorist organizations. Yet sociology has had to grapple with similar issues before. In the 1930s and 1940s, the consolidation of fascist and Nazi movements also taxed sociological understanding and competence to the maximum. This article describes aspects of American sociology's response to that earlier challenge, contrasting it with the approach of Hannah Arendt, who condemned the discipline for systematically failing to appreciate the uniqueness, enormity, and gravity of the events that assailed the epoch. Arendt's critique of sociological methods is followed by a case study--Theodore Abel's investigation into National Socialism--that lends some credence to her misgivings. The work of other sociologists of this period--notably, Talcott Parsons's--is also briefly considered. The concluding section of the paper examines the theoretical problems involved in seeking to conceptualize an "unprecedented" event (movement, institution). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the book "The Structure of Social Action," by Talcott Parsons. The paper was prepared, at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in 1987, a session held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the book and it drew a large and interested audience. The Structure, would at that time have been taken as a founding event in a relatively consensual, proto-scientific discipline. For even as late as the mid 1960, Structure was still seen as parsons had originally presented it: as a framework of accumulated theoretical knowledge, on the basis of which predictions could be made and compared with what social scientists had subsequently discovered about empirical fact. But there are even more important reasons for the continuing contemporary relevance of Parsons' early work. It is not only that there continue to be important discussions about, and in relation to the book earlier concepts. It is also that people can now understand the influence of Structure in a more reflective and more accurate way.

Talcott Parsons's methodological views, particularly as formulated in The Structure of Social Action, have recently become the center of scholarly disagreement, with sociologists portraying his approach as positivist and postpositivist, empiricist and antiempiricist, relativist and nonrelativist. Departing from these interpretations, this paper argues that understanding Parsons's early method requires an understanding of the sociointellectual context of his early writings and the social position he occupied within that context. Parsons's methodological ideas are analyzed in relation to the neoclassicist-institutionalist controversy in early twentieth-century American economics and the methodological views of leading economists and philosophers of science at Harvard during the same period. The position that Parsons occupied at Harvard, moving from the high-status field of economics to the low-status field of sociology, led him to accept the basic methodological argument of neoclassical economists--and to shape from it an equivalent method for sociology. Such an historical analysis produces a systematic and coherent interpretation of Parsons's early methodological work, resolves the major contradictions in the existing scholarship, and reveals the limitations of the Parsonsian method, especially when con wasted to the Weberian approach which it purportedly transcended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines sociologist Talcott Parsons' political sociology by focusing exclusively on "voting." First, "voting" is one of Parsons' rare attempts to relate his theory of social systems to a set of empirical findings and interpretations dealing with contemporary political processes in the United States. Second, a careful perusal of the paper provides enough information from which to illustrate Parsons' general orientation to the study of politics. Third, the paper illuminates the value implications of Parsons' position on such important problems as political stability and change, power, conflict and consensus, leadership, citizenship, and democracy. Fourth, Parsons' later writings in this area tend to support and further elaborate the perspective developed in "voting." For these reasons, "voting" is representative of the bulk of Parsons' work in political sociology. The paper affords a useful inroad toward understanding Parsons' conception of politics in particular and, owing to his pervasive influence, pluralist theory in general.

This article focuses on an article by Hugh Dalziel Duncan, which discussed the uses and misuses of Max Weber's types of legitimationin American sociology. The author of this article said that he delivered a critical paper on the social theory of Talcott Parsons, the substance of which was a rather stern injunction for him to realize that social action was better conceived of as symbolic interaction, and that man's propensity for selection and creativeness made social process out of what he thought was social system. Since the true breadth of Duncan's theoretical perspective may unwittingly have been obscured by a rather heavily developed critique of Parsons, it might be pointed out that at a time when the social organizational and social psychological dimensions of our field are increasingly subject to disparate analysis, Duncan's function has been to mount a campaign for their reintegration through an expanded and improved synmbolic interaction approach.

Sociologist Louis Guttman has conceived of two methods for placing individuals into relative positions along an attitude continuum. One method, that which is conventionally used, makes use of the observed marginals of selected items from an attitude universe to obtain cutting points or scale ranks. The second method and the one with which this study deals, is that of utilizing bending points of the regressions of higher principal components of scalable attitudes to obtain the various cutting points. Of the two methods, the latter, utilizing measures of principal components, is thought to be superior because of its quality of "invariance," that is, the cutting points are not dependent on the sample of items used. This paper reports the findings of a study which proposed to re-examine Guttman's "closure" as an empirical third component of scalable attitudes, and to introduce another psychological variable, suggested by Talcott Parsons, the sensitivity of the human personality to the attitudes of others, and test its empirical fit to the mathematical model of the third component.

This article provides information about the invitation made by the "American Journal of Economics and Sociology," for articles from economists and sociologists on Talcott Parsons's contribution to a dialogue between economics and sociology, the economic ideas discussed in his works, and the potential of his theories for illuminating a multitude of issues located on the border between the two disciplines. More than 20 years after his death, Talcott Parsons is still regarded as the most influential American sociologist. So broad was the scope of his theoretical inquiry, it transcended sociology and crossed into fields of other social sciences, of which economics played a particularly important role in Parsons's intellectual career. It would not be an exaggeration to say that building a bridge between economics and sociology was one of the major goals of Parsons's intellectual life. Authors interested in participating should submit a 600-word abstract to the journal editor, Professor Laurence S. Moss. The deadline for the submission of the abstract is November 30, 2004. The proposed final version of the paper will be due on February 1, 2005.

The article presents an account of the research and theories of Harvard University's Department of Social Relations in the years surrounding 1950 under the leadership of Talcott Parsons. Details are given describing the development and major theories of the Carnegie Project undertaken by the department between 1949 and 1951, outlining a general theory of social activity which combined elements of sociology, psychology and anthropology. Details are given noting the establishment and the reception of the institutional attempt to form a unified behavioral science system.

The issue of social order, how and why it is that social orders exists at all, is historically central to sociology. In this paper the focus is on the comparison between Parsons' and Garfinkel's point of view. Parsons regards social order as the outcome of value consensus in society, which ensures that behavior conforms to generally accepted norms. Garfinkel starts out with the assumption that social order is illusory. They believe that social life merely appears to be orderly; in reality it is potentially chaotic. Social order is constructed in the minds of social actors as society confronts the individual as a series of sense impressions and experiences which she or he must somehow organize into a coherent pattern. The differences seem to be less looking at the concept of social order and trust together as a common theoretical outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on sociologist Robert K. Merton, and the effect that he had on American sociology in the 20th century. While some criticise Merton, along with Talcott Parsons, for having harmed American sociology by narrowing the focuses of sociological theory, while others commend Merton for giving the discipline the biggest intellectual push in 50 years. Merton's views on how norms and counter-norms govern social roles are discussed, and ambivalence in Merton's view of autonomy theory are discussed in detail.

Of the many interesting pieces of information that can be found in Parsons's March 10, 1973 seminar at Brown University, one concerns his relationship to Schumpeter, and it is to this that this brief note is devoted. Parsons and Schumpeter knew each other for some 20 years, and one of the many things that Schumpeter taught Parsons was that one can read the texts of economists for the sociological insights that they contain. In Parsons's formulation from the seminar: “economists must have some sociological ideas.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigates the factors which contributed to the decision of Harvard University sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) to shift away from economics. Concerns of social scientists; Several social scientists and their definition of civil society; Views of Parsons on social reform; Impact of the notion of national society and culture on Parsons.

In striking contrast to the conflict surrounding his earlier studies of Japanese society and culture, an amicable climate of mutual respect developed between Parsons and Japanese scholars in the 1970s. During this time, Parsons made two visits to Japan, where he was hailed as a great theorist whose views were taken most seriously by Japanese sociologists. The data indicate that, shortly before his sudden death in the spring of 1979, Parsons had begun to reformulate his ideas about modernization as a result of his increasing knowledge of Japanese society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there are many interpretations of the central themes of Talcott Parsons's sociology, it is evident that the idea of citizenship played a major role in shaping the core of his mature social thought. In addition to specific discussions of citizenship in relation to black inequality and participation, of the historical roots of universal participation in the societal community, and of the political openness and pluralism of American society, the problems of universalistic participation were in fact analytically crucial to Parsonian sociology. In other words, the theme of universalistic values was not merely an empirical issue, and not merely an aspect of political questions in his occasional essays and papers, but it coloured the basic components of Parsons's work as a theorist. For example, the notion of universalism defined one possible mode of orientation to action in the pattern variables, being contrasted with particularism. The pattern variables were not merely a passing phase in Parsons's long theoretical maturation; they were fundamental to what he understood by 'modernity'. They were as a result constitutive of Parsons's understanding of social change theory and modernization processes. Indeed, this theme of universalistic participation, its dependence on the legacy of the Protestant idea of universal salvation and its peculiar role in the formation of western societies, was a co-ordinating theme in Parsons's complex theoretical legacy. In addition to its importance in his theoretical development, it was the foundation of the pressuppositional level of his general value position, because Parsons regarded American society as the culmination of the process of modernity which, as we will see, was a process of universalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents reflections the intellectual exchange between sociologists Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz from 1940 to 1941. According to Schutz, the question Parsons never asks is what really does happen in the mind of the actor from his subjective point of view. His analysis only answer the question of how a theoretical scheme can be established which is capable of explaining what may happen or what may be considered as happening in the mind of the actor. Parsons has some methodological opinions, but that his concern is with the theories one produces by employing a method, rather than the method itself. Responding to the response of Parsons, Schutz affirms that he had already agreed with the greater part of Parson's basic thought, which he took to be Parson's generalized system of scientific theory. One might say then that Parsons wanted his general sociological theory something produced in science, discussed, while Schutz wanted to discuss how such a theory is produced, considering such to be a part of the general theory of sociology, that a general sociological theory is a part of a general theory of sociology. Methodology is where philosophers and human scientists can meet.

The article offers a critical summary of social scientist, Charles Camic's research program. It discusses the sociological importance of the topic of predecessor selection, and summarize Camic's historical reconstruction of scientist Talcott Parsons's early development. Camic's own account of how Parsons's selection of his predecessors took place is also analyzed. Camic has developed an ambitious research program around Parsons's life, work, and theoretical heritage. He has produced historical contextualizations of Parsons's theoretical and methodological proposals, editions of previously unpublished materials, systematic anthologies of little-known texts, and, most important, inquiries into the sources of Parsons's maturing theoretical ideas. This study constitutes of a very active reappraisal of Parsons's contribution to sociology and social thought. Camic is not sympathetic with Parsons's ideas, and makes clear, that he believes key dimensions of Parsons's work to be fundamentally wrong. Less inclined to enter openly into the discipline's contemporary politics, Camic is apparently impartial and scholarly.

This article presents response of the authors on reply of Talcott Parsons, on the comment on his book "The Structure of Social Action." The authors say that Parsons leaves the bulk of their analysis unchallenged. Parsons continues to misread Sociologist Max Weber's usage category. Weber's definition did not mention norms nor did Parsons cite passages in Weber including any such reference. Whereas in his book Parsons cited standards of good taste as an example of usage, he now adds a second example, namely, rules of etiquette. Instead of citing supposedly neglected changes in his viewpoint, he devotes much of his commentary to a reaffirmation of his early argument-most importantly, his very strong emphasis on these normative aspects of Weber. Parsons says that he had special reasons to emphasize the importance of the normative. The question is whether this emphasis can accurately be attributed to Weber. A more serious disagreement between Parsons and them concerns the interpretation of Weber's book.

This article focuses on religion as a functional subsystem of a functionally differentiated society in response to the view of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann on functionally differentiated system. As a subsystem in a functionally differentiated society, Luhmann sees religion primarily concerned with the maintenance of institutionalized cultural patterns. He omits tension management, or at least downplays its importance as a functional exigency. Luhmann argues that the fundamental problem of the paradoxical world, the improbability of the probable, can be solved by religion. Yet he recognizes and laments the fact that religion, as a result of structural differentiation, has become privatized in modern society. If we return to Talcott Parsons' analysis of the pattern maintenance/tension management subsystem we can recall that two of the social structures which meet this need of the social system, the need to transmit cultural values and to manage tensions are viewed as predominantly in the private sphere, namely religion and family. Luhmann makes the point that the evolutionary process of structural differentiation separated religion from politics and the economy. Yet he laments the privatization of religion when he says, semantic and structural differentiation of religion leave other areas of life without religious support.

According to Parsons' theory of evolution, socialist (communist) societies deviate from the progressive line of evolutionary development. But Parsons' empirical analyses indicate that socialist societies exhibit many of the features which, according to his theory, are supposed to characterize societies at the apex of evolutionary development. An endeavor to elicit from Parsons' works plausible solutions to this contradiction fails. Juxtaposing Parsons' treatment of the relationships between the developed and the underdeveloped societies to that of the imperialism-dependency theory it is found that the assumptions, propositions, and interpretations of the two are incompatible, or even diametrically opposed to each other. Moreover, Parsons completely disregards the rich theoretical and empirical research emanating from the school of imperialism-dependency. It is concluded that Parsons' theory of evolution can explain neither the socialist path of development, nor can it address the issue of change of underdeveloped countries within the context of the contemporary world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various critics, mainly at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, charged Parsons with the inability to understand social change and with normative determinism. This criticism has been aptly contradicted in the 1980s. However, such recent rehabilitation of Parsons's ability to analyse conflict in society, epitomized by his views on National Socialism, still misses out on some important issues. One is that, visible even in the guise of the abstract formulations of The Social System, he not only used National Socialism as a subject of historical reference, but also developed a sociology of National Socialism in the 1940s. In it, systems theory addressed the practical problems of the day and attempted to contribute to their solutions by means of social-science analysis. An article published in 1945 was an obvious occasion where he made visible how his sociology of Nazism could contribute to a policy programme for the post-war democratization of Germany. That this involved economic integration of Europe as a most desirable strategy he explained in a number of memoranda written in 1945 for a government agency. These have not been analysed hitherto. In this context of economic planning for peace he devised some cogent suggestions that are strikingly similar to the ideas which subsequently inspired the Marshall Plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theoretical schema of the sciences of action developed by the sociologist Talcott Parsons in "The Social System," is fundamentally inimical with the Christian tradition conceived almost as broadly as possible without reducing that tradition to a minority. In this article the ordering of the sciences according to the schema developed by Parsons has been outlined. In addition, the bases of the classification of types of belief systems have been examined, and the fundamental notions on the basis of which the schematism stands or falls will be suggested. Finally, these fundamental notions have been criticized from an alternative perspective related to a different conception of the social studies. The whole schematism that has been reviewed here is inextricably related to the classification of belief systems. Parsons develops a four-fold typology of belief systems and contrasts non-scientific types of belief systems with scientific belief systems. In conclusion, the author of this article turn to an external critique of Parsons. Formulations from an alternative perspective have been contrasted with those of Parsons.

This article focuses on the theory of sociology given by sociologist Talcott Parsons. The fate of the functional requisites in Parsonian sociology can be regarded as happy or sad according to one's theoretical predilections. It has been shown that in many respects the development and changes that have taken place in and around the concept have reflected the development and changes in Parson's theory of society. The caveat on theory-building expressed in the book "The Structure of Social Action," has held good over the years as of March 1970. This is especially the case with respect to the universal imperatives. They are not subject to change for they are not empirical realities; they are, however, real in their consequences for social systems and for the structure of social organization in terms of all human societies. Parsons has made and elaborated the important distinction between social and personality systems in such a fashion that old notions of the individual versus the society have been seen to be inadequate. This is particularly relevant here as it paves the way to an understanding of individual and social requisites of human society, though Parsons himself has not taken full advantage of the possibilities in this context.

The goals of complex organizations, especially public ones, always seem to be defined in terms too simple or too vague to be useful in guiding organizational behavior. The reason is undoubtedly due to the fact that such organizations are expected to effect complicated changes in society. Talcott Parsons' form of functional analysis offers a means of identifying the societal and institutional roots of organizational activities, thereby providing the basis for the construction of realistic organizational goals. This article demonstrates how the rationale of Parsons' functional problems can be utilized to provide the connecting link between societal-institutional needs and organizational capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This articles presents the topics discussed in the June 1998 issue concerning sociology. All of the articles here are historical, but not merely so. All look beyond the bare chronicling of events to the larger and wider impact of those events on the sociological enterprise. Gary Jaworski examines receptions to Simmel's work at two universities in order to illumine the open-ended, constructed and contested nature of the sociological tradition. William Buxton presents one little known, and done previously unpublished, work by Parsons on Georg Simmel in an effort to expand dialogue on the significance of Simmel in Parson's thought. Bernard Barber takes up a similar theme by focusing on how Parsons' thinking about social systems gradually evolved. The editor's contribution, finally, points to the influence of developments in psychology on the famous experiment in Social Relations at Harvard. The emphasis in all articles is the unfolding of ideas and the consequence of interpretative decisions, including roads not taken. In view of Talcott Parson's worldwide reputation and influence, his lost manuscript on Simmel may attract considerable scholarly attention. Indeed, Professors Don Levine, Kiyomitsu Yui, Charles Camic and Hans Joas and others have been planning a series of papers on this manuscript that may appear at a special issue of Theory, Culture and Society or elsewhere.

A letter is presented from sociologist Talcott Parsons to John Tropman of the Institute of Gerontology regarding the instrumental activism.

The article presents a text of a memorandum sent by Talcott Parsons to Henry H. Fowler in 1944 regarding a study on the Japanese economy. The most significant suggestion that Parsons thinks he can make appropos of the plans for study of the control of the Japanese economy is that very special attention should be devoted to the prewar status of small and medium-sized business in Japan and of the prospects for stimulating its postwar development. His reason for special interest in this sector of the economy is not in its economic significance as such, but in its potential significance for the social structure and orientation of the country. It is a very striking feature of Japanese society that in modern times at least there has been no strong locally independent middle class which could form a stabilizing factor in the society. Japanese feudalism was highly centralized lacking a small and moderate-scale gentry with strong roots in the land of their local communities. The Samurai were directly dependent on the Daimyo and controlled from his court, and this circumstance largely explains the fact that it was possible to shift so abruptly from feudalism to a westernized capitalistic economy. There was no Japanese equivalent for the Chinese town-dwelling, land-owning gentry who were the real backbone of the traditional Chinese class structure.