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The article discusses polarization and middle class. It references the 1992 article "Polarization and the Decline of the Middle Class: Canada and the U.S.," by James Foster and Michael Wolfson in the same issue. The authors used Lorenz curve to determine pay inequality and Gini-like index to measure bipolarization. It is said that the authors' concept of polarization was divided between people with incomes below and above the median income.

Ideological divisions in the United States have become increasingly prominent in daily communication. Accordingly, there has been much research on political polarization, including many recent efforts that take a computational perspective. By detecting political biases in a text document, one can attempt to discern and describe its polarity. Intuitively, the named entities (i.e., the nouns and the phrases that act as nouns) and hashtags in text often carry information about political views. For example, people who use the term "pro-choice" are likely to be liberal and people who use the term "pro-life" are likely to be conservative. In this paper, we seek to reveal political polarities in social-media text data and to quantify these polarities by explicitly assigning a polarity score to entities and hashtags. Although this idea is straightforward, it is difficult to perform such inference in a trustworthy quantitative way. Key challenges include the small number of known labels, the continuous spectrum of political views, and the preservation of both a polarity score and a polarity-neutral semantic meaning in an embedding vector of words. To attempt to overcome these challenges, we propose the Polarity-aware Embedding Multi-task learning (PEM) model. This model consists of (1) a self-supervised context-preservation task, (2) an attention-based tweet-level polarity-inference task, and (3) an adversarial learning task that promotes independence between an embedding's polarity component and its semantic component. Our experimental results demonstrate that our PEM model can successfully learn polarity-aware embeddings that perform well at tweet-level and account-level classification tasks. We examine a variety of applications—including a study of spatial and temporal distributions of polarities and a comparison between tweets from Twitter and posts from Parler—and we thereby demonstrate the effectiveness of our PEM model. We also discuss important limitations of our work and encourage caution when applying the PEM model to real-world scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although political parties are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the two-party electoral system is wellestablished in American elections and gerrymandering naturally occurs to benefit the party that controls both a state's legislative chambers and the governor's office. Tracing the evolution of partisan gerrymandering and examining the gerrymandering practices, this research finds that redistricting manipulation enabled by two-party electoral system, is a tale as old as time and it has continued for over two hundred years, rising or falling depending on the intensity of partisan politics. In 21st century, political polarization and gerrymandering have been feeding off each other. When the redistricting process is manipulated by entrenched partisan gerrymanders, it has become counterproductive to fair representation, competitive election, and translating public will into policies. As long as the foxes are allowed to guard the hen houses, partisan politicians will continue to abuse "one person, one vote" principle and pick voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze trends in Americans' immigration attitudes and policy preferences nationally and across partisan and racial/ethnic groups. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats and Republicans shared similarly negative attitudes toward immigrants and high levels of support for restrictionist immigration policies. Beginning in the 2010s and continuing through the early 2020s, however, Democrats' aggregate immigration opinions liberalized considerably. We observed increasingly liberal immigration preferences among Democrats of all racial and ethnic backgrounds after 2016, but this trend was especially pronounced among white Democrats. Among Republicans, opinion on immigration remained mostly stable over this period, although in some cases it became more conservative (e.g. border security) and more liberal on others (e.g. amnesty). The marked liberalization in immigration opinion among Democrats has left partisans more divided on immigration than at any point since national surveys began consistently measuring immigration opinion in the late twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarization and participation are often connected in the political science literature, though sometimes the causality runs participation to polarization and sometimes the causality runs in the reverse direction. In some accounts there is an expectation that increasing participation and increasing polarization generate an ongoing spiral effect. In this paper we evaluate the over-time relationships between polarization and participation by assessing evidence in existing panel and aggregate data. We find that people with more extreme attitudes are more likely to participate in politics. However, only one particular form of participation—persuading others—appears to predict later levels of polarization. Therefore, only persuasion has the necessary correlation and temporal ordering for a feedback loop with more extreme ideology. The implication is that the discipline should pay more attention to interpersonal persuasion as a form of participation in American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different--motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation--authoritarianism--is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The form of political polarization where citizens develop strongly negative attitudes toward out-party members and policies has become increasingly prominent across many democracies. Economic hardship and social inequality, as well as intergroup and racial conflict, have been identified as important contributing factors to this phenomenon known as “affective polarization.” Research shows that partisan animosities are exacerbated when these interests and identities become aligned with existing party cleavages. In this paper, we use a model of cultural evolution to study how these forces combine to generate and maintain affective political polarization. We show that economic events can drive both affective polarization and the sorting of group identities along party lines, which, in turn, can magnify the effects of underlying inequality between those groups. But, on a more optimistic note, we show that sufficiently high levels of wealth redistribution through the provision of public goods can counteract this feedback and limit the rise of polarization. We test some of our key theoretical predictions using survey data on intergroup polarization, sorting of racial groups, and affective polarization in the United States over the past 50 y. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study learning via shared news. Each period agents receive the same quantity and quality of firsthand information and can share it with friends. Some friends (possibly few) share selectively, generating heterogeneous news diets across agents. Agents are aware of selective sharing and update beliefs by Bayes's rule. Contrary to standard learning results, we show that beliefs can diverge in this environment, leading to polarization. This requires that (i) agents hold misperceptions (even minor) about friends' sharing and (ii) information quality is sufficiently low. Polarization can worsen when agents' friend networks expand. When the quantity of firsthand information becomes large, agents can hold opposite extreme beliefs, resulting in severe polarization. We find that news aggregators can curb polarization caused by news sharing. Our results hold without media bias or fake news, so eliminating these is not sufficient to reduce polarization. When fake news is included, it can lead to polarization but only through misperceived selective sharing. We apply our theory to shed light on the polarization of public opinion about climate change in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last 50 years, political polarization in the US House of Representatives has intensified. One explanation for this trend emphasizes the importance of congressional redistricting. This paper analyzes the relationship between political polarization and redistricting in the context of two trade liberalization bills. The results of the paper indicate that redistricting has not contributed significantly to party polarization over trade policy although it has produced a partisan shift in favor of trade liberalization. Redistricting does not appear to impact political polarization largely because district-level characteristics currently are dominated by broader, national factors such as party affiliation. The results of the paper clearly demonstrate this point by showing that changes in party affiliation have a much greater impact on voting behavior than changes in district characteristics. The paper also finds, however, that institutional control of the redistricting process at the state level has influenced political polarization with respect to trade policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that our increasingly polarized politics has led to political stalemate and policy gridlock in Congress which, in turn, have contributed to a change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government; specifically, executive power has increased at the expense of a diminished legislature. The paper will trace the extent to which Congress has become increasingly polarized and how this increased polarization has reduced Congress's capability and productivity while simultaneously increasing policy gridlock resulting in the expansion of executive power (and judicial authority) relative to legislative authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mass public has become affectively polarized—ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party, with negative consequences for politics. Drawing on work in political and social psychology, this paper tests two mechanisms for reducing this discord, both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other settings: heightening partisan ambivalence, and using self-affirmation techniques. A population-based survey experiment shows that neither strategy reduces affective polarization in the aggregate. But this null finding masks an important heterogeneity: Heightening partisan ambivalence reduces affective polarization for ideological moderates, but increases such discord for those with more extreme ideological identities. Efforts to depolarize the electorate can make it more deeply divided, with important implications for our understanding of contemporary politics and the durability of affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effect of recent technical change on the labor market and explains the observed differences in wage inequality among advanced countries. In particular, we focus on the difference between the inequality in the U.S. and in continental Europe. Many studies have indicated a rise in wage inequality in the U.S. over the past three decades. On the other hand, there has been little change in wage inequality in continental Europe. By introducing human capital investment into the model by Acemoglu (Am Econ Rev 89:1259-1278, ), we show that ex ante homogeneous economies would have distinct ex post wage distribution. The strategic complementarity between human capital investment and firms' hiring strategies yields the possibility that multiple equilibria exist, which explains the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we show that differences in tax or education systems can explain the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beliefs and attitudes form the core of public opinion about climate change. Network analysis can reveal the structural configuration of these beliefs and attitudes. In this research, we utilize a belief system framework to identify key psychological elements, track change in the density of these belief systems over time and across political groups, and analyze the structural heterogeneity of belief systems within and between political groups in the United States. Drawing on fifteen waves of nationally representative survey data from 2010 to 2021 (N = 16,742), our findings indicate that worry about climate change is the most central psychological element. Interestingly, we find that among politically unaffiliated individuals, the connections between psychological elements have strengthened over time, implying an increase in the consistency of belief systems within this group. Despite the political polarization in beliefs about climate change between Republicans and Democrats, our findings reveal that the ways these two groups organize and structure climate change beliefs systems are not markedly different compared to those of other groups. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for climate change experts and communicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealth inequality has been sharply rising in the United States and across many other high-income countries. Due to a lack of data, we know little about how this trend has unfolded across locations within countries. Examining the subnational geography of wealth is crucial because, from one generation to the next, it shapes the distribution of opportunity, disadvantage, and power across individuals and communities. By employing machine-learning-based imputation to link national historical surveys conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve to population survey microdata, the data presented in this article addresses this gap. The Geographic Wealth Inequality Database ("GEOWEALTH-US") provides the first estimates of the level and distribution of wealth at various geographical scales within the United States from 1960 to 2020. The GEOWEALTH-US database enables new lines of investigation into the contribution of spatial wealth disparities to major societal challenges including wealth concentration, income inequality, social mobility, housing unaffordability, and political polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spatial distribution of income shapes the structure and organisation of cities and its understanding has broad societal implications. Despite an abundant literature, many issues remain unclear. In particular, all definitions of segregation are implicitely tied to a single indicator, usually rely on an ambiguous definition of income classes, without any consensus on how to define neighbourhoods and to deal with the polycentric organization of large cities. In this paper, we address all these questions within a unique conceptual framework. We avoid the challenge of providing a direct definition of segregation and instead start from a definition of what segregation is not. This naturally leads to the measure of representation that is able to identify locations where categories are over- or underrepresented. From there, we provide a new measure of exposure that discriminates between situations where categories co-locate or repel one another. We then use this feature to provide an unambiguous, parameter-free method to find meaningful breaks in the income distribution, thus defining classes. Applied to the 2014 American Community Survey, we find 3 emerging classes—low, middle and higher income—out of the original 16 income categories. The higher-income households are proportionally more present in larger cities, while lower-income households are not, invalidating the idea of an increased social polarisation. Finally, using the density—and not the distance to a center which is meaningless in polycentric cities—we find that the richer class is overrepresented in high density zones, especially for larger cities. This suggests that density is a relevant factor for understanding the income structure of cities and might explain some of the differences observed between US and European cities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarization in the United States and around the world is of growing concern. Polarization is about more than just differences in opinions in society. It occurs when groups increasingly diverge in either actual or perceived differences in opinion and can involve both disagreements about issues and negative views of other groups. Since most environmental problems are collective action problems, polarization may interfere with the kinds of deliberation and collaborations needed for effective environmental decision-making. In this review, we examine how polarization influences environmental decision-making and what strategies could be useful for preventing or reducing the negative consequences of polarization. Evidence about the extent of polarization among citizens suggests the current situation may be less severe than is sometimes assumed. The coevolution of individual views, network interactions, and social media that cause polarization is complex and subject to rapid change. However, there are interventions that seem to be effective at reducing polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider two classes of explanations for the rise in policy-related economic uncertainty in the United States since 1960. The first stresses growth in government spending, taxes, and regulation. A second stresses increased political polarization and its implications for the policymaking process and policy choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If nothing else, democratic politics requires compromise. Mass polarization, where citizens disagree strongly and those disagreements magnify over time, presents obvious threats to democratic well-being. The overwhelming presumption is that if polarization is occurring, a substantial portion of it is attributable to the fragmentation attendant an increasingly choice-laden media environment where individuals expose themselves only to opinion-reinforcing information. Under what conditions does mass opinion polarization occur? Through two over-time laboratory experiments involving information choice behavior, this paper considers, first, the effects of slant in one’s information environment on over-time opinion dynamics and, second, the moderating role of attitude importance on those effects. The experiments reveal that, despite similar information search behavior, those with strong attitudes are dogmatic, resisting even substantial contrary evidence; those with weak attitudes, by contrast, hear opposing arguments and develop moderate opinions regardless of the prevalence of those arguments in their environment. Evaluations of information, rather than information search behavior per se, explain why individuals with strong attitudes polarize and those with weak attitudes do not. Polarization therefore seems to require more than media fragmentation and, in fact, a more important factor may be the strength of citizens’ prior attitudes on particular issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The polarization of the political and social environment over the past four decades has provided citizens with clearer cues about how their core political predispositions (e.g., group interests, core values, and party identification) relate to their issue opinions. A robust and ongoing scholarly debate has involved the different ways in which the more polarized environment affects mass opinion. Using heteroskedastic regression, this paper examines the effect of the increasingly polarized environment on the variability of citizens' policy opinions. We find that citizens today base their policy preferences more closely upon their core political predispositions than in the past. In addition, the predicted error variances also allow us to directly compare two types of mass polarization-issue distance versus issue consistency-to determine the independent effects each has on changes in the distribution of mass opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several recent studies have suggested that the distribution of income (earnings, jobs) is becoming more polarized. Much of the evidence presented in support of this view consists of demonstrating that the population share in an arbitrarily chosen middle income class has fallen. However, such evidence can be criticized as being range-specific—depending on the particular cutoffs selected. In this paper we propose a range-free approach to measuring the middle class and polarization, based on partial orderings. The approach yields two polarization curves which, like the Lorenz curve in inequality analysis, signal unambiguous increases in polarization. It also leads to an intuitive new index of polarization that is shown to be closely related to the Gini coefficient. We apply the new methodology to income and earnings data from the U.S. and Canada, and find that polarization is on the rise in the U.S. but is stable or declining in Canada. A cross-country comparison reveals the U.S. to be unambiguously more polarized than Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States are engaging in brute force (anti) federalism, where both sides of the political spectrum push agendas that extend beyond the Founder's early ideal of balanced federalism, using popular support and special interest groups' interests as their springboard. These trial‐and‐error tactics increase vertical and interstate horizontal frictions, create political and economic challenges for businesses, and increase American polarization. However, they also allow states the opportunity to force an increasingly stalemated federal government into action. This article introduces the concept of brute force (anti) federalism by first examining the evolution of modern federalism. It then offers a sampling of state brute force efforts, analyzes the effect of popular momentum and special interest groups on state political activity, advances broad‐based perspectives surrounding brute force (anti) federalism, and poses additional questions to be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether rising polarization in Americans' partisan judgments has positive implications for political participation. Drawing on cross-sectional and panel survey data, we find evidence that polarized judgments are related to pre-election intent to vote, as well as to post-election self-reported voter turnout. Polarized evaluations also predict greater reporting of participation in campaign activities beyond voting. Polarization in candidate evaluations consistently has more of an impact than affective polarization. However, our results suggest that polarization in evaluations of both parties and candidates includes an expressive component that does not necessarily translate into political action. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the actual change in turnout can potentially be attributed to polarization in evaluations of Republican and Democratic presidential candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conformity and polarization are two reactions to pathogen threats like the Covid-19 pandemic. This article discusses the dilemma between protecting public health as well as preserving the democratic dialogue and constitutional rights. I compare two countries which reacted very differently to the pandemic. While Germany was marked by high social conformity levels, in the United States political polarization was predominant. The analysis focuses on the time between March and November 2020. I show, first, the differences and interactions between conformity and polarization. Second, societies seem to be more aware and concerned about polarization than about conformity. Third, I show that both reactions, high conformity and polarization levels are detrimental for the democratic dialogue and constitutional rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the increasing polarization and nationalization of state supreme court elections in the U.S. held from 2016 to 2021 affects the flow of information to the electorate. Topics include an analysis of the competitiveness of these elections, examples of the kinds of partisan frames and partisan-tinged information flowing to voters in various elections, and how the character of contemporary elections may affect judicial legitimacy.

Childfree adults do not want to have children, making them distinct from parents and other adults without children. However, they are difficult to study because they cannot be identified using conventional data on fertility. We use data from a representative sample in the United States to examine the prevalence, age of decision, and interpersonal warmth judgments by and about childfree adults. Our prevalence estimates suggest that childfree adults are quite common, comprising over one-fifth (21.64%) of the population. Our analysis of age-to-decision suggests that most childfree adults reported that they decided they did not want children early in life. Finally, our analysis of interpersonal warmth suggests asymmetric affective polarization among parents and childfree adults driven primarily by parent's ingroup favoritism. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of childfree adults and for future research on this historically overlooked segment of the population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of reelection. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain reelection, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will discuss Robert Altman's Nashville (1975) in the context of its relationship to bicentennial-era American socio-political culture, contemporary American filmmaking, and other films by Altman. In particular, I will argue that Nashville is typical in its problematic representation of "America," echoing similarly problematic representations of contemporary America found in a number of films of the period. American society in 1975 anticipated the upcoming bicentennial and presidential election in 1976, but a sense of positive American renewal was complicated by very recent memories of the withdrawal from Vietnam (a matter of weeks before Nashville's release), Watergate, and the pervasive ideological polarization of the late 1960s onward. Nashville is characterized by both the dystopic narrative structure and the fragmentary visual style common to Altman's films and numerous "New Hollywood" films of the 1960s and 1970s, and which was symptomatic of a period which for many American filmmakers underlined the inapposite nature of utopian fantasies and the desirability of rejecting the traditionally more ordered, invisible and "objective" style of filmmaking that defined much of the American cinematic past. Nashville's conscious representation of contemporary America - an America defined in terms of polarized communities, a bankrupt political culture, and the threat of random violence - ensures the film's resonance as a cultural document, and as such one that merits considered analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in U.S. politics. I assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising, and of costly valence campaigning in general, positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters. A decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates. If the voters are risk-averse, the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending. The degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has caused an unprecedented public health crisis worldwide. Its intense politicization constantly made headlines, especially regarding the use of face masks as a safety precaution. However, the extent to which public opinion is polarized on wearing masks has remained anecdotal and the verbal representation of this polarization has not been explored. This study examined the types, themes, temporal trends, and exchange patterns of hashtags about mask wearing posted from March 1 to August 1, 2020 by Twitter users based in the United States. On the one hand, we found a stark rhetorical polarization in terms of semantic antagonism between pro- and anti-mask hashtags, exponential frequency increases of both types of hashtags during the period under study, in parallel to growing COVID-19 case counts, state mask mandates, and media coverage. On the other hand, the results showed an asymmetric participatory polarization in terms of a predominance of pro-mask hashtags along with an "echo chamber" effect in the dominant pro-mask group, which ignored the subversive rhetoric of the anti-mask minority. Notwithstanding the limitations of the research, this study provides a nuanced account of the digital polarization of public opinion on mask wearing. It draws attention to political polarization both as a rhetorical phenomenon and as a participatory process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States currently ranks last among high-income countries for life expectancy. Since 2014, U.S. life expectancy has declined. By now, these alarming trends are well known to researchers, the public, and policymakers. Nevertheless, there is no consensus among researchers on the causes of the trends, and there has been no serious and effective bipartisan effort to solve the problem. The dominant narrative has implicated Americans' behaviors, such as smoking, illicit drug use, and suicide; yet, this narrative is misguided and counterproductive. It also exonerates the key structural drivers of behaviors and health, namely the U.S. policy context and the outsized influence of corporations and big donors on those policies. The U.S. policy context has changed dramatically since the 1970s, particularly at the state level. State policies have hyperpolarized along partisan lines. These changes have likely had a profound impact on nearly every aspect of Americans ' lives, cutting short many of them. Consequently, this Essay argues that state policies increasingly affect life and death in the United States. It raises concerns about how the polarization of state policies will further deteriorate the health of many Americans, It points to three significant forces behind the polarization and the growing importance of state policy contexts on Americans ' lives--(1) New Federalism; (2) the new type of state preemption laws; and (3) the emergence of organizations, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council, through which corporations and big donors influence policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the United States is not a consociational democracy, it is of considerable interest to consociational scholars. Not only is it in many respects a plural society, its political practice and thought include rudimentary elements of consociationalism's four defining characteristics. That these institutions and practices have not developed further is unsurprising, given the generally unfavorable conditions for racial or ideological consociationalism there. Furthermore, factors such as the U.S.'s competitive political culture and its history of racial inequality present special challenges for consociational theory and practice. Meanwhile, the possibilities for addressing current ideological polarization by consociational means are limited, while ideological cleavage as such presents its own challenges. Nevertheless, several areas for reform remain possible, while changing ethno‐demographic conditions could make U.S.‐American consociationalism more likely in the next several decades. Furthermore, these considerations open up several potentially fruitful lines for further research into consociational democracy and the conditions that foster it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for 'equality of opportunity' policies. We find strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility: their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions; and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of this is true for right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as a 'problem' and not as the 'solution.' (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24, J31, J62) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses freedom of expression legal protections in America in relation to a debate about how colleges and universities in the U.S. should handle potentially controversial and provocative guest speakers. The rights of identity-based groups are addressed, along with efforts to mitigate the harm that is associated with speakers' presentations on college campuses. Political polarization, U.S. antidiscrimination laws, and a college's educational mission are assessed.

Research on the distribution of federal expenditures has provided mixed evidence showing that states with more legislators who belong to the president's party and states with more legislators in the chamber majority tend to receive a larger allocation of federal funds. We add to this research by considering how political polarization and political alignment impact these presidential and congressional determinants of how the domestic US budget is distributed to the states. Our results show that states with a larger percentage of senators in the majority can secure a larger share of federal grant expenditures per capita when political polarization is relatively low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We measure the persuasive effects of slanted news and tastes for like-minded news, exploiting cable channel positions as exogenous shifters of cable news viewership. Channel positions do not correlate with demographics that predict viewership and voting, nor with local satellite viewership. We estimate that Fox News increases Republican vote shares by 0.3 points among viewers induced into watching 2.5 additional minutes per week by variation in position. We then estimate a model of voters who select into watching slanted news, and whose ideologies evolve as a result. We use the model to assess the growth over time of Fox News influence, to quantitatively assess media-driven polarization, and to simulate alternative ideological slanting of news channels. (JEL D72, L82) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic responsiveness concerns the degree to which government policies match public preferences. Responsiveness studies typically use national surveys to characterize public opinion, but whether poll questions overlap with the policy agenda is unknown. The first of two empirical analyses presented here, with hundreds of issues on the national agenda in the United States from 1947 to 2000, reveals that public opinion is mostly unrelated to policy outcomes. The picture appears to be even more ominous--that is, opinion and policy are negatively related--on highly salient issues that attract media attention. A second study revisiting published work confirms that responsiveness patterns look different depending upon whether studies of opinionpolicy connections (a) begin with survey data and then examine policy developments, or (b) begin with national legislative agenda issues and then examine survey data. Thus, conclusions about democratic responsiveness depend upon the issues that are examined, and often opinion surveys do not include questions about tangible public policy options. In that sense, future changes in democratic responsiveness might go undetected because scholars often lack data on what goes into the denominator of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on mass polarization is itself polarized. Some argue that the United States is in the midst of a culture war; others argue that the claims are exaggerated. As polarization is a multifaceted concept, both sides can be correct. I review four distinct manifestations of polarization that have appeared in the public opinion literature--ideological consistency, ideological divergence, perceived polarization, and affective polarization--and discuss ways in which each has been measured. Then, using longitudinal data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), I update past analyses in order to more clearly show the ways in which Americans have or have not polarized: Americans at the mass level have not diverged, nor have they become more consistent ideologically, but partisans have; perceptions of polarization have increased, but this change is driven by partisans, who increasingly dislike one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few topics in public opinion research have attracted as much attention in recent years as partisan polarization in the American mass public. Yet, there has been considerably less investigation into whether people perceive the electorate to be polarized and the patterns of these perceptions. Building on work in social psychology, we argue that Americans perceive more polarization with respect to policy issues than actually exists, a phenomenon known as false polarization. Data from a nationally representative probability sample and a novel estimation strategy to make inferences about false polarization show that people significantly misperceive the public to be more divided along partisan lines than it is in reality. Also, people's misperceptions of opposing partisans are larger than those about their own party. We discuss the implications of these empirical patterns for American electoral politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although anecdotal stories of political anger and enthusiasm appear to be provoked largely by issues such as gay marriage or healthcare reform, social sorting is capable of playing a powerful role in driving anger and enthusiasm, undercutting the perception that only practical disagreements are driving higher levels of political rancor. Because a highly aligned set of social identities increases an individual's perceived differences between groups, the emotions that result from group conflict are likely to be heightened among well-sorted partisans. An experimental design in a national online survey manipulates political threats and reassurances, including a threat to a party and a threat to distinct policy goals. Issue positions are found to drive anger and enthusiasm in the presence of issue-based messages, but not all party-based messages. Partisan identity drives anger and enthusiasm in the presence of party-based threats and reassurances, but not all issue-based messages. Social sorting, however, drives anger and enthusiasm in response to all threats and reassurances, suggesting that well-sorted partisans are more reliably emotionally reactive to political messages. Finally, these results are driven not by the most-sorted partisans, but by the emotional dampening effect that occurs among those with the most cross-cutting identities. As social sorting increases in the American electorate, the cooler heads inspired by cross-cutting identities are likely to be taking up a smaller portion of the electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uncovers strong evidence that polarization has developed in presidential candidate trait evaluations. Unlike for ideology or policy preferences, the distribution of trait evaluations has become increasingly bimodal and clustered toward the poles. This change stems in part from a more polarized choice set, but perceptions of candidate extremeness are asymmetric, with partisans perceiving the other party's candidate, but not their own, as extreme. In addition, the increased salience of racial and moral issues helps explain trait polarization. Racial attitudes among Republicans have become both more conservative over time and more potent in explaining trait evaluations; among Democrats, racial attitudes have neither changed over time nor become more potent. Moral values among Democrats have grown more liberal over time and more potent in explaining trait evaluations. Among Republicans, however, moral values have not become more conservative, but have become a more potent predictor of trait evaluations. We discuss the implications of the emergence of trait polarization for understanding problematic features of contemporary American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of political parties and elections around the globe have devoted extensive study toward understanding how party polarization affects the criteria voters use to determine their party preferences in elections. In American politics, previous empirical research suggests that congressional job performance ratings do not affect public attitudes toward parties and therefore have no significant ramifications for the electoral fortunes of parties. Building on the existing literature from American and comparative traditions, I demonstrate that congressional performance evaluations can be important for American parties and elections, but this depends on the extent of party polarization in Congress. First, when congressional parties are more distinct, congressional performance evaluations have a greater effect on the relative favorability of the majority party brand: when citizens like how Congress is performing under the leadership of the majority party, this boosts the favorability of that party overall. Second, because partisan polarization increases the effect of congressional performance evaluations on party brand favorability, partisan polarization also increases the role played by congressional performance evaluations in a variety of elections outside of Congress. These results inform our understanding of public opinion, parties, and elections, both in the U.S. and from a comparative perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the interplay between ethnic change and individual psychology in shaping mass opinion on immigration. Recent research suggests that personality traits related to uncertainty aversion structure left-right orientation in American politics, and we argue that this personality cleavage should shape citizens' reactions to ethnic change. Using national survey data and a survey experiment, our analysis reveals that ethnic change polarizes citizens by personality, as those averse to uncertainty feel heightened cultural threat from ethnic change, while those open to uncertainty feel less threatened. The association of traits related to uncertainty aversion with left-right orientation suggests that polarization over immigration is exacerbated by the interaction of citizen personality and ethnic context. While the opinion literature on immigration is replete with studies analyzing the separate effects of ethnic context and individual differences, this article contributes to the literature by analyzing the two in conjunction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political and cultural polarization in the United States is widely discussed, but does it relate to any economic disconnection among states? We estimate the 'border' effect between Red and Blue states using the gravity equation with a nonlinear generalized method of moments estimator to simultaneously overcome the problems associated with endogeneity, cross-state price differences, and zero-trade flow. The border effect is robustly confirmed for the 2000s, while not so robustly detected for the 1990s. Notably, in 2007, the border reduces trade between Red and Blue states to approximately 75% of the trade within each set of states. This estimated border effect is much smaller than the United States-Canada national border effect estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and by Feenstra (2002), yet is comparable to the border effect that Nitsch and Wolf (2009) find for the former West and East Germanies approximately 10 years after reunification. While the border effect in Germany after reunification is decreasing, the border effect between the Red and Blue states is emerging. We also find the border effect is more significant for consumption, rather than intermediate, goods. The border effect is an important indicator for a potential dismantling of the economic connectivity in the United States. ( JEL D72, F10, F15, R1) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When defined in terms of social identity and affect toward copartisans and opposing partisans, the polarization of the American electorate has dramatically increased. We document the scope and consequences of affective polarization of partisans using implicit, explicit, and behavioral indicators. Our evidence demonstrates that hostile feelings for the opposing party are ingrained or automatic in voters' minds, and that affective polarization based on party is just as strong as polarization based on race. We further show that party cues exert powerful effects on nonpolitical judgments and behaviors. Partisans discriminate against opposing partisans, doing so to a degree that exceeds discrimination based on race. We note that the willingness of partisans to display open animus for opposing partisans can be attributed to the absence of norms governing the expression of negative sentiment and that increased partisan affect provides an incentive for elites to engage in confrontation rather than cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research analyzes the effects of cross-national and temporal variation in income inequality on public opinion; however, research has failed to explore the impact of variation in inequality across citizens' local residential context. This article analyzes the impact of local inequality on citizens' belief in a core facet of the American ethos--meritocracy. We advance conditional effects hypotheses that collectively argue that the effect of residing in a high-inequality context will be moderated by individual income. Utilizing national survey data, we demonstrate that residing in more unequal counties heightens rejection of meritocracy among low-income residents and bolsters adherence among high-income residents. In relatively equal counties, we find no significant differences between high- and low-income citizens. We conclude by discussing the implications of class-based polarization found in response to local inequality with respect to current debates over the consequences of income inequality for American democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior work finds that voters punish candidates for sponsoring attack ads. What remains unknown is the extent to which a negative ad is more effective if it is sponsored by a party or an independent group instead. We conducted three experiments in which we randomly assigned participants to view a negative ad that was identical except for its sponsor. We find that candidates can benefit from having a party or group 'do their dirty work,' but particularly if a group does, and that the most likely explanation for why this is the case is that many voters simply do not connect candidates to the ads sponsored by parties and groups. We also find that in some circumstances, a group-sponsored attack ad produces less polarization than one sponsored by a party. We conclude by discussing the implications our research has for current debates about the proper role of independent groups in electoral politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical social movements can exacerbate tensions in local settings while drawing attention to how movement goals align with political party agendas. Short-term movement influence on voting outcomes can endure when orientations toward the movement disrupt social ties, embedding individuals within new discussion networks that reinforce new partisan loyalties. To demonstrate this dynamic, we employ longitudinal data to show that increases in Republican voting, across several different time intervals, were most pronounced in southern counties where the Ku Klux Klan had been active in the 1960s. In an individual-level analysis of voting intent, we show that decades after the Klan declined, racial attitudes map onto party voting among southern voters, but only in counties where the Klan had been active. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Individual-level studies of partisan and ideological change find that individuals generally adjust their ideological preferences to match their partisan affiliation. In examining this process among the state electorates, we find that contrary to these studies, states have adjusted their partisanship to match their ideology. In addition, we use a measure of state elite ideology to show that state parties have a role in the character of the partisan sort of the states. These results are consistent with political explanations of party strategy and rational mass responses for the character of macro-political change in the states over the last half century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]