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The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war's legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fifty-two years ago, in 1971, President Nixon declared the "War on Drugs", identifying drug abuse as a public enemy in the United States. Since then, US drug policy has been militarized and, more recently, privatized. Every year, the US government increasingly contracts private military and security companies to provide intelligence, logistical support and training to armed forces in drug-producing or drug-transit States. In Latin America, this militarization and privatization has increased the intensity of violence and has complexified domestic situations, to the extent that the existing international legal regimes now seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the War on Drugs. On the one hand, human rights law does not adequately address situations where the State faces organized crime groups that are able to control territory. On the other hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) was not created to address law enforcement situations, which the War on Drugs and the fight against organized crime ostensibly are. This article examines the situation in Latin America, looking at examples of different types of situations through the lens of intensity and organization of the group involved and, in some cases, the group's control over territory. It discusses the application of IHL and human rights law (focusing on the inter-American system of human rights) in these situations and their complementarity, and debates how these bodies of law are adapting or may need to be adapted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an obscure sector synonymous with mercenaryism, the private military and security industry has grown to become a significant complementing instrument in military operations. This rise has brought with it a considerable attention. Researchers have examined the role of private military and security companies in international relations as well as the history of these companies, and, above all, the legal implications of their use in the place of military organizations. As research progresses, a significant gap has become clear. Only a handful of studies have addressed the complex of issues associated with contractors' demographics and lived experience. This article sheds some light over this lacuna, examining contractors' demographics using descriptive statistics from an original data set of American and British contractors who died in Iraq between the years 2003 and 2016. The article augments our understanding of an important population of post-Fordist-contracted workforce, those peripheral workers supplementing military activity in high-risk occupations with uncertain long-term outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of its sensitivity, diplomatic protection has received very sporadic scholarly attention. This article provides a comparative analysis of US and UK diplomatic security policies, focusing on the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) for the protection of foreign service and development agencies’ personnel. The existing theoretical explanations of the privatization of security tasks cannot explain why countries displaying similar material incentives and similar political and market cultures have outsourced diplomatic protection to different degrees, nor can they account for variance in the use of PMSCs by different agencies within the same country. Our analysis highlights the importance of investigating organizations’ interests in providing a more accurate explanation of the varying propensity to outsource armed protection. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the outsourcing of diplomatic security was a resultant of foreign policy bureaucracies and military organizations’ preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the state of South Sudan's security services and the operations of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the country. Topics discussed include the tendency of PMSCs, like Blackwater, to commit human rights violations and the advantages of integrating PMSCs into the securty sector reform (SSR) process. Information is al presented on the threats to South Sudanese security and the state of SSR in the country.

The article presents a report on a conference on the history of humanitarianism, international cooperation, and humanitarian intervention, convened by the Centre for Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg, Germany, and the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (Institute of Cultural Studies, KWI) in Essen, Germany, from June 5-7, 2014, in Essen. Topics of discussion included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the post-World War I era, Arab Islamic charities in Africa, and private military and security companies.

Research in private military and security companies has matured over the last fifteen years. This essay reviews past research and identifies three areas needing further attention; progress in these areas is critical for guiding security and defense policies and establishing effective regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (Montreux Document) was adopted in 2008 by seventeen States to reaffirm and, as far as was necessary, clarify the existing obligations of States and other actors under international law, in particular under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). It also aimed at identifying good practices and regulatory options to assist States in promoting respect for IHL and IHRL by private military and security companies (PMSCs). Today, fifty-one States and three international organizations have endorsed the Montreux Document. It contains twenty-seven “Statements” – sections recalling the main international legal obligations of States in regard to the operations of PMSCs during armed conflicts. Each statement is the reaffirmation of a general rule of IHL, IHRL or State responsibility formulated in a way that clarifies its applicability to PMSC operations. This article aims to detail the basis of each legal obligation mentioned in the first part of the Montreux Document (Part I). The article follows the structure of Part I, in order to better facilitate its comprehension. The second part of the Montreux Document, relating to good practices, is not covered in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The scourge of Somali piracy has imperiled the free movement of commercial shipping vessels in the Gulf of Aden, a major conduit of global commerce. A "grand armada" of international naval forces sent to safeguard commercial vessels near Somalia has been unable to stem the growth of Somali pirate syndicates capable of brazen attacks and bolstered by the promise of multimillion dollar ransoms. This Comment explores the commercial shipping industry's increasing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) to secure their vessels, cargo, and crews from pirate attacks. The International Maritime Organization and other groups have vehemently opposed PMSC employment aboard commercial vessels, citing the inevitable escalation of violence and excessive use of force that are part of the PMSC modus operandi. This Comment highlights the factual underpinnings that animate these concerns and suggests that the PMSC misconduct in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide instructive, indeed critical, lessons regarding the responsible employment of PMSC forces to combat piracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should Congress limit private security contractors ("PSCs") in wartime by declaring that high-risk activities are "inherently governmental"? In govern-ment contracting law, private contractors are not permitted to conduct activities deemed inherently governmental. As a result, only governmental actors may per-form those functions. The role of PSCs in war zones raises a number of ques-tions as to where the line exists, in determining what is, or is not, within this classification. Traditionally, the government draws the line at combat and com-bat-related activities--only these functions are inherently governmental. This Article argues that the line should instead be drawn at "high-risk" activities, which would include a number of functions outside of combat. The author bases much of his argument on his personal experiences and observations as a mem-ber of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that attempts to regulate the private military and security industry have been stymied by a tendency to be constantly ‘regulating the last war’ or responding to the challenges of a previous manifestation of private force rather than dealing with the current challenges. It argues that states ought to more clearly consider the direction of the industry rather than regulate in response to crises, an approach that has left regulation unequipped to deal with two fields of PSC growth: the use of PSCs against piracy, and to deliver and support humanitarian aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion of the role of private military or security companies (PMSCs), adapted from the research project entitled "Supervision Without Vision," by Lucas Roorda. It explores the classification of the PMSC industry. It discusses how the risk society and risk aversion culture transform the security industry based on the state's point of view. It also tackles the national and international legal arrangements that govern the private security sector.

The article focuses on the active involvement of private security contractors (PSCs) in armed conflicts in South Africa. It recalls the growth of PSCs since the end of the Cold War due to the growth of the outsourcing of military and security functions in the sector. It also investigates the role of the PSCs in armed conflicts and examines the response of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) on the issue. However, it suggests the need for the government to properly categorized PSCs when they contact them to assist their armed forces and provide non-lethal services to prevent them from participating directly in hostilities and restrict their activities to defensive.

Expanding on the works of Beck and others on the growing business of risk, this article examines the role of the private security industry in the creation, management and perpetuation of the world risk society. It observes that the replacement of the concept of security with risk over the past decades has permitted private firms to identify a growing range of unknown and unknown-unknown dangers which cannot be eliminated, but require permanent risk management. Using the discourse of risk and its strategies of commercialised, individualised and reactive risk management, the private risk industry thus has contributed to the rise of a world risk society in which the demand for security can never be satisfied and guarantees continuous profits. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the need for increased accountability in relation to the actions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) with respect to human rights. It states that the use of PMSCs complicate any means of accountability for human rights violations. It highlights the reality of the use of PMSCs, and cites the history of international humanitarian and human rights law which is applicable on the use of PMSCs and mercenaries. It indicates that accountability can be attained by signing and ratifying the Convention Against Mercenaries by member States, and building and enforcing strong domestic regulation over PMSCs.

Though it lags behind the privatization of military services, the privatization of intelligence has expanded dramatically with the growth in intelligence activities following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The recent confirmation by the Director of the CIA that contractors have probably participated in waterboarding of detainees at CIA interrogation facilities has sparked a renewed debate over what activities it is appropriate to delegate to contractors, and what activities should remain 'inherently governmental'. The article surveys outsourcing in electronic surveillance, rendition, and interrogation, as well as the growing reliance on private actors for analysis. It then turns to three challenges to accountability: the necessary secrecy that limits oversight; the different incentives that exist for private rather than public employees; and the uncertainty as to what functions should be regarded as 'inherently governmental' and thus inappropriate for delegation to private actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main tools for 'socializing' private military contractors (PMCs) is litigation. The threat of litigation may encourage contractors to set up their own corporate social responsibility and accountability mechanisms with a view to preventing them being hauled before courts. The article identifies the jurisdictional opportunities and pitfalls of criminal (public law) and civil/tort (private law) litigation against PMCs in domestic courts. The focus lies on litigation for human rights abuses, with special emphasis on US proceedings, the US being the home and hiring state of the majority of PMCs active in overseas conflict zones. It is argued that, because the chances of success of tort litigation are, in fact, rather limited in the US, given the many procedural obstacles, the criminal law avenue may prove to be more promising, if at least prosecutors show more leadership in bringing cases. Also at a deeper accountability level, criminal litigation may be preferable on the ground that criminal punishment sends a stronger accountability and deterrence signal than a mere money judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States hire private military or security companies [PMSCs/contractors] in armed conflict and occupation to fulfil tasks formerly exclusively handled by soldiers, including combat, guarding and protection, and detention and interrogation. PMSC personnel, like soldiers, can and do violate or act incompatibly with International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Relying on the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, the article compares the responsibility of states for such conduct of their soldiers with that which states incur with respect to the conduct of contractors they hire. It reveals a regulatory gap which states seeking to reduce their exposure to international responsibility can exploit. Positive obligations of states under International Humanitarian Law narrow this gap to some degree. An analysis of the duty to prevent demonstrates that the potential of positive Human Rights Law obligations to bridge the gap— although important — remains limited by their due diligence nature, and problems of extraterritorial applicability. It is then argued that the conduct of certain contractors exercising coercive functions can be attributed to the hiring state as that of 'persons forming part of its armed forces' in the sense of the customary provision enshrined in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV of 1907 and Article 91 of Additional Protocol I. Where this is the case, the state will be responsible for their conduct as it would be for that of its soldiers, which fully eliminates the regulatory gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the United States and its potential application to private security contractors. It focuses on the ATCA as a civil remedy to the misconduct by private security contractors abroad and how the case law regarding the ACTA will influence the recent lawsuit brought in the case of Abtan v. Blackwater. It also discusses the trend toward using private military companies, highlighting one such company, Blackwater Worldwide. The author contends that the Abtan case represents just one instance in which a private security contractor could be held accountable for its actions.

The article looks at the allegation that private military firms in Iraq are hiring people from Latin America to become mercenaries. Erik Prince, chief executive officer (CEO) of private security company Blackwater Worldwide, has pointed out that the company's employees in Iraq who had killed 17 Iraqi civilians were not mercenaries. Peter Singer of Brookings Institution has claimed that there are citizens from 30 countries employed as security contractors in Iraq. It is said that Latin America is a fertile recruiting ground for military companies.

This article examines the regulatory framework of private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs) in South Africa. It is stated that the private security industry is one of the fastest-growing industries in South Africa, and that private security officers outnumber public police officers by a ratio of more than three to one. A concern related to the regulation of the private security industry is noted to be the poor training and lack of supervision of private security guards.

The article examines the privatization of state security functions within countries where conflicts are displacing large numbers of people. It is attested that, whereas these functions were once performed by national armies or police forces, they are increasingly being outsourced to private military and security companies (PMSC). The author urges that the activities of these private sector organisations create an arena of armed enforcement wherein there is neither accountability nor regulation. Within humanitarian operations, the use of these companies has allegedly blurred the distinction between non-profit organisations and for-profit organisations.

The article gives information on British private security company G4S with special attention paid to pie charts concerning company's sources of revenue and a world map showing the number of its employees. The author discusses the increasing tendency of governments to count on private companies for military tasks and core security. Attention is paid to the fact that though there are records for company's violations of human rights it managed to gain government's confidence.