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Frequently social theorists conflate power and influence, often subsuming influence under a broad conception of power. Two contemporary theories separate them. Elementary theory has investigated power, status characteristics and expectations states theory has investigated interpersonal influence, and neither theory has considered the phenomenon of the other. We use the two theories to explain how power produces influence and how Influence produces power. We develop a theory that shows how the emotional reactions of group members mediate the influence produced by power. We examine some new data and hypothesize that influence produces power. We trace the consequences when power and influence are opposed within a single relationship. Implications outside the limitations of the laboratory are discussed along with new hypotheses to be tested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a study on the issues concerning the scientific theories and approaches to exchange networks. As such, the two approaches are subject to three conventional modes of critique. These consist of identifying a logical contradiction or conceptual ambiguity. Also, the study determined a falsified predictions in preceding exchange network theories. As well, the research aims to provide an alternative theory with a greater analytic power, scope and descriptive accuracy. In relation to the objectives and based on previous experiments done by social theorists, central positions in exchange networks are not always powerful. Yet, high-power positions were predicted to influence and accumulate more resources. So, the researcher of this study predicts that relative power levels of positions exist in exchange networks. The proponents also sought to make the findings explicit, accurate and consistent with prior empirical findings. So, it includes four axioms used to generate theorems and hypotheses for any network within the theoretical framework applied in the study. In addition, it also predicts network breaks, power shifts and some major consequences of minor changes in previous related researches. As a whole, applying all three modes of critique, the research showed that preceding network exchange theory generated contradictions and its predictions are proven to be falsified.

Many theories address the problem of how a social structure affects the experiences and behaviors of its members This paper offers a network-exchange theory to solve this problem. Previous research has shown that the nature and outcomes of negotiations among individual or corporate actors can be inferred from their network positions. The impact of this research has been limited because its theory does not enable the researcher to locate power positions in the networks. We offer a theory that is both consistent with all previously reported experimental research and is generalized to conditions not considered by other formulations. In addition to supporting derived hypotheses pertaining to network-based power, our experiments demonstrate, among other things, that certain unstable networks break down to form stable substructures and that some networks contain overlapping but autonomous domains of power and exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a theory to explain how actors in social exchange networks reach agreements on division of resources. Social exchange theory grew. from the application of the economic theory of exchange to social relationships. Sociology focuses on a problematic area for economic theory, the exchange of valued objects in, relatively small groups, where actors seek to settle on one optimal outcome out of a range of possibilities. Central to theoretical development today is a class of networks in which subtle power differences occur. This phenomenon is known as weak power. In these weak power networks, some positions may have advantages over others in acquiring resources through exchange. However, unlike the advantages in strong power networks, advantages in weak power networks are not progressive. Over a series of exchanges, a strong power advantage eventually results in one, exchange partner receiving nearly all available resources. Weak power is limited in range and magnitude. This necessitates theoretical refinement because adequate assessment of power differences between positions in weak power structures requires more, precise predictions of exchange rates at equilibrium.