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ABSTRACT Capacity decisions involve trade-offs between the cost of capacity and the opportunity costs of lost sales. Accounting researchers posit that accounting performance provides sufficient information about these trade-offs and thus can be used to formulate simple rules to assist capacity decisions. Empirical research has not examined the role of accounting information in capacity investment decisions at the department level in a multiproduct firm in the presence of social costs. Empirical analyses using department-level data from California hospitals for the period 1998-2005 show that hospitals are more likely to make capacity investments in departments with high accounting performance. However, in the presence of demand variability, the association between accounting performance and capacity investment is attenuated because of the resulting increase in noise in accounting performance measures. Thus, the weight on accounting performance as a decision tool for capital investments reduces when there is demand variability. Another factor that reduces the weight on accounting performance is capacity utilization. Higher capacity utilization can lead to turning away or rerouting of patients to other hospitals and negatively impacts reputation and quality of care, which increases the hospital's social costs. Hence, hospitals do not require high accounting performance before investing in a department with high capacity utilization. This empirical evidence of the role of accounting performance in capacity investment decisions fills a gap in the capacity investment literature and furthers our understanding of the interactions between accounting performance and the operational determinants of firms' capacity investment behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates how board size and occupational background of directors differentially influence social performance in for-profit and non-profit organizations. Using data from California hospitals, we develop a quantitative measure of social performance and provide the following empirical evidence. First, board size is negatively (positively) associated with social performance in for-profit (non-profit) hospitals. Second, the presence of government officials on the board is negatively (positively) related to social performance in for-profit (non-profit) hospitals. Third, representation of physicians on the board is positively associated with social performance in for-profit hospitals, whereas their presence is not significantly related to social performance in non-profit hospitals. Our findings highlight the different effects of governance mechanisms on social performance in for-profit and non-profit organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]