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This research paper investigates the evolving defense cooperation between India and Japan in the context of the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly considering China's rise. The existing literature recognizes China's increasing influence as a significant factor in India-Japanese security cooperation, but tends to overlook the dynamics behind India's shifting stance. The study reveals that India initially hesitated to actively engage in anti-China security cooperation with Japan until the mid-2010s, but later adopted a more proactive partnership. An analysis of policy documents, political speeches, and government records attributes India's initial reluctance to its commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy, its desire to balance relations with both China and Japan, and its domestic political priorities favoring economic development over military expansion or strategic alliances. However, growing concerns over China's assertiveness, military modernization, a change in political leadership, and the Quad's development as a regional security platform have prompted India's attitude shift. The research's recommendations not only offer a roadmap for India, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific countries with deep economic ties to China, but also help combat China's military threats to contribute to regional stability and security, address common challenges, and foster a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Opuntia Brava is the property of Universidad de Ciencias Pedagogicas de Las Tunas, Centro de Documentacion e Informacion Pedagogica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contrary to the pre-existing mapping and top-down instantiation from thought to language, Discourse Dynamics Framework for Metaphor(DDFM)argues that metaphor works mainly inductively upwards from the linguistic metaphor data, offering a tool for understanding people, revealing something of speaker's ideas, affective aspects and values. This study is designed to apply DDFM to a political speech about fighting COVID-19 made by Xi Jinping, the president of the People's Republic of China. Assisted by computer software, such as tables of Microsoft Office, to sort metaphors of each segment of this speech, this article investigates metaphors in the speech by progressive process of metaphor analysis of DDFM. It is found that: (1)The most frequently occurring metaphors are related to bodily action and body experience, which implies actions Chinese government will take.(2)The dynamically emergent systematic metaphors evolve as the discourse proceeds, conveying the political ideas and attitudes of Chinese government in fighting COVID-19.(3) Most of metaphors are conventionalized, which indicates the framing role of conventional metaphors in discourse. Thus, DDFM offers a new approach regarding metaphors in political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Chinese Dream" has become a dominant discourse held by the current Chinese political leadership. By drawing on the methodological synergy of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Corpus Linguistic methods and Framing analysis, this study addresses "Chinese Dream" discourse in its sociohistorical context by examining its discursive construction in speeches and in media representations in three English-language newspapers: China Daily, South China Morning Post and The New York Times. The analysis identifies that (1) the sociohistorical context of contemporary China is absorbed into "Chinese Dream" and thus provides a common ground for its discursive formation; (2) the "Chinese Dream" discourse fundamentally promotes Chinese nationalism, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) consolidation of legitimacy, and President Xi Jinping's authority; (3) transiting from original political speeches to global media representation, the three media adopt different news frames to shape "Chinese Dream", namely: China Daily's China-centric frame, South China Morning Post's multiculturalist-oriented frame and The New York Times' American-centric "othering" frame. These news frames (and related narratives) form the ground for variation of sociopolitical-ideological perspectives. It is hoped that the critical analysis of "Chinese Dream" can contribute to critically understanding contemporary Chinese political discourse in presidential speeches and media reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Miscelánea: A Journal of English & American Studies is the property of Miscelanea: A Journal of English & American Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Critical discourse analysis became influential and prominent over throughout recent years. The aim of critical discourse analysis is to observe the relation between language, ideology, and power. The study aims to investigate the representation of China in Donald Trump's political speeches. This study is based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, and van Dijk's concept of the ideological square. Halliday's model is utilized to analyze the lexico-grammatical structures that Trump uses to represent China throughout COVID-19's speeches from the 26th of February until the 22nd of September. On the other hand, van Dijk's ideological square approach is employed to examine the dichotomy of Us (represented by America) versus Them (represented by China). The study consisted of fourteen press conferences elected from the period 26- February-2020, to 22-September-2020 which is restricted to COVID-19's spreading throughout America. The study's findings revealed that material processes are prominent throughout Trump's discourse. Moreover, the results showed that before the spreading of COVID-19 across America and Europe, Trump's political speeches reflected a positive stance toward China. However, after the spreading of COVID-19 across America and the rest of the world, Trump's speeches reflected more negative stances towards China, as he started to hold it responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research attempts to analyze two political discourses delivered respectively by American president Donald Trump and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in the 72nd session of UN assembly. With Fairclough's 3-Dimensional Discourse Model as the analytical framework, we make an investigation into the two political discourses so as to gain insights into the interplay of discourse, ideology and society, by examining linguistic characteristics of text, discursive and social practice dimensions. On the first dimension of text, we find that both leaders prefer Judgment resources to the other two resources within the Affect System in their remarks, by resorting to the new advancement in Systemic Functional Grammar--Martin's Attitude subsystem under his Appraisal framework, and closely examining the interpersonal metafunctions, coupled with statistical measures. Within the Judgment subsystem, there exist significant differences between the two speeches in terms of Tenacity+ resources. On the dimension of discursive practice, our research reveals that both leaders use a great number of intertextuality resources in the remarks. Besides, both leaders have a preference to the sub-category of "The Original Producer of Discourse being the Speaker's Compatriots" under the category of "Intertextuality". That is, Wang Yi has a preference for the lines of Chinese sages in the Antiquity, whereas Trump is fond of using intertextuality resources from a diversity of domains, such as laws and statues, legal texts and documents of governments. Lastly, we develop an understanding of roles played by "American First" ideology and Chinese government's national interest in today's political arena through analyzing technologizing means of discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tries to challenge--more accurately, to supplement--the "politico-centered" view in understanding China's free speech. Unlike the conventional view that only treats Article 35 as China's free speech clause and mainly focuses on political speech, this article argues that China's "free speech clause" includes not one, but three articles: 35, 41 and 47. While Articles 35 and 41 guarantee the right to political speech, Article 47 explicitly safeguards citizens' right to cultural construction. The underpinning of this new interpretation is the dual constitutional ideal embedded in the Chinese Constitution: the Chinese people should be masters in both political and cultural areas. All speech, both political and cultural, that could further this dual ideal should be protected. Also, by tracing the development and changes of above three clauses in China's three earlier Constitutions (the 1954 Constitution, the 1975 Constitution, and the 1978 Constitution) as well as the newly discovered 1953 Draft, this article shows that this unique understanding of free speech can be found throughout the evolvement of the Chinese Constitution; it also explains how China's "free speech clause" has been shaped over time and why it has taken its present form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this 2007 statement, the Chinese representative puts forward the views of the Chinese delegation on the International Law Commission's "Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this 2007 statement, the Chinese representative puts forward the views of the Chinese delegation oil the International Law Commission's work relating to the "Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities and Allocation of Loss in the Case of Such Harm". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]