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Numerous factors are undermining strategic stability in the contemporary world, making the prospects of nuclear war more dangerous. This article reviews the concept of strategic stability and provides an overview of the nuclear forces of the United States, Russia, and China to offer some understanding of the nuclear hardware that shapes strategic stability. It next explores new challenges to strategic stability. These include uncertainty about the reasoning behind China's nuclear buildup and the strategic challenge this buildup presents to the United States, the shift to a tripolar nuclear "balance" as China's nuclear forces continue to grow, Russian threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, enhanced Russian-Chinese ties overall and specifically in the nuclear arena, and challenges posed by smaller nuclear powers. The article concludes by discussing important implications of changes in the strategic environment and hence strategic stability. These include pressures on the United States to upgrade its nuclear posture, greater challenges for the US in convincingly providing extended deterrence to its allies, and the need to shift focus in arms control from limiting the number of weapons to more modest but achievable goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book analyzes cyberspace issues and its global infrastructures, which are essential for the global political system, civiliarchy, political economy and effective administration of political processes. In the modern context, cyberspace is becoming an intelligence and military operational domain for various actors. According to the author, this is evident in the establishment of military cyber departments and the integration of cyberspace into the security and defense strategies of small and large states. Current military technologies as well as established instruments of transparency, de-escalation and arms control measures do not work for cyberspace due to its specific technical characteristics. In this context, it is important for international organizations to achieve de-escalation of state-led conflicts in cyberspace, but in reality it is simply impossible to develop arms control over cyber weapons. In this context, an effective system of classification of cyber weapons, an approach to mutual reduction of stocks of vulnerability and non-interference in cyber conflict are also important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions are adversarial conventional arms control agreements (CAC) in Europe successful or unsuccessful? This study aims to identify the conjunctural causes of conventional arms control success in Europe from the end of World War One to the present based on a dataset of 22 cases. It applies a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to assess arms control success and failure resulting from four conditions: great power rivalry, national limitations, demilitarisation and delegation. Few studies have attempted to determine if CAC agreements in Europe have been successful and determine possible explanations for their outcome. This study's results suggest that national limitations between great power rivals and the absence of delegation with great power rivalry are more likely to result in agreement failure. Delegation may be important for agreement success when great powers or buffer zones are involved. These findings offer insights for future CAC agreements in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of the rapid degradation and destruction of the international security architecture dating back to the Cold War, the problems of arms control in general and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular assume new significance. There is an increasing need to search for new multilateral forms of interstate cooperation in this area, which would make it possible to adapt the established models of arms control to the realities of the emerging polycentric world order. In this regard, the history of relations between the members of the military-political blocs during the Cold War could offer some valuable lessons. This article examines three cases related to the deliberations between NATO allies on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the preparation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Central Europe. The study shows that though the United States had the final say in developing solutions to arms control problems in all three cases, the positions of its NATO allies significantly affected both the course of the negotiation and the content of the agreements. The author concludes that one of the main lessons to be learnt from the discussions of 1963–1975 is what ignorance of the lessons from the past can lead to. Disregard for the experience of the interwar negotiations did not allow then to unleash the full potential of a multilateral inter-bloc dialogue on arms control. Now this lesson is becoming more relevant than ever before.

The prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in South Africa is governed through the implementation of an integrated and robust non-proliferation and arms control policy, legislative and regulatory framework, which has been revised and improved over time to address global developments; scientific and technological developments; and advancement of the threat landscape in terms of illicit trafficking of restricted goods and technologies as well as terrorism. Nonetheless, deficiencies in the regulatory framework and legislation became apparent over the years, especially after the infiltration of the South African industry by the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Although some of these deficiencies have been addressed, others are more challenging and require further work to be concluded in order to improve regulatory processes and strengthen the non-proliferation system, and to ensure that the proliferation strategies of non-state actors can be combatted. It is also aimed at South Africa maintaining its image as a reliable and responsible supplier, recipient and end user of strategic goods and technologies, while contributing meaningfully to global efforts of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs as a responsible member of the international community, as an advocate for global disarmament, and as a leader in efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the legal modifications made to Law No. 17,798 on arms control in Chile. The reforms introduced by Laws No. 21,310, 21,412, 21,556, and 21,560 are highlighted, which prioritize the treatment of pyrotechnic devices and firearms. These reforms establish criminal law as the main control measure in this matter. Additionally, it is mentioned that the possession of firearms can be considered as a parameter for the imposition of the precautionary measure of preventive detention in cases of danger to the security of society. [Extracted from the article]

Western democracies imposed international sanctions, issued internationally coordinated public attributions, and/or deployed defensive cyberattacks after being hit by major cyber operations. These responses and measures have a role in reducing malicious state-sponsored activity, but their success is only temporary (if any). Bilateral agreements, such as the one between the US and China, are limited in scope, playing only a brief role. Moreover, a cyber arms control treaty could contribute to a more peaceful cyberspace, but it would be remarkably difficult to monitor compliance. Thus, in this study I shall explore the development and role of the two main United Nations processes on the security and usage of cyber technologies by state actors. In parallel, the paper will discuss the major cyber operations that have occurred during these processes, highlighting that progress has been largely obtained after escalations in cyber operations. The United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts and the Open-Ended Working Groups have achieved some limited results, but conclusive success is far from being obtained. State-actors' behaviour in cyberspace is still an issue that needs to be regulated and normed at an international level, but it will be difficult to achieve a meaningful consensus among several loosely-formed groups of states with very different approaches to these issues. Thus, democratic states need to go beyond sanctions and use cyber diplomacy for the adoption of an international set of rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how European Union (EU) arms control measures are tailored to its constitutional foundations. EU Member States subject shipments of arms and components to controls so as to screen them for risks and potentially block them. In this context different Member States may make different geopolitical and humanitarian risk assessments. Existing EU measures have achieved only limited security screening harmonisation, and have left room for Member States to shirk their obligations under international humanitarian law. But in case of joint arms production, which the EU subsidises to become more autonomous, one Member State's arms controls may block another State's exports and thereby jeopardise cooperation. This article posits that any reform of EU arms controls should start by re-evaluating their present legal basis. A constitutional competence analysis shows that controls on arms shipments to non-EU states should be regulated in part through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and not just through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This would be consistent with other EU regulatory regimes for trade security. While a joint CFSP-CCP approach cannot fully prevent conflict, since this would require further foreign policy harmonisation, it could help foster security convergence and strengthen humanitarian due diligence mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book analyzes cyberspace issues and its global infrastructures, which are essential for the global political system, civiliarchy, political economy and effective administration of political processes. In the modern context, cyberspace is becoming an intelligence and military operational domain for various actors. According to the author, this is evident in the establishment of military cyber departments and the integration of cyberspace into the security and defense strategies of small and large states. Current military technologies as well as established instruments of transparency, de-escalation and arms control measures do not work for cyberspace due to its specific technical characteristics. In this context, it is important for international organizations to achieve de-escalation of state-led conflicts in cyberspace, but in reality it is simply impossible to develop arms control over cyber weapons. In this context, an effective system of classification of cyber weapons, an approach to mutual reduction of stocks of vulnerability and non-interference in cyber conflict are also important.

This work assesses the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on modern warfare. AI has led to a new arms race, which has impacted military dynamics among the superpowers in the 21st century. The study aims to evaluate the propagation of AI-powered weapons from the vantage point of ethics, international humanitarian law, and arms control. Secondary data is engaged for this study, and the exploratory and descriptive research design is adopted alongside a thematic analysis for data synthesis. The theories of technological determinism and consequentialism are adopted to observe the effects of technological advancement on weaponry alongside the ethical consequences of these weapons to safeguard human rights in combat scenarios. The study discovered that AI has led to a new arms race among the superpowers, and there is a need to advocate for arms control measures to promote international peace and security. The intersection between AI and arms proliferation, as well as how it has affected peace and security dynamics, was also detailed. The work concludes by reasserting the need for substantive international humanitarian laws and arms control efforts for lethal and autonomous weapons.

What is the effect of delegation to an agreement executor, such as an international organization (IO), on the success of conventional arms control (CAC) agreements in Europe? Arms control agreements have taken different approaches to delegation. The extent of state delegation to treaty executors has ranged from nonexistent to substantial. Previous studies have not looked at delegation as an independent variable of CAC agreement success. This article applies a sum score methodology assessing nine variables in a dataset of nineteen CAC agreements in Europe over the past 100 years. There is a low correlation between delegation and CAC agreement success, though the data suggests that third-party state and IO involvement are the most significant variables related to success. This article proposes that high delegation to an IO with third-party state participation will increase the likelihood that a future CAC agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia could succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine reflects the culmination of two international crises - one of the European security architecture and the other of strategic stability. This paper aims to examine how these crises influence the feasibility of future arms control in Europe. The authors claim that the current situation is an opportunity for a comprehensive arms control agreement for Europe. They begin by providing a theoretical framework of international crises and explain the current state of the arms control regime. Through a content and discourse analysis, they consider the positions of the main actors in relation to the key elements of future arms control and, based on this, by using a comparative method, consider the possible common ground that would serve as the bedrock for a new European comprehensive arms control regime. The article concludes that by going comprehensive, arms control can provide grounds for tradeoffs between the parties, settling most issues of concern in a multi-track process.

The international landscape, particularly in Northeast Asia, is portrayed as volatile due to the presence of nuclear-armed states, territorial disputes, and escalating geopolitical tensions. Considering this reality, this paper delves into the political ramifications of potential nuclear use in the Northeast Asia. It scrutinizes conceivable power shifts, the evolving role of anti-nuclear groups, and the broader impact on security policies. The exploration extends to scenarios post-nuclear use, encompassing positive, negative, and complex outcomes. The paper concludes by offering recommendations to policymakers, underscoring the imperative of substantive dialogues on arms control and conflict resolution to avert catastrophic nuclear events. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted challenges posed by nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia and offers valuable insights for crafting a more secure global environment. Recent developments point towards a disconcerting unraveling of arms control structures and a growing threat to the nonproliferation regime. The paper underscores the dynamic evolution of nuclear deterrence, highlighting the strategic use of emerging technologies by states to reshape the balance of vulnerabilities.

The United States and Soviet Union/Russian Federation signed several arms control treaties that mandated reductions in their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. These treaties outlined complex technical procedures that governed the process of eliminating weapons in excess of allowed numbers. The procedures often required the physical destruction of missiles and launchers, thus making it difficult for the parties to reverse the elimination of these weapons while the treaties remained in force. These complex procedures also helped the parties verify compliance, as both the elimination process and the reduction in numbers were required. However, most of the treaties allowed the parties to produce and deploy new weapons while the treaty was in force, as long as the numbers remained within the treaty limits. Moreover, the parties could add to their forces and reverse their reductions after the treaties lapsed. Thus, even if the treaty required irreversible procedures to implement the mandated reductions, the outcome would not necessarily remain irreversible forever. Both parties could restore capabilities if their security assessments changed. Thus, a political commitment to restrain nuclear programs may be more important in ensuring the long-term irreversibility of disarmament than the legal obligations and technical procedures codified in arms control agreements.

Growing political and military tensions between China and the United States make it necessary to think of novel arms control approaches on nuclear weapons and certain emerging technologies, designed to include China and other actors. This commentary makes the case for a Behavioral Arms Control (BAC) framework between China and the United States, stabilizing relations in East Asia. It builds on the recent behavioral turn in arms control and historical examples from the realm of confidence-building measures. It suggests informal initiatives to reduce military risks by focusing on the actions, rather than the capabilities, that can lead to escalation. In order to avoid nuclear use and war, BAC prescribes responsible behavior in multiple military domains, involving various nuclear and non-nuclear actors. After discussing the BAC concept and “responsibility” in particular, the commentary lays out three principles for engaging China and subsequently offers a number of possible arms control initiatives under a BAC framework.

This second special issue on nuclear irreversibility shifts the focus from the conceptual to the empirical. It aims to explore how dynamics linked to irreversibility have played out in practice by examining arms control and disarmament efforts in South Africa, Kazakhstan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and US-Soviet/Russian contexts. This article begins by outlining new research and developments related to irreversibility in arms control and disarmament. It then reflects on the approach taken in developing empirical insights into the practice of irreversibility. Finally, the article reflects on some of the themes that emerge from the contributions made to this special issue.

This paper summarises the joint collaborative project between the Nautilus Institute, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) and the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) examining cases of nuclear weapons use in a conflict in Northeast Asia by devising and analysing plausible pathways that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons, and quantitatively estimating the fatalities and health effects of nuclear weapons use. The paper also describes the final year analysis with contributing essays by international experts and recommendations for narrowing the space for nuclear use-case scenarios to arise in the first place through forms of mutual threat reduction (structural risk reduction) and managing within-scenario risks (situational risk reduction) more responsibly if they arise.

The formation of the political and legislative regime concerning use of outer space becomes every day more relevant. The research is intended to further expand current studies devoted to this issue by providing thorough information on the formation of the world’s first international legal framework for outer space territories use. The author examines in chronological order the regulatory and institutionalization process of the world’s first informal system that determined interaction among the participants of the space race. At the same time, this study provides a detailed analysis of the problems related to the formation of a comprehensive international regime, allowing author to make a conclusion about the ineffectiveness of the current system based on targeted international treaties and the necessity of modifying the formalisation approaches. In addition, article proposes potential scenarios for the formation of a political and legal outer space regime. The author assesses the possibility of establishing military hegemony alongside militarisation of outer space, analyses prospects for a codified peaceful co-development regime in the absence of workable space diplomacy initiatives, as well as considers the possibility of privatisation of space under free competition and the probability of preserving the current regime.

This article reflects on securitization efforts with respect to 'killer robots', known more impartially as autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Our contribution focuses, theoretically and empirically, on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a transnational advocacy network vigorously pushing for a pre-emptive ban on AWS. Marking exactly a decade of its activity, there is still no international regime formally banning, or even purposefully regulating, AWS. Our objective is to understand why the Campaign has not been able to advance its disarmament agenda thus far, despite all the resources, means and support at its disposal. For achieving this objective, we challenge the popular assumption that strong stigmatization is the universally best strategy towards humanitarian disarmament. We investigate the consequences of two specifics present in AWS, which set them apart from processes and successes of the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and laser-blinding weapons: the complexity of AWS as a distinct weapons category, and the subsequent circumvention of its complexity through the utilization of pop-culture, namely science fiction imagery. We particularly focus on two mechanisms through which such distortion has occurred: hybridization and grafting. These provide the conceptual basis and heuristic tools to unpack the paradox of over-securitization: success in broadening the stakeholder base in relation to the first mechanism and deepening the sense of insecurity in relation to the second one does not necessarily lead to the achievement of the desired prohibitory norm. In conclusion, we ask whether it is not the time for a more epistemically-oriented expert debate with a less ambitious, lowest common denominator strategy as the preferred model of arms control for such a complex weapons category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACTThe Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Biden Administration was published in October 2022. What is its focus and how should we evaluate it? How is it different from previous administrations? Does the NPR reflect Biden’s proactive statements before its publication? This article introduces and examines pressing issues of the international security environment and threat perceptions, nuclear deterrence, declaratory policy, arms control, and nuclear capability as reflected in the NPR. Analysis is presented from two aspects, military and diplomacy, as the NPR emphasizes to “put diplomacy first”. The military aspects of the NPR, to strengthen and modernize nuclear deterrence as the main role of nuclear weapons, is strongly emphasized. On the other hand, diplomatic aspects of the NPR are narrowly and superficially treated, and it does not include proactive proposals. Future NPRs should include military and diplomatic positions more equally.

30 years after the end of the Cold War, bipolar structure still dominates in the nuclear sphere, although certain nuclear powers are closing the gap with Russia and the United States in terms of strategic arsenals and the system of world politics in general is moving towards polycentrism. At the same time, as US-Russian relations continue to deteriorate against the backdrop of the ‘Ukrainian crisis’, the prospects for strategic dialogue after the expiration of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) are becoming increasingly vague. The absence of a new agreement in this field threatens to throw international relations back to the beginning of the Cold War, with all the ensuing consequences. To avoid such a scenario, not only the leaders of Russia and the United States should demonstrate political will, but other nuclear powers should also be included in the negotiation process, particularly China. In this regard, the history of the Cold War can provide valuable lessons. The author argues that bipolarity (even at its apex in the late 1950s — early 1970s) had never been an exclusive characteristic of international relations. On the basis of a number of historical cases, the paper demonstrates that during this period the superpowers constantly had to reckon with the ‘third power’ factor. The latter did not only influence the logic and dynamics of Soviet-American relations, but also to a large extent predetermined the direction and nature of their military development and planning. Indeed, it was the ‘third power’ factor, namely China, along with the achievement of strategic parity between the superpowers that became one of the main impulses to the establishment of the non-proliferation regime. In conclusion, the author focuses on yet another important lesson from the Cold War: the experience of arms control negotiations during that period suggests that the meetings of politicians should be preceded by joint brainstorming sessions with scholars from interested countries. In the current situation, representatives of the academic community should take the lead so that by the time the political climate eventually changes, there would already be coherent and viable options for nuclear arms control adapted to new realities.

In February 2021, the Biden administration announced that it would exercise Article XIV of the New START Treaty—extending the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia for five years. The announcement came against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving arms control landscape. The collapse of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open SkiesTreaty have led many to suggest that the existing arms control regime might be close to its end. Complicating matters arecgrowing calls for emerging military technologies like cyber andcartificial intelligence to be regulated by arms control agreements.These developments beg several questions for both policymakers and academics: Why does arms control matter today? What are the near-term challenges to the existing arms control regime? And what are the possible paths forward for arms control?

The image the United States has always projected of itself in the international community is that of a state that is nuclear responsible and bears the responsibility to keep nuclear proliferation in check. To this effect, it uses sanctions, international pressure, and harsh language with states it deems to be in violation of the obligations of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, however, there is doubt about the United States' own dedication to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This paper is an attempt to examine the role the US has played vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation. It deals with the question: what role US has played in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and what its probable effects are on the international nuclear non-proliferation landscape. It argues that the US has not only engaged in excessive nuclear proliferation since 1945 but has also damaged the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, thereby reduced restraints, and set dangerous precedence for other states. The paper recommends that US may lead the world towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by example rather than unfair coercion. Bibliography Entry Rashid, Asma and Aiman Saif Ullah. 2023. "Unveiling Dualities: US Rhetoric and Realty in Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation under Trump and Biden Administrations." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 60-70.

The position-force tracking issue of an object being moved by collaborative Multiple Flexible-Joint arms, facing dynamic uncertainties, model nonlinearities, and unknown perturbations is studied in this paper. Toward this end, an adaptive control scheme applying the function approximation technique is suggested, enabling the object to track the reference trajectory. This capability arises from the universal approximation property of the FAT-based approaches. Herein, the q-Bernstein-Schurer operators are exploited to disturbances/uncertain dynamic approximations. Since the parameters of the system are not exactly recognized, adaptive rules are suggested for tuning the coefficients of the operator. The Lyapunov stability analysis guarantees uniformly ultimately bounded stability of all the error signals. Two Flexible-Joint manipulators transporting a rigid object are employed to validate the theoretical achievements. The state-of-the-art Chebyshev Neural Network approximator is also used to compare the suggested methodology. The outcomes exhibit the usefulness of the presented approach, handling the system even in the incidence of uncertainties and disturbances needless to the system's state feedback for function approximation with a low computational burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of this paper is to examine the relationship between the emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) and the sub-regional arms control regime in the Western Balkans (WB), established by the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, signed on June 14, 1996, in Florence (the Agreement). The main research question is: Do the EDTs that the WB countries possess or are planning to acquire influence the existing arms control equation in the WB and, if yes, do we need a new arms control regime? Authors explore this question through the analysis of EDTs that have taken roots in the WB and are likely to grow significant in the future, and WB sub-regional arms control regime, taking EDTs as one of the variables that challenges the existing arms control regime in this region. They compare the current EDT capacities that Western Balkan states possess, as well as the potential of those EDTs to disrupt the balance of forces set by the Agreement. The authors conclude that, although we do not need a completely new arms control agreement in the WB, having in mind the flexibility of the existing one, a responsible approach would include an update of the current arms control regime, especially regarding the new confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), including increased transparency on the acquirement and the nature of potential use of EDTs.

The paper provides a comparative analysis study of the dynamics and mechanisms of the strategic stability transformation both during the Cold War and at present. Drawing on the analysis of the factors affecting strategic stability in different time periods, the author outlines the priorities of this transformation. Its basic principles are confined to the stability of nuclear deterrence in any realistic scenarios and do not provide for practical action. Hence, one should distinguish them from applied solutions for calculating military-strategic balances and elaboration of arms control agreements. The latter depend on the current strategic landscape subject to constant, sometimes drastic change, as both the Cold War history and the recent developments testify. The choice of particular type of representation of strategic stability is determined by the nature of the most dangerous ongoing trends, and relies on a set of three basic groups of factors (political-military, military-technical, and military-strategic) existing at a given time. This necessitates constant revaluation of these factors and development of new practical measures to build up nuclear deterrence.The paper assesses the current set of relevant factors affecting stability of nuclear deterrence, and then compares it with the commonly used model of strategic stability based on the logic of arms control negotiations of the late 1980s. The author highlights the limitations of the latter model applicability to the present strategic landscape, and outlines the key factors that erode the current understanding of strategic stability (as it was stipulated in the 1990 U.S.–Soviet Joint Statement). In particular the author emphasizes the increasing complexity of international landscape as compared to the Cold War period: new and unanticipated challenges have affected all three above-mentioned groups of factors. The paper ends up with the analysis of the possible developments in the field of arms control that could alleviate tensions and increase strategic stability.

ABSTRACTHow can the United States get past the Chinese “no” to engaging on nuclear arms control? What can and should the United States do in the immediate to short term to lay the groundwork for arms control negotiations with China to begin? This paper reviews the origins and evolution of US-China nuclear relations and the history of China’s perceptions of, and approach to, nuclear arms control, and the restraint regimes more generally. On that basis, it reflects on several first steps that the United States can and should take now to try and develop an arms control relationship with China. The paper argues that developing such a relationship will take time but that taking these, or some of these, steps now is important.

ABSTRACTMilitary applications of artificial intelligence (AI) are said to impact strategic stability, broadly defined as the absence of incentives for armed conflict between nuclear powers. While previous research explores the potential implications of AI for nuclear deterrence based on technical characteristics, little attention has been dedicated to understanding how policymakers of nuclear powers conceive of AI technologies and their impacts. This paper argues that the relationship between AI and strategic stability is not only given through the technical nature of AI, but also constructed by policymakers’ beliefs about these technologies and other states’ intentions to use them. Adopting a constructivist perspective, we investigate how decision-makers from the United States and Russia talk about military AI by analyzing US and Russian official discourses from 2014–2023 and 2017-2023, respectively. We conclude that both sides have constructed a threat out of their perceived competitors’ AI capabilities, reflecting their broader perspectives of strategic stability, as well as the social context characterized by distrust and feelings of competition. Their discourses fuel a cycle of misperceptions which could be addressed via confidence building measures. However, this competitive cycle is unlikely to improve due to ongoing tensions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

ABSTRACTBilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia is not a new concept, but it is one that is both evolving and contested. It faces two interrelated challenges that make its operationalization difficult today. First, as Michael Gerson has observed, it has “no single, universally accepted definition”, and there is little agreement on “which factors contribute to and detract from it”. Second, efforts to negotiate US-Russia bilateral arms control and risk reduction measures designed to advance strategic stability can become stymied as a result because negotiators lack a common goal. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents an inflection point for strategic stability on several levels. Against the backdrop of the impending expiration of New START and the arrival of what Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala call a third nuclear age, policymakers in Washington and Moscow should seek to reach a shared understanding of what strategic stability is and does as a means to its operationalization. Recognizing the challenges to doing so, particularly in the current environment, this article outlines two-phased approach to strategic stability dialogue that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and translated into policy through mechanisms like backcasting and threatcasting. Its objective is to aid both sides in disambiguating their conceptualization of strategic stability while prioritizing approaches that can strengthen its most desirable outcomes.

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The image the United States has always projected of itself in the international community is that of a state that is nuclear responsible and bears the responsibility to keep nuclear proliferation in check. To this effect, it uses sanctions, international pressure, and harsh language with states it deems to be in violation of the obligations of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, however, there is doubt about the United States' own dedication to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This paper is an attempt to examine the role the US has played vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation. It deals with the question: what role US has played in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and what its probable effects are on the international nuclear non-proliferation landscape. It argues that the US has not only engaged in excessive nuclear proliferation since 1945 but has also damaged the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, thereby reduced restraints, and set dangerous precedence for other states. The paper recommends that US may lead the world towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by example rather than unfair coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]