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Policy makers and regulators have devoted much effort to reforms aimed at improving financial stability in response to lessons from the 2007-09 crisis. At the same time, much effort has also been directed to promoting greater financial inclusion as an enabler of equal opportunity. To some extent, these endeavors have been exerted in silos, neglecting the possibility that financial inclusion and financial stability could be significantly intertwined, positively or negatively. If there are synergies or trade-offs between inclusion and stability, policy decisions must be informed, and the policy setting, design, and implementation adjusted accordingly. This paper (i) discusses the relationship between financial inclusion and stability, (ii) illustrates empirically interactions between the two financial sector outcomes, and (iii) outlines policy challenges stemming from these interactions.

The global financial crisis has given greater credence to the idea that active state involvement in the financial sector can be helpful for stability and development. There is now evidence that, for example, lending by state-owned banks has helped in mitigating the impact of the crisis on aggregate credit. But evidence also points to negative longer-term effects of direct interventions on resource allocation and quality of intermediation. This suggests a need to rebalance the state's roles from direct to less direct involvement, as the crisis subsides. The state does have very important roles, especially in providing well-defined regulations and enforcing them, ensuring healthy competition, and strengthening financial infrastructure. One of the crisis lessons is the importance of getting the basics right first: countries with complex but poorly enforced regulations suffered more during the global crisis. Evidence also suggests that instead of restricting competition, the state needs to encourage contestability through healthy entry of well-capitalized institutions and timely exit of insolvent ones. There is also new evidence that supports the state's key role in promoting transparency of information and reducing counterparty risk. The challenge of financial sector policies is to better align private incentives with public interest, without taxing or subsidizing private risk-taking.

A large body of evidence points to misaligned incentives as having a key role in the run-up to the global financial crisis. These include bank managers'incentives to boost short-term profits and create banks that are"too big to fail,"regulators'incentives to forebear and withhold information from other regulators in stressful times, and credit rating agencies'incentives to keep issuing high ratings for subprime assets. As part of the response to the crisis, policymakers and regulators also attempted to address some incentive issues, but various outside observers have criticized the response for being insufficient. This paper proposes a pragmatic approach to re-orienting financial regulation to have at its core the objective of addressing incentives on an ongoing basis. Specifically, the paper proposes"incentive audits"as a tool that could help in identifying incentive misalignments in the financial sector. The paper illustrates how such audits could be implemented in practice, and what the implications would be for the design of policies and frameworks to mitigate systemic risks.

This paper introduces the Global Financial Development Database, an extensive dataset of financial system characteristics for 205 economies from 1960 to 2010. The database includes measures of (a) size of financial institutions and markets (financial depth), (b) degree to which individuals can and do use financial services (access), (c) efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions (efficiency), and (d) stability of financial institutions and markets (stability). The authors document cross-country differences and time series trends.

This paper presents the latest update of the World Bank Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, and explores two questions. First, were there significant differences in regulation and supervision between crisis and non-crisis countries? Second, what aspects of regulation and supervision changed significantly during the crisis period? The paper finds significant differences between crisis and non-crisis countries in several aspects of regulation and supervision. In particular, crisis countries (a) had less stringent definitions of capital and lower actual capital ratios, (b) faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, (c) were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans and loan losses, and (d) had weaker incentives for the private sector to monitor banks'risks. Survey results also suggest that the overall regulatory response to the crisis has been slow, and there is room to improve regulation and supervision, as well as private incentives to monitor risk-taking. Specifically, comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, the paper finds relatively few changes: capital ratios increased (primarily among non-crisis countries), deposit insurance schemes became more generous, and some reforms were introduced in the area of bank governance and bank resolution.