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How does the Supreme Court choose among cases to grant cert? In the context of a model that considers a strategic Supreme Court, a continuum of rule-following lower courts, a set of cases available for revision, and a distribution of future lower court cases, we show that the Court grants cert to the case that will most significantly shape future lower court case outcomes in the direction that the Court prefers. That is, the Court grants cert to the case with maximum salience. If the Court is rather liberal (conservative) then the most salient case is the one that moves the discretionary range of the legal standard as far left (right) as possible. But if the Court is moderate, then the most salient case will be a function of the skewedness of the distribution of ideologies of the lower courts and the likelihood that future cases will fall within the part of the discretionary range that is adjusted if the case is granted cert. Variations take place when the ideology of the Court is moderately liberal, moderately conservative or fully moderate. Extensions of the model allow us to identify the sensitivity of the results to the number of petitions for revision; the variety of legal topics covered by the petitions; and anticipation of whether the Court will confirm or reverse.

This Article is the first to examine the behavior of judges and their law clerks (officially entitled référendaires) at the Court of Justice of the European Union. It identifies a number of serious issues affecting Court performance. First, the Article finds that the Court's high judicial salaries and lack of procedural safe-guards for EU judicial appointments attract political appointees. As a consequence, some judges who are selected are not compe-tent to perform their duties and are dominated by their référen-daires. Moreover, the high turnover rate of EU judges hampers their productivity and increases their dependence on the référen-daires. Using a sample of data hand-collected from LinkedIn, the Article demonstrates that référendaires are drawn from a rela-tively closed social network. There is no open platform for re-cruiting référendaires, and the requirement of French as the working language significantly limits the pool of eligible candi-dates. The inefficiency of the référendaire labor market results in less competition, leading many référendaires to stay longer at the Court. The revolving door between the Court and the European Commission raises serious conflict issues, as the Commission is able to exert influence on the Court from the inside and gain a comparative advantage in litigation. In addition, the Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial decision encourages free-riding, increases pressures for judges and référendaires to con-form, and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case. Last but not least, the division of labor between the General Court and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent incentives for judges working at different levels of the Court.

InShergill & Others v. Khaira & Others[2014] UKSC 33, the UK courts considered whether a Sikh holy saint had the power to dismiss trustees who questioned his “succession” to the religious institution of theNirmal Kutia Johal. The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal that religious questions were “nonjusticiable,” reinstated the judgment at first instance of the High Court to the contrary. The decision of the Supreme Court is important because whenever questions of the identification and legitimacy of successors to a religious institution have arisen, their “justiciability” before a secular court has invariably been a bone of contention on grounds that it threatens the autonomy of religious institutions. InShergillthe Supreme Court got around these concerns by drawing a normative distinction between the public law of the land (which the courts are required to determine), and the internal private law of a religious institution on matters of succession, ordination, and removal (which are not in themselves for the courts to decide). ButShergillalso went further than previous case law in two respects. First, the fundamental tenets of a belief system are capable of an objective assessment by a secular court provided that there is public law element to a dispute, in which case the court can then decide on the fitness of the successor for office. This means there is no general presumption that a secular court is barred from considering religious questions per se. Second, these principles apply just as much to the judicial consideration of non-Christian faiths as they to the Christian religion, and this is so notwithstanding the court's unfamiliarity with other faiths.

Pesticede decision - Env NGO - COM decision T-192/12 – Pesticide Action Network Europe / European Commission Subject GC - dismissed as Implementing Act - is not AA

The decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have had an immense impact on development of European Union law, and this has raised a critical discussion about how the CJEU establishes and uses case law. Through a comparison with the United States Supreme Court (USSC) and network analysis, this article argues that much of the criticism is based on false expectations as to the nature of the CJEU. We argue that the Court of Justice must be understood as a precedent-driven constitutional court and that, if we take that as our starting point, its approach to case law is quite reasonable.

On August 18, 2016, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia (Constitutional Court or Court) rendered a significant decision in the Garcia de Borissow and Others case on issues of immunity from execution, diplomatic protection, and objections to customary international law in its review of two combined cases brought by former local employees against the embassies of the Lebanese Republic and the United States of America in Bogotá. While upholding the diplomatic missions’ immunity from execution of lower court judgments awarding monetary sums, the Constitutional Court instructed the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry) to pursue recovery of such amounts either by diplomatic means or through enforcement of those judgments in Lebanese and American courts. The decision is both unique and problematic as a matter of international and domestic law.

The South African adversarial system of civil procedure in the High Court owes its origin to that of England. As with all civil procedural systems, the South African system is not stagnant. Its primary sources, namely Acts of Parliament and rules of court, are constantly amended in an attempt to meet the changing needs of society. Court delay and costinefficient procedural mechanisms, however, contribute to public dismay. The High Court, in the exercise of its inherent power to regulate its process, do so with the purpose of enhancing access to justice. The advantage of the system lies in the fact that it is not cast in stone but could, subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, be developed to make it more accessible to the public whilst protecting the public’s fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution and, in this regard, particularly the right to afair trial embedded in sec. 34 of the Constitution. This contribution gives an overview of the system with reference to the court structure, the judiciary, the process in the High Court and its underlying principles, appeals, class actions and alternative civil dispute resolution mechanisms.

The Constitutional Court does not only interpreting the Constitution in judicial review cases. The Courtalso applies legal construction which include constitutional construction and statutory construction. Thisarticle aims to identify this approach in the Court rulings. It also seeks to find conditions that trigger theCourt to venture on discovering the law by applying legal construction.

УДК 340.15 The subject of research are the courts of England in 16-17 centuries. The purpose of article is to answer the question which courts must be included to a number of "courts of equity". Methodology. Historical analysis of the scientific literature, of the English legislation and judicial practice of the 16-17 centuries. Results. The priority for the Court of Star Chamber was to protect the interests of Royal power and not the rights of people. Moreover, this court did not seek to bridge the gaps of common law. In this regard, his reference to the number of “courts of equity” is incorrect. Star Chamber had a close relationship with the Privy Council. There were no clear boundaries between them during the XVI century. The Star Chamber was the emergency Committee of the Privy Council The purpose of the Court of Requests was to ease social tensions, to create the impression of caring filed emanating from the monarch and the nobility. Despite the fact that the Court of the Requests was conceived as "a court for poor people", it became popular wealthy people under the rule Henry VIII. The Court of High Commission was a court focused on the strengthening of Royal power. In its activities it has been focused on improving the rights of the Kingdom. The Court of Exchequer provided judicial protection for some types of transactions that are not recognized by the common law. In this it is similar to the Chancery Court. Initially, the Court of the Exchequer has been focused on protecting the interests of the crown. Therefore, the function to eliminate the gaps of the common law could not be implemented in full. The Chancery Court, unlike the special courts were required to consider complaints coming from citizens about the inability to get a fair trial. Conclusions. The criteria for judicial institutions to be considered as “courts of equity” are: the purpose of the establishment of the court was to fill gaps in the common law; interference with the jurisdiction of other courts, in fact, has been focused on the eradication the deficiencies of the common law; the court of equity was not supposed to apply a legal fiction in their practice; specialization in civil cases. The number of “courts of equity” may be assigned only by the Chancery Court.

The Supreme Court decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos rejected the two-stage test for dishonesty set out in R v Ghosh and replaced it with a single, objective test which transcends both criminal and civil law. This article asks whether it was correct to create a single test for dishonesty and in doing so, what role will subjectivity now play in the criminal law’s application of what is considered dishonest behaviour. Historically, the civil courts have beset with confusion as to the role of subjectivity in the test for dishonesty in the light of Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan. The author will consider whether lessons can be learned from the civil courts and whether similar problems will trouble criminal law, particularly in the light of criticism of the Ivey test and a preference, by some, for subjectivity to play a greater role in criminal liability for theft and other dishonesty offences.

The purpose of this contribution is to examine some salient applications of the comparative law method in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in light of relevant case law of the U.S. Supreme Court involving recourse to foreign and international law in domestic constitutional adjudication. It is divided into three main parts. The first part concerns the European Court of Justice's recourse to the comparative law method in the context of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, highlighting parallels to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The second part takes up the comparative law method in the context of the interpretation of EU law, focusing on the European Court of Justice's elaboration of the autonomous concepts of "spouse" and "marriage" and the potential implications for the mobility of same-sex couples in the EU, drawing insights from the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Windsor and Obergefell. The third part discusses the comparative law method in the context of the European Court of Justice's review of national and Union measures for compliance with EU fundamental rights, which invites comparisons with some recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on the incorporation doctrine and the standard of review. Altogether, the comparative reflections set forth in this contribution attest to similar challenges facing each Court in the context of constitutional adjudication and provide interesting insights into how the Courts carry out their mandates under their respective constitutional charters. ispartof: American Journal of Comparative Law vol:64 issue:4 pages:841-864 status: published

Introduction Court claims against gynaecologists in the Spanish criminal court system are a rare occurrence (less than 3%). These can lead to financial penalties, imprisonment and disqualification. Our aim is to study the court sentences issued in such cases, as these involve the most serious convictions, and to obtain a profile of those convicted.

Resumo Atualmente, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) ocupa hoje posição central no processo político nacional. Suas decisões são a última palavra oficial sobre os temas a que se referem, concentrando poderes para resolver conflitos políticos e morais, para além das esferas majoritárias. Esse cenário, porém, é muito diferente dos anos 1990, quando o STF não ocupava posição tão destacada na política brasileira. Neste artigo, discutiremos essa configuração do poder e do papel do STF por meio de análises do tribunal que a constituinte criou, mas também do que os ministros criaram por meio de práticas institucionais e interpretações de seus próprios poderes. Exploraremos algumas consequências mais recentes da manifestação do próprio poder conferido ao STF nesse processo de reconfiguração institucional, delineando, de maneira preliminar, novas tendências na forma de atuação política do tribunal. Argumentamos, também, que, em vez de atuar apenas como ponto de veto a decisões majoritárias, como câmara revisora do que faz o Congresso, o tribunal já sinalizou disposição para receber (e aceitar) provocações para funcionar como uma espécie de primeira câmara legislativa. Abstract The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) occupies a central role in the national political process. The court´s decisions have been the last official word on many key constitutional controversies, and it has increasingly asserted its own powers to solve political and moral conflicts, even against majoritarian decisions. This scenario, however, is very different from the 90s, when the court was much less relevant in national politics. In this paper, we engage with and try to map this process of institutional transformation by analyzing and contrasting the court that the constitution created in its original text, and the court that the Justices themselves have recreated, by means of institutional practices and constitutional interpretation of their own powers. We will explore some of the implications of the institutional transformations driven by the court itself, by identifying a set of new trends in the ways by which the court participates in the national political process. The paper concludes by arguing that, instead of acting just as a veto point to majoritarian decisions (that is, as a third legislative chamber), the court has been signaling its willingness to accept (and to rule on) cases in which it will be forced to act as a first legislative chamber.

The Supreme Court deals with many political cases, where policies are at stake, while on the other hand there is the politics within the Court which can also play an important role. It is difficult to judge the current system without sound empirical and theoretical studies, so one cannot confidently assess the effectiveness of the paper appeals in the American System in the light of the long history of the UK system, of different career paths of advocates in these two countries and of different routes of appointment for judges in both jurisdictions. Nevertheless, any interviews that were conducted with senior judges in the UK were conducted a long time ago and might not be applicable to the current realities. It is true that the British system is open to moderation—the elimination of the House of Lords and its replacement with the Supreme Court is the best example—but maybe more changes are needed. It is paramount that greater diversity in the profession brings fresh perspectives. This is evident in electing practitioners with different career paths, such as Justice Kennedy and Lord Sumption. The president of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, even suggested advertising the next position in the Supreme Court to be on a part time basis, to enable the election of an academic. As stated in the introduction, since Abela and others v Baadarani is a case with important principles at stake, is there a space for political disagreement?

The article sheds light on provisions of Codes of Civil Procedure of 1853 and 1860 concerning ordinary legal remedies. As this matter was codified for the first time, a necessity of amending and supplementing some provisions soon emerged. Those amendments and supplements, along with original provisions were examined in this paper. The author also deals with regulations on jurisdiction of Court of Appeal, Court of Cassation and Supreme court. Types and categories of ordinary legal remedies were scrutinized, as well as strict time limits within one should lodge an appeal and proper grounds for making an appeal. The author also responds to questions under which circumstances are ordinary legal remedies allowed, and what types of decisions a higher court can make after reviewing the correctness and reasonableness of a decision issued by a lower court. Shortly after enactment of the Code of 1853 it appeared that judicial procedure is too complicated, expensive and ineffective due to too many legal remedies and legal jurisdictions. That is the reason why the Supreme court as the highest court within the hierarchy of legal jurisdictions and as final court of appeal was abolished in 1860, when new Code of Civil Procedure had been passed. New codification envisaged Court of Appeal as second instance court and, at the same time, court of last resort. Regarding legal remedies, Code of 1860 introduced appeal as sole ordinary legal remedy.

Twenty-five years ago, in this Journal, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright argued that the structures of international law “privilege men.” As shown in Table 1, which summarizes data from a forthcoming article, on nine of twelve international courts of varied size, subject-matter jurisdiction, and global and regional membership, women made up 20 percent or less of the bench in mid 2015. On many of these courts, the percentage of women on the bench has stayed constant, vacillated, or even declined over time. Women made up a lower percentage of the bench in mid 2015 than in previous years on two-thirds of the courts surveyed.

The Constitution of Kenya provides that the sovereign power of the people shall be vested in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, reflecting the democratic ideal that if power is concentrated in the hands of a few, it is prone to misuse. This provision aims to safeguard against arbitrary and capricious governance and the abuse of power. In the new constitutional order, there has been instances of tensions between the judiciary and the other arms of government. Unfortunate incidents of members of the Legislature referring to court orders as stupid and idiotic with blatant disregard for court orders have been witnessed. In a government whose legitimacy is vindicated by a court, it is ironical to observe a selective attitude towards respecting subsequent court orders. This paper aims to consider the disregard of court orders against the backdrop of the separation of powers and other relevant principles of constitutionalism.

The article analyses the changes of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to give preliminary rulings in the proceedings launched where a national court submits a reference for preliminary ruling when considering a criminal matter as well as on a request from a national court to interpret a legal act of the European Union or deliver an opinion on its validity. In addition, it investigates the preliminary ruling, the requirements to fulfil when presenting procedural documents, and conditions of applying special measures in organizing the proceedings. The analysis of the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union will also help to reflect the potential trends of its future development. On the basis of the analysis of the case-law of the Court of Justice, the following conclusion is made: after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and expiry of the transitional period, no restrictions have been left for national courts (irrespective of their position in the national legislative system) to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice of the European Union where preliminary questions are related to the area of freedom, security and justice, therefore, the following trend arises: national courts more often decide to use this opportunity of cooperation with the Court also when a criminal case is pending before a national court. In the process of a preliminary ruling the role of a national court is very important, as it, requesting for a preliminary ruling, not only initiates the opening of the process, but also the quality of procedural documents submitted by a referring court may determine the progress, duration and result of the proceedings. Therefore, the requirements and stipulations laid down accordingly in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and Recommendations to national courts in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings are very important. An active use of national courts of a possibility to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in cases where there are doubts as regards interpretation of the European Union legal acts in considering criminal cases and the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice contributes to the attaining of one of the main objectives laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the European Union law throughout the Union.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. This study aims to investigate empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal approaches). We have collected two data sets relating to all ECJ copyright and database cases up to Svensson (February 2014): (1) Statistics about the allocation of cases to chambers, the composition of chambers, the Judge Rapporteur, and Advocate General (including coding of the professional background of the personnel); (2) Content analysis of argumentative patterns in the decisions themselves, using a qualitative coding technique. Studying the relationship between (1) and (2) allows us to identify links between certain Chambers/ Court members and legal approaches, over time, and by subject. These shed light on the internal workings of the court, and also enable us to explore theories about the nature of ECJ jurisprudence. The analysis shows that private law and in particular intellectual property law expertise is almost entirely missing from the Court. However, we find that the Court has developed a mechanism for enabling judicial learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and AGs. We also find that the Court has developed a “fair balance” topos linked to Judge Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of 40 copyright cases) that does not predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing rather than widening the scope of copyright protection.

In this essay, I suggest that the combination of formal and remedial techniques that equity courts traditionally have applied to the problem of trustee loyalty is strongly oriented to deterrence. One consequence is that when loyalty and prudence conflict, primacy for loyalty is built into the structure of fiduciary law. It is open to courts to reduce the role of loyalty in trust law by softening the standards currently applied to trustees. A change of this type, however, would not be a minor adjustment in the law governing trustees, but would instead represent fundamental structural change.

The article describes the identifying areas of influence of the European Court on the legal system of Ukraine, as well as the enforcement mechanism of decisions. Analyzes the problems that affect the designated question and points of view of different scholars and practitioners. In Europe there are different documents – convention covenants, charters that provide and ensure the inclusion of a special protection mechanism in case of violation of human rights. These documents Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 1950, hereinafter - the Convention), which provides the most effective and real protection mechanism for human rights. Convention not only proclaimed fundamental human rights, but also created a special mechanism to protect them. The key to this mechanism is the European Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter - the Court) located in Strasbourg, France. Its jurisdiction extends to forty-seven European states that are members of the Council of Europe and signatories. Article 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine clearly states that international treaties, ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are part of the national legislation of Ukraine. The Court can not apply the law that governs the legal relationship in question, other than an international agreement. However, international agreements apply if they do not contradict the Constitution of Ukraine. Urgency of the problem by the growth requirements of the rule of law in the judiciary, increasing legal awareness of citizens and their activity to protect their rights and freedoms, the presence of non judicial legislation with international legal acts. Procedural legislation of Ukraine in many aspects not harmonized not only in line with the decisions of the European Court, but also to the current constitution. Ukraine ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms July 17, 1997. Since then, the citizens of our country have an opportunity to apply for protection of violated rights to the European Court. The Convention, the basic human rights and freedoms, and in performance of work by an international agreement is necessary to consider the interpretation of the Court. It follows from Article 32 of the Convention, according to which the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and its Protocols. The case-law of the European Court increasingly becoming an important source of law in Ukraine. The European Court is the subject of judicial lawmaking. The high authority of the European Court was obtained by ensuring uniform interpretation and application of the Convention across the entire European continent. Number of appeals to the European Court is growing, and more and more of its decision relating to the interpretation of law, and the problems of its imperfection.Law of Ukraine «On execution of decisions and application of the European Court of Human Rights» dated February 23, 2006 by fundamental for the legal system of Ukraine provisions. The existence of precedents of the European Court as a unique source of law is due, usually gaps in the law or its ambiguous understanding. In terms of reforming legislation of Ukraine, the European Court in its systematic conceptual models provide certain legislative activities. The court is designed to ensure strict adherence to and compliance with the rules of the Convention by the States Parties. It carries out this task through the consideration and resolution of specific cases taken him to the proceedings on the basis of individual complaints filed by an individual, group of individuals or non-governmental organization. It is also possible filing complaints of violations of the Convention by the State - a member of the Council of Europe of another Member State. European court can not reverse the decision rendered by a public authority or national court does not give instructions to the legislator, the abstract does not control the national legislation or judicial practice has no right to order measures with legal consequences. The Court considers only specific complaint in order to establish whether indeed been admitted violation of the Convention. However, the Court has the right to award «just satisfaction claim» in the form of financial compensation for material damage and moral damages and compensation side that won all costs. European Court puts the main purpose of the payment of financial compensation for infringement of the applicant's main task - to draw attention to the fact of violation of the relevant articles of the Convention and provide the applicant all remedies, where he was denied a national legal system

The Supreme Court dominates America’s legal establishment. Predicting its decisions has, arguably, and for all practicality, become an industry. The traditions of the court have endowed it with a teleological approach which makes predicting the court’s decisions difficult. On important decisions, especially those with political overtones, the Justices on the court show a strong preference to vote along partisan lines, in harmony with the party that nominated them onto the court - but not always. In a review of the court’s history, in key decisions Justices have departed from their more predictable partisanship. Our analysis shows that when judges depart from their predictable partisanship, they do so for fairly consistent, if not predictable, reasons: institution building. This paper argues that the Supreme Court behaves in a manner consistent with Max Weber"s social theory: that a bureaucracy will labor to perpetuate itself. The Supreme Court often makes decisions for the purpose of enhancing and perpetuating the institution of the Court itself. Because the Supreme Court is a national institution, at times “institution building” means nation building. This paper studies the tension of partisanship versus institution building in Supreme Court decisions: the dynamics of fission versus fusion, the tension that exist between these two poles and the mechanics of how this is worked out, creates arguably some of the greatest drama in the Court’s history as demonstrated in Marbury v. Madison and Bush v. Gore.

This article assesses the social positions of the plaintiffs and defendants who appeared before a small claims court, namely the Peacemaker court (Vredemakers) of the city of Leiden in the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, a low threshold law court that boasted a quick and inexpensive procedure. Analysis of the social positions of the court's plaintiffs and defendants helps reveal the extent to which lower social groups actively made use of it. The article is based on linkage between a sample of users of the Peacemaker court during the years 1750–54 and a census of 1749 comprising socio-economic data for the entire Leiden population. The court clientele of the Peacemaker court was distinctively elitist. The court was thus first and foremost a forum for an inner group of more well-to-do households who were firmly established in the local community. The Peacemaker court was notably inexpensive and simple in its procedures, yet lower social groups remained markedly reticent to file complaints there, ...

This paper analyses the jurisprudence on the relevance of the commercial context to principles of the law of equity and trusts. We criticise recent UK Supreme Court decisions in the area (chiefly Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners and AIB Group v Mark Redler & Co) and identify a trend of the ‘commercialisation’ of the issues. The cases are placed in comparative context and it is argued that there is an unsatisfactory pattern of judicial reasoning, exhibiting a preference for some degree of unarticulated flexibility in commercial adjudication. But the price of that flexibility is a lack of doctrinal coherence and the development of equitable principles that will apply in, and beyond, the commercial context. We also argue that this trend has important implications for the coming rounds of Supreme Court appointments.

As of February 2017, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had 124 state parties. Among them, nineteen states belonged to the Asia-Pacific region and two thereof ratified Rome Statute amendments on the crime of aggression. Ratification indicates success of the rule of international law in Asia. Among Southeast Asian states, however, only two ratified the Rome Statute, namely, Cambodia and the Philippines. Although the Asia-Pacific region is home to half of the population on the globe, the people in the region are apparently underrepresented in the ICC. This article explores and explains why Asian states are disinclined to join the ICC. Ancillary discussion in this paper evaluates future prospects of current non-state parties of the ICC Statute. Lastly, the paper touches on the Asian region and ICC preliminary investigations by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, including such cases as the downing of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17.

Trabalho enviado em 13 de fevereiro de 2017.Aceito em 16 de abril de 2017. DOI: 10.12957/rqi.2017.27363 Resumen Un milenario puente historico juridico parece unir al viejo fideicomiso romano con la relacion juridica del trust, pues ambas figuras del derecho tienen la misma raiz: la confianza. Mediante cualquiera de ellas, una persona otorga a otra su patrimonio, para que esta ultima, a su vez, actue en beneficio de uno o varios terceros. Desde una optica historico - juridica sincronica, cuando nacio el fideicomiso todavia no existia el trust. Sin embargo, las circunstancias, los hechos, e incluso los caprichos historicos que son guiados por el paso del tiempo, propiciaron que numerosos elementos y principios juridicos romanos se proyectaran y fueran aceptados por la historia juridica de Inglaterra2. De esta forma, ambas instituciones, de neta naturaleza juridica fiduciaria, se encontraron y se relacionaron de forma intensa por los tribunales de equidad anglosajones. El fideicomiso (al menos la naturaleza juridica de las relaciones juridicas fideicomisarias) fue, probablemente, una de las fuentes principales romanas de inspiracion jurisdiccional para equity & trust. Sin embargo, los tribunales de equidad aplicaron otras normas romanas y canonicas, para construir las rigidas relaciones de confianza feudales que eran desconocidas por la angosta jurisdiccion del common law medieval. De este modo, a partir del siglo XIV d. C., Court of Chancery propicio el libre desarrollo de equidad para edificar, con materiales juridicos romanos, las relaciones juridicas procesales fiduciarias, que eran unidas mediante el triangulo magico del trust. Palabras Clave: Derecho Romano & Court of Chancery & Fideicomiso & Equity & Trust Abstract A thousand-year-old historical juridical bridge seems to join the old man Roman trust with the juridical relation of the trust, since both figures of the right have the same root: the confidence. By means of any of them, a person grants other one his heritage, in order that the latter, in turn, acts in benefit of a third party. From an historical - juridical optics synchronous, when it was born the trust still did not exist the trust. Nevertheless, the circumstances, the facts, and even the historical caprices that are led by the passage of time, propitiated that numerous elements and juridical Roman beginning were projected and accepted by the juridical history of England. Of this form, both institutions of clear juridical fiduciary nature were and related of intense form for the Anglo-Saxon courts of equity. The trust (at least the juridical nature of the juridical trust relations) was, probably, one of the principal Roman sources of jurisdictional inspiration for equity and trust. The courts of equity applied other Roman and canonical procedure to correct the rigid fiduciary feudal relations of confidence not known by the narrow jurisdiction of the medieval common law. Thus, from the 14th century A.D., Court of Chancery propitiated the free development of equity to construct with juridical Roman materials, finally, the juridical relations of confidence established by means of the magic triangle of the trust. Keywords: Civil Law & Court of Chancery & Fideicomiso & Equity & Trust

The Supreme Court decision which sentenced dr. Bambang suprapto.Sp.M.Surg. using article 76 of L aw N o 29 Year 2004 on the Practice of Medicine which had been annulled by the Constitutional Court has proved that the Supreme Court has put aside constitutional court's decision on constitutional review. This paper attempts to justify that at any reason, Constitutional Review decision of Constitutional Court still has binding force on the Supreme Court. It is based on four perspectives: 1. Historical perspective 2. Protected object perspective 3. Functional p erspective, and 4. Normative perspective. Keywords: Binding Force, Constitutional Review, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court.

Although nowadays most courts publish decisions on the internet, substantial differences exist between European countries regarding such publication. These differences not only pertain to the extent with which judgments are published and anonymised, but also to their metadata, searchability and reusability. This article, written by Marc van Opijnen, Ginevra Peruginelli, Eleni Kefali and Monica Palmirani, contains a synthesis of a comprehensive comparative study on the publication of court decisions within all Member States of the European Union. Specific attention is paid on the legal and policy frameworks governing case law publication, actual practices, data protection issues, Open Data policies as well as the state of play regarding the implementation of the European Case Law Identifier.

Ever since Justice Scalia passed away last February, the Supreme Court has been composed of eight Justices equally divided among Republicans and Democrats. This paper argues that Congress should permanently set the number of Justices at eight and require that at all times there are four Republicans and four Democrats on the Court. A permanent, evenly-divided Court will work harder to reach narrower decisions in its hardest cases and will be less able to impose its ideological agendas on the American people while at the same still have the tools necessary to maintain the supremacy and uniformity of federal law. To the extent the Justices do deadlock on a case, the issues will be resolved by court of appeals judges who are much more politically, educationally, and geographically diverse than the Justices.This proposal to limit the Court's power, unlike abolishing term limits or requiring a super-majority of Justices to strike down laws, does not require a constitutional amendment (the original number of Justices was six). Although the President could nominate any person he desires, even if it disrupts the Court's balance, the Senate could refuse to confirm any nominee who would lead to one of the political parties having a majority of Justices on the Court. This paper spells out the details of this proposal and explains both how it could be easily implemented and why it benefits both political parties, the Congress, the President, and the American people.Preexisting intellectual commitments or interpretative theories have not and cannot limit the Court's power. It is well past time to experiment with structural changes that will make it more difficult for the Justices to strike down state and federal laws based on ideological disagreement instead of a demonstration of clear inconsistency with the Constitution.

This paper therefore advances the theory that each non-Quebec “region”, as they are currently recognized, might need at least one appointee each in order to ensure the Court has functioning and legitimacy as a federal and bijural institution. This theory has the added benefit of providing the Governor-in-Council with flexibility in making appointments that meet other roles of the Court, such as adjudicating on Charter rights and aboriginal law.

This paper examines whether the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act has readied Canada to adopt the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. Reviewing the Convention as well as previous and current law and cases on forum selection clauses in common law Canada, including the very recent Supreme Court decision in Douez v Facebook, yields two conclusions. First, there are existing interpretive challenges flowing from gaps in the CJPTA with respect to jurisdictional clauses that need to be addressed. Second, the principles governing forum selection clauses in Canada are largely consistent with those put forward in the Hague Convention and should not be perceived as obstacles to its adoption.

The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court authors many of the most important opinions coming out of the Court. The prestige of authoring an important policy decision, and the value that such an opinion adds to the legacy of the Chief Justice’s Court, plays an important and strategic role in the Court’s opinion authorship dynamics and the policy outcomes of the Court. We present a Supreme Court decision-making model that, within the confines of legal doctrine, incorporates the authorship utility of the Chief Justice (and senior associate justices who hold secondary, yet important, property rights over authorship). New predictions emerge about who authors the Court’s opinion, what case outcome is chosen by the justices, which legal doctrines are chosen, and which decisions are unanimous among the justices. We illustrate aspects of the model with recent Supreme Court decisions involving health care and campaign financing.

Since 1831, Indian nations have been viewed as Domestic Dependent Nations located within the geographical boundaries of the United States. Although Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged that Indian nations had a certain amount of sovereignty, the exact extent of such sovereignty as well as the place of tribes within the federal system has remained ill-defined. This Article examines what has been the role of the Supreme Court in integrating Indian nations as the third Sovereign within our federalist system. The Article accomplishes this task by examining the Court’s Indian law record in the last 30 years. The comprehensive survey of Indian law decisions indicates that the Court has had difficulties upholding the federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government. After categorizing the cases between victories and losses, the Article divides the cases into four categories: Federal common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law. The cases are then further divided into four general areas: 1. Tribal Sovereign/Political rights, 2. Economic Rights (treaty/property rights), 3. Rights derived from the trust relationship, and 4. Cultural/Religious rights. The Article next focuses on the interaction between the Court and Congress concerning the incorporation of tribes as the third sovereign within the federalist system. This Part first evaluates Congress’s response to Supreme Court cases and then looks at the Court’s response to congressional legislation. The Article ends by arguing that through its disproportionate use of federal common law in its Indian law decisions, the Court has not attempted to reach a consensus with Congress about the place of Indian nations within our federalism. Instead, it has aimed to establish what the Court perceives should be the proper equilibrium between tribal interests on one hand and the non-Indian/state interests on the other.

The jurisdictional relationship between African states and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights and between the latter Court and the International Criminal Court is not entirely clear. While the Malabo Protocol (Annex) has borrowed the complementarity principle from the Rome Statute, the Protocol does not indicate that states’ investigations or prosecutions should be genuine, in order to render a case inadmissible. Moreover, the Malabo Protocol (Annex) is completely silent on the African Court’s relationship to the International Criminal Court. This chapter first discusses whether the leaving out of the term “genuinely” bears any consequences on the assessment of the quality of the performance of states in respect of investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Next, it considers two alternative scenario’s—one in which the International Criminal Court is hierarchically superior to the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights and one in which both courts cooperate as equal partners. The author concludes that the latter model would be feasible if the International Criminal Court and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights move towards a “division of labor”.

This article examines several topics relating to the administration and governance of courts in democratic societies. It includes a summary of the development of court administration as a profession, highlighting Australia and the United States. The summary includes a discussion of how judges and court administrators must work together and coordinate their efforts in key areas of court administration and management. The article also reviews separation of powers issues, highlighting the problems that emerge in systems in which oversight and administration of the courts is vested in the executive branch or power of government, most commonly in a justice ministry. It reviews the practical advantages of having courts governed and managed through institutional mechanisms within the judicial power rather than the executive power.

Many countries have developed statutory provisions governing norms and standards of practice (NSPs) for court interpreters. However, in South Africa, in the case of State versus Naidoo (1962:631), Judge Williamson states that “in relation to the courts of this country, there appears to be no statutory provision, Rule of Court or regulation governing the position of interpreters”. If Judge Williamson’s statement is true, court interpreters could be perceived as working without proper guidance from a statute containing NSPs for court interpreters. This situation might result in court interpreters working according to their own personal preferences, each creating and abiding by his or her own NSPs. In turn, this could lead to poor interpreting practices, as there would be no application of common NSPs which court interpreters are to follow and for which they need to be held accountable. The aim of this study is to investigate whether the statement by Judge Williamson is true, and if so, how the lack of NSPs for court interpreters could affect their work. This aim was achieved by examining the Personnel Administration Standard for Court Interpreters, contained in the Public Service Code, which relates to the employment of court interpreters in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development of South Africa; the Magistrates’ Court Act 44 of 1944 (as amended); the Oath of Office of Interpreters in terms of Rule 68 (1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 44 of 1944 (as amended); the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (as amended), and extracts from some case studies (Lebese 2011, 2013). The study revealed that the four documents do not make any reference to NSPs for court interpreters. The study concludes with a recommendation for the need of a statute governing court-interpreting issues in the broadest sense, including NSPs.Keywords: court interpreters, legislation, norms, standards of practice

There are two questions with multiple answers regarding the relationship between Africa and the International Criminal Court. The first is whether the International Criminal Court is targeting Africa and the second is if politics plays any role in the decision to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. For the African Union, the International Criminal Court has become a western court targeting weak African countries and ignoring the atrocities committed by big powers including permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The accusation by the African Union against the International Criminal Court leads to the argument that the International Criminal Court is currently politised. This is a charge consistently denied by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the United Nations Security Council, the International Criminal Court and the African Union. It articulates the role of the three institutions in the fight against impunity and the maintenance of international peace and security with reference to the African continent. The paper argues that complementarity should be applied to regional organisations and that the relationship between the African Union and the International Criminal Court should be guided by the application of positive complementarity and a nuanced approach to the interests of justice. This offers the International Criminal Court and the African Union an opportunity to develop mutual trust and result-oriented strategies to confront the impunity on the continent. The paper further argues that the power of the United Nations Security Council to refer situations to the International Criminal Court and defer cases before the Court is a primary source of the disagreement between the prosecutor and the African Union and recommends a division of labour between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council.

The court unification movement has progressed in fits and starts over the decades. Recent proposals have been put forth that attempt to continue the move toward a state court structure that utilizes a more coherent approach to governance. Drawing on a survey of court personnel who were asked about a set of proposed governance principles, this article examines how state court judges and administrators view their roles and responsibilities in the court system, the current need for court reform, the importance of future trends, and whether they are confident in the performance of their respective court system. Three hundred and seventy-five judges and administrators answered sixty-two questions regarding principles governing state court procedures and measures of their confidence in the court system. Participants overwhelmingly agreed that changes in court governance are necessary, although the degree of change for specific principles and trends was moderated by career, age, and time working for the courts. ...

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first international criminal justice institution that explicitly promises to deliver justice for victims by providing for the rights of victims to participation and reparation in criminal proceedings. More than a decade after its establishment, the time is right to consider how this new idea of justice for victims has developed at the ICC. While analysis of the ICC’s framework has benefited from international law and other academic disciplines, such as international relations and politics, there has been too little attention paid to international criminal justice by mainstream criminologists and victimologists. To fill this gap, this article will systematically reflect on the similarities and differences in the evolution of the idea of justice for victims at domestic criminal courts and the ICC from a criminological and victimological perspective. Overall, the comparison suggests that while the concept of justice for victims has been mainly understood in terms of the benefits and problems of incorporating victims’ rights into criminal law procedure in the domestic context, at the ICC, it has led to broader contestations and redefinitions of the very meaning of justice. These contestations on justice have to be understood in the institutional context of a still young and sui generis court that is unsure of the kind of justice it can and should deliver.