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There is a powerful fundamental right hiding in plain sight: the fundamental right to free movement. This right goes beyond the consistently acknowledged--though infrequently applied--fundamental right to interstate travel. The true scope of the Constitution's protection of movement through substantive due process safeguards local, interstate, and international travel. Though overlooked today, the fundamental right to free movement has deep roots in history and tradition, and in the decisions of numerous state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court. This Article is the first to examine freedom of movement using the history and tradition test for unenumerated fundamental rights. This Article begins by tracing the right to free movement from the Magna Carta, through Blackstone's Commentaries, colonial America, early state constitutions, and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As this analysis shows, repressive governments have routinely sought to limit movement across and within boundaries. But the English and U.S. legal traditions are marked by repeated affirmations of the right--there is strong and persistent historical support for a fundamental right to free movement. This Article then turns to judicial discussions of movement rights, both historical and contemporary. Drawing on several previously unconnected lines of decision, this examination surfaces a vibrant picture of the fundamental right to free movement recognized by the courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. Given its firm foundation and expansive reach, this is a right that should be applied regularly--to anti-gender-affirming-care or anti-abortion laws targeting travel, to quarantine restrictions locking down a community, and to any of the wide variety of other restrictions limiting free movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text addresses due process violations in immigration court, particularly regarding non-citizens' right to obtain legal representation. There is a split among circuit courts on the requirement to prove substantial prejudice when denied the right to an attorney. Proposed solutions include seeking a Supreme Court decision, new legislation, and an Executive Order to address these violations and ensure fair hearings and just outcomes for all individuals involved in removal proceedings. The importance of upholding constitutional protections, providing access to legal representation, and promoting fairness and justice in immigration court proceedings is emphasized. [Extracted from the article]

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Copyright of Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departamento de Derecho Penal y Criminologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The research paper examines subjective features of the crime related to illegal abortion provided for in Art. 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The authors focus on the problems of qualification of the subject of this offense, in particular, a person without special medical education who is not authorized by law to perform artificial abortion operations. The foreign experience of criminal-legal assessment of illegal abortion is partially highlighted. An analysis is provided regarding the relationship between illegal abortion and infliction of serious bodily harm, which can also lead to termination of pregnancy, but is subject to a different legal qualification. Some elements of the subjective side of the crime are also analyzed, in particular, the optional purpose and motive of the person who commits the offense, as well as manifestations of negligence in medical practice. Particular attention is paid to the issue of distinguishing between intentional actions and medical (medical) errors arising from professional negligence or lack of proper training. A scientific understanding of the medical error committed during the abortion, which led to a long-term health disorder, infertility or death of the victim (part 3 of article 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) is offered. It is shown that this error can be caused by one or more objective or subjective factors that have been officially established and recorded in due process. The work gives examples of the practical application of criminal legislation, in particular, cases of illegal abortion due to selfish motives. It describes what goal the offender sets and what motivation is guided by the offender during an illegal abortion. The need to improve the provisions of criminal and medical legislation, which regulate the procedure for carrying out abortion operations, and also ensure the protection of women's reproductive rights, is emphasized. In particular, it is prospectively important to review the criminal liability of medical professionals who perform abortions in violation of medical pro tocols. In the mode of searching for ways to improve the text of Art. 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine proposed the author's version of the disposition of the first part of the ban. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2019 case of Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine, reiterating that the Double Jeopardy Clause only bars successive or concurrent prosecutions by the same sovereign. When, therefore, a criminal defendant has violated the laws of two sovereigns by the same act, regardless of how similar those laws may be, no double jeopardy issue arises where both sovereigns prosecute the defendant independently. This Note argues that such an outcome is at odds with the Due Process Clause's guarantee against double jeopardy and rests upon an excessively rigid formulation of prior case law. The Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence actually suggests that the dual sovereignty doctrine should only be applied in instances where each sovereign possesses a distinct interest that they alone can vindicate. This Note advances a primary-purposes test to determine when separate or concurrent prosecutions are appropriate: a second sovereign should only be permitted to prosecute a defendant for the same crime if the primary purpose of that prosecution is to vindicate a sovereign interest that the first sovereign's prosecution would leave substantially unvindicated. Applying this test would also ease the Gamble Court's worry that modifying the doctrine could interfere with the balance of domestic and international prosecutions. Because the United States and a foreign sovereign, as completely independent entities, could always decline to treat the exercise of the other's jurisdiction as exclusive, each sovereign would retain an interest in prosecuting a defendant that the other sovereign could never substantially vindicate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last several decades, administrative law has recognized an expanding role for the President in controlling agency decisionmaking. Agency adjudication--and especially formal hearings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")--have been viewed as properly insulated from this development. To protect due process, the APA established a regime for ensuring that competent, impartial Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") preside over formal hearings. The regime includes two apparent levels of for-cause removal protection for ALJs combined with robust agency head control over the policymaking aspects of formal adjudication. Today, the regime is in peril because it appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's unitary executive theory of administration. This Article defends the constitutionality of the APA's ALJ regime under the Supreme Court's recent separation of powers cases. It argues that the APA's robust preservation of agency head control satisfies Article II, while its for-cause protections for ALJs ensure due process and faithful execution of the law through adjudicatory hearings. The statute is, in short, well-designed to ensure properly presidential adjudication. The Article further argues, however, that there is a deeper conceptual challenge lurking here. The APA and the administrative state were founded upon a New Deal-era conception of administrative power as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial and fundamentally not executive. Modern administrative law has rejected this conception, embracing instead the view that administrative power necessarily entails the exercise of executive power. The current threat to the APA offers an opportunity to improve upon this conception by recognizing that administration is about both discretion and duty. Political control has its place. But the President must also be able to rely on subordinate officers that Congress has equipped with the legal and institutional support necessary to fairly and faithfully execute the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Roberts Court has made protecting "the privacies of life" a catchphrase of Fourth Amendment law in the digital era. The time is thus ripe for revisiting the doctrinal and political roots of this newly influential quote from the Court's 1886 decision Boyd v. United States. Existing scholarship views Boyd and its paean to privacy as an opening salvo in the Supreme Court's turn-of-the-twentieth-century deregulatory jurisprudence (often associated with the Court's most famous substantive due process decision, Lochner v. New York). Scholars also assume Boyd's emphasis on privacy was in keeping with the Founders' view of the Fourth Amendment. This Article makes a novel argument that Boyd and its elevation of protecting the "privacies of life" to an animating principle of the Fourth Amendment was instead a product of Reconstruction and its dismantlement. Doctrinally, the Article argues that legal actors did not commonly associate the Fourth Amendment with something they called "privacy" until after the Civil War. This association, along with Boyd's other core doctrinal elements, was instead established during Reconstruction. Further, these Fourth Amendment innovations were pioneered in Congress, not the federal courts. Politically, the Article argues that Boyd's innovations did not arise in response to growing federal economic regulation. Instead, the idea that the Fourth Amendment protected the privacies of life was fed by white Americans' commitment to preserving racial hierarchy after the Civil War. Shared by moderate Republicans and Democrats, this embrace of Fourth Amendment privacy built an anodyne bridge between otherwise fierce political foes. In other words, Fourth Amendment privacy was produced by and helped secure Reconciliation--the process through which white Americans North and South, Democrat and Republican came together to limit Reconstruction, preserve white supremacy, and pave the way for the violent disenfranchisement of newly freed Black men. The Article is primarily a work of legal history; it concludes, however, by considering the divergent doctrinal implications of resituating Boyd and Fourth Amendment privacy in the politics of Reconciliation. Doing so supports the Roberts Court's recent Fourth Amendment decisions without undermining scholars who contend that the Fourth Amendment protected what we today call privacy from the start. At the same time, this history poses a problem for Justice Neil Gorsuch and other libertarians who use the modern administrative state's connections to Jim Crow-era white supremacy to undermine its legitimacy. This Article shows that the very libertarian tradition championed by these skeptics of the administrative state suffers the same tainted roots. Critical scholars, for their part, document how constitutional privacy doctrines provide limited protection to marginalized communities. This Article's history could support their reparative case for more robust Fourth Amendment protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, litigants and scholars have begun to argue that laws meant to prevent housing discrimination are takings under the Fifth Amendment. This theory of property law, if recognized by the courts, would provide expansive and unprecedented power to private property owners to discriminate against others and hamstring the government's power to protect its citizens. Plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit, Yim v. City of Seattle, advanced this very argument in protest of Seattle's renter protection laws. While their petition for certiorari was denied in 2024, Yim may be a harbinger of future legal actions that seek to allow discriminatory behavior under the veil of Fifth Amendment protections. This Note makes four arguments as to why such an interpretation of the Takings Clause is inappropriate. First, there is a powerful originalist case against regulatory takings that suggests the Court erred when expanding regulatory takings in cases like Cedar Point and Penn Central Transportation. Second, existing doctrine is clear that antidiscrimination legislation is distinguished from physical takings and does not amount to regulatory takings requiring compensation. Third, Heart of Atlanta Motel remains good law and supports the argument that takings cannot be used to reward a property owner's prejudiced or discriminatory practices when they advertise their property to the public. Finally, the extension of the takings doctrine contemplated here is contrary to the goals of government and the constraints of living in a multicultural society. The rights of property owners are not absolute, and the choice to rent property to the public necessarily comes with restrictions. The Note concludes that antidiscrimination housing regulations are not takings under the law as it exists now, nor is it desirable to change the interpretation of the takings doctrine to reward discriminatory housing practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of criminal proceedings is to protect individuals, society, and the State from criminal offences, to safeguard the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of participants in criminal proceedings, and to ensure a prompt, comprehensive, and impartial investigation and trial. This ensures that every person who has committed a criminal offence is held accountable to the extent of their guilt, that no innocent person is accused or convicted, that no individual is subjected to unreasonable procedural coercion, and that each participant in criminal proceedings is treated with due diligence and fairness. In the context of this research, the legislative provision stipulating that «no innocent person shall be accused or convicted» holds particular significance. This provision mandates that, in any instance where a person’s innocence is established during a pre-trial investigation or court proceedings, due process of law must be observed, culminating in either the closure of criminal proceedings on rehabilitative grounds or an acquittal. The purpose of this article is to analyze the national legislation and doctrinal provisions of criminal procedure law concerning the concept of «acquittal» in criminal proceedings. Neither the current Criminal Procedural Code (CPC) of Ukraine nor any other legal act provides a definition of the concept of «acquittal». However, an analysis of the provisions of the CPC of Ukraine suggests that the legislator conceives of acquittal as (1) the result of the court’s determination of a person’s innocence, and (2) the formal recognition of that innocence in a court decision – an acquittal. Thus, «acquittal», in the legislative sense, is inextricably linked to a court’s acquittal decision and can only be rendered by a court. This article also examines various scholarly approaches to the understanding of «acquittal» in criminal proceedings. Based on the analysis of legislation and scholarly sources, the author formulates a definition of «acquittal» and posits that acquittal should be understood in a broader context, rather than being equated exclusively with a court’s acquittal decision. Since a person’s innocence can be established not only through an acquittal but also through other so-called «acquittal decisions», such as a decision to terminate criminal proceedings on rehabilitative grounds during the pre-trial investigation stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is aimed at solving the scientific task of studying the problematic issues arising in connection with the implementation of the institute of appealing against a notice of suspicion in pretrial criminal proceedings. It is noted that with a view to ensuring human rights and freedoms in criminal proceedings, the provisions of criminal procedure legislation enshrine the right of a suspect to appeal against a notice of suspicion. However, the lack of clear legal regulation of the substantive and criminal procedural grounds for such an appeal leads to a violation of the principles of reasonableness of time limits and application of due process of law to a person. The author establishes that among the substantive grounds for appeal, the provisions on the completeness of the content of the suspicion, the correctness of the criminal law qualification should be distinguished, and among the criminal procedural grounds – the proper subject, compliance with the deadlines, availability of sufficient evidence, explanation of the suspect’s rights, and compliance with the procedure for serving a notice of suspicion. It is noted that in the context of determining the level of violation of human rights and freedoms, the criterion of ‘materiality/ insignificance’ should influence the establishment of grounds for appealing against a notice of suspicion to ensure the requirement of general fairness of criminal proceedings. The author emphasizes that the problem of regulatory regulation of appealing against a notice of suspicion is the uncertainty of the procedural time limit after which a relevant complaint may be filed if the prosecution parties notify a new suspicion or change the original notice of suspicion. It is found that the implementation of a notice of suspicion covers several stages, and therefore is considered through the prism of a combination of a procedural decision and the execution of a procedural action. It is stated that the inaction of an investigator, coroner, or prosecutor, which is manifested in the failure to serve a notice of suspicion, is subject to a separate appeal in terms of failure to serve a written notice of suspicion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In criminal proceedings, the establishment of facts beyond reasonable doubt is a cornerstone principle, ensuring that criminal offenses are accurately identified and perpetrators are justly punished while respecting the rights of all parties involved. The proof process is vital, with evidence playing an essential role in determining the outcomes of various procedural stages. Among the types of evidence, expert evidence has become increasingly significant, especially with advances in science and technology broadening the scope of issues requiring specialized knowledge. This paper aims to analyze the roles and impacts of professional and expert activities in criminal procedures. It seeks to highlight the distinctions between expert reports and professional statements, illustrating their respective legal standings and importance in the context of Slovak law. By examining the regulatory framework, specifically Act No. 382/2004 Coll. on experts, interpreters, and translators, and the Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 301/2005 Coll.), the paper delves into the conditions, rights, and obligations of experts. Additionally, it addresses the significance of expert consultants introduced by the Criminal Procedure Code, who provide advisory services without precluding the involvement of expert witnesses for comprehensive technical assessments. Expert reports, governed by stringent formalities, are pivotal in addressing complex technical issues within criminal cases. These reports must be produced by court-appointed experts and include detailed descriptions of the methods used and the conclusions drawn. Conversely, professional statements, considered documentary evidence, do not carry the same legal weight and lack the formalities required for expert reports. The Criminal Procedure Code also ensures that expert evidence is used appropriately by stipulating when and how expert opinions should be sought. This comprehensive approach ensures that all technical and scientific issues are thoroughly examined, contributing to the fair administration of justice. In conclusion, the integration of expert and professional activities in criminal proceedings enhances the accuracy and reliability of judicial decisions. By leveraging specialized knowledge, the legal system can better fulfill its mandate of delivering justice while upholding the principles of fairness and due process. This paper underscores the necessity of clear regulatory frameworks and th e proper application of expert evidence to achieve these aims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this perspective article, I explore the implications of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled algorithmic decisions on education governance. Three main questions are explored: (1) Are algorithmic decisions de facto policy decisions? (2) What distinct features of algorithmic decisions necessitate a re-evaluation of education governance? (3) How should one begin addressing algorithmic decisions in education governance? The analysis suggests, first, algorithmic decisions can indeed be considered de facto policy decisions, as they are often made by private companies with substantial public consequences but little oversight. Second, three distinct features of algorithmic decisions—fast speed of development and implementation, lack of interpretability and transparency, and unpredictable emergence of new capabilities—call for a re-evaluation of education governance. Third, to address algorithmic decisions in education governance, I propose a proactive approach to multilevel social control mechanisms, which includes federal and state legislation, local enforcement, non-governmental organizations, and individual stakeholders. The discussion in this perspective article will stimulate conversations that scrutinize how AI, and algorithmic decisions specifically, challenge traditional assumptions of education governance, including the separation of powers, power distribution between national and local governments, due process, and representative democracy. The discussion aims to shed light on the evolving landscape of education governance in the age of AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common technique in American interrogations is "moral minimization," in which investigators excuse or justify the suspect's criminal behavior on moral grounds. A surprising type of moral minimization is explicit victim-blaming, which includes blaming the victim by endorsing negative stereotypes on the basis of gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation, what we call victim-blaming-bystereotype. No one has previously considered the policy wisdom or constitutionality of this technique. We explore the unintended consequences. One cost is the secondary victimization of those who suffer from crime, especially when they discover how detectives have disparaged them. The second is the effect on the interrogators. Using the economic concept of self-selection and psychological theories of persuasion, we explain why the training and practice in the pretense of victim-blaming produces a detective cadre that is more likely to actually blame victims. Victim-blaming detectives are less likely to effectively investigate crime. Finally, we consider constitutional objections to victim-blaming-by-stereotype. The practice does not plausibly violate the suspect's due process or Miranda rights--the constitutional challenges that commonly garner the most attention among scholars of interrogation--but it plausibly violates the equal protection rights of the victim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2021, twenty-four states, in extraordinarily quick succession, have enacted statutes banning physicians from prescribing puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones to minors for treatment of gender dysphoria. Although the Food and Drug Administration has not approved these drugs for this use, offlabel prescribing is a common practice, and leading medical organizations all agree that this off-label use of puberty blockers and sex hormones is an essential component of transgender medical care. These state laws thus represent an extreme, and unprecedented, interference with the provision of standard-of-care medicine. This Article, after exploring the ongoing litigation challenging these bans, argues that they violate a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—namely, the right to obtain standard-of-care treatment from a physician. It demonstrates that this right is deeply rooted in America’s history and traditions by presenting the first-ever comprehensive review of state policies regarding off-label prescribing practices and showing that the states have virtually never interfered with physicians’ prescribing decisions in this manner. Finally, in light of relevant judicial precedents, this Article shows why courts should strike down these unparalleled, oppressive state laws as unconstitutional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American immigration law is a domain where ordinary constitutional rules have never applied. At least, that is the conventional wisdom. Immigration law's exceptionalism is widely believed to flow directly from the Supreme Court's invention, in the late nineteenth century, of the so-called plenary power doctrine. On the standard account, that doctrine has long insulated immigration policies from constitutional scrutiny. The plenary power doctrine is thought to permit everything from President Trump's Muslim ban to the indefinite detention of migrants at the border. But the reigning historical account of immigration exceptionalism is wrong. Revisiting the field's canonical cases, this Article reveals that the plenary power doctrine lawyers and judges argue over today was not created in a series of late nineteenth-century cases. Far from being exceptional, those cases applied the then-standard framework linking due process and the separation of powers. By failing to understand that nineteenth-century immigration law was ordinary public law, scholars and jurists have, for decades, badly misunderstood immigration law's foundational cases. We have also overlooked the role that immigration law played in the development of modern public law. At the turn of the twentieth century, immigration law evolved apace with the rest of public law as both underwent a dramatic transformation. In some cases, immigration law even led the revolution, driving the development of the legal regime we now call "administrative law." Immigration exceptionalism is thus a recent invention. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that the immigration plenary power doctrine was invented in the Roberts Court rather than in the late nineteenth century. Once we locate immigration exceptionalism in its proper moment, we can better appreciate immigration law's centrality to the development of American public law. We can also assemble new arguments against the modern exceptionalism that is responsible for the very worst parts of immigration law today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are almost 400,000 children currently separated from theirfamilies and living in foster care in the United States. In many of these cases, courtappointed special advocates volunteer to investigate the family, prepare aformal report, and make recommendations to the court on behalfofthe children. Studies show that the current judicial system tends to unnecessarily and wrongfully remove children from their families and terminate parental rights based on the implicit socioeconomic and racial biases of the court-appointed special advocate volunteers. Although court-appointed special advocates receive minimal training before their involvement injuvenile cases, these volunteers are often permitted by the court to testijj? about their opinion ofthe ability ofaparent to care for their child, the nature of the parent-child relationship, the mental health of family members, the quality of the family environment. and any diagnoses of health issues in the. family. Because the volunteers do not have the necessary training, experience, or education, this Note argues that this testimony violates the evidentiary rules of most states-which track the Federal Rules of Evidence on improper expert opinions-and do not ensure the specific guarantees of reliability and accuracy established in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, this Note argues that these volunteers jail to meet the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. Given that courtappointed special advocates have such a unique, influential role in the courtroom, this Note applies the Supreme Court balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge to conclude that the repeated evidentiary error in juvenile proceedings is a violation of procedural due process and a threat to the longestablished constitutional right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of one's children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In such widely noted decisions as Ford Motor (2021) and Mallory (2023), the Supreme Court has opened the door to a serious re-evaluation of the due process limits on state court assertions of personal jurisdiction. First, the Ford Motor Court clarified that the category of specific jurisdiction includes the defendant's actions "relating to" the cause of action. extending relevant contacts beyond those recognized in Nicastro (20\10. Second. in Mallory, the Court recognized the continuing vitality ofaform of general jurisdiction in state registration statutes that many thought foreclosed under the at-home test of Daimler (2014) and Goodyear (2011). Finally, some members of the Court have displayed a healthy interest in the historical origins ofpersonaljurisdiction law, one reflected both in the originalist impulses of Justice Gorsuch and in the deference to an elderly precedent on display in his recent opinion for the Court in Mallory. Indeed, some jurists and scholars actively support a restoration Of the rule-based formalism ofthe Pennoyer regime. In this Article, we consider and reject the historical argument jor Pennoyer 's restoration. On the one hand, we reach the counterintuitive and novel conclusion that Pennoyer 4 territorial formalism better ensured litigation in an interested forum than critics ®en admit. The plaintiff's desire for a convenient forum tended to restrict forum choice to states with a legitimate interest in the parties and the litigation. On the other hand, the plaintiff's incentives no longer restrict forum choice. Changes in the market. for plaintiffside legal representation have. fundamentally altered the forum-selection calculus. Instead of returning to Penno'yer's formal territorial rules, we urge a renewed. focus on the interest of the forum state in providing a suitable verniefor the litigation. Once a part of the International Shoe evaluation of fair play and substantial justice, forum interest factors have disappeared from an analysis dominated by a focus on defendant contacts. By rebalancing the due process inquiry, the Court might reclaim the hidden. Ainctionality of Pennoyer without reinstating a set of outmodedformal rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that exclusionary zoning-the imposition of restrictions on the amount and types of housing that property owners are allowed to buildis unconstitutional because it violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Zoning has emerged as a major political and legal issue. A broad cross-ideological array of economists and land-use scholars have concluded that it is responsible for massive housing shortages in many parts of the United States, thereby cutting off millions of people-particularly the poor and minorities-from economic and social opportunities. In the process, it also stymies economic growth and innovation, making the nation as a whole poorer. Exclusionary zoning is permitted under Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reaky, the 1926 Supreme Court decision holding that zoning is largely exempt from constitutional challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by extension also the Takings Clause. Despite the wave of academic and public concern about the issue, so.far, no modern in-depth scholarly analysis has advocated overturning or severely limiting Euclid. Nor has any scholar argued that exclusionary zoning should be invalidated under the Takings Clause, more generally. Exclusionary zoning is permitted under Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reaky, the 1926 Supreme Court decision holding that zoning is largely exempt from constitutional challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by extension also the Takings Clause. Despite the wave of academic and public concern about the issue, so.far, no modern in-depth scholarly analysis has advocated overturning or severely limiting Euclid. Nor has any scholar argued that exclusionary zoning should be invalidated under the Takings Clause, more generally of a variety of progressive living constitution theories of interpretation, including Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading," representation-reinforcement theory, and the emerging "anti-oligarchy" constitutional theory. The Article also considers different strategies for overruling or limiting Euclid, and potential synergies between constitutional litigation and political reform of zoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text discusses the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that allow for the discharge of pre-petition claims, with exceptions for claims related to fraud or intentional misconduct. It highlights the challenges faced by mass tort claimants in bankruptcy cases, particularly in instances like Purdue and LTL. The text suggests the need for amendments to the Code to protect the interests of mass tort claimants, including the authorization of emergency relief funds for claimants with urgent medical needs. This amendment would aim to provide a more equitable solution for claimants and ensure their well-being is preserved during bankruptcy proceedings. [Extracted from the article]

The article offers information on the court case SEC v. Jarkesy, where the Supreme Court ruled that administrative adjudication of securities fraud actions seeking civil penalties violated the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial. Topics include the public rights doctrine, the balance of powers between branches of government in administrative law, and the Court's interpretation of historical precedents in determining the scope of the Seventh Amendment.

The article offers information on the court case Department of State v. Muñoz, which centers on the Supreme Court's ruling that a U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental right to bring a noncitizen spouse into the country. Topics include the Court's interpretation of substantive due process, the concept of immigration exceptionalism in constitutional rights, and the limitations of procedural due process in visa proceedings involving noncitizens.

The article offers information on the court case McElrath v. Georgia, focusing on the Supreme Court's decision to apply the federal definition of acquittal in double jeopardy cases. Topics include the conflict between state and federal definitions of acquittal, the impact of Georgia's "repugnant verdicts" rule on double jeopardy protections, and the Court's clarification that once an acquittal is made, it cannot be revisited, even if the verdict appears inconsistent.

For centuries, juries in criminal trials have retreated to the privacy of their "black box" to deliberate and decide a defendant's guilt or innocence. The secrecy of the deliberation process is a hallmark of a democratic system that tasks the public with holding their neighbors accountable to community standards. What happens, however, when this curtain of confidentiality shields troubling impropriety? Jury experimentation with evidence is one circumstance that may justify a look inside the black box. Although jurors are encouraged during deliberations to examine trial evidence, experiments in the jury room may violate a defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial by introducing "new evidence" that the defendant does not have the opportunity to challenge in open court. Moreover, procedural "no-impeachment" rules often prohibit jurors from testifying to the process through which they reached their verdict after it has been delivered. In the absence of clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court, courts at the state and federal level are deeply split on how to approach the issue of juror experimentation with evidence. This Note examines the tension between the judicial system's policy of jury secrecy and the potentially competing commitment to upholding the constitutional rights of defendants. This Note argues against revising the federal and state no-impeachment rules to create additional windows into the juror deliberation process, which would disturb the important function of judicial finality. Rather, trial counsel should utilize the full breadth of in-court mechanisms available to prevent improper experimentation. Judges should consider the extent to which pre-verdict remedies were used and whether the defendant was prejudiced when determining whether juror misconduct occurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the Supreme Court has established the fundamental right of access to the courts, obligating state prisons to provide legal assistance to prisoners in pro se civil rights suits, it has left ambiguity regarding the extent of assistance required beyond the pleading stage, resulting in a circuit split. While the Seventh and Third Circuits advocate for continuous affirmative assistance, the Ninth Circuit limits it to the pleading stage. This Note argues that state prisons should be mandated to offer assistance throughout all litigation stages. It explains the constitutional basis for the right of access to the courts, which is rooted in the Due Process and Petition Clauses. It contends that such assistance ensures meaningful access to justice and aligns with constitutional rights. Moreover, this approach is pragmatic, increasing legal access for prisoners without imposing substantial financial burdens on state prisons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The right to a fair trial is a critical part of national and international human rights frameworks. To protect this right, the rule of law should be implemented. Currently, the approach to trying individuals accused of grave international crimes, including genocide, is different, which gives an impression of inequality. For instance, the person accused of the al-Anfal genocide was tried by a national court and sentenced to the death penalty, whereas the person accused of the Srebrenica genocide was sentenced to life imprisonment by an international tribunal. Not to mention the lack of respect for the defendants' rights during the al-Anfal genocide's trial, including the principle of due process and the right to a fair trial. The main reason for the differing decisions in these two identical cases involving genocide arises from their trials in different courts and under different legal frameworks. This paper addresses the significance of these challenges for equality under international law and emphasises the difficulties in securing fair trials by examining these examples. Methods: This article analyses the application of the right to a fair trial for international criminals by using doctrinal methods. Specifically, it adopts a qualitative approach to examine relevant international statutes. To illustrate, the research chose to analyse and compare two case studies: the trial of Ali al-Majid, the leader of the al-Anfal genocide, and Ratko Mladic, the leader of the Srebrenica genocide. This comparison focuses on aspects such as judicial independence and overall fairness in the trials of war criminals. It involves desk-based research and data that are collected through the analysis of relevant literature from primary sources, such as international law instruments and secondary sources, including books and academic articles, about the inconsistency of fair trial standards in different judicial contexts. Results and conclusions: Different approaches in trials for similar crimes threaten global justice and the protection of individual rights and freedoms. One practical way to address this issue is to bring those accused of grave international crimes, including genocide, to appear before the International Criminal Court (ICC), providing fair trials and punishments. However, this article demonstrates that the doctrine of state sovereignty may pose challenges to creating a uniform framework for the prosecution of war criminals. Additional challenges arise with the existence of different legal and political systems across the world. The article argues that to ensure a fair trial and maintain international peace and security, it is necessary to overcome these challenges and adopt a uniform framework for the prosecution of those accused of grave international crimes. The ICC can be the solution. The international community can overcome these challenges by encouraging all countries to join the Rome Statue and give it the sole jurisdiction over grave international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due process can be understood as a norm of fundamental law and a positive provision intended to preserve legal certainty; it can also be seen as a jurisdictional institution aimed at configuring procedural guarantees within a judicial action. But its relationship with artificial intelligence takes on a special meaning in the modern constitutional states, in the guarantee constitutions, and in the so-called constitutions of principles, all of these of great influence and gestation in the Euro-pean constitutionalism of the second post-war period, and which have poured their reception in Latin American legal systems and therefore in its fundamental normative bodies. In this paper we will precisely develop the hermeneutic-procedural impact on the administration of justice, of the relationship and connection between due process and artificial intelligence, a topic that will be addressed in the key of theory and philosophy of law. In particular, we will respond specifically to three points of our presentation: (i). What is artificial intelligence ap-plied to law? Theoretical and conceptual perspectives for a new exper-imental practical reason. (ii). Judges and the administration of justice mediated by AI: new meta-normative systems and their judicial her-meneutics. and (iii). Algorithmic jurisprudence: The artificial judicial decision and its procedural impact on the administration of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Professor Richard George Wright, a beloved and respected professor at IU McKinney School of Law, recently announced his retirement after forty-eight years of teaching. His impact on students, particularly in Constitutional Law, was profound, with his unique teaching style and witty humor making complex legal concepts more accessible. Professor Wright's generosity, kindness, and wisdom have left a lasting impression on his students, who fondly remember his guidance and support both inside and outside the classroom. As he transitions into retirement, Professor Wright's legacy as a mentor and educator will continue to inspire future generations of legal scholars. [Extracted from the article]

Substantive due process, drawn from the 14th Amendment, has been a consistent judicial doctrine for establishing and protecting the rights and liberties of Black citizens in the face of systemic racism. This prompts a question for political consideration and investigation: if the 14th Amendment is a constitutional equilibrium for rights Black citizens would otherwise not enjoy, could the rescission of a right decided and sustained by the 14th Amendment that is not racially explicit have negative racial implications for Black Americans? This study answers this question through an atheoretical case study on the ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade. This study finds that the ruling in Dobbs weakened the 14th Amendment by allowing parameters to be placed on substantive due process. Though the question before the Court was the constitutionality of Mississippi's abortion law, the implications of weakening the 14th Amendment are that it allows for the legal and cultural revitalization of Black exclusion that existed under the Black Codes, which has already come to fruition in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and the end of affirmative action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of investigative genetic genealogy ("IGG") as a basis for arresting suspects in complex and dormant investigations is raising serious concerns about whether the due process rights of criminal defendants in these cases are being violated. This Note provides a comprehensive look at the role of this groundbreaking, yet little-understood technology in criminal prosecutions. Technological advances have historically necessitated that courts expand and reinterpret legal principles. As a novel derivative of traditional DNA testing, this Note argues IGG should similarly require that discovery statutes be amended or rewritten to adapt to this cutting-edge technique, which is so new that it lacks uniform standards and certifications. By comparing IGG to traditional DNA profiling and other forensic evidence, this Note reveals the reliability and privacy issues arising from such an unconventional application of established scientific practices. While DNA evidence is now considered the "gold standard" and has attained an "aura of infallibility" in the criminal justice system, highly regarded scientific techniques have later been discredited, resulting in numerous wrongful convictions. There are early warning signs with respect to IGG, which have already led to false identifications, underscoring the need to subject it to the scrutiny of the discovery process. It is crucial to strike a reasonable balance that protects privacy interests but enables defendants to mount a vigorous defense by requiring the disclosure of material to challenge the admissibility of IGG, effectively cross-examine witnesses, and collect potentially exculpatory information. This Note delineates the specific language and scope of potential amendments or reinterpretation of discovery statutes needed to prevent prosecutors from having an unfair advantage and ensure that suspects obtain fair trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the use of pedagogy and curriculum in churches to teach about religion and culture. It explores the concept of implicit pedagogy, which relies on word of mouth and contextual cues, particularly in high-context cultures like many East Asian cultures. The article highlights the potential dangers of implicit pedagogy in cases of abuse, where it can prioritize the protection of perpetrators over justice for victims. It also examines the role of social media, specifically the anonymous Instagram profile @letters_from_rahab, in providing a platform for victim-survivors to share their stories and seek solidarity and accountability. The article emphasizes the importance of explicit pedagogies of solidarity to challenge and dismantle abuse cultures within religious communities. [Extracted from the article]

Criminal defendants face an uphill battle when attempting to prove that the government’s loss or destruction of evidence that could have played a significant role in their defense deprived them of their constitutional due process rights. To make this showing, the defendant must prove that the government lost or destroyed the evidence in bad faith. This requirement is problematic because direct evidence illustrating the subjective intent of the government officials who lost or destroyed the evidence is unlikely to exist, and in the off chance it does, the prosecution is unlikely to freely hand it over to the defendant. Thus, short of an admission from the government that it lost or destroyed the evidence in bad faith-which is also unlikely to happen-criminal defendants face an evidentiary void that makes it extremely difficult for them to satisfy the bad faith requirement, thereby limiting their ability to obtain constitutional recourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Wisconsin statute that regulates termination of parental rights (TPR) as a result of sexual assault is untenable and in need of revision. The current statute is far too stringent to be practically implemented, which is especially true in involuntary TPR proceedings. This Comment seeks to explain why Wisconsin's current statute for TPR as a result of sexual assault is flawed. First, this Comment gives background by detailing rape statistics in the United States to explain why the possibility for TPR exists when a conception results from a sexual assault. Second, Wisconsin adopts a position that is at odds with constitutional and state standards regarding TPR law by requiring what is essentially a criminal law "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for a finding of conception by rape. This standard contrasts with the constitutionally required "preponderance of the evidence" standard that is applied in other TPR cases. Third, while the due process considerations in TPR cases are high because the state is intervening in the parent-child relationship, the current status of these due process considerations would not be a barrier to redefining the statute allowing TPR as a result of sexual assault. This Comment suggests four small, yet profound, changes to this statute. First, guilty and no contest pleas should be permitted to prove conception as a result of sexual assault. Second, a mother's ability to be heard during the dispositional phase on her desire for the termination of the father's rights should be encoded in the statute. Third, the standard for the TPR statute should be a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Fourth, an example of "other evidence" as to previous sexual assaults of the mother should be added to the statute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through qualitative analysis, the paper examined the soured relationship between Gambian chiefs and their colonial masters against the backdrop of the legal implications of the disciplinary actions the latter meted out to the former. The article commenced with the theme, before addressing the legal concept of due process, which ensures fairness in the dispensation of justice. By disregarding normal standard legal procedures, the provisions of Magna Carta, and legal precedence, the colonial administrators inflicted draconian punishments on chiefs who dared think outside the box. From archival materials, colonial correspondences, and learned journal publications, the paper advanced explanations for the highhandedness of the colonialists, which degenerated into residency restrictions imposed on the chiefs. The absence of separation of administrative powers, caused by an acute shortage of European personnel, resulted in a situation whereby colonial rule in The Gambia amounted to a situation through which rule of man took precedence over the rule of law. The compelling approach resulting from the lack of collaboration among the chiefs and the colonial administrators fomented discord. The case laws cited in the paper indicate that colonialism in The Gambia remained a case of the strong exerting control over the weak, who had no option but to put up with the inevitable consequences of colonial rule. From diverse learned sources, instances of banishments in history and how the ancient practice was applied to The Gambia received attention with the aim of elucidating how the colonial administrators adopted legal standards which compromised fair play. With primary materials derived from The Gambia National Archive, instances of chiefs who were at loggerheads with the European colonialists was addressed hence, the paper ascertained the causes and nature of the soured relationship. The findings revealed why the local administrators grappled with situations that were at variance with the normal state of affairs in England. This partly accounts for the seemingly unorthodox tactics adopted while addressing a number of issues. Consequently, the activities of overseas colonial administrators were glossed over by the colonial office and British parliament as Gambians were perceived to be a people in need of civilization. Therefore, replicating the conditions in England in a frontier territory as The Gambia would be tantamount to an exercise in futility, as they felt that they should be on higher rungs of the civilization ladder before they could comprehend European conditions. The overbearing approach of the colonialists ultimately exacerbated the lack of cooperation from the colonial subjects leading to the bone of contention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]