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This monograph discusses five considerations for campaign planners to use in planning attacks on an enemy's command and control (C2) system. Development of the considerations focuses on the top military and political leadership as the most lucrative component of a C2 system for attack. The five considerations are the enemy's type of government, the identity of successors (if any), the desired state at war termination, the legal constraints, and the moral considerations. These considerations do not provide a 'cookbook' approach. Issues raised while examining one consideration interact with issues in other considerations and the strategic goals. Using the considerations as a guide will provide a wide look at the issues involved add reveal relevant and irrelevant aspects of the situation. Finally, the considerations are applied to three recent conflicts Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 conflict between a U. S. led coalition and Iraq; Operation Just Cause, the 1989 U. S. conflict with Panama, and Operation Eldorado Canyon, the 1986 U. S. attack on Libya. Each of these conflicts included attacks on top Political leadership. Application of the five considerations to these three cases clarifies the connection between U. S. strategic goals and the tactical application of force in each conflict. Campaign Planning, Panama, Target Selection, Command and Control, Libya, Operational Objectives, Political Leadership, Iraq, Operational Level of War

This monograph discusses five considerations for campaign planners to use in planning attacks on an enemy's command and control (C2) system. Development of the considerations focuses on the top military and political leadership as the most lucrative component of a C2 system for attack. The five considerations are the enemy's type of government, the identity of successors (if any), the desired state at war termination, the legal constraints, and the moral considerations. The considerations provide an important tool for campaign planners to use in connecting their strategic objectives with tactical operations against enemy command and control. The monograph first reviews theoretical models for command and control structures. These models provide the framework for analyzing attacks to disrupt, destroy, isolate, or influence an enemy C2 and the effect of these attacks on an enemy's combat capability. The attacks are analyzed in three spheres, the information, communication, and decision spheres. These spheres represent vulnerabilities of C2 systems to attack. Each type of attack is related to the spheres it influences and the vulnerabilities in the model it affects. Using the models as a theoretical base, the considerations are developed. Descriptions of the considerations provide a campaign planner with a method for applying them in specific situations. They do not provide a 'cookbook' approach. Issues raised while examining one consideration interact with issues in other considerations and the strategic goals. Using the considerations as a guide will provide a wide look at the issues involved and reveal relevant and irrelevant aspects of the situation. Finally, the considerations are applied to three recent conflicts: Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 conflict between a U.S. led coalition and Iraq; Operation Just Cause, the 1989 U. S. conflict with Panama; and Operation Eldorado Canyon, the 1986 U. S. attack on Libya. Each of these conflicts included attacks on top pol