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This selected bibliography lists references for readings on Jointness, an enduring theme of the U.S. Army War College. A revised and updated version of the library's earlier bibliographies on jointness, it focuses on aspects of the United States Armed Forces such as joint operations, joint logistics, interservice cooperation, interservice rivalry, joint communications, joint training, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. With the exception of some important older titles, most of the books, documents, journal articles, and online resources cited are dated 2004 to the present. All items are available in the U.S. Army War College Library. For users' convenience, at the end of the citations, the author added Library call numbers, Internet addresses, or database links. Web sites were accessed during July 2007.

While the US Army focused on counter-insurgency operations during the beginning of the 21st century, competitors such as Russia and China focused on conventional military force modernization threatening US military dominance. This perceived decrease in the US military capability gap coupled with emerging technology, such as cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum, changed the character of warfare. The US Army's response, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), seeks to use the concept of convergence to integrate all military domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment rapidly and continuously to confer a military advantage. To achieve convergence, the US Army must conduct joint development efforts with other services, develop inter-service agreements, revise staff structures, and revise personnel policies. The development of AirLand Battle in the post-Vietnam era and subsequent military operations in Operation Desert Storm provide a historical case study focused on organizational changes to achieve convergence between the land and air domains. Current institutional mechanisms for US military force modernization, developed mainly during the AirLand Battle period, may need to be adjusted to ensure adaptation for achieving MDO convergence.

Throughout the history of close air support (CAS) there exists a consistent theme of friction and interservice rivalry. There are periods where close coordination and cooperation led to extremely effective CAS. Experiences in North Africa during World War II proved to be a harbinger of CAS throughout the twentieth century. The ineptness of the initial air-to-ground integration evolved by wars end into a synchronized, lethal form of combined arms operations. The troubled relationship between the Army and the Air Force over CAS directly impacts four major areas needed to accomplish effective CAS. Those areas are training, doctrine, trust and dialogue. Because of the troubles experienced in CAS during recent military operations in Afghanistan the Army is once again finding fault with current CAS capabilities. The Air Force admitted that there are problems. They also stress, with much justification, that there is plenty of fault to go around. The conclusion of the thesis is that CAS will continue to be an integral part of joint military operations. The Army and the Air Force must focus on improving training, doctrine, and most importantly, trust before any improvements are realized. The lives of US soldiers may well depend upon the effectiveness of CAS.

This study reviews the Army's involvement in the nation's space activities during the late 1950's when the Army went from being the clear leader in space research and operations to a position of relatively minor significance by 1961. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal those forces responsible for the rapid departure by the Army from the space field. Such an analysis is important now since the Army appears ready to dramatically increase its activities in space. Unless Army leaders account for the existence of these same forces today, this service may be destined to repeat past mistakes, refight old battles, and, in the end, find important Army space aspirations frustrated. The forces identified include inter-service rivalry, national strategy controversy, and political and bureaucratic disputes. Each of these forces is examined and the consequences on the Army detailed. When the final bureaucratic and political battles are waged in 1961, the Army proves willing to trade off most of its space activities to fund much needed conventional force modernization. The reasons for the renewal of Army interest in space are examined along with the emerging organizational and policy initiatives concerning space undertaken by the Army. In a number of appendices, current Army statements of policy, organizational proposals, and study summaries are presented. The final chapter contains over 24 conclusions concerning potential problems facing Army leaders as the Army increases it involvement with space activities. These conclusions are all drawn based on historical antecedents and observations of emerging Army space intentions discussed in the thesis. Overall, the Army can expect opposition when its actions cross perceived or actual boundaries between "accepted" roles and missions in space or threaten the existence of USAF or USN space systems that support "vital" air or sea operations. The Army's strongest bureaucratic position seems to be as spokesman for the space needs of t