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In this paper we investigate the introduction of an export tax on steam coal levied by an individual country (Australia), or a group of major exporting countries. The policy motivation would be twofold: generating tax revenues against the background of improved terms-of-trade, while CO2 emissions are reduced. We construct and numerically apply a two-level game consisting of an optimal policy problem at the upper level, and an equilibrium model of the international steam coal market (based on COALMOD-World) at the lower level. We find that a unilaterally introduced Australian export tax on steam coal has little impact on global emissions and may be welfare reducing. On the contrary, a tax jointly levied by a "climate coalition" of major coal exporters may well leave these better of while signifcantly reducing global CO2 emissions from steam coal by up to 200 Mt CO2e per year. Comparable production-based tax scenarios consistently yield higher tax revenues but may be hard to implement against the opposition of disproportionally afected local stakeholders depending on low domestic coal prices.

In this paper we investigate the introduction of an export tax on steam coal levied by an individual country (Australia), or a group of major exporting countries. The policy motivation would be twofold: generating tax revenues against the background of improved terms-of-trade, while CO2 emissions are reduced. We construct and numerically apply a two-level game consisting of an optimal policy problem at the upper level, and an equilibrium model of the international steam coal market (based on COALMOD-World) at the lower level. We find that a unilaterally introduced Australian export tax on steam coal has little impact on global emissions and may be welfare reducing. On the contrary, a tax jointly levied by a "climate coalition" of major coal exporters may well leave these better off while significantly reducing global CO2 emissions from steam coal by up to 200 Mt CO2 per year. Comparable production-based tax scenarios consistently yield higher tax revenues but may be hard to implement against the opposition of disproportionally affected local stakeholders depending on low domestic coal prices.

This paper examines the effects of combining an international cap-and-trade scheme with national carbon taxes. We consider a two-country stochastic partial equilibrium model with log-normally distributed uncertainty. The situation is analogous to the situation where European countries impose national carbon taxes in addition to the EU emissions trading. The allowance price in the joint cap-and-trade scheme depends on the tax rate, the relative size of countries and abatement options, the magnitude of uncertainty, and correlation of abatement costs. In most cases, the additional tax will not lead to additional production of the public good beyond the fixed targets. The additional tax results in higher costs of abatement to the country introducing the additional tax, and higher costs overall.

In recent years, renewable energy technologies have been advocated in Fiji on the basis that they improve energy security and serve as a risk-mitigation measure against oil price volatility. Despite this, there have been few attempts to measure the impact of renewable technologies on energy security. That analysis is important if the benefits of renewable energy technologies in Fiji are to be adequately evaluated. This paper develops and applies a method for assessing the potential contribution of renewable technologies to the security of electricity supply in Fiji. The method is based on an application of portfolio theory, traditionally used in financial markets, to the electricity generation mix in Fiji. The results demonstrate the impact of different renewable technologies on both portfolio generation cost and risk for Fijian electricity grids.

We give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission control, using the first multiparty model to combine tax-versus-trading under uncertainties with revenue recycling. Including multiple parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions (permit) trading in handling abatement-cost uncertainties, from that shown by existing, single-party literature. But a tax has a different, much bigger advantage, from better handling uncertainties in business-as-usual emissions. Either mechanism's free emissions share, from tax thresholds or free permits, which lowers its possible welfare gain from revenue recycling, may however dominate any tax-versus-trading advantage. Moreover, political and practical constraints, such as the political unacceptability of no free emissions, the institutional unavailability of efficient emissions tax thresholds, and the unpopularity of recycling revenue as conventional tax cuts, make ideal welfare maximisation a poor guide for mechanism choice; and at optimal prices, trading currently tends to outperform taxation.

There is demand for qualitative and quantitative economic analysis on the optimum degree of climate change mitigation and adaptation, the optimal timing of such actions, and their optimum distribution between countries and sectors. This paper discusses what is, as well as what is not, possible for economic modelling in this field. Specific reference is made to the paper by Bosello, Carraro and de Cian (2009), as well as Tol (2009). Integrated assessment modelling can provide powerful qualitative insights (for example, about the need for both mitigation and adaptation and the interactions between the two, or the need for both individual and policy-driven adaptation). However, the more detailed quantitative results from such studies are subject are extremely limited. In many cases, they are virtually irrelevant as a policy guide. For these models to be useful representations of reality, economic climate change models need three important features: representation of uncertainty about impacts (in particular, the risk of abrupt climate change); fuller representation of economic impacts from climate change and inclusion of non-market impacts; and finally, modelling of equity dimensions. These features are absent in many models currently used. This leads to a tendency for quantitative results to be biased against mitigation as an option to address climate change and in favour of other adaptation.

We analyse the long-term efficiency of the emissions target and of the provisions to reduce carbon leakage in the Australian Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, as proposed in March 2009, and the nature and likely cause of changes to these features in the previous year. The target range of 5-15% cuts in national emission entitlements during 2000-2020 was weak, in that on balance it is too low to minimise Australia's long-term mitigation costs. The free allocation of outputlinked, tradable emission permits to Emissions-Intensive, Trade-Exposed (EITE) sectors was much higher than proposed earlier, or shown to be needed to deal with carbon leakage. It plausibly means that EITE emissions can rise by 13% during 2010-2020, while non-EITE sectors must cut emissions by 34-51% (or make equivalent permit imports) to meet the national targets proposed, far from a cost-effective outcome. The weak targets and excessive EITE assistance illustrate the efficiencydamaging power of collective action by the 'carbon lobby'. Resisting this requires new national or international institutions to assess lobby claims impartially, and more government publicity about the true economic importance of carbon-intensive sectors. Published in the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, volume 54, pages 185-202.

A detailed proposal for an economy-wide emissions trading scheme in Australia was tabled by the government in December 2008 with a proposed start date for mid-2010. The government proposes unilateral linking, with no initial bilateral linkages, through the clean development mechanism and joint implementation. The proposal has resulted in serious concern about significant permit price increases and price capping, leading to a ban on permit sales. This research paper evaluates the proposed Australian scheme in relation to international emissions trading and linkages. Different scenarios for the Australian permit price under unilateral linking are considered. Options for bilateral linking with the European Union and New Zealand schemes are also evaluated, including access to ‘hot air’ units. The research paper argues that Australia needs to dismantle linking obstacles, such as the price cap, and move towards suitable bilateral linking schemes.

The Asia-Pacific region is the major source of global growth in greenhouse gas emissions. Strong action is needed in Asian countries, particularly China and India, to reduce these global emissions. Driven by the desire to limit energy consumption, some Asian countries already have domestic policies to limit greenhouse gas emission. But much more ambitious policies are needed to turn emission trends around. This research report examines the implications of international efforts to mitigate the impacts of human activity on climate in the Asia-Pacific region.

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is to have firms pay an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.

Effective climate policy requires global emissions of greenhouse gases to be cut substantially, which in energy sectors can be achieved by lower emissions supply technologies, greater energy use efficiency, and substitution in demand. For policy to be efficient requires fairly uniform, pervasive emission pricing from taxes, permit trading, or hybrid combinations of the two, as well as significant government support for low-emission technologies. We compare the kind of technology-focused climate policies currently adopted by Australia and the USA, the 'Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate' (AP6), against this ideal policy yardstick. We find they omit the need for emission pricing to achieve abatement effectively and efficiently; they over-prescribe which abatement actions should be used most; they make unrealistic assumptions about how much progress can be achieved by voluntarism and cooperation, in the absence of either adequate funding or mandatory policies; and they unjustifiably contrast technology-focused policy and the Kyoto Protocol approach as the only two policies worth considering, and thus ignore other important options.

We analyse the impact of the agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP6bis in Bonn in July 2001 on investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the Protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks will be credited to Annex B countries under Article 3.4 of the Protocol. In addition, there is a large potential supply of surplus emissions quota (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition. This means that demand for certified emission reductions (CERs) from CDM projects will be relatively small. The magnitude of the CDM as a means for meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments, and individual countries' shares, will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply side of the global carbon market. The analysis is based on a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves and designed specifically for this type of analysis. We estimate required emission reductions in Annex B countries, the share of the Kyoto mechanisms in meeting this demand, the price for CERs, and the geographical distribution of CDM projects, and discuss distribution of sequestration projects. A ?low demand, low price? carbon market scenario appears likely, with intense competition between developing countries to attract CDM investors. Sensitivity analysis illustrates the likely direction and magnitude of impacts when key supply and demand parameters are changed. We examine the impact of higher or lower implementation and transaction costs, as well as expanding or contracting the supply of CERs through baseline and additionality rules. While the CDM could suffer a loss in competitiveness if transaction costs are too high, changes in CDM supply parameters do not fundamentally change estimates of CDM size and revenue. On the demand side by contrast there are there are a number of factors which could greatly reduce the size of the CDM, or even preclude commercially driven CDM projects altogether. Key factors that could harm the CDM are lower business-as-usual emissions growth in Annex B countries, higher supply of surplus emissions quota (hot air) from EIT countries, and possibly crediting under Article 3.4 of sequestration in agricultural soils. If however the United States participated in implementing the Kyoto Protocol, none of these factors would be a threat to a viable and sizeable CDM. We conclude that although the potential role for the CDM is seriously diminished under the Bonn agreement and without the United States on board, a significant amount of CDM projects in developing countries could still be achieved. Much will depend on international market factors, as well as the design of rules for CDM project implementation. The best strategy is to prepare to be competitive in a low-demand, lowprice market, and at the same time to strive for the United States to still come on board the Kyoto Protocol. Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen des Bonner Abkommens zur Umsetzung des Kyoto- Protokolls vom Juli 2001 auf Projekte zur Verringerung von Treibhausgasen in Entwicklungsländern (Clean Development Mechanism, CDM). Die von den Industrieländern insgesamt geforderte Emissionsverringerung ist bei Nichtteilnahme der USA relativ gering, da erhebliche Mengen in heimischen Senken gespeicherten Kohlenstoffs unter Art. 3.4 des Kyoto-Protokolls angerechnet werden. Außerdem gibt es ein großes Angebot überschüssiger Emissionsrechte aus Russland und anderen Transformationsländern (sogenannte ?heiße Luft?). Daher wird die Nachfrage nach zertifizierten Emissionsreduktionen (CERs) aus CDM-Projekten relativ gering sein. Das Gesamtvolumen des CDM und der Anteil einzelner Länder wird durch eine Vielzahl von Faktoren sowohl auf der Angebots- als auch der Nachfrageseite beeinflusst. Unsere Analyse basiert auf einem quantitativen Modell des globalen Treibhausgasmarktes. Wir ermitteln die in den Industrieländern erforderlichen Emissionsverringerungen, den Anteil der Kyoto-Mechanismen, den CER-Preis und die geographische Verteilung von CDM-Projekten generell sowie von Senkenprojekten im besonderen. Ein Szenario mit niedriger Nachfrage und niedrigen Preisen sowie intensivem Wettbewerb der Entwicklungsländer um CDM-Investoren erscheint wahrscheinlich. Mittels Sensitivitätsanalysen analysieren wir die Auswirkungen von Veränderungen auf der Angebotsseite (Transaktionskosten und unterschiedliche Regeln für die Bestimmung von Referenzfällen und Zusätzlichkeit). Während hohe Transaktionskosten die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des CDM stark einschränken können, sind die anderen Faktoren von untergeordneter Bedeutung. Dagegen können diverse Faktoren auf der Nachfrageseite den CDM stark reduzieren oder völlig überflüssig machen. Dabei handelt es sich um niedrigeres Emissionswachstum im business-as-usual-Fall, höheres Angebot an ?heißer Luft? und Speicherung in landwirtschaftlichen Böden. Falls jedoch die USA teilnehmen, würde keiner dieser Faktoren den CDM ernsthaft bedrohen. Wir kommen zum Ergebnis, dass trotz der starken Einschränkung des CDM durch das Bonner Abkommen und das Fernbleiben der USA eine relevante Menge an CDMProjekten in Entwicklungsländern zustandekommt. Viel hängt von den Regeln für die Umsetzung des CDM ab. Die beste Strategie ist die Vorbereitung auf einen Markt mit niedriger Nachfrage und niedrigen Preisen. Gleichzeitig muss versucht werden, die USA zur Teilnahme am Kyoto-Protokoll zu bewegen.

Given the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to decrease the risk of dangerous climate change, economists have often argued in favour of carbon pricing. Carbon pricing can essentially take two forms: an emissions trading system or a carbon tax. The European Union chose the former option and implemented the EU ETS in 2005, the first large scale carbon market. As a first mover in experimenting with such regulatory instruments, the EU ETS case offers qualitative and quantitative insights of foremost importance for emerging carbon markets worldwide. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I provides ex-post learnings on the EU ETS price formation and policy design. Part II offers an ex-ante perspective by exploring the expansion of the European carbon market. Both parts pay particular attention to a central feature of the EU ETS: its political nature as a government created market. This institutional perspective on the EU ETS, which seeks to take into consideration the impact of politics and institutions on market functioning, is at the heart of this thesis. It brings a new lens to examine emissions trading as well as draws on the experience of other policy fields, notably monetary policy. Following the drop of permit prices in the EU ETS, intense discussions emerged on the need to and modality for reforming the market, which is the focus of Part I of this thesis. Yet, evaluating the need to reform first implies understanding the goals of the EU ETS and whether market outcomes are likely to deliver on their promises. Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for the remaining discussions of the thesis by clarifying the different implicit and explicit objectives expected from the EU ETS. Although cost-effectiveness is often proclaimed to be the main goal of the EU ETS, stakeholder opinions diverge regarding the appropriate time frame for this objective, some focusing on short-term while other having a long-term perspective. In addition, certain stakeholders have multiple objectives, for instance, addressing the social cost of carbon. Based on economic theory, Chapter 2 then provides a comprehensive review of the drivers of the price collapse in the EU ETS, classifying them into three categories: (i) exogenous demand shock, (ii) lack of policy credibility and (iii) market imperfections. From this classification, a new framework to map the reform option space is developed. It carefully examines which policy options represent potential solutions depending both on what drives the price as well as on the objective intended for the EU ETS. Drawing on the analogy to monetary policy, this mapping of the reform option space introduces the concept of delegation in the context of emissions trading. Delegation reflects the extent to which the governance of the market is relinquished to a rule-based adjustment mechanism or an independent body with varying levels of discretionary power. Complementing the qualitative analysis of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 offers an empirical analysis of price formation. It shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, demand-related fundamentals such as fuel prices or the economic downturn only explain a fraction of the carbon price drop. Importantly, chapter 3 provides preliminary evidence that regulatory uncertainty and the lack of policy credibility played a much larger role than previously assumed in driving down the price. Chapter 4 is a direct follow-up, closing the gap on the influence of regulatory events in price formation. Using an empirical event study methodology, the chapter carefully investigates how the political process of the cap adjustment has shaped market outcomes in the European carbon market. The findings show that the tedious process of achieving reform unveiled the lack of political consensus on the EU ETS goals; thereby increasing political uncertainty and contributing to the price decline. These empirical findings have critical implications for the reform of the EU ETS – instruments that do not attempt to anchor long-term regulatory credibility are unlikely to be successful in bringing the price closer to its long-term, socially-optimal path. In this context, though delegation is unlikely to be a silver bullet, it could strengthen the credibility of political commitment by locating the governance of the market outside the political sphere. It could likewise reinforce the flexibility of responding to “unknown unknowns”. Supplementing the previous chapters, Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive policy analysis of the specific reform option for the EU ETS proposed by the European Commission in 2014 following the price collapse: the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). It is argued that the MSR is unlikely to enhance long-term commitment credibility, raising doubt on its ability to trigger low carbon investments. This policy evaluation is embodied in a broader reform context taking both an ex-post and ex-ante perspectives. It thereby bridges Part I and II. The second half of this thesis, Part II, offers a forward-looking perspective on the expansion of carbon markets. Chapter 6 investigates the sectoral expansion of the EU ETS towards agriculture, which has often been perceived as challenging. Implementation barriers are regularly cited as impeding carbon pricing in the sector, in particular transaction costs stemming from sector specificities, risks of leakage and distributional impacts on farmers, often perceived as major veto-players. However, the importance of the barriers hinges critically on the precise policy design. Chapter 6 therefore offers the first synthesis of literature on the pricing of agricultural emissions with the rich body of literature on the design of carbon markets. The chapter provides a new perspective on carbon pricing in European agriculture by disentangling the key dimensions of policy design in the light of implementation barriers. In particular, it investigates the role of policy coverage, instrument choice and transfers to farmers in overcoming policy obstacles. First, it is shown that a policy coverage targeting large farms and few emission sources could include a significant share of agricultural emissions, while reducing transaction costs. Second, it is argued that the distributional impacts and leakage risks are contingent upon the policy being voluntary or mandatory. From this perspective, a voluntary instrument can be attractive, but comes at the cost of possible subsidy lock-ins and carbon price distortion. Third, the role of the Common Agricultural Policy and its potential interaction with carbon pricing is highlighted as being pivotal in determining political feasibility. Chapter 7 focuses on the other critical side of carbon pricing, going beyond jurisdictional borders. In principle, linking could lead to efficiency gains and reduce the cost of compliance for entities covered under a trading system. Taking the example of REDD+ offsets (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), Chapter 7 investigates the trade-offs between the opportunities of allowing an import of cheaper offsets in carbon markets and the risks it entails in terms of investments. It is shown that a well-designed policy could provide a risk-hedging opportunity for compliance entities while having limited impact on low carbon investment. In sum, this thesis concentrates on investigating the conditions under which the EU ETS requires policy intervention. It offers an institutional view on the EU ETS reform. Drawing on empirical results, it demonstrates the role of political commitment in price formation. It then analyses the pros and cons of delegation in carbon markets to overcome time-inconsistency and lack of policy credibility (Part I). Part II delivers insights to broaden carbon pricing in the European Union and beyond in the future. Focusing on pricing agricultural emissions, it provides a framework to disentangle the different dimensions of policy design and conceptualize policies that reduce implementation barriers. Finally, Part II examines the trade-offs associated with various policy options to link carbon markets to a forestry offset scheme. In Anbetracht der Dringlichkeit, Treibhausgasemissionen zu reduzieren, um das Risiko eines gefährlichen Klimawandels zu senken, sprechen sich Ökonomen oft für eine Bepreisung von Kohlenstoff aus. Die Bepreisung von Kohlenstoff kann grundsätzlich zwei Formen annehmen: ein Emissionshandelssystem oder eine CO2-Steuer. Die Europäische Union hat die erste Option gewählt und 2005 das EU ETS (EU Emissions Trading System, Europäisches Emissionshandelssystem) eingeführt, den ersten großangelegten Kohlenstoffmarkt. Als Vorreiter in diesem regulatorischen Instrument bietet das EU ETS qualitative und quantitative Erkenntnisse von höchster Bedeutung für entstehende Kohlenstoffmärkte weltweit. Diese Doktorarbeit unterteilt sich in zwei Teile. Teil 1 stellt ex-post Lernerfahrungen hinsichtlich der Preisbildung und Politikgestaltung des EU ETS dar. Teil 2 bietet eine ex-ante Perspektive, indem es die Ausweitung des Europäischen Kohlenstoffmarktes erforscht. Beide Teile legen ein besonderes Augenmerk auf ein zentrales Merkmal des EU ETS: seine politische Natur als ein von Regierungen geschaffener Markt. Diese institutionelle Perspektive auf das EU ETS, die den Einfluss von Politik und Institutionen auf das Funktionieren des Marktes berücksichtigt, steht im Zentrum dieser Doktorarbeit. Sie bietet eine neue Perspektive, was die Untersuchung von Emissionshandel betrifft, und zieht Erfahrungen anderer Politikfelder, insbesondere der Geldpolitik, heran. Der Preisrückgang für Zertifikate im EU ETS führte zu intensiven Diskussionen über Bedarf und Modalitäten einer Reform des Marktes, was der Fokus von Teil 1 dieser Doktorarbeit ist. Doch eine Bewertung des Reformbedarfs verlangt zuerst ein Verständnis der Ziele des EU ETS und der Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der der Markt seine Versprechen hält. Kapitel 2 leistet Vorarbeit für die weitere Diskussion der Doktorarbeit, indem es die verschiedenen expliziten und impliziten Ziele des EU ETS beleuchtet. Während Kosteneffizienz oft als Hauptziel des EU ETS angeführt wird, gehen die Meinungen der Stakeholder auseinander, was den angemessenen Zeitrahmen für dieses Ziel betrifft: Manche nehmen eine Kurzzeit-, andere eine Langzeitperspektive ein. Zusätzlich verfolgen einige Stakeholder mehrere Ziele, wie zum Beispiel die sozialen Kosten von Kohlenstoffemissionen zu minimieren. Basierend auf ökonomischer Theorie gibt Kapitel 2 eine umfassende Übersicht über die treibenden Kräfte des Preisverfalls im EU ETS, welche in drei Kategorien eingeteilt werden: (i) exogener Nachfrageschock, (ii) mangelnde Glaubwürdigkeit der Politiken und (iii) Marktverzerrungen. Auf Basis dieser Klassifikation wird ein neuer Rahmen entwickelt, um den Spielraum für Reformen aufzuzeigen. Es wird untersucht, welche Politikoptionen als Lösungen in Frage kommen, in Abhängigkeit verschiedener Preistreiber und Ziele des EU ETS. Analog zur Geldpolitik führt diese Darstellung des Spielraumes für Reformen das Konzept der Delegation im Kontext vom Emissionshandel ein. Delegation beschreibt das Maß, in demdie Governance des Marktes einem regelbasierten Anpassungsmechanismus oder einer unabhängigen Institution mit unterschiedlichen Graden an Weisungsbefugnis überlassen wird. Komplementär zur qualitativen Analyse in Kapitel 2 bietet Kapitel 3 eine empirische Analyse der Preisbildung. Sie zeigt, dass nachfragebezogene Faktoren wie die Rezession, im Gegensatz zur gängigen Meinung, nur einen (kleinen) Teil des CO2-Preisverfalls erklären. Kapitel 3 erbringt den vorläufigen Nachweis dafür, dass regulatorische Unsicherheit und mangelnde Glaubwürdigkeit der Politiken eine viel größere Rolle für den Preisverfall spielten als vorher angenommen. Kapitel 4 schließt direkt daran an, indem es die Wissenslücke bezüglich des Einflusses von regulatorischen Ereignissen auf die Preisbildung schließt. Unter Verwendung einer empirischen Event-Studie analysiert das Kapitel wie der politische Prozess der Cap-Anpassung den Europäischen Kohlenstoffmarkt beeinflusst hat. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der langwierige Prozess der Reformierung den Mangel an politischem Konsens bezüglich der Ziele des EU ETS offenbart und somit die politische Unsicherheit erhöht hat, was zum Preisverfall beitrug. Diese empirischen Ergebnisse bringen entscheidende Implikationen für die Reform des EU ETS mit sich: Instrumente, die keine langfristige regulatorische Glaubwürdigkeit erzeugen, warden voraussichtlich keinen Erfolg darin haben, den Preis näher an sein langfristiges soziales Optimum zu bringen. Wenngleich Delegierung keine Wunderwaffe ist, könnte sie in diesem Kontext doch die Glaubwürdigkeit des politischen Engagements stärken, indem sie die Governance des Marktes außerhalb der Politik ansiedeln würde. Auch könnte sie die Flexibilität stärken, auf “unbekannte Unbekanntheiten” zu reagieren. In Ergänzung zu den vorhergehenden Kapiteln bietet Kapitel 5 eine umfassende politische Analyse jener spezifischen Reformoption für das EU ETS, die 2014 nach dem Preissturz von der Europäischen Kommission vorgeschlagen wurden: die Marktstabilitätsreserve (MSR). Es wird argumentiert, dass es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die MSR die langfristige Glaubwürdigkeit des verbindlichen politischen Engagements erhöhen wird, was Zweifel an ihrer Fähigkeit aufkommen lässt, die entsprechenden Investitionen in Gang zu setzen. Diese Politikbewertung bettet sich in den weiteren Reformkontext ein und nutzt sowohl eine ex-post als auch eine ex-ante Perspektive. Sie bildet damit die Brücke zwischen Teil 1 und 2. Die zweite Hälfte der Doktorarbeit, Teil 2, bietet eine vorausschauende Perspektive auf die Erweiterung von Kohlenstoffmärkten. Kapitel 6 untersucht die Ausweitung des EU ETS auf den Landwirtschaftssektor, die oft als Herausforderung wahrgenommen wird. Oft wird angeführt, dass zu viele Hürden einer Umsetzung der Kohlenstoffbepreisung in diesem Sektor im Wege stünden, insbesondere sektorspezifische Transaktionskosten, Leakage Risiken und Verteilungseffekte für Landwirte, deren Verbände oft als wichtige Veto-Mächte betrachtet werden. Die tatsächliche Bedeutung dieser Hindernisse hängt jedoch stark von der konkreten Ausgestaltung der Politiken ab. Kapitel 6 bietet daher die erste Synthese der Literatur zur Bepreisung von Landwirtschaftsemissionen und der Literatur zur Ausgestaltung von Kohlenstoffmärkten. Das Kapitel bietet eine neue Perspektive auf Kohlenstoffbepreisung in der europäischen Landwirtschaft in dem es die Schlüsseldimensionen der Politikgestaltung im Hinblick auf Umsetzungsbarrieren analysiert. Insbesondere untersucht es die Rolle des Anwendungsbereiches der Politiken, derWahl der Politikinstrumente und von Transfer an Landwirte für das Überwinden von politischen Hindernissen. Zuerst wird gezeigt, dass eine Anwendung auf große Betriebe und wenige Emissionsquellen einen beträchtlichen Anteil an landwirtschaftlichen Emissionen abdecken und gleichzeitig Transaktionskosten reduzieren könnte. Zweitens wird argumentiert, dass die Verteilungseffekte und Leakage Risiken davon abhängen, ob das Politikinstrument verpflichtend oder freiwillig ist. Aus dieser Perspektive kann ein freiwilliges Instrument attraktiv sein, jedoch auf Kosten eines möglichen Fortbestandes von Subventionen und Kohlenstoffpreisverzerrungen. Drittens wird die Rolle der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU und ihrer möglich Wechselbeziehung mit Kohlenstoffbepreisung als entscheidend für die politische Machbarkeit hervorgehoben. Kapitel 7 betrachtet einen anderen entscheidenden Aspekt der Kohlenstoffbepreisung: die Ausweitung über Grenzen hinweg. Im Prinzip kann eine Verbindung von Kohlenstoffmärkten Effizienzgewinne mit sich bringen und die durch die Beachtung der Rechtsvorschriften entstehenden Kosten für die vom Handelssystem abgedeckten Einheiten reduzieren. Anhand des Beispiels der REDD+ Kompensation wägt Kapitel 7 die Chancen, die sich daraus ergeben, dass ein Import von preisgünstigeren Kompensationszertifikaten in Kohlenstoffmärkten erlaubt wird, mit den damit verbundenen Risiken für Investitionen ab. Es wird gezeigt, dass die richtige Politik eine Möglichkeit zur Risikoabsicherung für einbezogene Betreiber darstellen und gleichzeitig einen begrenzten Einfluss auf weniger emissionsintensive Investitionen haben könnte. Insgesamt konzentriert sich diese Doktorarbeit darauf, die Bedingungen, unter denen das EU ETS ein Eingreifen der Politik benötigt, zu untersuchen. Sie bietet eine institutionelle Perspektive auf die EU ETS Reform. Indem sie empirische Ergebnisse heranzieht, demonstriert sie die Rolle eines verbindlichen politischen Engagements für die Preisbildung. Sie analysiert dann die Vor- und Nachteile von Delegierung in Kohlenstoffmärkten, um zeitliche Inkonsistenzen und einen Mangel an politischer Glaubwürdigkeit zu überwinden (Teil 1). Teil 2 stellt Erkenntnisse zur zukünftigen Ausweitung der Kohlenstoffbepreisung in der Europäischen Union und darüber hinaus dar. Mit einem Fokus auf die Bepreisung von Agraremissionen bietet dieser Teil einen Analyserahmen um die verschiedenen Dimensionen der Politikgestaltung zu entflechten und Politiken zu konzeptualisieren, die Umsetzungshürden reduzieren können. Schließlich untersucht Teil 2 die Zielkonflikte verschiedener Politikoptionen, die eine Verbindung von Kohlenstoffmärkten mit waldbezogenen Kompensationssystemen anstreben.