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This article examines two versions of the proportionality constraint in just war theory, one minimalist, prohibiting almost no military acts, and one maximalist, prohibiting pretty much everything. I argue that neither one meets the needs of the theory and that they should be supplemented and modified by an ethic of responsibility. Ovaj članak ispituje dve verzije ograničenja proporcionalnosti u teoriji pravednog rata, jednu minimalističku, koja ne zabranjuje gotovo nijedna vojna dejstva, i jednu maksimalističku, koja zabranjuje gotovo sve. Tvrdim da nijedna ne zadovoljava potrebe teorije i da bi ih trebalo dopuniti i modifikovati etikom odgovornosti.

International audience; Against an international backdrop of mutating forms of conflict (privatization, judiciarisation), of evolving centers of interest (the environment, police actions, terrorism) and weaponry (armed drones, lethal autonomous weapons systems), the place of war ethics in contemporary thinking must be questioned. This status has been vigorously contested by certain political leaders all while prompting an outpour of debate in academia. This paper aimed to discuss war ethics’ current standing with the help of Michael Walzer. He proposes some clarifications, new questions, but also food for thought on how to apprehend changing conflictuality with his trademark sharpness.; Dans un contexte international de mutation des modalités des conflits (privatisation, judiciarisation), d’évolution des centres d’intérêt (écologie, actions de police, terrorisme) et des armements (drones armés, systèmes d’armes létaux autonomes), la place de l’éthique de la guerre dans la pensée contemporaine doit être questionnée. Vivement contestée par certains dirigeants politiques alors même qu’elle suscite parallèlement un foisonnement de réflexions dans le champ académique, nous avons souhaité aborder son actualité avec Michael Walzer. Il nous propose des clarifications, des interrogations inédites mais également des pistes de réflexion pour aborder les évolutions de la conflictualité avec le regard avisé qui est le sien.

The findings reported in the article “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants,” by Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, are indeed disturbing, but I am not convinced that they tell us all we need to know about public attitudes. Different questions, those that invite respondents to reflect on the reciprocal nature of practical morality (exemplified by the golden rule: “Do unto others . . .”), might reveal very different views of justified and unjustified conduct in war. I believe that these views, regarding, for example, the treatment of prisoners of war, would probably support the idea of the moral equality of soldiers on the battlefield.

Targeted killing in the “war on terror” and in war generally is subject to familiar and severe moral constraints. The constraints hold across the board; they don't change when drones are the weapon of choice. But the ease with which drones can be used, the relative absence of military risks and political costs, makes it especially tempting not only to use drones more and more, but also to relax the constraining rules under which they are used. It seems clear that the rules have, in fact, been relaxed in the course of the American experience with drone warfare – by presidential decision and without public debate. This essay is an argument for the opening up of the decision process to democratic scrutiny and in defense of the familiar constraints.

The author, a well know theorist and activist of the civil rights movement and the movement against the Vietnam War, published the first part of this article from his own intervention and experience in 1968. There, he analyses the emergence of the New Left in the United States -and its global connection- through the social structure, the actors’ class background and their cultural configuration to account for the aspirations and limits that accompanied the middle class youth that lead this movement. The dilemmas that emerged between the racial, ethnic, social and economic axes that defined the actors framed the diverse social movements and throw light on the promises, scope and weaknesses that characterized them. In the post scriptum, written explicitly for the Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales 50 years later with a great analytical and existential wisdom, the author inspects the way in which class profile, radicalization and separatism led to an isolation of the New Left from the natural support basis it should have reached. It evaluates the consequences of its integration either to the Old Left or to the system, as it manifests in the turn towards right that progressive and democratic sectors had in the United States. Furthermore, he underlines the way it influenced the inequality and vulnerability that prevails among the social class –the “precateriat”– the left should have represented, and projects itself in the current situation and in Trumpism. Without a doubt, the depth, realism and theoretical and practical vision of Michael Walzer have turned him into one of the representative figures of political theory. JBL, El autor, teórico y activista del movimiento de los derechos civiles y de los movimientos contra la guerra en Vietnam, publicó la primera parte de este artículo en 1968. En él, analiza la emergencia de la Nueva Izquierda en Estados Unidos -y su conexión global- a partir de la estructura social, la pertenencia de clase de los propios actores y su configuración cultural para dar cuenta de las aspiraciones y limitantes que acompañaron a la juventud de clase media que encabezó este movimiento. Los dilemas que emergieron entre la configuración étnico-racial, social y económica de los actores enmarcados en el movimiento por los derechos humanos arrojan luz sobre las promesas, alcances y debilidades que éste tuvo. En el post scriptum, escrito explícitamente para la Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales 50 años después, con una gran sabiduría analítica y existencial, el autor revisa el modo como el perfil de clase, la radicalización y el separatismo condujo a un aislamiento de la Nueva Izquierda de las naturales bases de apoyo que debió haber alcanzado. Evalúa las consecuencias ya sea de su integración a la Vieja Izquierda o bien al sistema, tal como se manifiestan en el viraje a la derecha que los sectores progresistas y democráticos tuvieron en Estados Unidos, y cómo se reflejó en la situación de desigualdad y vulnerabilidad prevaleciente en gran parte de las clases sociales que la izquierda debió representar, e incluso en el Trumpismo hoy. Sin duda, la profundidad, realismo y visión teórica y práctica de Michael Walzer lo han convertido en una de las figuras representativas de la teoría política. JBL.

Artykuł omawia argumenty Pawła Włodkowica, polskiego filozofa/teologa z XV wieku, dotyczące wojen etycznie usprawiedliwionych (ius ad bellum). Autor opowiada się za przyjęciem twierdzenia Włodkowica, zgodnie z którym rozum naturalny wyznacza granice dla uzasadnionych działań zbrojnych, a w szczególności zakazuje wszczynania wojen świętych, takich jak krucjaty Zakonu Krzyżackiego, wykluczając tym samym również wojny prowadzone przez współczesnych bojowników dżihadu. Zakazuje on także prowadzenia operacji militarnych wspieranych przez bojowo nastawionych rzeczników ideologii świeckich.

My purpose here is to argue that political theorists have a kind of professional permit to move back and forth between the academic and political worlds and to expound and defend particular political positions. I then describe my own engagements, political and theoretical, and the books and articles that have come out of them—about war, social justice, pluralism, social criticism, and nationalism (with Zionism the key example of the last of these).

Asymmetrical warfare poses many problems for soldiers and insurgents who would like to fight in accordance with current understandings of just war theory and the internationally recognized rules of engagement. Members of both groups complain that they cannot win if they stick to the rules. In fact, the rules, rightly understood, are consistent with military success. But, given the political character of modern warfare, it is important that public opinion is shaped by that right understanding so that just conduct is recognized and reinforced.

I am not going to tell you this evening how Jews (or anyone else) should think about the war in Iraq, or about the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, or about different incidents in the “war” on terrorism, or about the 2006 Lebanon war or the 2009 war in Gaza. This is not a political talk. I want to look back on the treatment of war, and more particularly, the ethics of war, in the Jewish tradition. How does war figure in the Bible, the Talmud, in Jewish law (halakha), in scholarly commentaries and rabbinic responsa? And with regard to this material, I am going to adopt a typically Jewish approach (that is, a critical approach): I will begin by discussing the deficiencies and omissions of the Jewish account of the ethics of warfare. I will say something later on about the strengths of this account. But the deficiencies are important, especially so from a Zionist perspective (which is my own perspective), because they have an important cause: namely, the centuries of statelessness. Now that there is a Jewish state, legal scholars and philosophers need to look carefully and critically at exilic understandings of politics. In most of the world, after all, political theory in general, and ideas about war in particular, are a reflection of decisions made and policies adopted by sovereign states. And for almost 2000 years, the Jews were without sovereignty. There were, of course, autonomous or semi-autonomous Jewish communities in the diaspora, and these communities provided a political space for power-seeking (even if there wasn’t much power to seek), and for decision-making, and for debates about what decisions to make and who should make them—so there is a long tradition of Jewish political and legal argument. But the Jews had no “high” politics, no politics of war and peace, from the time of Bar Kokhba (135 C.E.) to the time of Ben-Gurion (1948). The incompleteness of Jewish thought about war derives from this central historical fact. I will need a point of comparison for my analysis of what the rabbis produced, and I am going to use Catholic just war theory for that purpose—since for most of our Philosophia (2012) 40:633–641 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9390-5

Seven US academics and commentators set out their hopes and suggestions for President Obama's first 100 days in office

T he first question that we have to ask about promoting democracy is the question of agency: Who are the promoters? Most of the recent arguments have focused on the state, that is, on the already democratic states and, particularly, the United States. Regime change, it is commonly thought, is a state project, and so we need to think about the means that states might use for the sake of this project. Crucially, when can they use force? My own view is that they can never rightly use force to create a democratic regime in someone else’s country. The old arguments for ‘‘nonintervention,’’ first made by John Stuart Mill, still hold. But once states have used force for some other legitimate purpose, to defeat the Nazis, for example, or (hypothetically, since we did not do it) to stop a massacre in Rwanda, they can continue to use it; they may even be obligated to continue to use it, for political reconstruction. Absent some such overriding purpose, I do not believe that sending an army across the border is a good democratic move; nor is it likely to be an effective way to promote democracy. Even if a morally necessary humanitarian intervention produces a change of regime and opens the way for democratization, we need to be realistic about what kinds of politics are possible after an extended period of ethnic cleansing and mass murder. A devastated country in which the killers and the people they tried to kill (and whose relatives they did kill) live side by side is not a likely setting for democratic deliberation, popular engagement, and nonviolent opposition. Sometimes all that we can demand in replacing a murderous regime is a nonmurderous regime. Democratization will have to wait for the (slow) development of peaceful coexistence and mutual trust. An occupying army may aid that development, but it is not itself, and should not try to be, an agent of political transformation. States can also encourage democratization without using military force— through diplomacy, say, or ideological argument. But I suspect that they are more effective in protesting and perhaps restraining the worst abuses of nondemocratic, authoritarian regimes. The heavy hand of state bureaucracy, working

Walzer Michael, Kastoryano Riva, Bouvet Laurent, Jaffrelot. Le multiculturalisme au coeur. In: Critique internationale, vol. 3. 1999. Crime et politique en démocratie, sous la direction de Didier Bigo. pp. 55-63.

Responding to the critiques of the four previous authors, Walzer opens with a statement of the inherent imperfection of any theory of war. He reminds us that theories are merely frameworks for decisions and cannot provide answers in and of themselves. Moral decisions in war are especially difficult, for it is often necessary to choose between equally valid claims. Walzer continues the discussion of sieges initiated by both Koontz and Boyle and concedes the validity of Koontz's criticism of inconsistency in his theory of noncombatant immunity. Addressing the different authors' moral doctrines–Hendrickson's consequentialism and Koontz's and Boyle's deontology–Walzer argues that it is better to judge each case individually, weighing both the consequences and principles, rather than strictly adhere to one moral doctrine, an approach commended by Smith. Finally, in the search for a perfect just war theory, Walzer issues a realist reminder that there can be no such thing as a morally perfect war.

In dem Gespräch geht es um Fragen des Pluralismus in modernen Gesellschaften und der Begründung von Gerechtigkeit. Universalistischen Prinzipien wird eine Absage erteilt. Statt dessen werden die Bedingungen erörtert, wie Nonnen der Gerechtigkeit in partikularisierten Gesellschaften gesichert werden können. Dabei spielen Verfahren gerechter Problemlösungen ebenso eine Rolle wie die Schwierigkeiten einer substantiellen Rechtfertigung. Trotz oder wegen der Partikularismen bedürfe es eines Gemeinwesens, dessen Subjekt die Staatsbürger sind und deren Zusammenfassung der (National)staat bleibt.

Intellectual fashions are notoriously short-lived, very much like fashions in popular music, art, or dress. But there are certain fashions that seem regularly to reappear. Like pleated trousers or short skirts, they are inconstant features of a larger and more steadily prevailing phenomenon in this case, a certain way of dressing. They have brief but recurrent lives; we know their transience and except their return. Needless to say, there is no afterlife in which trousers will be permanently pleated or skirts forever short. Recurrence is all. Although it operates at a much higher level (an infinitely higher level?) of cultural significance, the communitarian critique of liberalism is like the pleating of trousers: transient but certain to return. It is a consistently intermittent feature of liberal politics and social organization. No liberal success will make it permanently unattractive. At the same time, no communitarian critique, however penetrating, will ever be anything more than an inconstant feature of liberalism. Someday, perhaps, there will be a larger transformation, like the shift from aristocratic knee-breeches to plebian pants, rendering liberalism and its critics alike irrelevant. But I see no present signs of anything like that, nor am I sure that we should look forward to it. For now, there is much to be said for a recurrent critique, whose protagonists hope only for small victories, partial incorporations, and when they are rebuffed or dismissed or coopted, fade away for a time only to return. Communitarianism is usefully contrasted with social democracy, which has succeeded in establishing a permanent presence alongside of and some

La obra de Michael Walzer es una de las claves para entender el resurgimiento de la Guerra Justa que pudo observarse en los años 90. El prólogo, a través del ejemplo de la Guerra del Golfo, ilustra sobre como las decisiones políticas o militares que desembocan en un conflicto armado, constituyen un problema moral de primer orden que repercute en los propios combatientes, así como en la población civil y sobre el que es necesario debatir. Walzer plantea problemas de enorme actualidad como la cuestión del pacifismo y sus consecuencias, la necesidad de distinguir y justificar el derecho a la guerra o el derecho en la guerra y poner de manifiesto que solo la existencia de una regulación normativa sobre la Guerra Justa permitirá conseguir el objetivo de que deje de ser un recurso ilimitado. Michael Walzer´s book is one of the keys to understanding the resurgence of the Just War during the 1990´s. Through the use of the Gulf War as an example, the Prologue explains how the political or military decisions that lead to war constitute a moral dilemma with consequences not only for the combatants, but also for the civilian population, thus representing an issue that must be debated. Walzer takes on current issues such as the pacifist question and its consequences, the need to distinguish and to justify the Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, and to explain that only a normative regulation for Just War will avoid the consideration for war as an unlimited resort.

On the occasion of the November 2006 annual meeting of the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization (IPSO), we, the members of IPSO's International Scientific Council, noted with considerable satisfaction the receipt of 71 proposals for joint scientific research between Palestinian and Israeli

The prestige of political philosophy is very high these days. It commands the attention of economists and lawyers, the two groups of academics most closely connected to the shaping of public policy, as it has not done in a long time. And it claims the attention of political leaders, bureaucrats, and judges, most especially judges, with a new and radical forcefulness. The command and the claim follow not so much from the fact that philosophers are doing creative work, but from the fact that they are doing creative work of a special sort-which raises again, after a long hiatus, the possibility of finding objective truths, "true meaning," "right answers," "the philosopher's stone," and so on. I want to accept this possibility (without saying very much about it) and then ask what it means for democratic politics. What is the standing of the philosopher in a democratic society? This is an old question; there are old tensions at work here: between truth and opinion, reason and will, value and preference, the one and the many. These antipodal pairs differ from one another, and none of them quite matches the pair "philosophy and democracy." But they do hang together; they point to a central problem. Philosophers claim a certain sort of authority for their conclusions; the people claim a different sort of authority for their decisions. What is the relation between the two? I shall begin with a quotation from Wittgenstein that might seem to resolve the problem immediately. "The philosopher," Wittgenstein wrote, "is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher."' This is more than an assertion of detachment in its usual sense, for citizens are surely capable, sometimes, of detached judgments even of their own ideologies, practices, and institutions. Wittgenstein is asserting a more radical detachment. The philosopher is and must be an outsider; standing apart, not occasionally (in judgment) but systematically (in thought). I do not know whether the philosopher

Throughout much of the history of political thought in the West, the Bible was at once a constitutional document and a kind of case book, putatively setting limits to speculation as well as to conduct. Theologians and political theorists were forced to be judges interpreting a text or, more often, lawyers defending a particular interpretation before the constituted powers in church and state or before the less authoritative court of opinion. The Bible became, like other such texts, a dissociated collection of precedents, examples and citations, each of which meant what the lawyers and judges said it meant.