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This paper summarises the outcome of an analysis of stablecoins undertaken by the ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force. At the time of writing, the stablecoin debate lacks a common taxonomy and unambiguous terminology. This paper applies a definition that distinguishes stablecoins from existing forms of currencies – regardless of the technology used – and characterises stablecoin arrangements based on the functions they fulfil. This approach emphasises the role of technology-neutral regulation in preventing arbitrage, as well as comprehensive Eurosystem oversight, irrespective of stablecoins’ regulatory status. Against this background, this paper assesses stablecoins’ implications for the euro area based on three scenarios for the uptake of stablecoins: (i) as a crypto-assets accessory function; (ii) as a new payment method; and (iii) as an alternative store of value. While the first scenario is merely the continuation of the current state of the market and, thus far, has not posed concerns for the financial sector and/or central bank tasks, stablecoins of the type envisaged in the second scenario may reach a scale such that financial stability risks can become material, and the safety and efficiency of the payment system may be affected. The third scenario is both the least plausible and the most relevant from a monetary policy perspective. The paper concludes that the Eurosystem relies on appropriate regulation, oversight, and supervision to manage the implications of stablecoins (and the risks that stem from them) on its mandate and tasks under plausible scenarios. The Eurosystem continues monitoring the evolution of the stablecoin market and stands ready to respond to rapid changes in all possible scenarios.

This paper analyzes product market competition between foreign entrants and former SOEs in transition markets with respect to expansion of product variety and consumer loyalty formation. While the market share motive induces the more efficient foreign entrant to price aggressively, the extent of this behavior depends critically on its relative efficiency vis-a-vis the local incumbent. If the efficiency gap exceeds some threshold value, the entrant exploits increasingly its cost advantages by raising price rather than investing in market share. Our result suggests that immediate restructuring of former SOEs is important to realize fully the competitive benefits of opening local markets.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 700–715. International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431.

I study the endogenous formation of pricing policies – posted-uniform versus negotiated pricing – by using a version of a two-stage pricing game in a duopoly context. The model explains the prevalence of uniform pricing in some markets/countries and identifies a typical Prisoners' Dilemma in these cases. The sellers' commitment to a pre-announced price under uniform pricing mitigates the fear of buyers that they might be exploited once they start price negotiations. While such buyers' anticipation induces sellers to adopt uniform pricing in an attempt to capture more buyers, it results in intensified competition with lower seller payoffs.