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This study quantifies the annual pay and allowance cost savings associated with Selective Reserve pilots employed within the C-9 community of the Naval Air Reserve. The present method of combined active duty and reserve pilot manning of the C-9 community is compared to three hypothetical all active duty manning scenarios to determine aggregate cost savings. A Days of Pay Model is developed and used to determine the Average Annual Base Pay Cost of Selective Reserve C-9 pilots and Base Pay Cost Savings associated with Selective Reserve manning of C-9 squadrons. Additional analysis quantify cost savings associated with Basic Allowance for Quarters, Variable Housing Allowance, Basic Allowance for Subsistence, Career Incentive Pay, and Retirement Pay. Further analysis is presented pertaining to the Average Annual Flight Time Benefits which are gained through Selective Reserve C-9 pilots who are airline pilots. Areas for further study associated with cost savings pertaining to Selective Reserve pilot manning are suggested, http://archive.org/details/costsavingsndben1094526953, Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Normally, military reservists who perform at least 20 years of creditable service are eligible to receive retirement pay once they have reached the age of 60. For some military reservists this could mean waiting an additional 22 years before receiving retirement pay after completing 20 years of active military service. By contrast, retired active duty military personnel can start receiving retirement pay the month following their completion of 20 years of active military service. For some retired active duty military members this could mean receiving retirement pay as early as age 38. This research paper will examine the issue of retirement pay for military reservists. The research reveals that lowering the age at which military reservists are eligible to receive retirement pay will improve the overall readiness of our reserve forces. Recommendations are provided to suggest changing the age that a military reservist should be eligible to start receiving retirement pay., USAWC Program Research Project.

To attract and retain the military personnel it needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) must offer a competitive compensation package -- one that adequately rewards service members for the rigors of military life. After reenlistment rates declined in the late 1990s, law makers and DoD began increasing cash and noncash elements of military compensation. In 2000, for example, they authorized that basic pay for service members would rise 0.5 percentage points faster than wages in the civilian sector through 2006. Housing allowances and other compensation also were increased. As a result, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, regular military compensation adjusted for inflation -- basic pay, allowances for food and housing, and the tax advantage that arises because those allowances are not subject to federal income tax -- grew by 21 percent for the active-duty enlisted force as a whole between 2000 and 2006. This study looks at compensation for the 83 percent of active-duty U.S. service members who are enlisted personnel. It considers various ways to measure military compensation and examines common methods of -- and problems with -- comparing that compensation with pay and benefits in the civilian sector. The analysis also explores the connection between the components of military compensation and the military's recruiting and retention of personnel. Finally, the study discusses possible options to make the military compensation system visible to service members and decision makers and more efficient., The original document contains color images.

Three separate areas of military manpower are analyzed: the effects of retirement pay on quits, and of military service on lifetime earnings; and the quantity-quality trade-offs in the market for recruits. Coupling the 1986 change in military retirement pay with the Army's delayed entry program makes a natural experiment with individuals entering active duty during the same period governed by retirement systems whose generosity differs by as much as 20%. Focusing only on Army enlistees, lower bounds for the elasticity of retention with respect to retirement pay are 0.80 for two-year and 0.00 for three and four-year enlistees. With simple assumptions and ignoring additional costs in recruiting, this analysis suggests the costs of the new retirement system exceed the benefits. We analyze the effect of changes in quantity demanded on the supply of quality. Using data on military recruiting over an eight-year period in the 1990s provides sufficient variation in economic conditions and demand to estimate this relationship.

When retirement-eligible military members are court-martialed for any offense and are punitively discharged, by operation of law they forfeit retirement pay-an amount sometimes more than one million dollars. This forfeiture is a collateral consequence of receiving a punitive discharge-it is not a specific punishment imposed by the court-martial sentencing authority or by the convening authority who approved the court-martial's action. In some cases the loss of retirement pay is appropriate and reasonable; in other cases it is harsh and inappropriately severe. My thesis is that the court-martial members and the convening authority, not the operation of law, should deprive a member of retirement pay. This paper explores the implications of a new punishment, Punitive Discharge with Retirement Pay (PD&R). The PD&R would be a new punishment authorized at the trial of a retirement-eligible military member. The court members would be instructed that if they sentence the accused to a PD&R, the accused would be punitively discharged from service with the loss of all military benefits except retirement pay. The members would also be instructed that they are free to adjudge a traditional punitive discharge that carries with it the loss of retirement pay. Thus, the sentence adjudged would directly take into account whether the accused should be required to forfeit retirement pay as an aspect of the punishment, rather than leaving the determination to the collateral operation of law.