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We examine the impact on the variance-covariance structure of UK and US equity markets of the quantitative easing (QE) operations implemented by the Bank of England (BoE) and the Federal Reserve (Fed). While the theory of portfolio balance suggests that QE operations could affect markets other than those in which the operations occur, prior analysis of these other markets is scarce. We find that while QE operations in general reduced equity volatility, day to day operations generated spikes in volatility in UK equities. We also find that BoE operations increased the covariance between the UK and US equity markets.

The paper provides evidence of a turn of the year effect in the order flow imbalance of both retail and institutional investors. In December there is net selling pressure which is reversed in January. We examine high frequency intraday order flow information and find that the changes in order flow imbalance between December and January are related to firm risk factors and characteristics. We find that retail order flow imbalances are associated with a wide range of risk characteristics including beta, illiquidity and unsystematic risk. Imbalances in institutional order flow are associated with only a small number of risk variables. We show that these order flow changes are important because risk premiums are elevated in January. Our results are robust to the effects of decimalization.

We examine the chief executive officer (CEO) optimism effect on managerial motives for cash holdings and find that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have significantly dissimilar purposes for holding more cash. This is consistent with both theory and evidence that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds. Optimistic managers hoard cash for growth opportunities, use relatively more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in adverse conditions. By contrast, they hold fewer inventories and receivables and their precautionary demand for cash holdings is less than that of non-optimistic managers. In addition, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that optimistic managers’ cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. We also document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. Our work highlights the crucial role that CEO characteristics play in shaping corporate cash holding policy.

Using a simulation analysis we show that non-trading can cause an overstatement of the observed illiquidity ratio. Our paper shows how this overstatement can be eliminated with a very simple adjustment to the Amihud illiquidity ratio. We find that the adjustment improves the relationship between the illiquidity ratio and measures of illiquidity calculated from transaction data. Asset pricing tests show that without the adjustment, illiquidity premia estimates can be understated by more than 17% for NYSE securities and by more than 24% for NASDAQ securities.

We examine the returns to UK government bonds before, during and between the phases of quantitative easing to identify the side effects for the market itself. We show that the onset of QE led to a sustained reduction in the costs of trading and removed some return regularities. However, controlling for a wide range of market activity, including issuance and QE announcements, we find evidence that investors could have earned excess returns after costs by trading in response to the purchase auction calendar. Drawing on economic theory, we explore the implications of these findings for both the efficiency of the market and the costs of government debt management in both the short and long run.

We model the effects of quantitative easing on the volatility of returns to individual gilts, examining both the effects of QE overall and of the specific days of asset purchases. The action of QE successfully neutralized the six fold increase in volatility that had been experienced by gilts since the start of the financial crisis. The volatility of longer term bonds reduced more quickly than the volatility of short to medium term bonds. The reversion of the volatility of shorter term bonds to pre-crisis levels was found to be more sensitive to the specific operational actions of QE, particularly where they experienced relatively greater purchase activity.

In this paper we re-examine the relationship between non-trading frequency and portfolio return autocorrelation. We show that in portfolios where security specific effects have not been completely diversified, portfolio autocorrelation will not increase monotonically with increasing non-trading, as indicated in Lo and MacKinlay (1990). We show that at high levels of non-trading, portfolio autocorrelation will become a decreasing function of non-trading probability and may take negative values. We find that heterogeneity among the means, variances and betas of the component securities in a portfolio can act to increase the induced autocorrelation, particularly in portfolios containing fewer stocks. Security specific effects remain even when the number of securities in the portfolio is far in excess of that considered necessary to diversify security risk.

A two-factor no-arbitrage model is used to provide a theoretical link between stock and bond market volatility. While this model suggests that short-term interest rate volatility may, at least in part, drive both stock and bond market volatility, the empirical evidence suggests that past bond market volatility affects both markets and feeds back into short-term yield volatility. The empirical modelling goes on to examine the (time-varying) correlation structure between volatility in the stock and bond markets and finds that the sign of this correlation has reversed over the last 20 years. This has important implications far portfolio selection in financial markets. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.