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What are the effects of labor market policies when the economy is sliding into a deep recession? We show that public announcements asking firms not to cut wages under H. Hoover during 1929–33 postponed entering the zero lower bound episode and reduced its duration. We develop and estimate a medium scale New Keynesian model to measure the effect of Hoover policies during the Great Depression and we find evidence that without such polices the U.S. economy would have ended up in a liquidity trap 3 years before it actually did, suffering an even deeper recession with a larger deflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Competition with China has become the main lens through which the United States looks at the world. How will this affect US strategy in Europe? First, Washington's increased focus on China leaves fewer US resources available to influence security developments in and around Europe. This compels US policy makers to seek ways to preserve a favorable regional balance in Europe that require less of the United States. Second, Sino-American competition is leading Washington to view its transatlantic relationships in terms of how they affect its position relative to China. As the Euro-Atlantic area becomes less central to US grand strategy, global--and particularly China-focused--considerations will play an increasingly important role in the context of the transatlantic relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Potential US adversaries have integrated nuclear weapons into their concepts for fighting and winning a future regional conflict. To this end, they have organized, trained, and equipped nuclear-capable forces for theater war fighting. The United States, and its allies, must prepare for adversaries who integrate conventional and nuclear arms to shape the regional battlespace, counter theater defenses, and combat coalition forces. The challenge posed by this conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) cuts across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. While CNI is not a new phenomenon, its growth and evolution in recent years is placing increasing pressure on US regional deterrence and defense strategies. To effectively deter this threat requires an integrated, but not mirror-imaged, approach. The goal of US CNI is to convince potential adversaries that integrating conventional and nuclear-capable forces grants insufficient advantages within a future regional conflict to overcome either the latter's potential vulnerabilities or the risks attendant with attempting to leverage nuclear escalation. Potential adversaries are likely to retain some of these platforms and their associated nuclear weapons as a hedge against uncertainty. However, it is important for the Department of Defense to bolster US and allied deterrence postures in Europe and the Asia-Pacific by taking steps--prior to any regional crisis--to influence their cost-benefit calculus in contemplating the deployment or employment of nuclear weapons in theater. This article proposes a three-part framework using the Department of Defense's Deterrence Operations - Joint Operating Concept (deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage restraint) to plan and posture for accomplishing this goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of the Federal Reserve as a leading actor in global economic governance. As a creature of U.S. domestic law with an international presence and operational independence, the Fed wields authority without a well-defined international legal status, international legal standards to guide its conduct, or accountability to those around the world affected by its decisions. This Essay explores three conceptual approaches that could be used to develop norms, standards, and principles to address this gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much has been written about the quantity of jobs created by entrepreneurs, scholars have yet to examine the quality of these jobs. In this article, the authors begin to address this important issue by examining nearly 5,000 businesses that began operations in 2004. They investigate the extent to which nascent employers provide what many think of as quality jobs-those offering health care coverage and a retirement plan. The authors find that because of small scale, constrained resources, and protection from institutional pressures, start-up companies do not provide their employees with either of these proxies for job quality, and their likelihood of offering health or retirement benefits increases only marginally over their first six years of operation. The finding that entrepreneurs' impressive record of job creation is not matched by a similarly impressive outcome with respect to job quality challenges policymakers to ensure that entrepreneurs are encouraged to create quality employment opportunities in the course of creating new businesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this article is to explore the background of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) crisis using Marxist, neo-Marxist or, at least, Marxist-influenced theories of political economy and international relations. Its purpose is twofold. First, to propose an interpretation of the actual WTO crisis that will address alternative interpretations' gaps. Second, to advance theoretical inputs founded on Marxist or Marxist-influenced writing in political economy, inputs which could be useful elsewhere in critical studies in international law. At the root of the crisis lies the functioning of neoliberalism (understood as the regime of accumulation promoted by US-dominant classes) and the institutions it uses to regulate itself, to deal with contradictions that hurt its capacity to produce profit, and to allow capital accumulation. One of the most important of these institutions, at the international level, is the WTO. We argue that neoliberalism's incapacity to continuously provide, since the Asian crisis in 1997, a satisfying rate of profit to US capitalists (and to Western capitalists in general, even if our argument focuses on the former) lured it into a crisis. Since the WTO's main function is to prevent neoliberalism from being hurt by contradictions that would limit its capacity to provide profits allowing capital accumulation, it was inevitable that one day or another, the struggle faced by the latter would also drag the former down in an institutional crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents' partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded "cognitive discounting" parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is " neo-Fisherian" in the long run, Keynesian in the short run. (JEL E12, E31, E43, E52, E62, E70) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is the only large federal country that does not have an explicit way to reduce the economic disparities among more and less developed regions. In Germany, for example, federal revenues are distributed by a formula that takes into account the relative level of wealth of each state (the so-called Finanzausgleich, or fiscal equalization). Similar mechanisms are found in Australia, Canada, India, and other large federal countries. The United States, on the other hand, has no such explicit redistribution. Each state is generally considered equal and sovereign, and the federal government does not distribute revenues to equalize the states' spending capacity. While the overall impact of the federal tax and transfer system may be to shift revenues from richer to poorer states, this is not openly acknowledged, and that impact is generally condemned in existing literature as unfair to the states that send mor e revenues to Washington, D.C., than they get back in federal transfer payments. Nor is it politically likely that the U.S. will adopt a formal fiscal equalization mechanism, because--unlike Germany or Canada--it decisively settled the problem of secession in the Civil War and therefore does not fear a potential break-up along regional lines. This Article proceeds from the normative position that the increasing gap between the richer and poorer areas of the United States is a problem that requires federal intervent ion, and that the federal tax system can play a role in that intervention. There is increasing evidence of a yawning economic gap between the heartland and the coasts of the U.S., which translates into higher permanent unemployment and minimum wage employment, opioid abuse, imprisonment, and premature death. This gap contributed to the political division of the country revealed in the 2016 presidential election and needs to be addressed if we want to prevent ever further polarization. The Article first assesses past and current attempts to enact tax provisions to help disadvantaged regions in the United States. On the federal level the prime example is Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") section 936, which provided tax breaks for investments in Puerto Rico. This section was widely criticized and was ultimat ely repealed in 1996 with a ten-year phase-out. The Article will argue that, in fact, the evidence shows that section 936 was quite successful in creating and maintaining jobs in the territory, and that its repeal led directly to Puerto Rico's current economic problems, which began when section 936 was finally abolished in 2006. A contrary example was IRC section 199, the domestic manufacturing deduction, which was intended to stimulate manufacturing in low-growth areas like the Rust Belt, but was captured by coastal industries like software a nd entertainment, and was ultimately repealed in 2017 because it was widely conceded to be ineffective and mostly failed in reaching its initial goal. Its replacement, the Foreign Derived Intangible Income ("FDII") provision in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, IRC section 250, is geared toward aiding exports by intangible intensive industries and is therefore more likely to help the richer areas where these industries are located. On the state and local level, there exists a proliferation of tax incentives, but inmany cases they do not result in successful development. Rather, they tend to confer windfalls on multinationals who would have invested in the U.S. anyway and to favor investment in already rich cities, such as the twenty finalists and the ultimate winner on Amazon's list of candidates for its second headquarters. The Article then takes a comparative perspective by surveying several more or less successful taxmeasures taken to encourage development of less developed regions, including in China and Israel. Finally, the Article develops a proposal for using federal taxes to influence multinationals to invest in poorer locations. It builds on an existing list of approved targets, namely the so-called "opportunity zones" created by the 2017 tax reform. Opportunity zones are limited to census tracts that have at least a 20-percent poverty rate or are below 80 percent of the state or city median income. An investor in an opportunity zone gets a tax break, although it is limited to gains that she has already made from other investments. The opportunity zone provisions have been widely criticized as only helping investors and not being limited to people and areas in need. We would limit our proposal to opportunity zones in the target area, i.e., ruralAmerica, and excludemajormetropolitan zones in that area. We propose that the federal government should declare that a corporation that invests in an opportunity zone in the target area would pay no federal tax on profits from that zone. To define profits from the opportunity zone and segre gate them from other profits, we suggest using a formula like the one the states use: total corporate profit x [(wages paid to employees in the opportunity zone/total wages) + (number of employees in the opportunity zone/total employees)]/2. This type of formula should work to incentivize corporations to move jobs to the preferred areas. With well paid jobs come good schools, better infrastructure, and the general economy dynamismthe richer areas of the United States already have in abundance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry began as a means of making use of natural gas resources in socially remote regions and of natural gas associated with oil production. Natural gas was transformed from a waste product into LNG that could be moved thousands of miles to market, redefining "waste" as a valuable raw material. As the newest large-scale LNG exporter, the United States entered the LNG industry based on another redefinition of nature: the extraction of natural gas previously economically and technologically inaccessible in shale formations. Hydraulic fracturing and new drilling technologies have created reserves of natural gas that are driving down prices with excess production and provoking a search for new markets via LNG exports. Liquefied natural gas is reshaping economies, communities, industries, and ecosystems in the United States and in other parts of the world. This article analyzes the role of the LNG industry with a particular focus on the economic and geopolitical consequences for the United States. The United States is returning to its historical role of energy exporter. Some view the return to this role as an economic and geopolitical boon that will enhance the U.S. economy and the nation's global standing. A contrasting interpretation sees the United States sliding into the extractive periphery, serving the energy demands of a growing China, much like the United States once did for Europe and especially Great Britain. This view condemns what it views as the exploitation of U.S. natural resources to meet China's energy needs while leaving large areas of the United States with depleted resources, damaged ecosystems, and disrupted communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of fair use in the arts has become an inflexible binary. Either artist Shepard Fairey has permission to use the Associated Press photograph of Barack Obama to create the Hope Poster, or he has stolen the image in violation of copyright. This legal framework is rigid, inaccurate, and creatively unsafe. Yet it is the interpretation, not the doctrine itself that needs shifting. The copyright statute already includes an overlooked "value" test that can more accurately reflect collaboration and sampling in the digital age. And yet instead, some scholars have responded to digital copying by suggesting we throw out the copyright of art altogether. This suggestion is dangerous. It ignores both the economic contingency of artistic labor and the constitutional mandate to incentivize creativity. The fair use test for art does not need wholesale abandonment but rather careful attention. This analysis requires us to address two errors: to refocus on the artist's, not the judge's, point of view, and to look clearly at a bias in the case law that has created unequal treatment of visual and verbal creativity. Then, an "added value" analysis--that is, adapting the game-theory tool of asking what happens if one actor is subtracted out--can support the legal test of "transformative use " while also framing the relative contributions of the various makers. This analysis of shared value helps everyone: It relieves judges of their awkward tour of duty as art critics. It makes artists feel safe in the moment of creativity, before value is known. It accomplishes the same outcome of so many cases--"The parties ultimately settled--without the costs of litigation or the losses to society. Newer technologies such as blockchain make shared ownership possible. Such systems offer robust economic complements to copyright that protect speech without impeding innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents two competing views on China's growth experience over the past three decades. For the sake of illustrative ease and brevity I label these two opposing views as the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus interprets China's economic growth as a function of innovations in the state sector, including close financial controls, state ownership of firms, and political controls in favor of economic growth. The Washington Consensus views China's experience much the same as growth experiences elsewhere•that is, as a result of financial liberalization, private entrepreneurship, and political opening. Contrary to the established views among China scholars, this paper argues that the Washington Consensus view fits with the Chinese growth experience better. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We use two different nonparametric methods to determine whether there were multiple regimes in U.S. monetary policy over the period 1955-2003. We model monetary policy using two different versions of Taylor's rule for the nominal interest-rate target. By contrast with parametric tests for regime changes, the nonparametric methods we use allow the data to determine the dimensions on which to split the sample for purposes of estimating the coefficients of the Taylor rule. We find evidence for a few structural breaks and consistent agreement between our two nonparametric methods on the dating of those breaks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We quantify the welfare differential between precommitment and discretionary monetary policy in three estimated models of the U.S. economy by calculating the permanent deviation of inflation from target that in welfare terms is equivalent to moving from discretion to precommitment. Using a range of reasonable central bank preference parameters, this "inflation equivalent" ranges from 0.05 to 3.6 percentage points, with a mid-point of either 0.15 or 1-1.5 percentage points, depending on the model. In addition to the degree of forward-looking behavior, we show that the existence of transmission lags and/or information lags is crucial for determining the welfare gain from precommitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates regime switching in the response of U.S. output to a monetary policy action. We find substantial, statistically significant, time variation in this response that corresponds to "high response" and "low response" regimes. We then investigate whether the timing of the regime shifts are consistent with three particular manifestations of asymmetry by modeling the transition probabilities governing the switching process as functions of state variables. We find strong evidence that policy actions taken during recessions have larger effects than those taken during expansions. We find less evidence of asymmetry related to the direction or size of the policy action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The return to "sound" fiscal policy after the high budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s has been hailed by many as the Clinton administration's most important achievement. We evaluate post-war, U.S. fiscal policy using a generalized tax-smoothing model that allows for stochastic interest rates and growth rates. We show that contrary to conventional wisdom, the evolution of the U.S. debt--GDP ratio during the 1980s was remarkably consistent with the tax-smoothing paradigm. In fact, a more substantial departure occurred during the late 1990s, when the debt--GDP ratio fell more rapidly than predicted by optimal tax smoothing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents commentary on the report "Government Asset and Liability Management in an Era of Vanishing Public Debt," by Henning Bohn, included within the issue. An overview of the report's conceptual basis is given and a review is provided of its three primary explorations into the potential treasury surplus, rent-seeking, and balance sheet analysis monetary policies adoptable by the United States. Comments on the clarity and methodology of the paper are included, along with discussion regarding the viability of its conclusion goals of a state-contingent Social Security tax-benefit policy.

The paper examines alternative options for managing public debt and public assets in a government balance sheet framework that includes the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and Social Security. Even after September 11, U.S. fiscal policy is on a trajectory to accumulate substantial "uncommitted funds." The paper examines how such funds should be invested. I conclude that high-quality fixed-income securities are the best benchmark and that Social Security is the most appropriate government asset manager. The analysis of policy alternatives reveals a trilemma between maintaining a liquid Treasury market, minimizing rent seeking, and facilitating inter-generational risk sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents econometric evidence on whether the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1914 caused a structural change from level stationarity to difference stationarity in U.S. and U.K. short-term nominal interest rates. We develop new econometric tests that allow for parameter transitions to test for a break of this kind and under- take a grid search analysis of dates and speeds for the change. We find that U.S. nominal interest rales most likely evolved rapidly to difference stationarity in June 1917. For the United Kingdom we fail to reject the null that U.K. interest rate series follow a difference stationary process over the entire period 1890-1934. Our analysis differs from previous research on this topic in that we take care to explore statistical uncertainty around parameter estimates, and incorporate higher-order dynamics into our econometric analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the success that Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan has had in maintaining the financial stability of the U.S. as seen by low levels of inflation and high economic growth. The author notes that this success can be seen as even greater when one examines how other countries have struggled and dealt with financial crises during this same time period. The author outlines some of Greenspan's policy contributions, examines global capital flows and discusses capital market efficiency under Greenspan.

I investigate how the level of inequality affects American public opinion on foreign aid. As the level of inequality increases across the United States, the majority of the public will be more likely to demand the government implement policies that should ameliorate severe inequality in society. Assuming that government resources are limited, a greater level of inequality in American society may weaken public support for foreign aid because the public may prioritize providing social safety nets and welfare programs in domestic milieu over granting foreign aid to developing countries. In addition, as inequality widens, the public may perceive economic globalization as one of the main causes of inequality; thus, their overall support for globalization will decline. As a result, American support for global engagement will be negatively affected, and public support for foreign aid may decrease. An empirical test using public opinion data in 50 U.S. states since the 1980s confirms my theory: widening inequality both across states and within a given state does weaken public support for U.S. foreign aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionalists believe that foreign policy is forged by conflict between the legislature and the executive, with the judiciary acting as referee. We reject that paradigm, and make the case that the country's independent agencies, exemplified by its central bank, have become significant and independent foreign policymakers. The U.S. Federal Reserve System sometimes has imposed a globalist, cosmopolitan approach to international economic relations at loggerheads with the political preferences of the executive and legislative branches; at other times it pursues a form of rank nationalism at the expense of our allies. Our account complicates the paradigmatic story of foreign relations law and identifies a problem--the independent agency foreign policy role is both necessary and unconstrained. To solve the problems posed by the Fed's foreign policy, we identify a mechanism that might preserve central bank independence and yet support some of the advantages that accrue from tolerating the Fed as an independent foreign policy-maker. We argue that this solution may also be applicable more generally to the problem of regulatory diplomacy wherever it occurs in the administrative state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses a stylised vector autoregression to estimate the impact of shocks to lending standards on the depth of US recession and duration of recovery from the 2007−2008 financial crisis. It estimates that the US economic activity was about 0.5 percentage points lower every quarter than in the case when banks' lending standards had not tightened beyond the levels warranted by economic fundamentals. The article further shows empirical evidence that the economic contraction of 2008−2009 would have been 2 percentage points of GDP milder in the absence of the shocks to lending standards sentiment. Finally, the lending sentiment seemed to switch to a loosening bias when GDP recovered to its pre‐recession levels in 2012. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Estimating a large‐scale factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model for 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member countries, we quantify the global effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. More specifically, we check whether the signs, the magnitude, and the persistence profile are consistent with the literature on the real and financial sector effects of uncertainty. In that respect, we compare the impacts of a U.S. and a Euro area policy uncertainty shock. According to our results, an increase in economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on economic activity (gross domestic product), consumer prices, equity prices, and interest rates. Uncertainty shocks cause deeper recessions in Continental Europe (except Germany) than in Anglo‐Saxon countries. U.S. uncertainty shocks have a bigger impact than those for the Euro area. Economic policy uncertainty does not only affect that country where the shock originates but also has large cross‐border effects. We also find a high degree of synchronization among the responses of national variables to a (foreign) uncertainty shock, indicating evidence of an international business cycle. With respect to the responses of national long‐term interest rates to an economic policy uncertainty shock, our results reveal a strong "North‐South" divide within the Euro area with rates decreasing less significantly in the South. Moreover, economic policy uncertainty shocks emerging in one region quickly raise uncertainty outside the region of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democratic Party's current left-wing resurgence shows that significant popular support exists for an expanded vision of fundamental rights for all people: rights to public health care and higher education; affordable housing; living-wage jobs; and a Green New Deal that transitions human society to ecological sustainability while also reducing inequality. But what are the best institutional means to provide this expanded vision of fundamental rights? This paper argues that we must stop expecting or hoping that highly centralized state and corporate institutions, which reserve rights to ownership and control for the few, will produce any results other than those that benefit the few. I argue that in order to provide an expanded vision of fundamental rights we must create a democratic political economy comprised of institutions that are themselves democratic and controlled by the people they are meant to serve. Guided by Karl Polanyi's insight that the fictitious commodification of labor, land, and money has made human society an accessory of the economic system, I propose a vision for creating, starting at the city level, democratic systems for controlling land, labor, and money. The vision--inspired by global movements including the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Movement of Landless Workers in Brazil, the Kurds in Rojava in Northern Syria, and the municipalist movement in Spain--calls for democracy in the workplace through worker cooperatives, local democratic ownership and control of land through land banks, community land trusts, and a land value sales tax, and democratic banking through public banks at the city level. By demonstrating the viability of democratic political economy institutions at the local level, organizers can amass resources to build toward broader systemic transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1992 Presidential election campaign, candidates Bill Clinton and Albert Gore emphasized their commitment to a new U.S. technology policy. Nevertheless, Clinton Administration technology policy in fact carries forward many of the policies that emerged under the Reagan and Bush administrations. These policies were developed in response to changes in the international economic and technological environment that have reduced U.S. technological dominance and have deepened the technological and economic interdependence of the U.S. and foreign economies. Nevertheless, these conditions create persistent dilemmas for the design and implementation of technology policies. One enduring dilemma is the tension between technology and trade policies. A second dilemma concerns the relationship between defense-related R&D programs and civilian technology development. This article reviews the efforts of the Clinton Administration and its immediate predecessors to deal with these policy conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the measures that can be taken to improve economic conditions in the United States. The author cites the country's federal deficit, trade deficit, and slow productivity growth as basic signs on a less-than vigorous economy. Several possible courses of action for enhancing productivity, flexibility, and specialized advantages are outlined. Some advantages of the United States economy are discussed, including a highly skilled work force, a well-developed research and development infrastructure, and market size.

Evidence from the 1970s does not support the view that the United States is "deindustrializing." Nor is there evidence that, in periods of normal (nonrecession) economic conditions, American labor and capital cannot successfully make the gradual but inevitable transition from older to newer industries and occupations. There is no need for a new `industrial policy" under which the federal government attempts to influence industrial structure by some combination of "picking the winners" and "protecting the losers." Industrial policy is not the secret of Japanese industrial success. And in the American political and governmental structure, such a policy would almost surely do much more harm than good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several myths complicate our perception of the economic status in the U.S. today. Among these are the myth that we don't know how the nation got into this inflation situation, or how to get out of it, that economic policy can focus on just one specific problem, and that there is some economic solution that will achieve quick and painless results in improving the present situation. The author dispels these myths, arguing for the Administration and Congress to work together responsibly to control federal spending and to improve the efficiency and operation of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this analysis of contemporary issues facing the nation, the author suggests that a strategy for survival must go beyond military strength to include the economic status of a nation, the conditions of its domestic society, and the degree to which that nation plans for its future. The planners who formulate such a national strategy also must carefully assess the international political situation and the distribution and availability of essential material resources, such as minerals, petroleum products, and foodstuffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the ideological commitment of America to competition as essential to the efficient use of resources and protection of consumers, the U.S. has long had only a partial and largely negative public policy toward competition. The American people would be greatly benefitted by the installation of an Office of Competition within the Executive Office or an-independent Commission on Competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views regarding various issues related to foreign aid given by the U.S. It says that foreign aid from the U.S. often benefits the powerful than the powerless as farmers in low income countries cannot convey to donors of foreign aid their economic priorities. Most of the farmers are poor and do not have any political influence. Information is given about the U.S. net disbursements for 1980.

This article presents the thoughts of the authors on commercial bank securities, specifically events in 1902. According to the authors, controversy over the participation of the commercial banks in securities activities has been ongoing for decades. In 1902, the Comptroller of the Currency was reputed to have forced banks to separate their activities, but the authors find this unsubstantiated. They track the origin of the myth to "The Molding of American Banking," by Fritz Redlich, who claimed court decisions forced the Comptroller to action.

The article examines the partisan effect of electoral terms and changes in government administrations on U.S. economic conditions. The two partisan models, which represent conservative and liberal parties, calculate the political-business cycle and political-economic interaction in terms of exogenous and endogenous variables. One model is based on the assumption that the government risks losing power. The other assumption is that the government calls for an election. The study found that real output is affected when the probability of a regime change is nonzero. The Phillips curve, rational expectation of inflation, the probability of an election or coup d'état, and the prediction of when recessions would occur in conservative governments are mentioned.

The article examines the macroeconomic effects of a tax on bond interest rates in the United States. The article discusses the United States' economy's response to the unanticipated introduction of financial repression (FR) in the long run and in the short run. The article also extends the analysis to the case of a small open economy and demonstrates the effect of FR on the external debt. It is reported that the article's analysis reveals that FR decreases capital stock, which is a result of the higher cost of capital.

The article presents comments on issues in economics related to monetary dynamics in the United States. The article also provides information on approaches towards the understanding of economic events and an estimation of money demands. One approach considered in the article aims at applying an appropriate definition of money, or other constructed measures. Another approach examines the specifications of short-run dynamic monetary adjustments, in terms of supple-versus demand-adjusting models. The article uses cointegration and error-correction modeling.

The article focuses on money demand in the United States. The article presents a correlation between real money balances and scale measures. It is suggested that pervious studies of money demand in the United States have not provided overwhelming support for the hypothesis that real money balances are predictably related to some scale measure, such as income or wealth, and some measure of the opportunity cost of holding real balances. The article asserts that money demand uniformly presumes that there exists an underlying equilibrium relationship between real money balances and a given set of variables that explain it. The article's aim is to determine whether in fact there exists a cointegrating relationship between certain combinations of real money balances, real income, and interest rates.

The article focuses on the association of inflation rates with inflation uncertainty in the United States. The article also provides information on the significance of inflation rates to economic costs and presents specification of methods used in studying the link between inflation rates and inflation uncertainty. It is explained that policymakers and economists argue that moderate rates of inflation merit strong anti-inflationary policies mainly because the benefits from reduced uncertainty outweigh the costs associated with a possible recession.