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Depression is associated with subjective di - culties identifying one’s emotions, known as low emotional clarity, but the mediators and moderators of this relationship are not well understood. We hypothesized that the role of emotional clarity in emotion regulation and, in turn, depres- sion depends on individual di erences in negative a ect intensity. In Study 1, conducted in an unselected sample (N = 119), low emotional clarity more strongly predicted depression symptoms among individuals higher in a ect intensity. In Study 2, conducted in a clinically diagnosed, treatment-seeking sample (N = 245), we examined whether a ect intensity moderated an indirect path of clarity through emotion regulation strategy use that has emerged in previous work. Except when a ect intensity was very low, emotional clarity predicted reappraisal, and except when a ect inten- sity was very high, emotional clarity predicted non-accept- ance and experiential avoidance. By contrast, rumination mediated associations of emotional clarity with depressive symptoms regardless of a ect intensity. Findings support a process model of low emotional clarity in depression that integrates (1) emotion regulatory mediators and (2) modera- tion by negative a ect intensity. Trait di erences in a ect intensity may determine whether and how emotional clarity and regulation processes factor into mood psychopathology.

Deficits in emotional clarity, or difficulties identifying which emotions one feels, are increasingly associated with multiple forms of psychopathology. We addressed two fundamental, unresolved issues regarding the transdiagnostic nature of this dysfunction. First, we examined the relationship of deficits in emotional clarity to seven symptom types, accounting for possible confounding effects of overlapping symptoms. We found that deficits in emotional clarity were associated with symptoms of depression, social anxiety, borderline personality, binge eating, and alcohol use, but not anxious arousal or restrictive eating. Second, we tested whether deficits in emotional clarity would relate to psychopathology by way of impaired emotion regulation. Notably, the relationship between deficits in emotional clarity and each symptom type was mediated by a distinct, disorderspecific pattern of emotion regulation deficits. Findings suggest that deficits in emotional clarity can be conceptualized as a transdiagnostic process with diverging mechanisms involving emotion regulation difficulties that vary from disorder to disorder. We discuss these findings within a contextual approach to delineating transdiagnostic processes.

Research is needed on the affective mechanisms that motivate people to ruminate. One possibility is that some people might ruminate in response to deficits in emotional clarity because not knowing how they feel might be intolerable to them. We tested the hypothesis that the relationship between low emotional clarity and rumination would be moderated by intolerance of ambiguity. Participants in a longitudinal online study (N = 195) provided self- reports of intolerance of ambiguity and rumination and reported state emotional clarity following an idiographic mood induction; three weeks later they reported on rumination again. As predicted, participants with low emotional clarity at Time 1 ruminated more three weeks later, but only if they were intolerant of ambiguity. Findings support the notion that rumination sometimes functions as a search for answers about emotions. We discuss implications for understanding the affective disturbances perpetuating vicious cycles of rumination and for rumination-focused clinical interventions.