Search

We examine the flow of federal grants-in-aid from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the states. We simultaneously model two dependent variables (the flow of EPA funds, and state environmental and natural resource budgets) to identify the independent roles of state political institutions, political preferences, economic and demographic characteristics, and the task environment. Our central focus, though, is on the relationship between grants and state spending after taking into account those direct effects. We examine the evidence for positive association (a flypaper effect) and negative association (crowding out). We show the different roles for political institutions, political preferences, demographic and economic characteristics, and the task environment in each spending context. Most importantly, we find evidence for a flypaper effect between federal funds and state spending: Federal spending and state spending are positively correlated after accounting for the contribution of the unique factors. (Contains 2 tables and 1 footnote.)

This article examines the relationship between political veto points, credible commitments, and regulatory compliance costs. Its central purpose is to assess whether different types of political veto points credibly constrain regulatory change and thus lower compliance costs. The authors conceptualize veto points broadly, including legislative oversight, gubernatorial powers, and direct democracy. We analyze state-level environmental compliance costs from 1988 to 1994 as a function of the structure of state political institutions and state political and economic characteristics. The results suggest that a key veto point, the authority for legislators to review bureaucratic behavior, consistently reduces compliance costs. Keywords: veto points; credible commitment; environmental regulation; compliance costs; bureaucracy

Modern American public welfare agencies are the results of the continual reorganization of multiple agencies, departments, and programs. I develop four themes about the micro-foundations of reorganization in this article to illustrate how politics intersect with agency structure and the reshaping of the national bureaucracy. The empirical part of this article examines President Dwight D. Eisenhower's assembling of a national health, education, and public welfare agency. The creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953 represents a critical juncture in that evolutionary process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

MENDELSON, ELLIOTT. 2004. Introducing Game Theory and Its Applications. Chapman and Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, FL. 259 pp. $69.95. In one view, games are situations in which one person's actions affect [...]

We examine the flow of federal grants‐in‐aid from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the states. We simultaneously model two dependent variables (the flow of EPA funds, and state environmental and natural resource budgets) to identify the independent roles of state political institutions, political preferences, economic and demographic characteristics, and the task environment. Our central focus, though, is on the relationship between grants and state spending after taking into account those direct effects. We examine the evidence for positive association (a flypaper effect) and negative association (crowding out). We show the different roles for political institutions, political preferences, demographic and economic characteristics, and the task environment in each spending context. Most importantly, we find evidence for a flypaper effect between federal funds and state spending: Federal spending and state spending are positively correlated after accounting for the contribution of the unique factors. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty in the context of voluntary exit from organizations in the public workforce. Specifically, we test the effects of loyalty and voice on the likelihood a person states their intention to leave. We assess these relationships using data from the Federal Human Capital Survey. Our statistical analysis provides evidence that perceptions about voice and loyalty limit exit at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. Yet, dissatisfaction with pay is also a substantial cause of intention to leave--and this effect is greatest for executive-level employees. We also show evidence for "motivation crowding" when pay-based motivation is emphasized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]