Search

Domain adversarial training has shown its effective capability for finding domain invariant feature representations and been successfully adopted for various domain adaptation tasks. However, recent advances of large models (e.g., vision transformers) and emerging of complex adaptation scenarios (e.g., DomainNet) make adversarial training being easily biased towards source domain and hardly adapted to target domain. The reason is twofold: relying on large amount of labelled data from source domain for large model training and lacking of labelled data from target domain for fine-tuning. Existing approaches widely focused on either enhancing discriminator or improving the training stability for the backbone networks. Due to unbalanced competition between the feature extractor and the discriminator during the adversarial training, existing solutions fail to function well on complex datasets. To address this issue, we proposed a novel contrastive adversarial training (CAT) approach that leverages the labeled source domain samples to reinforce and regulate the feature generation for target domain. Typically, the regulation forces the target feature distribution being similar to the source feature distribution. CAT addressed three major challenges in adversarial learning: 1) ensure the feature distributions from two domains as indistinguishable as possible for the discriminator, resulting in a more robust domain-invariant feature generation; 2) encourage target samples moving closer to the source in the feature space, reducing the requirement for generalizing classifier trained on the labeled source domain to unlabeled target domain; 3) avoid directly aligning unpaired source and target samples within mini-batch. CAT can be easily plugged into existing models and exhibits significant performance improvements.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI., Comment: Accepted by KDD 2024

Visual Question Answering (VQA) has emerged as a highly engaging field in recent years, attracting increasing research efforts aiming to enhance VQA accuracy through the deployment of advanced models such as Transformers. Despite this growing interest, there has been limited exploration into the comparative analysis and impact of textual modalities within VQA, particularly in terms of model complexity and its effect on performance. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive comparison between complex textual models that leverage long dependency mechanisms and simpler models focusing on local textual features within a well-established VQA framework. Our findings reveal that employing complex textual encoders is not invariably the optimal approach for the VQA-v2 dataset. Motivated by this insight, we introduce an improved model, ConvGRU, which incorporates convolutional layers to enhance the representation of question text. Tested on the VQA-v2 dataset, ConvGRU achieves better performance without substantially increasing parameter complexity.

The classification of the $2$-designs with $\lambda=2$ admitting a flag-transitive automorphism groups with socle $PSL(2,q)$ is completed by settling the two open cases in \cite{ABDT}. The result is achieved by using conics and hyperovals of $PG(2,q)$.

Online bidding and auction are crucial aspects of the online advertising industry. Conventionally, there is only one slot for ad display and most current studies focus on it. Nowadays, multi-slot display advertising is gradually becoming popular where many ads could be displayed in a list and shown as a whole to users. However, multi-slot display advertising leads to different cost-effectiveness. Advertisers have the incentive to adjust bid prices so as to win the most economical ad positions. In this study, we introduce bid shading into multi-slot display advertising for bid price adjustment with a Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading(MEBS) method. We prove the optimality of our method theoretically and examine its performance experimentally. Through extensive offline and online experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method, and we obtain a 7.01% lift in Gross Merchandise Volume, a 7.42% lift in Return on Investment, and a 3.26% lift in ad buy count.

In online advertising, advertisers participate in ad auctions to acquire ad opportunities, often by utilizing auto-bidding tools provided by demand-side platforms (DSPs). The current auto-bidding algorithms typically employ reinforcement learning (RL). However, due to safety concerns, most RL-based auto-bidding policies are trained in simulation, leading to a performance degradation when deployed in online environments. To narrow this gap, we can deploy multiple auto-bidding agents in parallel to collect a large interaction dataset. Offline RL algorithms can then be utilized to train a new policy. The trained policy can subsequently be deployed for further data collection, resulting in an iterative training framework, which we refer to as iterative offline RL. In this work, we identify the performance bottleneck of this iterative offline RL framework, which originates from the ineffective exploration and exploitation caused by the inherent conservatism of offline RL algorithms. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose Trajectory-wise Exploration and Exploitation (TEE), which introduces a novel data collecting and data utilization method for iterative offline RL from a trajectory perspective. Furthermore, to ensure the safety of online exploration while preserving the dataset quality for TEE, we propose Safe Exploration by Adaptive Action Selection (SEAS). Both offline experiments and real-world experiments on Alibaba display advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method., Comment: Accepted by The Web Conference 2024 (WWW'24) as an oral paper

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.

In this paper we show that a flag-transitive automorphism group $G$ of a non-trivial $2$-$(v,k,\lambda)$ design with $\lambda\geq (r, \lambda)^2$ is not of product action type. In conclusion, $G$ is a primitive group of affine or almost simple type., Comment: 13 pages,2 figures

Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial constraints over multiple ad auctions in a long-term period. Based on these distinct features, we consider a new ad auction model for automated bidding: the values of advertisers are public while the financial constraints, such as budget and return on investment (ROI) rate, are private types. We derive the truthfulness conditions with respect to private constraints for this multi-dimensional setting, and demonstrate any feasible allocation rule could be equivalently reduced to a series of non-decreasing functions on budget. However, the resulted allocation mapped from these non-decreasing functions generally follows an irregular shape, making it difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the auction objective. To overcome this design difficulty, we propose a family of truthful automated bidding auction with personalized rank scores, similar to the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction. The intuition behind our design is to leverage personalized rank scores as the criteria to allocate items, and compute a critical ROI to transform the constraints on budget to the same dimension as ROI. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism outperforms the widely used ad auctions, such as first-price auction and second-price auction, in various automated bidding environments.

Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility maximizer} model in auction theory not fit well. Some recent studies proposed a new model, called \emph{value maximizer}, for auto-bidding advertisers with return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. However, the model of either utility maximizer or value maximizer could only characterize partial advertisers in real-world advertising platforms. In a mixed environment where utility maximizers and value maximizers coexist, the truthful ad auction design would be challenging since bidders could manipulate both their values and affiliated classes, leading to a multi-parameter mechanism design problem. In this work, we address this issue by proposing a payment rule which combines the corresponding ones in classical VCG and GSP mechanisms in a novel way. Based on this payment rule, we propose a truthful auction mechanism with an approximation ratio of $2$ on social welfare, which is close to the lower bound of at least $\frac{5}{4}$ that we also prove. The designed auction mechanism is a generalization of VCG for utility maximizers and GSP for value maximizers., Comment: accepted by AAAI2023

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to acquire in practice. Data-driven auction mechanisms, powered by machine learning, enable to design auctions directly from historical auction data, without relying on specific value distributions. In this work, we design a learning-based auction, which can encode the correlation of values into the rank score of each bidder, and further adjust the ranking rule to approach the optimal revenue. We strictly guarantee the property of strategy-proofness by encoding game theoretical conditions into the neural network structure. Furthermore, all operations in the designed auctions are differentiable to enable an end-to-end training paradigm. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism can represent almost any strategy-proof auction mechanism, and outperforms the auction mechanisms wildly used in the correlated value settings., Comment: The proof of the epxressiveness of CAN is wrong. We made some unnecessary assumptions. We need to correct this idea and resubmit it later

For the scalability of industrial online advertising systems, a two-stage auction architecture is widely used to enable efficient ad allocation on a large set of corpus within a limited response time. The current deployed two-stage ad auction usually retrieves an ad subset by a coarse ad quality metric in a pre-auction stage, and then determines the auction outcome by a refined metric in the subsequent stage. However, this simple and greedy solution suffers from serious performance degradation, as it regards the decision in each stage separately, leading to an improper ad selection metric for the pre-auction stage. In this work, we explicitly investigate the relation between the coarse and refined ad quality metrics, and design a two-stage ad auction by taking the decision interaction between the two stages into account. We decouple the design of the two-stage auction by solving a stochastic subset selection problem in the pre-auction stage and conducting a general second price (GSP) auction in the second stage. We demonstrate that this decouple still preserves the incentive compatibility of the auction mechanism. As the proposed formulation of the pre-auction stage is an NP-hard problem, we propose a scalable approximation solution by defining a new subset selection metric, namely Pre-Auction Score (PAS). Experiment results on both public and industrial dataset demonstrate the significant improvement on social welfare and revenue of the proposed two-stage ad auction, than the intuitive greedy two-stage auction and other baselines.

In online advertising, auto-bidding has become an essential tool for advertisers to optimize their preferred ad performance metrics by simply expressing high-level campaign objectives and constraints. Previous works designed auto-bidding tools from the view of single-agent, without modeling the mutual influence between agents. In this paper, we instead consider this problem from a distributed multi-agent perspective, and propose a general $\underline{M}$ulti-$\underline{A}$gent reinforcement learning framework for $\underline{A}$uto-$\underline{B}$idding, namely MAAB, to learn the auto-bidding strategies. First, we investigate the competition and cooperation relation among auto-bidding agents, and propose a temperature-regularized credit assignment to establish a mixed cooperative-competitive paradigm. By carefully making a competition and cooperation trade-off among agents, we can reach an equilibrium state that guarantees not only individual advertiser's utility but also the system performance (i.e., social welfare). Second, to avoid the potential collusion behaviors of bidding low prices underlying the cooperation, we further propose bar agents to set a personalized bidding bar for each agent, and then alleviate the revenue degradation due to the cooperation. Third, to deploy MAAB in the large-scale advertising system with millions of advertisers, we propose a mean-field approach. By grouping advertisers with the same objective as a mean auto-bidding agent, the interactions among the large-scale advertisers are greatly simplified, making it practical to train MAAB efficiently. Extensive experiments on the offline industrial dataset and Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate that our approach outperforms several baseline methods in terms of social welfare and revenue., Comment: Accepted by WSDM 2022

In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due to their fixed allocation rules to optimize a single performance metric (e.g., revenue or social welfare). Recently, data-driven auctions, learned directly from auction outcomes to optimize multiple performance metrics, have attracted increasing research interests. However, the procedure of auction mechanisms involves various discrete calculation operations, making it challenging to be compatible with continuous optimization pipelines in machine learning. In this paper, we design \underline{D}eep \underline{N}eural \underline{A}uctions (DNAs) to enable end-to-end auction learning by proposing a differentiable model to relax the discrete sorting operation, a key component in auctions. We optimize the performance metrics by developing deep models to efficiently extract contexts from auctions, providing rich features for auction design. We further integrate the game theoretical conditions within the model design, to guarantee the stability of the auctions. DNAs have been successfully deployed in the e-commerce advertising system at Taobao. Experimental evaluation results on both large-scale data set as well as online A/B test demonstrated that DNAs significantly outperformed other mechanisms widely adopted in industry., Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), 2021

In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. However, most of the state-of-the-art auction mechanisms only focus on optimizing a single performance metric, e.g., either social welfare or revenue, and are not suitable for e-commerce advertising with various, dynamic, difficult to estimate, and even conflicting performance metrics. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism called Deep GSP auction, which leverages deep learning to design new rank score functions within the celebrated GSP auction framework. These new rank score functions are implemented via deep neural network models under the constraints of monotone allocation and smooth transition. The requirement of monotone allocation ensures Deep GSP auction nice game theoretical properties, while the requirement of smooth transition guarantees the advertiser utilities would not fluctuate too much when the auction mechanism switches among candidate mechanisms to achieve different optimization objectives. We deployed the proposed mechanisms in a leading e-commerce ad platform and conducted comprehensive experimental evaluations with both offline simulations and online A/B tests. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of the Deep GSP auction compared to the state-of-the-art auction mechanisms., Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (WSDM), 2021

In the field of fixed wing aircraft, many morphing technologies have been applied to the wing, such as adaptive airfoil, variable span aircraft, variable swept angle aircraft, etc., but few are aimed at the tail. The traditional fixed wing tail includes horizontal and vertical tail. Inspired by the bird tail, this paper will introduce a new bionic tail. The tail has a novel control mode, which has multiple control variables. Compared with the traditional fixed wing tail, it adds the area control and rotation control around the longitudinal symmetry axis, so it can control the pitch and yaw of the aircraft at the same time. When the area of the tail changes, the maneuverability and stability of the aircraft can be changed, and the aerodynamic efficiency of the aircraft can also be improved. The aircraft with morphing ability is often difficult to establish accurate mathematical model, because the model has a strong nonlinear, model-based control method is difficult to deal with the strong nonlinear aircraft. In recent years, with the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology, learning based control methods are also brilliant, in which the deep reinforcement learning algorithm can be a good solution to the control object which is difficult to establish model. In this paper, the model-free control algorithm PPO is used to control the tail, and the traditional PID is used to control the aileron and throttle. After training in simulation, the tail shows excellent attitude control ability., Comment: PDF, 8 pages with 10 figures, IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters and ICRA (under review)

This submission has been removed by arXiv administrators due to copyright infringement., Comment: This submission has been removed by arXiv administrators due to copyright infringement