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This series contains files detailing financial and narrative information conveyed to the Division of the Budget for the purpose of documenting projected service plans, income sources, expenses, and financial needs for activities carried out by the agency. Information provides details as to the sources of funds; statistical data; appropriations from various state, federal, and private sources; requests for changes; fund types; consulting service contract expenses; and other financial and accounting information.

The June 2003 release of the radically-revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Service-initiated Requirements Generation System (RGS) upside down. The decades-old threat-driven," bottom-up" development process of warfare-materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a "revolutionary," capabilities-driven," top-down" process. The author provides an analysis, from a Program Manager's (PM) perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes upon the acquisition community in four distinct areas: Continuity with Service legacy requirements generation expertise, PM management challenges when other PMs are responsible for supplying critical subsystems and components that will enable satisfaction of Key Performance Parameters, Total Ownership Cost implications of deploying multiple, low-density materiel configurations, and potential disconnections between Presidential Budget Requests and Congressional enactment., The original document contains color images.

Cost growth remains a concern for cost analysts, program managers, senior DoD decision-makers, Congress, and even the American public. All of these people have a vested interest in the cost of DoD programs and most would like to see those costs decrease; as such, we need additional tools to help combat cost growth. Previous research creates the foundation for the use of a two-step methodology to help predict cost growth, which we follow closely. First, utilizing logistic regression we analyze whether specific program characteristics predict cost growth within the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase for combined RDT&E and procurement budgets. The second step uses this answer (i.e., a positive response) to find cost growth predictor variables. Specifically, we perform a multiple regression analysis and determine the amount of cost growth incurred by these DoD programs. Through these two steps, we seek to unearth any predictive relationships within the data in order to build a predictive cost growth model. The final models predict whether a program will have cost growth and what the potential amount of the cost growth will be for the combined RDT&E and procurement budgets within the EMD phase of acquisition., The original document contains color images.

Although Saddam Hussein's ousted regime's outstanding debt obligations are not known for sure some estimates put his total financial obligations as high as $383 billion. As the United States leads the restructuring and reconstruction efforts in Iraq the disposition of this huge debt has become a topic of great concern and debate. The debate centers on whether Hussein's debt should be deemed odious under the Doctrine of Odious Debts and therefore forgiven. According to the Doctrine of Odious Debts states have the right to repudiate debts if they are incurred without the consent of the people of the state and if the debt cannot benefit the public in that state as long as the lender was aware of these two conditions. Although there have been numerous recent examples of dictators or regimes that contracted odious debt including Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire) Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in none of these cases did the successor governments receive any form of debt forgiveness. This paper argues that Hussein's debt should be forgiven due to its shear size and because it meets the three conditions necessary to repudiate the debt under the doctrine. Resolution of this issue has the potential to have a significant impact on the global economy and more importantly on U.S. national security. Due to the significant level of international discourse on this issue and in light of its powerful global influence it is important for the U.S. to establish a clear and firm policy on the disposition of Iraqi debt. This paper begins by discussing the different types of debt a sovereign government can incur. It then chronicles the history of the Doctrine of Odious Debts and provides recent examples of illegitimate leaders and regimes that contracted huge amounts of odious debt before being ousted., The original document contains color images.

The science and technology (S&T) programs sponsored by the United States Department of the Navy (DoN) are divided into three major budget categories: 1) Basic Research (6.1) 2) Applied Research (6.2) 3) Advanced Technology Development (6.3) In 1999, DoN commissioned an internal review of the 6.3 program. A thirty-one member review panel met for one week to rate and comment on six evaluation criteria (Military Goal, Military Impact, Technical Approach/ Payoff, Program Executability, Transitionability (to more advanced development/ engineering budget categories or acquisition), Overall Item Evaluation) for each of the fifty- five presentation topics into which the mid-$500 million per year 6.3 program was categorized. This report describes the review process, documents insights gained from the review, summarizes key principles for a high-quality S&T evaluation process, and presents a network-centric protocol for future large-scale S&T reviews., Prepared in collaboration with OMNI Engineering, LLC, McLean, VA.

This document is a report of the Audit Oversight: Quality Control Review of Grant Thornton, LLP Office of Management and Budget Circular A-133 Audit Report of the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation, Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2001.

The open systems approach is both a technical approach to weapons systems engineering and a preferred business strategy that is becoming widely applied by manufacturers of large complex systems. Today, legacy systems continue to be developed with their own, often unique, and frequently closed designs, making upgrade or modification difficult over their expected lifetimes (20 to 40 years). Also, reduced procurement budgets and the increased dominance of commercial technology cause DoD acquisition managers to increasingly rely on commercial markets for affordable product development and support. For the most part, however, DoD weapons systems managers still risk relying on unique products provided by a single supplier at high non-competitive prices with little opportunity for technology insertion or product support by other suppliers. Life cycle supportability of weapons systems is seriously impacted by the continued use of closed designs. This paper discusses the use and application of open systems concepts and design principles to provide weapons systems that more readily accommodate changing technology to achieve system cost, schedule, and performance benefits by promoting multiple competitive sources of supply within the commercial marketplace. Open systems concepts and design principles also offer the potential to greatly improve supportability of such systems over their service lifetimes.

New types of threats are constantly emerging in this rapidly-changing, global military and economic environment. At the same time, the revolution in business affairs occurring within the Department of Defense (DoD) brings with it major impacts on the warfighter. One significant impact is in the area of increased reliance on contractor support, with changes both in the magnitude and the nature of that support. Contractors now provide many of the functions that were previously performed by military personnel, ranging from traditional base operations support to maintaining sophisticated weapons systems. This transition has occurred as a result of globalization and expansion of U.S. interests abroad, with a concurrent increase in military operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Furthermore, transformation dictates that the military must have the capability to deploy quickly and decisively, with the optimum tooth-to-tail ratio, while complying with established troop limitations set by Congress or host nations. Other factors have exacerbated the situation-deep cuts in DoD personnel and budgets, the Congressional push to privatize functions that can be accomplished outside the military, and new technology and complex weapons systems that have found their place on the battlefield. Contractors on current and future battlefields create a host of challenges for the commander. This paper chronicles the historical perspective of contractor support to the military. It reviews policy and doctrine and examines critical DoD issues and risks in light of the movement to contract out more, not less-and differently-in the future. Lastly, the paper looks to the future and identifies a course of action to legitimize contractors as an integral piece of the Total Force, augmenting existing DoD force structure and creating a seamless partnership between contractors and the military.

The Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies require federal agencies to make available on their websites, no later than October 1, 2002, guidelines for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies, including administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the guidelines.

By dividing the Cold War into distinct periods that correspond with the changes in the Army and the nation, it is possible to examine transformation and modernization. There are several themes that are common to each of these periods and how they related to the Army, including the impact of national strategy, especially nuclear strategy and the concomitant rise of the Air Force; the impact of budget and the economy; technology and its seductive promise of "cleaner war;" and the endless quest within the Army for relevancy. Since the end of World War lithe Army has not transformed. Transformation is not modernization, although technological advances are important to both. The history of the Cold War bears stark witness to an army that evolved slowly and carefully through a series of incremental weapons modernization programs, minor organization changes, and doctrinal changes. Transformation was not needed, nor is it likely needed in the future. It is modernization- the introduction of new technologies and upgrades in command and control and weapons systems- that is the imperative of the future for the Army if it is to remain viable as the primary instrument of the nation's policy decisions.

The DoD Deputy Director, Operational Test and Evaluation / Live Fire Testing (DDOT&E/LFT) through the DOT&E, tasked Hicks & Associates (HA&I) to conduct a survey of models and simulations (M&S) being used in support of defense acquisition programs. The tasking came as the direct result of issues first raised in an article which was published in DSMC's Program Manager (PM) Magazine in their March - April 1999 issue entitled "Meet MASTER: Modeling & Simulation Test & Evaluation Reform: Energizing the M&S Support Structure". The MASTER concept includes a number of proposals including the formation of an M&S Consortium and the possibility of finding this Consortium by tapping into the budgets of the acquisition systems which would benefit from M&S. However, when the question of how much is currently being spent in support of M&S, and related questions as to who is spending it and for what, there was little, if any, comprehensive data upon which to base a response. The purpose, then of the Hicks tasking was to identify, characterize, and determine the extent of M&S applications across a range of program office activities -- from concept exploration and engineering development through production and logistical support to systems in the field., The original document contains color images.

This letter provides policy guidance for the peacetime distribution of equipment and personnel resources to the Army. The DAMPL is the standing order of precedence list approved by the senior Army leadership to guide the distribution of personnel and equipment resources used or controlled by Department of the Army (DA). HQDA publishes a DAMPL listing via separate message once a year. The Fiscal Year (FY) 00-03 DAMPL is effective for the budget execution year (FY00) and for planning through the effective period of the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM). HQDA assigns DAMPL values to each unit identified in the Army Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) Master Force (M-Force) at the unit identification code (U IC) AA level of detail.

To reduce domestic military infrastructure, the United States enacted two laws that instituted rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC) in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, As a result of these BRAC rounds, the United States Army has closed or realigned 139 installations, Environmental cleanup is almost $2.3 billion (43%) of the entire cost through 2001 associated with the closure and realignment of these 139 Army installations, The United States Army Base Realignment and Closure Office (BRACO) uses an integer linear program called BAEC (Budget Allocation for Environmental Cleanup) to help determine how to allocate limited yearly funding to installations for environmental cleanup, Considering environmental policies and yearly installation funding requests from 2002 to 2015, this thesis modifies BAEC to better account for uncertainty in future environmental cleanup cost, Based on historic data that show most environmental cleanup cost estimates increase over time, the stochastic BAEC model recommends funding fewer sites than the deterministic BAEC model recommends The stochastic BAEC model thereby provides funding recommendations with a better chance of staying within limited available yearly funding, "The original document contains color images"

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly the Health Care Financing Administration) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have been testing the feasibility of making Medicare-covered health care services available to Medicare-eligible DoD beneficiaries through the TRICARE program (the managed care program of the Military Health Service) and military treatment facilities (MTFs). The vehicle used was the Medicare-DoD Subvention Demonstration, which was established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). The goal of the demonstration was to implement cost-effective alternatives for care for this dually eligible population while ensuring budget neutrality, that is, neither CMS's nor DoD's total costs increase. The Secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services and of the Department of Defense executed a Memorandum of Agreement that specified how the subvention demonstration was to be designed and operated. The Memorandum provided for an independent evaluation of the demonstration, which RAND conducted. This report describes the final results of the RAND evaluation.

In June 1993, DoD and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, established a memorandum of understanding to implement a cooperative program of research and development intended to accomplish major improvements in non-acoustic technology. The program was a congressionally established joint project under the Advanced Sensor Applications Program. This audit was in cooperation with the Inspector General, Department of Commerce, and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. The Inspector General, Department of Commerce, received an allegation concerning potential misappropriation of DoD funds by the Environmental Technology Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, located in Boulder, Colorado. The allegation was that the Environmental Technology Laboratory charged the Advanced Sensor Applications Program Joint Project for costs applicable to other programs.

The budget system of the United States Government provides the means for the President and Congress to decide how much money to spend, what to spend it on, and how to raise the money they have decided to spend. Through the budget system, they determine the allocation of resources among the Government's major functions-such as providing for the national defense, regulating commerce, and ensuring the availability of health care-and among individual programs, projects, and activities-such as building navy ships, issuing patents, and controlling diseases. The budget system focuses primarily on dollars, but it also allocates other resources, such as Federal employment. The decisions made in the budget process affect the nation as a whole, State and local governments, and individual Americans. Many budget decisions have worldwide significance. The Congress and the President enact budget decisions into law. The budget system ensures these laws are carried out. This chapter provides an overview of the budget system and explains some of the more important budget concepts. It includes summary dollar amounts to illustrate major concepts. Other chapters of the budget documents discuss these amounts, and more detailed amounts, in greater depth. A glossary of budget terms appears at the end of the chapter. Various laws, enacted to carry out requirements of the Constitution, govern the budget system. The chapter refers to the principal ones by title throughout the text and gives complete citations in the section just preceding the glossary.

This report, comprised of viewgraphs, describes DARPA and its technology investments, including budgeting, major focus areas, chain of command, and investment strategy., Proceedings from National Summit on U.S. Defense Policy: Acquisition, Research, Test and Evaluation, 26-30 March 2001 sponsored by NDIA. Contains viewgraphs only.

The Army OPTEMPO in the peacekeeping arena is creating a significant readiness challenge. The Army must be able to respond in peace and war to support the nation's vital interests. Our Army leaders are not afforded the opportunity to 'pick and choose' the missions it receives. It is therefore necessary to be trained, equipped and ready to take on all assigned missions. This will have to be done as a total Army within greatly constrained budgets. It is a fact that the recent tremendous pace of operations has caused the Army great concern over relevancy, which in turn has caused the organization to attempt to accomplish too much with too little. The Army leadership must look for revolutionary approaches that at a minimum streamline training processes and set up an organization totally capable of serving over the full spectrum of conflict.

Since the passage of the Government Performance Review Act of 1995, U.S. government agencies have faced increased pressures to justify their activities and funding decisions. Government-funded research is no exception. One area of study whose rationale has faced skepticism from some quarters is international demographic research. Demography is the study of trends and patterns in fertility, mortality, marriage, migration, retirement, and health, as well as the factors that determine and are affected by these variables. The majority of funding for international demographic research comes from government sources. Why, some ask, should U.S. taxpayers underwrite the study of problems abroad when America has so many domestfc issues to tackle? How can research on foreign countries have any relevance to U.S. concerns?

In the fall of 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coined the phrase "Joint Experimentation" to operationalize Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010). General Shelton stated, "joint experimentation will be the true engine for exploring concepts contained in JV 2010". The United States Special Operations Command already has the capability to implement joint experimentation. In 1987, Title 10 of the FY87 Defense Authorization Act gave the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) responsibility and authority to develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment. In order to facilitate this task, Title 10 also provides USCINCSOC the responsibility and authority to prioritize requirements, recommend programs, and propose budgets. These are all the tools necessary for USCINCSOC to unilaterally conduct combat development and joint experimentation to meet the urgent operational needs in rapid-changing situations common to Special Operations and expected for the Joint Vision 2010 environment. This report presents a process that addresses validation, funding, experimentation, and follow-on acquisition in a timely fashion. This process is applicable for SOF as well as the Joint Staff and the Interagency Process.

The Air Force Class A aviation mishap rate has hovered around 1.5 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours since 1985. Recent attention on Air Force accidents has caused the leadership to seek to reduce its mishap rate. The Army's Class A aviation mishap rate declined after it implemented risk management (RM) principles in 1987. This reduction caught the attention of Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of operational risk management (ORM) is how the Air Force will reduce, even eliminate, mishaps. With current budget constraints, ORM is considered to be the most cost-effective way the Air Force can reduce its mishap rate. The purpose of this research was to determine whether the Air Force can expect its mishap rate to significantly decline due to ORM implementation. This determination is based on the relationship between the Army's implementation of RM and its aviation mishap rate. The analysis of the Army's aviation mishap rates and available causal data was performed primarily using discontinuous piecewise linear regression. Results showed that the effect of RM was not reflected in the Army's mishap rates. As a result, the Air Force should not expect its mishap rate to significantly decline due to ORM implementation.

The purpose of this study is to estimate the costs borne by the government for providing space-available travel to eligible uniformed services personnel and their dependents. As the primary provider of the space-available privilege, it is important that the Air Force have an estimate of the burden that the administration of that privilege places on the budget. In January 1993, the Air Force discontinued its 15-year-old practice of charging a fee for space-available travel aboard AMC-owned or controlled aircraft. The fee had been set at $10 in 1978 and was collected to recover a portion of the costs associated with providing space-available travel. At the time of cancellation, the fee was less than one third of those costs, which were estimated to be approximately $32. The cost of space-available travel consists primarily of personnel expenses and the cost for the additional aviation fuel required for transportation. Naturally, as salaries and fuel prices continue to rise, so does the cost of space-available transportation. This study estimates the current per-passenger cost to be $42, and given the volume of space-available traffic this amounts to approximately $16,000,000 annually. These rising costs may warrant consideration of once again collecting a nominal space-available fee.

Vietnam has released data on a number of key economic indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP), imports and exports, foreign investments, and growth rates. However, it has not made available some other important data on the economy For example, it does not publish the state budget and does not provide standard financial information used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its monthly International Financial Statistics (IFS) publication. Virtually all countries in the world, including transitional economies and the poorest countries, publish their country pages in the IFS. When data is available, it is highly aggregated and difficult to interpret because the data collection, analysis, and reporting methods used to produce it are not transparent or readily available to users. While the quality of the data has improved in recent years, published indicators such as GDP contain weaknesses because they do not include important components of the economy. For example, small businesses, the service sector, and remittances from overseas are underreported, while growth and foreign investment estimates may be overestimated. Without more accurate data, it is difficult to effectively evaluate economic conditions in Vietnam and identify economic and financial problems that may be occurring. Several international agencies, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have recognized that data deficiencies exist and are currently providing technical and financial assistance to the Vietnamese government to help it improve the availability and quality of its data., Report to Congressional Requestors.

The principle objective of this project is to identify and implement methods for the analysis of error and uncertainty of spatial data in spatially explicit ecological models. The development of these methods for spatial error and uncertainty analysis is done in coordination with Dr. George Gertner and SERDP Conservation Thrust Area Project SC-1096. Methods and tools developped and implemented by our project will be transferred to Project CS-1096 for incorporation within that project's error budget framework and toolbox. Our software tools will also be compatible with the specifications and requirements of DoD and SERDP land management tools and software like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Land Management System (LMS) or others. We have completed the first phase of a survey of existing methods for the analysis of error and uncertainty analysis in spatial data. From this survey we have formulated a general framework for spatial error and uncertainty analysis of ecological models, and we have implemented software tools for treatment of error and uncertainty in categorical spatial data. We have begun the process of testing and refining these software tools.

The Army's strategic planning horizon extends to the year 2025. The Army Plan (TAP) FY00-15 focuses primarily on the program years (FY00-05 plus ten years. TAP presents comprehensive and cohesive strategic, mid-term planning, and programming guidance that addresses the Army's enduring core competency over this sixteen year time period. The document identifies trends and sources of conflicts such as demographics (aging population), geopolitics (states loosely aligned) and the environment (loss of natural resources). It highlights the Army After Next's report that the forces of the future have to be physically fit, emotionally resilient and mentally prepared. The document sets the direction and provides a focused and consistent theme for developing the Army's program and budget. This TAP starts with the strategic core competency (that is, ends) and translates it into capabilities (that is ways for accomplishing the ends), which ultimately produce the program and budget (that is, means). The approach provides a coherent context for explaining and defending the Army's programs and budgets. Explaining the Army's budget effectively is essential to obtaining appropriations and authorizations that provide the means to move along the azimuth to the future.

The overall audit objective was to determine whether the FY 1997 DoD Consolidated Financial Statements were presented fairly in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 94-01, "Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements," November 16, 1993, as supplemented by the Office of Management and Budget Bulletin No. 97-01, "Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements," October 16, 1996. On February 27, 1998, we issued a disclaimer of opinion on the FY 1997 DoD Consolidated Financial Statements. We issued our report on internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations on June 22, 1998.

The defense intellectual community is currently engaged in a heated debate over alternative future strategies. The outcome of this debate may well shape the kind of forces with which the United States will maintain its security well beyond the first quarter of the 21st century. The debate has engaged a broad spectrum of the community and, despite being sometimes advanced by the latest in "Powerpoint" slide briefing techniques, really revolves around old issues surrounding the role of air power and is fostered by the even older motivation of a scramble for limited budget resources. At the center of the debate is a concept called the "Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine," or more simply, "Halt."

Naval Aviation is in the midst of a major transformation as it attempts to come to terms with the demands of maintaining operational readiness in the face of diminishing budgets and reduced manning. Diminishing operating and procurement budgets mean that Naval Aviation is for the most part "making do" with existing aircraft. Over the past decade, one in four Naval Aviation mishaps were partially attributable to maintenance error. The present operating environment underscores the need to address maintenance error and its causes. The current study accomplishes three things. First, it evaluates 470 Naval Aviation mishaps with distinct maintenance error correlates. Second, it categorizes those errors using a taxonomy based upon current organizational and psychological theories of human error. Third, it mathematically models the consequences of these errors and uses the models to (a) predict the frequency with which maintenance-based mishaps will occur in the future and (b) approximate the potential cost savings from the reduction of each error type.

It Is certainly not news that the use of commercially-available-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software is revolutionizing the acquisition process for new real time embedded systems. Designs using COTS hardware and software can be the only approach to meeting today's aggressive schedule and cost budgets, while lowering production risks. Using Open Systems is an attractive approach to inexpensively incorporate increased performance as technology improves. It is hard to imagine a program manager who would not want to try to take advantage of these benefits. DOD is not only encouraging, but also mandating the use of COTS hardware and software in the development of new and replacement (sub)systems to meet current budget constraints. However, the use of COTS must be carefully managed or the results of these benefits will disappear into a life cycle maintenance nightmare. There are several lessons that have been learned about the use of COTS that should be considered before planning a new program. The use of Commercial-Off the Shelf (COTS) hardware and software in real-time systems is not new. The author has been involved in developments using COTS in real-time systems since 1983 and he was hardly a pioneer. The use of COTS in real-time systems in the past was limited by technical considerations, operational suitability issues, and life cycle concerns. The lower cost of COTS was always attractive, but for most programs these limitations made its use impractical. The major performance hurdle to using COTS in Command and Control (C2) real-time applications was always that COTS hardware and its shrink-wrapped operating systems were not designed to handle the quantity of interrupts that C2 systems need to process in a timely fashion. As technology developed, it was possible to use intelligent controller cards to solve this technical issue. There were only a handful of vendors who started to design their products for the real-time market., Presented to the Joint Avionics and Weapons Systems Support Software and Simulation Conference.

First-order solutions indicate that a forced Keplerian trajectory (FKT) obtained by thrust-drag cancellation is as fuel-efficient as a Hohmann transfer. Further analysis has shown that the FKT is not Mayer-optimal. Therefore there must exist another trajectory that matches or exceeds the efficiency of the Hohmann transfer. The application of this result to the fuel-optimal orbit maintenance problem implies that periodic reboosts must be more efficient than an WT profile. This research begins with the formulation of an optimal periodic control (OPC) problem to determine the minimum fuel-reboost strategy. The problem is numerically solved by a spectral collocation method. The optimization code is further modified to increase accuracy and reduce sensitivity to initial guesses. The results of this effort identified a trajectory for a sample satellite that was 3.5% more efficient than an ideal impulsive Hohmann transfer over the same period of time. From the optimal code, a maximum thruster size is also identifiable for a set of initial conditions. The optimal trajectory can save as much as 10% of the propellant budget when compared to finite-bum Hohmann transfers.

The President's budget is intended to address many objectives and meet many information needs; more than two dozen requirements are currently listed at 31 U.S.C. 1105. Accordingly, the budget comprises a wealth of information in a daunting array of schedules, tables, graphs, and narrative summaries. The comprehensiveness of the President's budget submission is its principal strength, but also creates its most obvious inconvenience - its sheer size and complexity. For example, for fiscal year 1999, the President's budget spanned 5 volumes and over 2,500 pages. We developed this compendium to give users a convenient way to sort through the fiscal structure of the federal government and to determine the level of budgetary resources - used, estimated, or requested by fiscal year - for individual accounts.

The number of federal regulations and their effect on the American economy have grown dramatically during the past 30 years. With that growth has come an increased concern about the manner in which those regulations are developed by federal agencies. Executive Order 12866 on "Regulatory Planning and Review," which was issued on September 30, 1993, describes the process by which proposed significant rules of regulatory agencies (other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies) are to be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget's (0MB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). One of the stated purposes of Executive Order 12866 is to make the federal rulemaking process "more accessible and open to the public." In furtherance of that objective, the order includes requirements to improve the "transparency" of the process. Specifically, the order requires that agencies identify for the public in a complete, clear, and simple manner the substantive changes that are made to rules while under review at 0IRA and, as a separate requirement, the changes that are made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA. The order also requires OIRA to make available to the public at the conclusion of the rulemaking process all documents exchanged between 0IRA and the agency during the review process., Report to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.

In his article, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. suggests an adaptive, flexible, and innovative acquisition system will become increasingly important as the rate of technological change increases. Indeed, how can we make systems acquisition more efficient and effective? The current acquisition reform effort is an excellent beginning to addressing the issue. However, more must be done to hone the skills of the acquisition workforce to meet the challenge of implementing acquisition reform successfully. One can employ two tools from the study of military history and theory to meet this requirement. First, one could adapt the Doctrine-Strategy Relationship Model to clarify the relationships between the myriad of acquisition reform initiatives, resulting acquisition policy, requirements generation process, and budget process. A second tool, Carl von Clausewitz's critical analysis, provides the mechanism to thoroughly evaluate the implementation of acquisition reform and to determine the applicability of lessons learned from recent acquisition experiences to future acquisition programs. Together these tools are important in improving acquisition program execution. Ultimately we will challenge the acquisition workforce to educate themselves using these tools in the planning of, during, and following an acquisition program. This emphasis on individual development and education indeed makes this an acquisition program. This emphasis on individual development and education indeed makes this an age of acquisition renaissance., The original document contains color images.