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Background: Studying the human peri-implantation period remains hindered by the limited accessibility of the in vivo environment and scarcity of research material. As such, continuing efforts have been directed towards developing embryo-like structures (ELS) from pluripotent stem cells (PSCs) that recapitulate aspects of embryogenesis in vitro. While the creation of such models offers immense potential for studying fundamental processes in both pre- and early post-implantation development, it also proves ethically contentious due to wide-ranging views on the moral and legal reverence due to human embryos. Lack of clarity on how to qualify and regulate research with ELS thus presents a challenge in that it may either limit this new field of research without valid grounds or allow it to develop without policies that reflect justified ethical concerns.Objective and Rationale: The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing scientific approaches to generate ELS from mouse and human PSCs, as well as discuss future strategies towards innovation in the context of human development. Concurrently, we aim to set the agenda for the ethical and policy issues surrounding research on human ELS.Search Methods: The PubMed database was used to search peer-reviewed articles and reviews using the following terms: 'stem cells', 'pluripotency', 'implantation', 'preimplantation', 'post-implantation', 'blastocyst', 'embryoid bodies', 'synthetic embryos', 'embryo models', 'self-assembly', 'human embryo-like structures', 'artificial embryos' in combination with other keywords related to the subject area. The PubMed and Web of Science databases were also used to systematically search publications on the ethics of ELS and human embryo research by using the aforementioned keywords in combination with 'ethics', 'law', 'regulation' and equivalent terms. All relevant publications until December 2019 were critically evaluated and discussed.Outcomes: In vitro systems provide a promising way forward for uncovering early human development. Current platforms utilize PSCs in both two- and three-dimensional settings to mimic various early developmental stages, including epiblast, trophoblast and amniotic cavity formation, in addition to axis development and gastrulation. Nevertheless, much hinges on the term 'embryo-like'. Extension of traditional embryo frameworks to research with ELS reveals that (i) current embryo definitions require reconsideration, (ii) cellular convertibility challenges the attribution of moral standing on the basis of 'active potentiality' and (iii) meaningful application of embryo protective directives will require rethinking of the 14-day culture limit and moral weight attributed to (non-)viability. Many conceptual and normative (dis)similarities between ELS and embryos thus remain to be thoroughly elucidated.Wider Implications: Modelling embryogenesis holds vast potential for both human developmental biology and understanding various etiologies associated with infertility. To date, ELS have been shown to recapitulate several aspects of peri-implantation development, but critically, cannot develop into a fetus. Yet, concurrent to scientific innovation, considering the extent to which the use of ELS may raise moral concerns typical of human embryo research remains paramount. This will be crucial for harnessing the potential of ELS as a valuable research tool, whilst remaining within a robust moral and legal framework of professionally acceptable practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the guidelines by the Quality Committee of the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) on whole-genome sequencing (WGS) in health care. It states that WGS is used for diagnosing severely-ill infants who are in neonatal intensive care. It highlights the role of the Public and Professional Policy Committee (PPPC) and the recommendations by ESHG on minors' genetic testing.

Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome differs from other forms of population screening in that the usual aim of achieving health gains through treatment or prevention does not seem to apply. This type of screening leads to no other options but the choice between continuing or terminating the pregnancy and can only be morally justified if its aim is to provide meaningful options for reproductive choice to pregnant women and their partners. However, this aim should not be understood as maximizing reproductive choice per se. Only if understood as allowing prospective parents to avoid suffering related to living with (a child with) serious disorders and handicaps can prenatal screening be a publicly or collectively funded programme. The alternative of moving prenatal testing outside the healthcare system into the private sector is problematic, as it makes these tests accessible only to those who can afford to pay for it. New developments in prenatal screening will have to be assessed in terms of whether and to what extent they either contribute to or undermine the stated aim of providing meaningful options for reproductive choice. In the light of this criterion, this article discusses the introduction of the new non-invasive prenatal test (NIPT), the tendency to widen the scope of follow-up testing, as well as the possible future scenarios of genome-wide screening and 'prenatal personalised medicine'. The article ends with recommendations for further debate, research and analysis., (© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The advent of new genetic and genomic technologies may cause friction with the principle of respect for autonomy and demands a rethinking of traditional interpretations of the concept of informed consent. Technologies such as whole-genome sequencing and micro-array based analysis enable genome-wide testing for many heterogeneous abnormalities and predispositions simultaneously. This may challenge the feasibility of providing adequate pre-test information and achieving autonomous decision-making. At a symposium held at the 11th World Congress of Bioethics in June 2012 (Rotterdam), organized by the International Association of Bioethics, these challenges were presented for three different areas in which these so-called 'new genetics' technologies are increasingly being applied: newborn screening, prenatal screening strategies and commercial personal genome testing. In this article, we build upon the existing ethical framework for a responsible set-up of testing and screening offers and reinterpret some of its criteria in the light of the new genetics. As we will argue, the scope of a responsible testing or screening offer should align with the purpose(s) of testing and with the principle of respect for autonomy for all stakeholders involved, including (future) children. Informed consent is a prerequisite but requires a new approach. We present preliminary and general directions for an individualized or differentiated set-up of the testing offer and for the informed consent process. With this article we wish to contribute to the formation of new ideas on how to tackle the issues of autonomy and informed consent for (public) healthcare and direct-to-consumer applications of the new genetics., (© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The great promise of the pending introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) for trisomy 21 (18 and 13) is that it enables one-step, early and safe testing for these abnormalities. The ethical debate so far has been limited to possible drawbacks of routine access to this type of testing: normalization of testing and abortion and adverse effects on autonomous decision-making. We address the ethical implications of the fact that routine NIPD affects the scope and strategy of current prenatal screening cascades. A decision is needed whether complementary (invasive) testing remains in place in order to avoid a loss of information as compared with current practice. If so, the supposed advantages of NIPD may be less significant than generally assumed. Accumulation of tests challenges informed consent and proportionality. Therefore, an ethical evaluation of the implications of NIPD for the prenatal screening strategy as a whole is needed.

No consensus exists whether women at increased risk for trisomy 21, 13, and 18 should be offered stand-alone rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) or karyotyping. In this paper, the ethical implications of a fast, relatively cheap and targeted RAD are examined. The advantages of RAD seem less robust than its proponents suggest. Fast test results only give a short-term psychological benefit. The cost advantage of RAD is apparent, but must be weighed against consequences like missed abnormalities, which are evaluated differently by professionals and pregnant women. Since pre-test information about RAD will have to include telling women about karyotyping as a possible alternative, the advantage of RAD in terms of the quantity of information that needs to be given may also be smaller than suggested. We conclude that none of the supposed arguments in favour of RAD is decisive in itself. Whether the case for RAD may still be regarded as convincing when taking these arguments together seems to depend on one's implicit view of what prenatal screening is about. Are we basically dealing with a test for trisomy 21 and a few conditions more? Or are there good grounds for also testing for the wider range of abnormalities that karyotyping can detect? As professionals and pregnant women may have different views about this, we suggest that the best approach is to offer women a choice between RAD and karyotyping. This approach is most in line with the general aim of prenatal screening: providing opportunities for autonomous reproductive choice.

This paper explores the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnostic tests (NIPD tests) in prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities. NIPD tests are easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy. Precisely because of these features, it is feared that informed consent may become more difficult, that both testing and selective abortion will become 'normalized', and that there will be a trend towards accepting testing for minor abnormalities and non-medical traits as well. In our view, however, the real moral challenge of NIPD testing consists in the possibility of linking up a technique with these features (easy, safe and early) with new genomic technologies that allow prenatal diagnostic testing for a much broader range of abnormalities than is the case in current procedures. An increase in uptake and more selective abortions need not in itself be taken to signal a thoughtless acceptance of these procedures. However, combining this with considerably enlarging the scope of NIPD testing will indeed make informed consent more difficult and challenge the notion of prenatal screening as serving reproductive autonomy. If broad NIPD testing includes later-onset diseases, the 'right not to know' of the future child will become a new issue in the debate about prenatal screening. With regard to the controversial issue of selective abortion, it may make a morally relevant difference that after NIPD testing, abortion can be done early. A lower moral status may be attributed to the foetus at that moment, given the dominant opinion that the moral status of the foetus progressively increases with its development.