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Environmental protection efforts commonly make use of two types of government interventions: command and control policies (C&C) and market-based instruments (MBIs). While MBIs are favored for their economic efficiency, visible prices on pollution may generate political backlash. We examine whether citizens are more likely to support policies that tend to obfuscate policy costs (C&C), as opposed to MBIs, which impose visible costs. Using conjoint experiments in Beijing and New Delhi, we examine support for 'policy bundles', including both C&C policies and MBIs, aimed at limiting air pollution from vehicles. In both cities, increasing fuel taxes (a MBI) reduces policy support. However, pledging revenue usage from fuel taxes to subsidize electric cars or public transport eliminates this negative effect. Furthermore, individuals with a lower evaluation of their government respond more negatively to MBIs. MBIs may be economically efficient, but are politically difficult unless policy-makers can offset visible costs through additional measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy processes are affected by how policymakers assess public support for a policy. But is public support for a given policy itself affected by characteristics of the policy process, such as cooperation or confrontation amongst policy actors? Specifically, if different branches of government hold conflicting positions on a given policy, do clashes affect public support for the policy? To address this question, we exploit an unexpected clash amongst the executive and judiciary in New Delhi, between survey waves, over exemptions for women in the context of the odd–even rule, a policy intervention to reduce air pollution from transportation. We find that public support for the contested policy was not undermined by the executive–judiciary clash. However, the clash polarised public opinion by gender, based upon the policy exemptions. Our findings shed new light on the broader question of how conflicts amongst different parts of government influence mass public policy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A substantial literature in political science suggests that individuals' policy preferences can be shaped by the actions of elite actors and the policies they emphasize and implement. Yet can these actions and interactions have second order effects and actually affect individuals' beliefs about the causes of the problems that policy seeks to address in the first place? This research note identifies the effect of policy conflict upon individuals' beliefs about the societal problems, using original survey data from New Delhi. This effect is estimated by comparing beliefs about the causes of air pollution just before and after an unexpected policy conflict between the government and a judicial body over policy to limit vehicle usage. The results find that the policy conflict caused mass beliefs about the causes of pollution to change. In line with the theory of inferred justification, belief updating led individuals who generally approve (disapprove) of the government to believe vehicle usage was more (less) responsible for air pollution respectively. This is in spite of the fact that the spike in air pollution was caused by agricultural burning. The results suggest that policy conflict between political elites can not only affect mass policy preferences, but also alter beliefs about the cause of such societal problems policy seeks to address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]