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Children aged 4.75-8.50 years (n = 127) heard testimony about improbable or impossible events-referencing either spoken hearsay, a book, or the internet-and judged whether the events could occur in reality. A separate baseline group (n = 48) judged the events without hearing testimony. Relative to baseline, younger children (4 and 5 years) reported greater belief that improbable events could occur when testimony referenced hearsay and less belief when testimony referenced the internet. In contrast, older children (8 years) were less likely to believe improbable events could occur when testimony referenced hearsay and believed testimony that referenced a text-based source (a book or the internet) at rates similar to baseline. Beliefs about the occurrence of impossible events were similar (and low) across ages and testimony conditions. Implications for children's learning from spoken and text-based sources are discussed., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Children aged 4-7 years (N = 120) played four rounds of a find-the-sticker game. For each round, an informant looked into two cups and made a claim about which cup held a sticker. At the end of each round, children guessed the sticker's location, and then the sticker's actual location was revealed. For three of the rounds, the informant accurately reported the sticker's location. But critically, for one round-either Round 1, 2, or 3-she was inaccurate. Children continually adjusted their trust in the informant as they obtained more information about her accuracy. Relations between the informant's pattern of accuracy and children's trust were robust, neither mediated nor moderated by children inferences about her intent or traits., (© 2017 The Authors. Child Development © 2017 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

A developmental cascade model was tested to examine longitudinal associations among firstborn children's aggression, theory of mind (ToM), and antagonism toward their younger sibling during the 1st year of siblinghood. Aggression and ToM were assessed before the birth of a sibling and 4 and 12 months after the birth, and antagonism was examined at 4 and 12 months in a sample of 208 firstborn children (initial Mage  = 30 months, 56% girls) from primarily European American, middle-class families. Firstborns' aggression consistently predicted high sibling antagonism both directly and through poorer ToM. Results highlight the importance of examining longitudinal influences across behavioral, social-cognitive, and relational factors that are closely intertwined even from the early years of life., (© 2016 The Authors. Child Development © 2016 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

This study examined how children's intuitions and informants' expertise influence children's trust in informants' claims. Three- to 8-year-olds (N = 192) watched videos in which experts (animal/biology experts or artifact/physics experts) made either intuitively plausible or counterintuitive claims about obscure animals or artifacts. Claims fell either within or beyond experts' domains of expertise. Children of all ages were more trusting of claims made by informants with relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, expertise. Children also showed greater acceptance of intuitive rather than counterintuitive claims, a differentiation that increased with age as they developed firmer intuitions about what can ordinarily happen. In summary, children's trust in testimony depends on whether informants have the relevant expertise as well as on children's own developing intuitions., (© 2014 The Authors. Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

Individuals in many cultures believe in omniscient (all-knowing) beings, but everyday representations of omniscience have rarely been studied. To understand the nature of such representations requires knowing how they develop. Two studies examined the breadth of knowledge (i.e., types of knowledge) and depth of knowledge (i.e., amount of knowledge within domains) that preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults (N = 180) attributed to an all-knowing being. Preschoolers often reported that an omniscient mind would lack many types of knowledge, and they completely failed to understand the depth of omniscient knowledge. With increasing age, children approached an understanding of omniscience-attributing broader and deeper knowledge to an omniscient agent-but only adults firmly understood the depth of omniscient knowledge. We identify socio-cultural and cognitive factors that correlate with children's understandings of omniscience. Findings demonstrate that childhood representations of fallible, limited, human minds both make possible and constrain developing representations of radically non-human minds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Children and adults often encounter counterintuitive claims that defy their perceptions. We examined factors that influence children's acceptance of such claims. Children ages 3-6 years were shown familiar objects (e.g., a rock), were asked to identify the objects, and were then told that each object was something else (e.g., that the rock was soap). For some children, informants explicitly stated that the objects were different from what they appeared to be, whereas other children received testimony about the objects' identities without any reference to the discrepancy between appearance and reality. Children also completed standard tasks measuring appearance-reality understanding. When later asked about the objects' identities and properties, children who had a firm understanding of the appearance-reality distinction and those who heard informants mention that distinction were more accepting of the informants' counterintuitive claims. Thus, receptivity to counterintuitive claims can reflect conceptual growth rather than simple deference or conformity., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.)

This prospective longitudinal study provides evidence of preschool-age precursors of hostile attribution bias in young school-age children, a topic that has received little empirical attention. We examined multiple risk domains, including laboratory and observational assessments of children's social-cognition, general cognitive functioning, effortful control, and peer aggression. Preschoolers (N = 231) with a more advanced theory-of-mind, better emotion understanding, and higher IQ made fewer hostile attributions of intent in the early school years. Further exploration of these significant predictors revealed that only certain components of these capacities (i.e., nonstereotypical emotion understanding, false-belief explanation, and verbal IQ) were robust predictors of a hostile attribution bias in young school-age children and were especially strong predictors among children with more advanced effortful control. These relations were prospective in nature-the effects of preschool variables persisted after accounting for similar variables at school age. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future research and prevention., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

The emotional reactivity hypothesis holds that, over the course of phylogeny, the selection of animals with less reactive temperaments supported the development of sophisticated social-cognitive skills in several species, including humans (Hare, 2007). In the ontogenetic human case, an emotional reactivity hypothesis predicts that children with less reactive temperaments will reach certain milestones in theory-of-mind (ToM) development more quickly. We examined relations between temperament and false-belief understanding in 102 preschool-age children from China and the United States. Temperament was measured via parental ratings of behavior as well as with physiological measures of children's reactivity (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis reactivity gauged via salivary cortisol). In accord with an emotional reactivity hypothesis, children with certain reactive temperaments--specifically, those who were more aggressive and those who were both socially withdrawn and physiologically reactive--evidenced poorer social-cognition. However, our findings also force amendment to the ontogenetic emotional reactivity hypothesis. For the majority of children in both countries, physiological reactivity predicted more advanced ToM, perhaps by facilitating social engagement and attention to social stimuli. Moreover, children who were withdrawn from social interaction yet nonreactive, especially Chinese children of this temperament, evidenced advanced ToM. Thus, some forms of social disengagement may foster social-cognitive development in certain sociocultural contexts.

Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans' fallible minds and God's less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate another agent's less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among children who understood ordinary humans' mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development, sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds., (© 2012 The Authors. Child Development © 2012 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

The current study utilized longitudinal data to investigate how theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding (EU) concurrently and prospectively predicted young children's moral reasoning and decision making. One hundred twenty-eight children were assessed on measures of ToM and EU at 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. At 5.5 years, children were also assessed on the quality of moral reasoning and decision making they used to negotiate prosocial moral dilemmas, in which the needs of a story protagonist conflict with the needs of another story character. More sophisticated EU predicted greater use of physical- and material-needs reasoning, and a more advanced ToM predicted greater use of psychological-needs reasoning. Most intriguing, ToM and EU jointly predicted greater use of higher-level acceptance-authority reasoning, which is likely a product of children's increasing appreciation for the knowledge held by trusted adults and children's desire to behave in accordance with social expectations.

How and when do children develop an understanding of extraordinary mental capacities? The current study tested 56 preschoolers on false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks about the mental states of contrasting agents--some agents were ordinary humans, some had exceptional perceptual capacities, and others possessed extraordinary mental capacities. Results indicated that, in contrast to younger and older peers, children within a specific age range reliably attributed fallible, human-like capacities to ordinary humans and to several special agents (including God) for both tasks. These data lend critical support to an anthropomorphism hypothesis--which holds that children's understanding of extraordinary minds is derived from their everyday intuitive psychology--and reconcile disparities between the findings of other studies on children's understanding of extraordinary minds., (© 2010 The Authors. Child Development © 2010 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.)

Children and adults often encounter counterintuitive claims that defy their perceptions. We examined factors that influence children's acceptance of such claims. Children ages 3-6 years were shown familiar objects (e.g., a rock), were asked to identify the objects, and were then told that each object was something else (e.g., that the rock was soap). For some children, informants explicitly stated that the objects were different from what they appeared to be, whereas other children received testimony about the objects' identities without any reference to the discrepancy between appearance and reality. Children also completed standard tasks measuring appearance-reality understanding. When later asked about the objects' identities and properties, children who had a firm understanding of the appearance-reality distinction and those who heard informants mention that distinction were more accepting of the informants' counterintuitive claims. Thus, receptivity to counterintuitive claims can reflect conceptual growth rather than simple deference or conformity.

This prospective longitudinal study provides evidence of preschool-age precursors of hostile attribution bias in young school-age children, a topic that has received little empirical attention. We examined multiple risk domains, including laboratory and observational assessments of children's social-cognition, general cognitive functioning, effortful control, and peer aggression. Preschoolers (N = 231) with a more advanced theory-of-mind, better emotion understanding, and higher IQ made fewer hostile attributions of intent in the early school years. Further exploration of these significant predictors revealed that only certain components of these capacities (i.e., nonstereotypical emotion understanding, false-belief explanation, and verbal IQ) were robust predictors of a hostile attribution bias in young school-age children and were especially strong predictors among children with more advanced effortful control. These relations were prospective in nature--the effects of preschool variables persisted after accounting for similar variables at school age. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future research and prevention.

Three- to 5-year-old (N = 61) religiously schooled preschoolers received theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks about the mental states of ordinary humans and agents with exceptional perceptual or mental capacities. Consistent with an anthropomorphism hypothesis, children beginning to appreciate limitations of human minds (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God. Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans' fallible minds and God's less fallible mind. Unlike secularly schooled children, religiously schooled 4-year-olds did appreciate another agent's less fallible mental abilities when instructed and reminded about those abilities. Among children who understood ordinary humans' mental fallibilities, knowledge of God predicted attributions of correct epistemic states to extraordinary agents. Results suggest that, at a certain point in ToM development, sociocultural input can facilitate an appreciation for extraordinary minds.

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory-of-mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3)--lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity--predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding 2 years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind.

How and when do children develop an understanding of extraordinary mental capacities? The current study tested 56 preschoolers on false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks about the mental states of contrasting agents--some agents were ordinary humans, some had exceptional perceptual capacities, and others possessed extraordinary mental capacities. Results indicated that, in contrast to younger and older peers, children within a specific age range reliably attributed fallible, human-like capacities to ordinary humans and to several special agents (including God) for both tasks. These data lend critical support to an anthropomorphism hypothesis--which holds that children's understanding of extraordinary minds is derived from their everyday intuitive psychology--and reconcile disparities between the findings of other studies on children's understanding of extraordinary minds.

When deciding whether to trust someone's claims, how do children combine—over multiple interactions—information about that person's general behavioral tendencies (traits) with that person's ongoing (and changing) rate of providing accurate claims? Children aged 4–8 played 11 rounds of a find-the-sticker game. For each round, an informant looked into two cups and made a claim about which cup held a sticker. Children guessed the sticker's location and the sticker's actual location was revealed. Prior to the game, children received information that the informant was either honest or dishonest. In Study 1 (N = 201, 105 female, 96 male), the informant provided inaccurate information on the first five trials and then provided accurate information for the remaining trials (55% overall accuracy). In Study 2 (N = 144, 89 female, 55 male), the informant produced a less predictable pattern of (in)accuracy, but remained 55% accurate overall. The trait information children initially received about the informant's honesty strongly influenced their epistemic trust when they lacked additional information about the informant's reliability (the earliest trials). When children's first-hand experiences with the informant prevented them from making strong predictions about the informant's future behavior, only children approximately 7 years and older utilized trait information to guide their epistemic trust. These results demonstrate some similarities in children's causal reasoning about the physical world and their social reasoning. The results also demonstrate developmental patterns in how children weigh different types of social information at different junctures in social interaction. Public Significance Statement: When deciding whether to trust what someone told them, 4-year-olds relied on information about an informant's traits (honesty/dishonesty) when they had limited first-hand experience with that informant. By 7 years, children also relied on trait information when a person's future behavior was more nuanced or inconsistent with past behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This prospective longitudinal study provides evidence of preschool-age precursors of hostile attribution bias in young school-age children, a topic that has received little empirical attention. We examined multiple risk domains, including laboratory and observational assessments of children's social-cognition, general cognitive functioning, effortful control, and peer aggression. Preschoolers {N = 231) with a more advanced theory-of-mind, better emotion understanding, and higher IQ made fewer hostile attributions of intent in the early school years. Further exploration of these significant predictors revealed that only certain components of these capacities (i.e., nonstereotypical emotion understanding, false-belief explanation, and verbal IQ) were robust predictors of a hostile attribution bias in young school-age children and were especially strong predictors among children with more advanced effortful control. These relations were prospective in nature-the effects of preschool variables persisted after accounting for similar variables at school age. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future research and prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Social experiences are critical to children's theory-of-mind (ToM) development. • Children vary in how they to attend to, shape, and engage in social experiences. • We integrate research establishing links between children's social tendencies and ToM. • Findings inform debates on the ways in which social experiences might influence ToM. • We conclude with suggestions for continued research on these topics. A wealth of research and theorizing has been dedicated to the idea that children's theory of mind (ToM) development is contingent upon qualities of their social contexts (e.g., parents' mental-state language use, the presence of siblings). We highlight the importance of considering the child as an active observer and participant in these social contexts, and thus an agent in their own ToM development. Drawing on research and theory that emphasizes the child's active role in ToM development, we identify child-level social factors that may be critical in explaining individual differences in this development. Specifically, we focus on variability in children's 'social tendencies'—how they attend to social contexts, and how they interact within and shape those contexts. These tendencies may influence the social information that children garner from social contexts—information that they use to construct a ToM. We review and integrate a growing body of research that has established empirical links between individual differences in children's ToM and their social tendencies—specifically, factors such as their social attentiveness, shyness, anxious-withdrawal, and aggressiveness. Taken together, these findings inform continued debates on whether and how social contexts and children's participation in those contexts influence children's ToM, particularly with regard to how children construct their ToM. We conclude with suggestions for continued research on these topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]