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Urban growth management is a popular topic for study area all over the world. Despite the increasingly rich literature, however, little has been considered of the complex relationship between the various urban development factors and their feedback structure. This paper contributes in understanding the mechanism of, and establishing a link between, urban growth management oriented by zoning in China (namely development priority zoning or DPZ). A system dynamics urban growth model is presented that is integrated with China's socio-economic development situation. With Yiwu city and Qingtian County as case studies, the model is applied in simulating urban growth under different driving modes. The results indicate that the DPZ in these two areas has an influence on urban growth management strategy, with the driving mode of urban growth affecting economic development levels, migration and types of land conversion. It is concluded that different driving modes are needed for different types of regions according to the functional positioning of their DPZ and that the model contributes to their identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast with the classical topics of poverty and exclusion of rural areas, the multiple dualities in the social-spatial dimension of villages in semi-urbanized suburbs of China’s large cities have received little attention to date. As this paper demonstrates, such dualities have emerged during China’s rapid urbanization since the early 2000s. It is firstly argued that these dual characteristics are derived from the institutional separation of urban and rural entitlements (e.g., hukou , welfare, land property ownership etc.). These distinctions are then projected into social capital differentiation, such as the division between the strong and weak ties of local community residents. Consequentially, the dualities are embodied in the residential space segregation between established residents and rural migrants that is divided into Houses in Single-Family Occupancy (HSFOs) and Houses in Multiple-Family Occupancy (HMFOs). To support these claims, a case study of the village of Zhoucun, a southern suburb of the Nanjing Metropolitan Area on the east coast China, is used. This draws on both quantitative and qualitative data that includes interviews with authorized officers from local government to municipal government, and a questionnaire survey and interviews with both the HSFO and HMFO residents themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has experienced considerable economic growth since 1978, which was accompanied by unprecedented growth in urbanization and, more recently, by associated rising urban housing and land banking issues. One such issue is that of land hoarding – where real estate developers purchase land to hold unused in the rising market for a future lucrative sale, often several years later. This practice is outlawed in China, where land use is controlled by increasingly strengthened Government policies and inspectors. Despite this, land hoarding continues apace, with the main culprits being the developers and inspectors working subversively. This resembles a game between two players – the inspector and the developer – which provides the setting for this paper in developing an evolutionary game theory model to provide insights into dealing with the dilemmas faced by the players. The logic and dilemma of land banking strategy and illegal land banking issues are analysed, along with the land inspector's role from a game theory perspective by determining the replication dynamic mechanism and evolutionary stable strategies under the various conditions that the players face. The major factors influencing the actions of land inspectors, on the other hand, are the costs of inspection, no matter if it is strict or indolent, conflict costs, and income and penalties from corruption. From this, it is shown that, when the net loss for corruption (income from corruption minus the penalties for corruption and cost of strict inspections) is less than the cost of strict inspections, the final evolutionary stable strategy of the inspectors is to carry out indolent inspections. Then, whether penalising developers for hoarding is severe or not, the evolutionary strategy for the developer is to hoard. The implications for land use control mechanisms and associated developer-inspector actions and counteractions are then examined in the light of the model's properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]