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While most ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand are Thai citizens now, their everyday lives are a site where we can witness the political power entanglement of China, Taiwan and Thailand. With this in mind, this paper aims to look into the relationship between global China and overseas Chinese from the perspective of the ethnic Chinese in the northern borderlands of Thailand. The purpose is not just to disclose the multiplicity of global China in people's everyday lives, but also to complicate the picture of overseas Chinese as portrayed in top-down grand narratives about global China. I argue that the ongoing re-Sinicization in South-East Asia and the territorial geopolitics among China, Taiwan and Thailand have opened a conceptual space for the ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand to flexibly articulate themselves within the changing geopolitical economy. I use tea production and related Chinese-language education programmes, two separate but intertwined cases, to address these issues. By looking beyond the competition, conflict and dilemmas between China and Taiwan, I argue that Taiwan's previous engagement with agricultural transfer to Thailand and the rooting of pro-Taiwan identity and discourse in language education have paradoxically paved a way for China to stretch its influence into the everyday lives of the Chinese communities in the northern Thai borderlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up until the end of Cold War mainstream theories in the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies have overlooked the transformation in relations between actors but instead concentrated on either the constant state of conflict between units or radical changes from war to peace. Acknowledging major changes in their subject matters due to the changing conditions with the end of Cold War, both disciplines had to rethink their theoretical assumptions and renew their toolboxes. Accordingly, the constructivist turn in International Relations and the introduction of Transformational Approach to conflict in Peace Studies have brought the two disciplines closer. Similar to the Constructivist theory of International Relations that emphasizes changes rather than law-like regularities in international politics, the Conflict Transformation Approach in Peace Studies focuses on perennial transformation processes in conflicts. This paper through bringing together insights from the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies, analyses the cross-strait conflict between the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan) within a constructivist framework, and from a transformational perspective by applying Hugh Miall's five-point model of conflict transformation (context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, and personal/elite transformation). Miall's five-point model is utilized in this paper to show that, despite serious crisis occurred in more than 70 years history of People's Republic of China-Republic of China conflict, the relationship of the parties has undergone a set of transformations on the way to reconciliation. Although the conflict, with serious disagreements on crucial issues, is far from being settled, the ongoing transformation creates room for negotiations and further reconciliation on issues that were previously regarded as non-negotiable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait economic activities are no longer unidirectional. The Taiwanese government opened the doors to Chinese investment in 2009. This paper addresses the following crucial question: What is the impact of Chinese investment on Taiwan's high-technology industrial development? Two further questions immediately follow: Will Chinese investment put Taiwanese industrial development at risk? Will an influx of Chinese investment lead to a turning point for Taiwanese industry? The paper first reviews Chinese investment in Taiwan under the framework of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and then explains why we have chosen to focus here on the high-technology industry in Taiwan. It then outlines the main elements of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) before seeking to answer the above research questions. Fieldwork for this paper was conducted from December 2014 to March 2016. Interviewees include Chinese investors, along with consultants from a Taiwanese institute created to promote industrial development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two Taiwan projects: the National Palace Museum (1965) in Taipei (NPM) and the NPM Southern Branch (NPMSB) in Chiayi (2003). The NPMSB targeted the liberalisation of the NPM from the stained political connotation of Chinese nationalism and constructs anew Taiwan's autonomous national identity. This paper argues that the construction of NPM/NPMSB in Taiwan is a cultural and colonial traumatism of national identity, and a struggle between official Chinese nationalism and rising prior Taiwanese subjectivity in a postcolonial context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Europeans regard monetary arrangements as a key element of the overwhelming effort to never again allow hostilities to flare up on their continent. For Taiwan and China, a monetary coordination mechanism may also be appealing in order to eliminate hostilities caused by the Chinese civil war since 1949. Due to certain historical and geopolitical reasons, the impact of a China-Taiwan Economic Union on the world can not be measured by its economic scale only. On the basis of Robert Mundell's earlier proposal and the current development of the European Monetary Union, this paper provides a framework to analyze whether the establishment of a Chinese monetary union (CMU) could be sustained after suffering various economic shocks. We assume that a Chinese central bank coordinates the single monetary policy of the Chinese Economic Area and that China and Taiwan maintain their fiscal independence. An international policy coordination approach is used to simulate possible outcomes if the CMU were to be implemented. The simulation indicates that the U.S. and Japan may suffer welfare losses if China and Taiwan insist on their monetary unification. However, if both the U.S. and Japan accept the CMU, further international policy coordination may help them decrease such kind of losses. The analysis is preliminary but may be helpful in considering the East Asian economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether and w hy the Taiwanese investors in mainland China are pursuing a different location selection strategy from other foreign direct investors. I find that, compared to the general foreign direct investors, Taiwanese direct investors seem to be more dependent on the autonomy of local governments, especially as investment in a locality increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In June 2010, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential trade agreement, which is arguably the most important agreement between China and Taiwan. In this paper, we analyze ECFA and investigate its implications for South Korea since China is South Korea's largest trade partner and Taiwan is its sixth largest. We find that ECFA will have significant political and economic implications for South Korea due to China's role in East Asia and South Korea's competition with Taiwan in the China market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Taiwan and China have a long history of sharing marine resources in the China Seas. However, due to political issues, the two sides have yet to formalize collaboration and interaction despite such a close geographical relationship. The lack of formal collaboration means they cannot manage fisheries or conserve resources as a team. The lack of collaboration in the regional fisheries management organizations also means a mutually beneficial situation for the two sides is yet to be achieved. Recognizing this, the two sides began negotiations in 2008 and have since signed agreements on fisheries co-operation projects. This paper discusses the unique fisheries relationship between Taiwan and China, and the characteristics of their fishing industries. The paper also presents the latest update on the collaboration between the two sides. Finally, this paper proposes practical solutions for resolving outstanding issues between the two sides’ fishing industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the Japanese occupation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. It also explores the development of the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the process of colonization. It explains the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese military and civilian governments. It demonstrates that although the Japanese occupation brought economic welfare, it also brought discrimination towards Taiwanese people. The paper looks at the movement organized by Taiwanese intellectuals and students who wanted to gain political participation. Final remarks are given about the fifty years that Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the impact of ongoing cross-strait economic integration on the development of China and Taiwan. The overall impact has been positive for both economies. Taiwan's industrial employment remains robust even as it transforms into a knowledge-based economy. Taiwanese investment has spurred China's technological development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECFA), signed on in 2010 between China and Taiwan, is the first regional preferential agreement for Taiwan, which is seen as a significant turning point in China-Taiwan relations and a landmark to promote Asia’s overall economic development. This article introduces the ECFA’s aim and discusses its implications for future economic relations between China and Taiwan while reviewing overall and specific statistics data of trades and investment flows. With the fourth anniversary of the enactment of the ECFA, the trade volume seems to increase, but the trends and components shows a further integration in the region, implying the post-ECFA trend sheds light on China and Taiwan’s solid cooperation on production networks of information, communication, and solar panel related products with ASEAN countries, as well as the RMB internationalization opportunity for the future AIIB framework for China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Taiwan has had discriminatory trade and investment policies towards China, severely limiting economic engagement across the Strait. Not having free and open trade with China, one of the largest and most important parts of the East Asian economy, has resulted in Taiwan's underperforming in attracting foreign direct investment, effectively cut Taiwan off from participating fully in East Asian production networks and prevented the deepening of its specialisation in the regional and international economy. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is a watershed in cross-Strait relations and gives Taiwan the opportunity to integrate more fully into the East Asian economy. There is pressure now for Taiwan to pursue preferential trade deals with other countries. This is not the best way forward; rather, Taiwan should pursue a multilateral trade strategy and focus on domestic reforms that will bring larger economic gains, economic diversification and avoid the political risks to the cross-Strait relationship associated with preferential deals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the article, we analyze how names for China are used by five ROC presidents in National Day speeches over 58 years (1949–2007), including “communist bandits”; “Chinese communists”; “mainland” and “opposite shore/both shores”; “China”; and “People’s Republic of China.” Each name registers unique historicity and each displays associated expressions, reshuffling power structures and allowing negotiation of ideological positioning. Sometimes overlapping, sometimes joining at edges, these names cleave to inconsistent layers of meaning, helping presidents negotiate courses of action in Taiwan’s yet-to-be-resolved political identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is the first systematic attempt at estimating the size of Taiwanese foreign aid and, thus, the cost of Taiwan's aid diplomacy. It questions the Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou's justification of his 'diplomatic truce' with China as necessitated by an ineffectiveness of his predecessor Chen Shui-bian's costly aid diplomacy. Deriving its evidence from the ROC governmental budgets, local media reports and interviews with Taiwanese officials involved in foreign aid implementation, the article argues that President Chen did not engage in 'generous financial aid' and proposes that this parsimony, rather than futility of aid diplomacy as a strategy to expand Taiwan's international space, should be considered as contributing to Taipei's diplomatic failures from 2000 to 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Universitas: Relações Internacionais is the property of Universitas: Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since 1990, 19 Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been held. The Workshop, attended by Government and military officials in their private capacities as well as by academics mainly from the littoral States of the South China Sea (SCS) and from the non-SCS countries, is a continuing dialogue process that aims to manage potential conflicts by exploring areas of cooperation among the littoral States in the SCS area. It is also the only regional dialogue mechanism dealing specifically with the SCS issues, where scholars and Government officials from Taiwan and China can meet regularly and exchange views. This article reviews and evaluates the SCS Workshop process and discusses Taiwan's participation in the process. In the concluding section, the adoption of the China-Taiwan South-East Asia Network for Education and Training (SEA-NET) joint project at the nineteenth SCS Workshop, a big step regarding Taiwan's participation in the Workshop process, is discussed. And it is suggested that there likely will be more cooperative measures taken by Taipei and Beijing regarding the SCS area in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the authors discuss the issue of democratization as it applies to Hong Kong. It is the contention of the author that the transfer of power over Hong Kong to the Chinese state has not decreased democratic government in the region and that there has been an improvement in the transparency and accountability in Hong Kong since the 1997 hand over of power. The article attempts to explain these factors and includes a discussion of the implications for China and Taiwan and the international relations between the two countries.

This article discusses the increasing political roles of Taiwanese business people, called taishang, in the relations between Taiwan and China under the policy of Hu Jintao, president of the People's Republic of China. This article explains why the efforts of China to use Taiwanese business people to gain political leverage over Taiwan will most likely not work. The 2008 election of new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou signaled a new effort to promote increased interaction and economic integration with China, hoping that it would lead to eventual peace between the two governments.

China's Taiwan policy has been one of coupling intimidation (the "stick" approach) with coercion (the "carrot" approach), a policy mix which, in the near term, is not likely to change, as is evidenced by the passage of the "Anti-Secession Law" in March, 2005. However, under Hu Jintao, the focus has been on pragmatism. The warm atmosphere that presently reigns in the Taiwan Strait area is unprecedented. Further talks are expected before the two cross-Strait leaders are slated to step down, simultaneously, in 2012. An era of reconciliation and negotiations has dawned. For the first time there is consensus regarding norms of interaction between the two sides. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized after years of tumult. More open, stable and predictable cross-Strait relations are in the interests of both sides. Difficulties surely lie ahead, but they will be dealt with in a different manner than what has been witnessed in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]