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What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1990s, Taiwan and China conducted over twenty rounds of negotiations through the semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) concerning the following issues: notarized papers, registered mail, illegal immigration, fishing disputes, airplane hijacking, and post-1997 shipping links between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Regrouping these issues into rights, law-and-order, and shipping, this study analyzes the differences in the negotiation processes and outcomes through variations of value-interest alignments and their perceived impact on future policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an examination into the cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan, focusing on the political implications of the 2012 Taiwanese elections. Introductory details are given explaining the victory of incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT Party, suggesting that Ma's former policies will likely continue into the next four years. An overview is then given of Ma's policies, noting Taiwan's strategic non-confrontation approach to China in geopolitical and economic areas, its openness to cultural exchange through tourism and education, and its military hedging. Final remarks are also included predicting Chinese continuation of its equivalent policies toward Taiwan.

The article presents an examination into cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China as of 2012, focusing on the paradoxes seen in the overlap shared between domestic and foreign policies of Taiwan. Four paradoxes are named, including the difficulties created by Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995, internal polarization in Taiwanese politics regarding nationalism, Taiwanese economic dependency on Chinese trade and investment, and rapprochement since 2008. Each of these four issues are discussed in turn, citing how each shows both promise for continued relations and continuing difficulties between the two nations.