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When preschoolers are presented with a label for an entity that conflicts with its appearance, they sometimes rely on the new label rather than on the entity’s appearance to categorize the entity and to infer its properties. We examined whether children’s learning from such claims is short-lived or long-lasting and whether the persistence of their learning depends on the degree of fit between those claims and the available perceptual evidence. Children aged 3–5 years ( N = 71) were asked to categorize hybrids. These hybrids combined 75% of the features from one animal or object with 25% of the features from a different animal or object. After categorizing each hybrid, children heard an informant provide a contrary label. Immediately after they were provided with this new label, children often recategorized the entities accordingly, especially when the label matched the hybrid’s predominant features. Children’s endorsement of the informant’s label proved to be long-lasting when it matched the hybrid’s predominant features, typically persisting even after 5 weeks. In contrast, children’s endorsement often faded over time when the informant’s label did not match the hybrid’s predominant features. Overall, children were more skeptical of testimony that was more discrepant with the perceptual evidence available to them, and they were less likely to continue endorsing it after a delay. The findings have implications for our understanding of how children eventually come to represent and believe in counter-perceptual and counterintuitive concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two studies, we investigated the development of children’s reasoning about potent invisible entities. In Study 1, children aged 2.2–5.5 years ( N = 48) were briefly told about a novel invisible substance that could produce a novel outcome—make a novel box turn green. During this introduction, children watched as one container was inverted over a box and the box lit up green, and then another identical container was inverted over the box and the box did not light up. On test trials, the experimenter inserted a spoon in novel (actually empty) containers and inverted the spoon over the box, which turned green in one trial and did not light up in the other trial. For both trials, children were asked whether there was anything in each container. Children across this age range appropriately reported that an invisible substance was present only when the box lit up. In Study 2, children aged 2.4–4.5 years ( N = 48) watched similar demonstrations but were not explicitly provided information about the invisible substance. Children as young as 3 years spontaneously inferred that an invisible substance was present when the box lit up and was absent when the box did not light up. A final task tested children’s ability to use their causal knowledge of invisible substances to produce an effect—making the box light up. The youngest children had difficulty with this task, but many children aged 3.5–4.5 years performed capably. These results indicate an early-emerging understanding of potent invisible entities that develops rapidly during early childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals in many cultures believe in omniscient (all-knowing) beings, but everyday representations of omniscience have rarely been studied. To understand the nature of such representations requires knowing how they develop. Two studies examined the breadth of knowledge (i.e., types of knowledge) and depth of knowledge (i.e., amount of knowledge within domains) that preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults (N = 180) attributed to an all-knowing being. Preschoolers often reported that an omniscient mind would lack many types of knowledge, and they completely failed to understand the depth of omniscient knowledge. With increasing age, children approached an understanding of omniscience—attributing broader and deeper knowledge to an omniscient agent—but only adults firmly understood the depth of omniscient knowledge. We identify socio-cultural and cognitive factors that correlate with children’s understandings of omniscience. Findings demonstrate that childhood representations of fallible, limited, human minds both make possible and constrain developing representations of radically non-human minds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research shows that even preschoolers are skeptical; they frequently reject claims from other people when the claims conflict with their own perceptions and concepts. Yet, despite their skepticism, both children and adults come to believe in a variety of phenomena that defy their first-hand perceptions and intuitive conceptions of the world. In this review, we explore how children and adults acquire such concepts. We describe how a similar developmental process underlies mental representation of both the natural and the supernatural world, and we detail this process for two prominent supernatural counterintuitive ideas—God and the afterlife. In doing so, we highlight the fact that conceptual development does not always move in the direction of greater empirical truth, as described within naturalistic domains. We consider factors that likely help overcome skepticism and, in doing so, promote belief in counterintuitive phenomena. These factors include qualities of the learners, aspects of the context, qualities of the informants, and qualities of the information. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]