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What determines whether a temporary migrant chooses to go abroad as a documented worker or as an illegal alien? We address the question from a theoretical perspective by focusing on how immigration policies, aimed at both documented and undocumented foreign workers, influence the choice between the two modes of migration. Calibrating our model to the specific case of temporary emigration from Thailand, we provide estimates of the relative policy effectiveness. The deportation rate facing undocumented aliens is shown to be the most potent instrument, while some of the measures directed at documented contract workers are found to be more effective in influencing the choice of emigration mode than border controls and employer sanctions aimed at illegal immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries with strict immigration policies often resort to deportation measures to reduce their stocks of illegal immigrants. Many of their undocumented foreign workers, however, are not deported but rather choose to return home voluntarily. This paper studies the optimizing behavior of undocumented immigrants who continuously face the risk of deportation, modeled by a stochastic process, and must decide how long to remain in the host country. It is found that the presence of uncertainty with respect to the length of stay abroad unambiguously reduces the desired migration duration and may trigger a voluntary return when a permanent stay would otherwise be optimal. Voluntary return is motivated by both economic and psychological factors. Calibration of the model to match the evidence on undocumented Thai migrants in Japan suggests that the psychological impact of being abroad as an illegal alien may be equivalent to as large as a 68 % cut in the consumption rate at the point of return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A guest-worker program can be a very flexible and convenient way of meeting labor shortages in a host country, assuming that the migrants adhere to the rules of the program. This article investigates the conditions under which guest workers have sufficient incentives for voluntary return to their country of origin when their work permits expire. Should they choose to overstay, the article examines how various factors influence the optimal duration of the overstay phase of a foreign worker's planning horizon. The analysis is conducted in the context of a lenient enforcement regime that avoids deportations of undocumented aliens. It relies instead on eligibility criteria and pricing instruments, such as partial withholding of salary and an exit tax for those who overstay, to provide incentives for voluntary return at the end of the contract period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Savings of guest workers as well as of undocumented migrants represent important inflows of foreign exchange for some developing countries. This paper compares the saving behavior of these two types of migrants, assuming that the former are authorized to work abroad for a specific period of time, while the latter can stay until apprehended and deported by the immigration authorities. Due to the risk of deportation, the saving rate of an illegal immigrant is found to be initially above that of a documented migrant. This precautionary saving phenomenon is, however, short-lived. A key finding of the paper is that the total repatriated assets of an illegal migrant are always lower than those of a documented worker, provided that their duration of stay abroad is identical. This is because the undocumented migrant's saving rate falls over time as her expected lifetime earnings are adjusted upwards every day that she avoids apprehension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]