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Who gets the last word on how much time a prisoner will serve when subject to unexpired terms imposed at different times by state and federal courts? The short answer is the executive, though the question is complicated by who has "primary jurisdiction." In 2015, 1 began representing Jose Antonio, who after pleading guilty but before being sentenced on a California robbery, pled guilty to federal drug charges, for which he was sentenced. Rather than deliver him to a federal prison, the feds returned him to state court, which pronounced an eight-year term on the robbery to run concurrently with his 9.3-year Jtderal term on the drug ollense. But there seemed nothing we could do to prevent the state and.#deral terms from running consecutively, the reason being that. junior bureaucrats at the DOJ wanted to run them that way. As sovereigns, both the United States and California may exact from a convicted person as much or as little punishment for a crime as they like. But neither the state nor the federal court sentenced Antonio to a 17.3-year term, a sum realizable only had the terms been structured to run consecutively, which they explicitly were not. Antonio's plight betrays a jriction between sister jurisdictions and among coequal branches of governments that is an affront to anyone of the mind that in these recurring, high-stakes conflicts, deference is due the second sentencing court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, using mostly data drawn from a study of the criminal work of the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, from 1880 on, explores the history of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining, it turns out, was used in Alameda County from at least 1880 though it was by no means as common in the late 19th century as it is today. There is also ample evidence of "implicit plea bargaining." that is, pleading guilty in expectation of a lighter sentence. The data from this study suggest that plea bargaining cannot be explained simply as a reaction to crowded court conditions. It is connected with structural and social changes in criminal justice, in particular, the rise of professional police and prosecutors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to relieve its overburdened superior courts, California introduced a statutory amendment which allowed lesser felonies to be dealt with in lower-level courts. Using an interrupted time-series methodology, this study examines the impact of this change in law on caseloads, plea bargaining, conviction rates, and sentencing in the superior courts. After the statutory intervention there was a reduction in superior court caseloads, but the overall rate of plea bargaining remained relatively constant. However, there were substantial changes in types of plea bargains with a decline in fast pleas and a corresponding rise in slow pleas. It was also found that severity of sanctions was related to the changing caseload patterns. Policy and theoretical implications of these and other findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that former vice president Dante Nicholson of the City of Angels Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, has pled guilty to charges that he intentionally brought Skid Row denizens to the hospital for unnecessary treatments. His malicious act has allegedly brought more than $4 million to the institution. Due to admission, Nicholson may face a prison term of up to 10 years and be forced to make full restitution of the bilked funds.