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Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been adopted in many resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) applications to provide effective and lightweight solutions for device authentication. However, an attacker can collect challenge–response pairs (CRPs) of a strong PUF, to build a machine learning (ML) model and mimic its behavior, i.e., predicting the responses of unseen challenges with high accuracy. Although several PUFs have been proposed to resist such modeling attacks, they incur high hardware overhead. Developing a PUF primitive with low hardware cost and high resistance to ML attacks is thus a crucial task. In this article, we propose the first response–feedback-based lightweight anti-ML-attack PUF (FLAM-PUF). It is only composed of one arbiter PUF (APUF) and one Galois linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), with some basic logic gates, reducing more than 62% hardware cost compared with the state-of-the-art robust strong PUFs. Specifically, FLAM-PUF leverages a cost-effective feedback loop structure to dynamically control and update the LFSR configuration. FLAM-PUF has two main characteristics: 1) it feeds back a 1-bit response in every cycle to intentionally poison the data of the CRP set for training. To resist ML-based modeling attacks, the 1-bit response can randomly update one coefficient of the feedback polynomial to implant more complex correlations into the model built by attackers and 2) it takes advantage of an $n-$ bit response feedback-controlled reconfigurable Galois LFSR to enlarge the original challenge space of the APUF. Extensive experimental results show that the proposed FLAM-PUF achieves near-optimal uniformity, uniqueness, and reliability. Our scheme works well under standard attack models with public crucial initial information. In particular, the prediction accuracy of modeling attacks against FLAM-PUF is nearly 50% under the four widely used ML algorithms, i.e., support vector machines (SVMs), logistic regression (LR), covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES), and deep neural networks (DNNs), indicating excellent resistance against these ML attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are circuits that produce outputs determined by random physical variations from fabrication. The PUF studied in this paper utilizes the variation sensitivity of static random access memory (SRAM) data retention voltage (DRV), the minimum voltage at which each cell can retain state. Prior work shows that DRV can uniquely identify circuit instances with 28% greater success than SRAM power-up states that are used in PUFs [1]. However, DRV is highly sensitive to temperature, and until now this makes it unreliable and unsuitable for use in a PUF. In this paper, we enable DRV PUFs by proposing a DRV-based hash function that is insensitive to temperature. The new hash function, denoted DRV-based hashing (DH), is reliable across temperatures because it utilizes the temperature-insensitive ordering of DRVs across cells, instead of using the DRVs in absolute terms. To evaluate the security and performance of the DRV PUF, we use DRV measurements from commercially available SRAM chips, and use data from a novel DRV prediction algorithm. The prediction algorithm uses machine learning for fast and accurate simulation-free estimation of any cell’s DRV, and the prediction error in comparison to circuit simulation has a standard deviation of 0.35 mV. We demonstrate the DRV PUF using two applications—secret key generation and identification. In secret key generation, we introduce a new circuit-level reliability knob as an alternative to error correcting codes. In the identification application, our approach is compared to prior work and shown to result in a smaller false-positive identification rate for any desired true-positive identification rate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]