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China's deepening ties to Iran, evident in the comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) signed in 2021 after five years of stalled progress, is not an indication of a revisionist Chinese approach to the Gulf region. In fact, its CSPs with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, already activated and implemented, are at far more mature levels, commensurate with China's deep levels of economic and political engagement with the Arab side of the Gulf. This is consistent with a strategic hedging approach that Beijing has used to build a sustainable presence without disrupting a competitive and fragile regional order. With far larger and more diverse interests in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, China's partnership with Iran creates leverage due to the asymmetry inherent in the China‐Iran relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What led to the boom of Chinese development cooperation in Latin America? This article provides a systematic analysis of China's foreign behavior, motives, and policies regarding development cooperation toward the region between 2000 and 2014. I propose a comparative framework that defines Chinese development cooperation as a tool of economic diplomacy. Drawing on empirical evidence from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset and Chinese white papers on foreign aid, the findings evidence that China was motivated by multiple and conjunctural factors in providing development cooperation. In the realm of theory, the article contributes to the literature on economic statecraft—filling in gaps in understanding the relationship between economics and politics. Empirically, it provides a set of tools for understanding the important role that development cooperation plays in a nation's statecraft. Regarding Chinese foreign policy studies, it offers insight into the financial dimension of China's international economic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the challenge posed by flawed democracies or political regime to the rise of China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Topics discussed are attempts of political leaderships in Nepal, Malaysia, Pakistan and Maldives to influence the direction of China's development efforts and flaws in the design of BRI including investment of China in corruption, scale of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) financial obligations and demand for local participation in BRI projects.

Central Asia has an important geopolitical and geo–economic position. Comparing with other regions of the world, the integration level of Central Asia is still insufficient, and the lack of regional public goods is believed that the main reason. In recent years, China became increasingly involved in the affairs of Central Asia, and China’s policy has attracted more and more attention. On the basis of research literature reviews, this article analyzes China’s policies in the Central Asian with a view of regional public goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they will respond with a more moderate policy known as ‘hedging’. In considering these options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT–NE situation will balance against China; those in the LT–PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT–PE or LT–NE situations will hedge against China. Hypotheses are supported by three case studies, Vietnam–China (HT–NE), Cambodia–China (LT–PE) and Singapore–China (HT–PE) relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The large and rapidly growing trade relationship between Japan and China has occurred against a backdrop of political tensions. This study measures performance of the trade relationship, benchmarking it against other trade flows worldwide, and examines the impact of the politics on bilateral trade performance. To do this, a frontier gravity model is estimated using core determinants of trade. This gives a benchmark against which to measure trade performance, explained using resistances to trade. While the economic relationship is not independent from the politics, an important conclusion is that trade has not been diminished or disturbed by politics to a significant extent. China's commitment to the global trading system from the mid-1980s and its accession to the WTO in 2001 has meant that tensions in the political relationship with Japan from time to time have not derailed, but rather have increasingly come to be dominated, by the economic relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El trabajo aborda, en síntesis, los derroteros que han seguido los vínculos entre China y los países de América Latina. Recoge las coyunturas que gravitaron, en diferentes momentos, después de la proclamación de la "Nueva China" en 1949, en el establecimiento y desarrollo de las relaciones político-económicas. Enfatiza en el giro que se vislumbra, a partir del año 2004, en los vínculos sino-latinoamericanos, después de la visita efectuada por Hu Jintao, a varios países del Continente. Señala, entre otras cuestiones, las oportunidades y retos que abre para América Latina el mercado de China, ya sea en calidad de destino de las exportaciones tradicionales latinoamericanas, así como alternativas para la obtención de créditos, tecnologías y relaciones sin condicionamientos políticos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]