Search

The EU and NATO both have acquired a vast experience in acting as security providers on the international stage in recent years. However, the responses to on-going international crises so far have been selective and certain areas of the world are still kept at distance from Brussels, with limited aid provided at best. One of the most striking examples of such an approach proved to be a humanitarian crisis in the Western province of Sudan, Darfur. The study of the EU and NATO responses to Darfur crisis puts ahead the following research questions: how far the EU and the Atlantic Alliance can go in crisis management, considering the modalities of the given crisis? How is the interaction between the organizations structured and whether it corresponds to the existing agreements between the two? What are the ways the capabilities of two organizations are distributed and how are their comparative advantages (if any) are used? Finally, what impact does the EU-NATO interaction have on the effectiveness of the given responses and what could be the implications for their future operations, autonomous and/or joint ones?The paper will first look at the modalities of the responses to Darfur crisis both the EU and NATO were elaborating and the ways their interaction was set. It will then analyze the implementation phase and, finally, focus on the limitations the responses to Darfur crisis reveal regarding the organizations’ capacities to act as international security providers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of the African Union have formed a working regional peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, solving what should have been an intractable collective action dilemma. The motivations for such cooperation without any traditional incentives are the central focus of this study, as understanding why these governments are willng to form supra-state bonds will shed light upon unique elements of African states, as well as perceived benefits of regional cooperation. In explaining this phenomenon, this paper concentrates on the key actors in the Darfur mission: Nigeria and Rwanda. In contrast to the formal statements issued by these countries, it will be argued that neither humanitarian concerns nor other liberal norms are causing Nigeria or Rwanda to take part in the intervention. It will also be shown that neither of these countries face security threats due to the conflict in the Sudan. Rather, regional cooperation in Africa is driven by the need that weak, often transitional, states have to prove their legitimacy to international actors in order to either maintain adequate funding in the post-Cold War setting of "good governance" conditionalities, or gain access to international organizations. Specifically, Nigeria hopes to improve its chances of being named to the UN Security Council, in the event that the proposed reforms are carried out. Rwanda, on the other hand, has failed meet most of its contractual goals with the IMF and World Bank, placing them in a precarious position for continued funding or debt relief. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the late 1990s, largely in response to its individual as well as the world?s collective failure during the Rwandan genocide, the Canadian government became a leading advocate of the concept of human security. More specifically, it sponsored the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and then became an outspoken advocate of its most important conceptual innovation ? the idea of the ?Responsibility to Protect? and the international community?s obligation to intervene where state governments fail to fulfill this Responsibility. Yet throughout this same period, the government of Canada was effectively eroding its resource capacity ? developmental, security, and diplomatic ? to respond to international crises both before and after they ?break.? The crisis in Darfur has brought these two contradictory trends to a head. How does a global ?middle power?, with expansive normative objectives but limited and eroding means, respond to a crisis in which the Responsibility to Protect is so flagrantly flaunted? What influence is it able to bring to bear in attempting to orchestrate an effective international response in line with the principles it has sought to promote? To what extent, conversely, does its inability to contribute more substantially to the international effort to respond to the Darfurian crisis weaken both its foreign policy credibility and the campaign to breathe life into the ?R2P? project? Finally, under the new Conservative regime are we now seeing a historic retreat from the ?norm entrepreneurship? role, and the concomitant commitment to African security and development, which marked the discursive priorities of the previous Liberal government? The paper addresses these questions through a critical analysis of Canada?s diplomatic, security, and developmental response to the Darfurian crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seldom has an internal armed conflict in Africa attracted as much public attention internationally as the Darfur crisis has over the past few years. Players as different as UN diplomats, advocacy movements, representatives of humanitarian organizations, c ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]