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"A Liberal Chronicle in Peace and War: Journals and Papers of J.A. Pease, 1st Lord Gainford, 1911-1915" is a book edited by Cameron Hazlehurst and Christine Woodland. The book explores the life and political career of J.A. Pease, a largely forgotten figure who held key positions in Liberal governments during the early 20th century. The book delves into Pease's journals and correspondence, shedding light on his views on various issues such as women's suffrage, international tensions, and the First World War. It also provides insights into the political landscape of post-Edwardian England and features notable figures like Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George. The book is a valuable resource for researchers interested in this period of history. [Extracted from the article]

Following his introduction, Marcocci surveys several examples of these Renaissance era world histories over the course of five chapters. By the early seventeenth century, Marcocci maintains, blinkered nationalist histories sponsored by rulers and religious histories extolling Christianity over other beliefs replaces the cosmopolitan world histories. Marcocci believes that the last major example of a history of the world was Walter Raleigh's I History of the World i (1614), which used multiple world histories as its base and compared recent history and rulers to those of ancient empires. [Extracted from the article]

bioRxiv was founded on the premise that publicly posting preprints would allow authors to receive feedback and submit improved papers to journals. This paper analyses a number of trends against this stated purpose, namely, the timing of preprint postings relative to submission to accepting journals; trends in the rate of unpublished preprints over time; trends in the timing of publication of preprints by accepting journals; and trends in the concentration of published, reviewed preprints by publisher. Findings show that a steady c.30% of preprints remain unpublished and that the majority is posted onto bioRxiv close to or after submission – therefore giving no time for feedback to help improve the articles. Four publishers (Elsevier, Nature, PLOS, and Oxford University Press) account for the publication of 47% of bioRxiv preprints. Taken together, it appears that bioRxiv is not accomplishing its stated goals and that authors may be using the platform more to establish priority, as a marketing enhancement of papers, and as functional Green OA, rather than as a community‐driven source of prepublication review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the 2017 Navigating Research Report "How Academic Users Understand, Discover and Utilize Reference Resources" of the Oxford University Press related to student engagement with easily available and library-acquired reference materials. Topics discussed include 75 percent of free library-acquired reference materials used by students, students from English-speaking regions use free available study materials and student behavior.

The paper addresses the problem of imaginative resistance in science, that is, why and under what circumstances imagination sometimes resists certain scenarios. In the first part, the paper presents and discusses two accounts concerning the problem and relevant for the main thesis of this study. The first position is that of Gendler (Journal of Philosophy 97:55–81, 2000), (Gendler, in: Nichols (ed) The Architecture of the Imagination: New essays on pretence, possibility and fiction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006a), (Gendler & Liao, in: Gibson, Carroll (eds) The routledge companion to philosophy of literature, Routledge, New York, 2016), according to which imaginative resistance mainly concerns evaluative scenarios, presenting deviant moral attitudes. The second account examined is that of Kim et al. (in: Cova, Réhault (eds) Advances in experimental philosophy of aesthetics, Bloomsbury, London, 2018), who insisted on the link between imaginative resistance on the one hand and counterfactual and counterdescriptive scenarios on the other. In the light of both theories, this paper discusses the importance of addressing the problem of imaginative resistance in the scientific enterprise in the light of some mechanisms of embodied simulation, based on the activity of mirror neurons and investigated within the framework of the Embodied Simulation Theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ+) people are experiencing increasingly varied visibility on social media due to ongoing digitalization. In this paper, I draw on social epistemology and phenomenological accounts of the digital (Frost-Arnold in: Lackey (ed) The epistemic dangers of context collapse online, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021; Krueger and Osler in Philos Topics 47(2):205–231, 2019; Hine in: Ethnography for the internet: embedded, embodied and everyday, Bloomsbury, London, 2015), and argue that, for LGBTQ+ individuals, social media provides a space for connecting with people with shared lived experiences. This, in turn, makes it possible for social media to enable feelings of belonging. By interacting with other LGBTQ+ people online, LGBTQ+ individuals are enabled to imagine their own being in the world and to feel like they belong. This is especially important when we consider that, for LGBTQ+ identities, it may be more complicated to feel connected due to marginalization and (fear of) discrimination. This paper not only draws on literature from phenomenology and social epistemology on the digital, but also presents and analyzes interviews that were conducted in order to explore the social media experiences of LGBTQ+ people through a phenomenology and social epistemology informed framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder's expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker's argument for (1) is unsound, and that (1) is unlikely to be true. This obviates the need to explain the alleged rational incoherence, and so Baker's objection to Schroeder's expressivism is undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré's edited collection of papers in I Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology i is an excellent example of the skillful sampling of an on-going approach in philosophy of science. Everything flows: towards a processual philosophy of biology. I especially warmly recommend it to those philosophers exposed chiefly to the standard topics and approaches in philosophy of biology and in philosophy of science more generally. [Extracted from the article]

In a recent paper, Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020) have formulated a decidable sequent calculus for the logic of agency, specifically for a deliberative see-to-it-that modality, or dstit. In that paper the adequacy of the system is demonstrated by showing the derivability of the axiomatization of dstit from Belnap et al. (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). And while the influence of the latter book on the study of logics of agency cannot be overstated, we note that this is not the only axiomatization of that modality available. In fact, an earlier (and arguably purer) one was offered in Xu (J Philosophical Logic 27(5):505–552, 1998). In this article we fill this lacuna by proving that this alternative axiomatization is likewise readily derivable in the system of Negri and Pavlović (Studia Logica 1–35, 2020). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua [Shepherd, J. 2015. "Conscious Control Over Action." Mind & Language 30 (3): 320–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12082; Shepherd, J. 2021. The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press] aims to fill this gap. His proposal is grounded in the standard causalist account of action, according to which, simply put, bodily movements are controlled by the agent if and only if they are caused, in the right way, by the relevant psychological states. In this paper, I argue that the proposal does not succeed in distinguishing between mere causation and actual control; it does not solve the problem of deviant causation. On the basis of my criticism, Anscombean action theory promises to offer a valuable perspective. It suggests that an important function of consciousness is to integrate an action into a rational whole. If this is on the right track, it supports Shepherd's overall claim that the importance of consciousness for action control is often underestimated, because this contribution of consciousness may often go unnoticed in experimental settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging for objectivists about color. Second, we offer a response to this challenge, claiming that once we focus on determinate colors rather than the determinables they determine, a response to arguments from perceptual variation becomes apparent. Third, our nominal opponents are relationalist (like Cohen in The red and the real: an essay on color ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) and we will argue that the main argument for rejecting objectivism commits the relationalist to a position that is more radical than the one he would wish to endorse. Fourth, we suggest that insight into which properties could be relational may be found by looking to our best scientific theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses van Leeuwen's (2008. Discourse and practice: New tools from critical discourse analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press) Authority Legitimation framework to examine government posters published in the 1950s–1980s in Hong Kong, which serve as a means of shaping public opinion and legitimate social action. Martin and White's (2005. The language of evaluation: Appraisal in english. London: Palgrave Macmillan) Appraisal framework is also applied to provide the study with relevant analytical tools by which to construct evaluatively coherent authorial reading positions propagated by the government in the posters as well as aligning viewers with these desired positions. The government posters being studied are concerned with various aspects of social practices in the domain of public health communication. This paper argues that the representations of these social practices are realized as texts – both visual and verbal – in the posters, as part of a broader recontextualization process where legitimate ways of doing things as stipulated in the government guidelines are recontextualized in these posters and conveyed to members of the public. The aim is two-fold: (1) to provide a systematic analysis of how visual and verbal resources construe evaluation in the government posters and the consequent legitimation discourse as viewers are being persuaded to align with legitimate social practices; (2) to highlight various forms of legitimation, namely, role model authority legitimation, impersonal authority legitimation, and conformity authority legitimation, that are realized in these posters through visual-verbal articulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In German (and Dutch), main clauses and dependent clauses differ clearly with respect to form. Main clauses are always V2 and autonomous (with speech act status) while dependent ones are verb-final/VL (V-last) and nonautonomous (without speech act status). This paper is about autonomous clauses with the form of dependent clauses (i.e. VL-form, also captured in the literature under the term insubordinate subordination, coined by Evans, Nicholas. 2007. Insubordination and its uses. In Irina Nikolaeva (ed.), Finiteness: Theoretical and empirical foundations, 366–431. Oxford: Oxford University Press). In the recent literature, it has been argued that in order to explain the occurrence of autonomous dependent clauses in the historical development of German, the introducing main clause fell elliptically leaving behind a dependent form with autonomous status. The present paper argues that this account is false. Dependent forms can exist independently. Since speech act autonomy of dependent forms exists with certain (albeit not all) complementizers, a special account is provided. It is argued that this development typical of modern German, matches with the tendency toward an illocutionary semantics in its own right. Parallels for the latter path of grammaticalization are drawn from several languages other than German. The importance of the concerns for modern generative grammar is a twofold one: first, it provides insights into how independent (autonomous), but formally dependent sentences divide into several kinds of modality that are expressed in the left sentential periphery; and, second, it shows in which ways speaker-perspective is grammaticalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a novel measure of arbitrage activity to examine whether arbitrageurs can have a destabilizing effect on the stock market. We focus on stock price momentum, a classic example of a positive-feedback strategy that our theory predicts can be destabilizing. Our measure, dubbed comomentum, is the high-frequency abnormal return correlation among stocks on which a typical momentum strategy would speculate. When comomentum is low, momentum strategies are stabilizing, reflecting an underreaction phenomenon that arbitrageurs correct. When comomentum is high, the returns on momentum stocks strongly revert, reflecting prior overreaction from crowded momentum trading that pushes prices away from fundamentals. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We establish limitations to the usage of direct revelation mechanisms (DRMs) by corporations seeking decision-relevant information in economies with securities markets. In this environment, posting a DRM increases the informed agent's outside option: if the agent rejects the DRM, he convinces the market he is uninformed, and he can aggressively trade with low price impact, thereby generating large (off-equilibrium) trading gains. This endogenous outside option may make using a DRM to screen uninformed agents impossible. When screening is possible, solely relying on the market for information is optimal if the increase in outside option is sufficiently large. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India introduced credit scoring technology in 2007. We study its adoption by the two main types of banks operating there: new private banks (NPBs) and state-owned public sector banks (PSBs). Soon after the technology is introduced, NPBs start checking the credit scores of most borrowers before lending. PSBs do so equally quickly for new borrowers but very slowly for prior clients, although lending without checking scores is reliably associated with more delinquencies. We show that an important factor explaining the difference in adoption rates is the stickiness of past bank structures and managerial practices. Past practices inhibit better practices today. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyses the extent to which research in the field of English and development in the global South supports the claim that English can contribute to development. Particular reference is made to the Colombian context, which, along with several other countries in Latin America, has prioritised English language teaching in recent years through a series of initiatives. In doing so this paper highlights domains where English skills may be more or less useful in developing contexts in general and in Colombia more specifically and identifies factors which may influence the role of English in development. To aid in this analysis, this article draws on Phillipson's (Linguistic imperialism. Oxford University Press, 1992) theory of linguistic imperialism and relevant literature which looks at the role of English and development in the global South. The paper argues that although English may foster development in domains such as employment, trade, migration, and education, this is contingent upon a range of personal and contextual factors including level of Englishand socioeconomic status. It is also argued that, regardless of the contribution that English can make to development, interests in the global North are benefitting from the proliferation of this language in developing contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Jody Azzouni's "deflationary nominalism," the singular terms of mathematical language applied or unapplied to science refer to nothing at all. What does exist, Azzouni claims, must satisfy the quaternary condition he calls "thick epistemic access" (TEA). In this paper I argue that TEA surreptitiously reifies some mathematical entities. The mathematical entity that I take TEA to reify is the Fourier harmonic, an infinite-duration monochromatic sinusoid applied throughout engineering and physics. I defend the reality of the harmonic, in Azzouni's account, not by satisfying all four TEA conditions with respect to it, but by showing that the harmonic renders satisfiable the TEA condition called "grounding," specifically in Azzouni's (Talking about nothing: numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) example of a human visually perceiving a vase. The harmonic thereby plays what Azzouni calls an "epistemic role," and merits inclusion in the deflationary nominalist ontology. Against the "coding" objection of Azzouni and Bueno (Br J Philos Sci 67:781–816, 2016), which would nominalize the harmonic to nonexistent status, I reply that in the context of grounding, the coding objection begs the question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the 'exclusion argument'. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. "My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What's Wrong with It." In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call 'the Neurosceptical Argument', the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke's proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Paul (Transformative experience, 1st edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge to decision theory since their value cannot be anticipated. Building on Pettigrew's (in: Lambert, Schwenkler (eds) Becoming someone new: essays on transformative experience, choice, and change, Oxford University Press, pp 100–121, 2020) redescription, this paper presents a new approach to how and when transformative decisions can nevertheless be made rationally. Thanks to fundamental higher-order facts that apply to any kind of experience, an agent always at least knows the general shape of the utility space. This in combination with the knowledge about the non-transformative alternative in the choice set can enable rational decision-making despite the presence of a transformative experience. For example, this paper's approach provides novel arguments for why gender transition (cf. McKinnon in Res Philosophica 92(2):419–440, 2015) or staying childfree (cf. Barnes in Philos Phenomenol Res 91(3):775–786, 2015) can be rational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While medicine is solidly grounded on scientific areas such as biology and chemistry, some argue that it is in its essence not a science at all. With medicine playing a substantial societal role, addressing questions about the scientific nature of medicine is of obvious urgency. This paper takes on such a task and starts by consulting the literature on the "demarcation" problem in the philosophy of science. Learning from failures of earlier approaches, it proposes that we adopt a Deflated Approach, which acknowledges that "science" is a family resemblance concept that admits differences of degrees to nonscientific undertakings. Then, drawing on Paul Hoyningen-Huene's (Systematicity: The nature of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013); (Synthese 196: 907–928, 2019) account of systematicity and Alexander Bird's (Synthese 196: 863–879, 2019) analysis of examples from the history of medicine, the paper argues that medicine meets the requirement for systematicity on all dimensions and thereby qualifies as a science. The paper then considers and defuses two objections. First, it is shown that nonepistemic differences linked to the distinctive duality of medicine do not warrant thinking that medicine is not science. Second, against some recent criticism (Oreskes in Synthese 196: 881–905, 2019), the paper uses homeopathy as an example to show that (synchronic and diachronic) systematicity can succeed as a demarcation criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to explore the depiction of gender and their roles in textbooks of Oxford University Press in Pakistan. The objectives are to explore the gender roles and representation of male and female characters within the English and Urdu textbooks of the Single National Curriculum in Pakistan. A descriptive-qualitative approach is used and data collected is analyzed thematically. Beauvoir's feminist theory is employed for the analysis of the textbooks. The research reveals that the feminist agenda of equity has been fulfilled in that women should be given an equal place in society, where women are portrayed as strong, engaged individuals who wish to play a part in changing society. Besides, this study supports the notion that children ought to be allowed to follow their passions and abilities without hindrance fromgender-based societal norms. Since children of both sexes should be treated equally, the feminist perspective's comparative analysis of the two textbooks will help the authors carefully design the course curriculum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the work of von Bertalanffy (Q Rev Boil 32:217–231, 1957), several models have been proposed that relate the ontogenetic scaling of energy assimilation and metabolism to growth, which are able to describe ontogenetic growth trajectories for living organisms and collapse them onto a single universal curve (West et al. in Nature 413:628–631, 2001; Barnavar et al. in Nature 420:626, 2002). Nevertheless, all these ontogenetic growth models critically depend on fitting parameters and on the allometric scaling of the metabolic rate. Using a new metabolic rate relation (Escala in Theor Ecol 12(4):415–425, 2019) applied to a Bertalanffy-type ontogenetic growth equation, we find that ontogenetic growth can also be described by a universal growth curve for all studied species, but without the aid of any fitting parameters (i.e., no fitting procedure is performed on individual growth curves). We find that the inverse of the heart frequency f H , rescaled by the ratio of the specific energies for biomass creation and metabolism, defines the characteristic timescale for ontogenetic growth. Moreover, our model also predicts a generation time and lifespan that explain the origin of several "Life History Invariants' (Charnov in Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) and predict that the Malthusian parameter should be inversely proportional to both the generation time and lifespan, in agreement with the data in the literature (Duncan et al. in Ecology 88:324–333 2007; Dillingham et al. in Paper 535, 2016; Hatton et al. in PNAS 116(43):21616–21622 2019). In our formalism, several critical timescales and rates (lifespan, generation time, and intrinsic population growth rate) are all proportional to the heart frequency f H , and thus, their allometric scaling relations come directly from the allometry of the heart frequency, which is typically f H ∝ M - 0.25 under basal conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen growing interest in modifying interventionist accounts of causal explanation in order to characterise noncausal explanation. However, one surprising element of such accounts is that they have typically jettisoned the core feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the philosophy of science literature suggests that interventions exclusively demarcate causal relationships. This position is so prevalent that, until now, no one has even thought to name it. We call it "intervention puritanism". In this paper, we mount the first sustained defence of the idea that there are distinctively noncausal explanations which can be characterized in terms of possible interventions; and thus, argue that I-puritanism is false. We call the resultant position "intervention liberalism" (I-liberalism, for short). While many have followed Woodward (Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) in committing to I-pluralism, we trace support for I-liberalism back to the work of Kim (in: Kim (ed) Supervenience and mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974/1993). Furthermore, we analyse two recent sources of scepticism regarding I-liberalism: debate surrounding mechanistic constitution; and attempts to provide a monistic account of explanation. We show that neither literature provides compelling reasons for adopting I-puritanism. Finally, we present a novel taxonomy of available positions upon the role of possible interventions in explanation: weak causal imperialism; strong causal imperialism; monist intervention puritanism; pluralist intervention puritanism; monist intervention liberalism; and finally, the specific position defended in this paper, pluralist intervention liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces and develops the concept of "reflexive peacebuilding". Peacebuilding has been conceptualised using different theoretical frameworks and operationalised across various levels of governance. This paper re-conceptualises peacebuilding in the context of the growing discourse on the Anthropocene. Drawing on the work of John S. Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering (2019. The Politics of the Anthropocene. Oxford: Oxford University Press) on reflexivity in the Anthropocene, this paper locates the "pathological path dependency" of international peacebuilding and the need for reflexive peacebuilding institutions across the agency, time, and space of peace formation. It specifically examines the United Nations peacebuilding architecture to identify the path dependency and potential for reflexivity of its institutions and practices. The discussion in this paper aims to contribute to recommendations for restructuring the international peacebuilding architecture and re-affirming its relevance to the evolving peace requirements of post-conflict societies, especially in the context of the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A well-known objection to Humean accounts of laws (e.g. BSA, Lewis in Australas J Philos 61:343–377, 1983, Philosophical papers vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1986) charges them with circularity (Armstrong in What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 102; Maudlin in The metaphysics within physics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 172). While the view has it that particular facts explain the natural laws, natural laws are often relied upon in order to explain particular facts. Thus, the Humean is committed to circular explanations—or so goes the argument. In this paper, I review two ways of dealing with the circularity objection against Humean views of laws. Then, by introducing a contrastive treatment of explanations, I put forward a new one, which, if it does not end up dethroning its competitors, I am hoping is still worth exploring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall and Restall's book. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information related to the journal "Oxford Economic Papers," which is published quarterly in January, April, July and October by Oxford University Press, Oxford, Great Britain.

The article presents information on subscription rates, contact details and method of payment for the periodical "Oxford Economic Papers."

The current study used the capability approach (CA) to explore the English learning experiences of 10 economically vulnerable higher education (HE) students in Colombia in order to better conceptualise English from a capability perspective. In doing so, this paper builds on the empirical and theoretical work of capability scholars which has looked at the role of English in educational settings. It highlights the importance of viewing linguistic capabilities as inchoative since viewing them as fully formed can obscure injustices. These injustices can include poor quality English language education (ELE), an unfavourable financial situation, and a lack of opportunities for exposure to and practice of English. This last-mentioned injustice foregrounds another important dimension of linguistic capabilities: their inter-subjective, relational nature. To aid in this conceptualisation, the paper also draws on Phillipson's [1992. Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press] theory of linguistic imperialism to better illustrate how English is implicated in asymmetrical power relations which give rise to oppression and domination. However, this paper also shows how some injustices can be navigated by educationally resilient individuals. The findings of this thesis are therefore of interest not only to language policy experts and other language education stakeholders in developing contexts, but also to capability scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the issue whether feminism needs a metaphysical grounding, and if so, what form that might take to effectively take account of and support the socio-political demands of feminism; addressing these demands I further propose will also contribute to the resolution of other social concerns. Social constructionism is regularly invoked by feminists and other political activists who argue that social injustices are justified and sustained through hidden structures which oppress some while privileging others. Some feminists (Haslanger and Sveinsdóttir, Feminist metaphysics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University, 2011) argue that the constructs appealed to in social constructivism are real but not metaphysically fundamental because they are contingent. And this is exactly the crux of the problem—is it possible to sustain an engaged feminist socio-political critique for which contingency is central (i.e., that things could be otherwise) and at the same time retain some kind of metaphysical grounding. Without metaphysical grounding it has been argued, the feminist project may be rendered nonsubstantive (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). There has been much debate around this issue and Sider (as an exemplar of the points under contention) nuances the claims expressed in his earlier writings (Sider, Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011) and later presents a more qualified account (Sider, Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2467–2478, 2017). Nonetheless, I propose the critiques and defences offered by the various parties continue to depend on certain erroneous assumptions and frameworks that are challengeable. I argue that fundamentality as presented in many of these current accounts, which are underpinned by the explicit or implicit ontologies of monism and dualism and argued for in purely rationalist terms which conceive of subjects as primarily reason-responding agents, reveal basic irresolvable problems. I propose that addressing these concerns will be possible through an enactivist account which, following phenomenology, advances an ontology of interdependence and reconceives the subject as first and foremost an organism immersed in a meaningful world as opposed to a primarily reason-responding agent. Enactivism is thus, I will argue, able to legitimize feminist socio-political critiques by offering a non-reductive grounding in which not only are contingency and fundamentality reconciled, but in which fundamentality is in fact defined by radical contingency. My paper proceeds in dialogue with feminists generally addressing this 'metaphysical turn' in feminism and specifically with Sally Haslanger and Mari Mikkola. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Absolutism about mass claims that mass ratios obtain in virtue of absolute masses. Comparativism denies this. Dasgupta (in: Bennett, Zimmerman (eds), Oxford studies in metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) argues for comparativism about mass, in the context of Newtonian Gravity. Such an argument requires proving that comparativism is empirically adequate. Dasgupta equates this to showing that absolute masses are undetectable, and attempts to do so. This paper develops an argument by Baker to the contrary: absolute masses are in fact empirically meaningful, that is detectable (in some weak sense). Additionally, it is argued that the requirement of empirical adequacy should not be cashed out in terms of undetectability in the first place. The paper closes by sketching the possible strategies that remain for the comparativist. Along the way a framework is developed that is useful for thinking about these issues: Ozma games—how could one explain to an alien civilisation what an absolute mass is? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion's conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called 'the agency problem of compatibilism' (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily plausible, actional account of deciding which explains the phenomenology. In summary: The act of making a difficult choice is triggered by a metacognitive decision to intentionally stop deliberating, despite ongoing uncertainty. This decision is the output of a metacognitive cost–benefit computation, which weighs the value of uncertainty reduction against the costs of ongoing deliberation. Strikingly, contemporary theories of effort suggest that this cost–benefit computation is also the source of the feeling of mental effort, which tracks the costs of that decision. If this account is correct, the agency problem of compatibilism has been solved. The act of making a difficult choice and the associated paradigmatic experience of agency, felt effort, both follow from the metacognitive evaluation. Implications are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend's pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce's account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a 'well-ordered science' as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981–990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (J Philos 87:5–22, 1990), Strevens (J Philos 100(2):55–79, 2003) and Weisberg and Muldoon (Philos Sci 76(2):225–252, 2009), unwittingly make use of this problematic assumption. I conclude by outlining a proposed model of resource allocation where funding is determined by lottery and briefly examining the extent to which it is compatible with the position defended in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how research approaches and methods in language education policy could serve to erase local multilingualism and its associated epistemologies while reproducing inequalities of languages. This paper builds on "epistemicide" (Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide. New York: Routledge) to critique how the knowledge constructed on the basis of the evidence collected by using research questions in binary/conflictual terms misrepresents the real experiences and voices of multilingual participants, particularly those from language-minoritized communities. This paper argues that advancing research and building educational practices upon the lived experiences of the people, particularly Indigenous and ethnic minorities, could help us resist the destruction of languages, epistemologies, and linguistic/epistemic self-determination of communities. I use the case of Nepal not only because I am familiar with its historical, sociopolitical, and cultural contexts (so I can provide an insider's reflective perspective), but also because Nepal's case offers new insights into understanding language ideological issues in the discourses of language education policies from the vantage point of "peripheral multilingualism" (Pietikäinen, Sari & Helen Kelly-Holmes. 2013. Multilingualism and the periphery. Oxford: Oxford University Press). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adverbs and Functional Heads: a Cross-Linguistic perspective (Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and functional heads: A cross-linguistic perspective. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press)—one of the founding works of "Syntactic Cartography"—combines some of the developments in Syntactic Theory from the 1980s and 1990s with insightful contributions from Linguistic Typology. This paper has two interrelated goals. First, it aims to review the fundamental theses of Cinque's monography of 1999—which are far from controversial among scholars working in Cartography—; at the same time it provides conceptual support to them. Secondly, it aims to explore some methodological tools of Syntactic Cartography presented and discussed by Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. Adverbs and functional heads: A cross-linguistic perspective. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, namely the so-called precedence-and-transitivity tests—after a brief discussion on methodology used to recognise the functional categories, namely the criterion by Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press—and the use of the hierarchies as tools to detect intra and interlinguistic variation. With regard to this latter issue, the paper gathers data from Brazilian Portuguese, Canadian English and Colombian Spanish on verb raising. The discussion of the data not only favours Cinque, Guglielmo. 2017. On the status of functional categories (heads and phrases). Language and Linguistics 18(4). 521–576 recent updates of his theoretical approach to the cartography of the clause but also shows how Cartography offers a natural scenario for a methodological approach to both micro and macro-variation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Saito, Mamoru. 2007. Notes on East Asian argument ellipsis. Language Research 43. 203–227 argues that argument ellipsis (AE) is available only in languages that lack phi-feature agreement. Accordingly, Japanese, but not English, permits AE. Under Saito's theoretical framework, this paper compares experimental data from L1 Japanese learners of L2 English (J-EFL) and L1 English learners of L2 Japanese (E-JFL). Given that sloppy and quantificational reading arises from an ellipsis operation (Hankamer, Jorge & Sag, Ivan. 1976. Deep and surface anaphora. Linguistic Inquiry 7. 391–426, Takahashi, Daiko. 2008. Noun phrase ellipsis. In Miyagawa, Shigeru & Saito, Mamoru (eds.), The Oxford handbook of Japanese linguistics, 394–422. Oxford: Oxford University Press, among others), we hypothesize that J-EFL learners, but not E-JFL learners, allow the reading in point with null arguments: AE is available only in the grammar of J-EFL learners, forced by the lack of phi-features in their L2 English grammar, due to L1 transfer. The results from our main study adopting a truth value judgement task supported the hypothesis. Based on our finding, we suggest that correct L2 phi-feature specification can ultimately be obtained when no phi-features are present in L1 (Ishino, Nao. 2012. Feature transfer and feature learning in universal grammar: A comparative study of the syntactic mechanism for second language acquisition. Doctoral dissertation: Kwansei Gakuin University, Miyamoto, Yoichi. 2012. Dainigengo-ni okeru hikenzaiteki-na yōso-ni kansuru Ichikōsatsu [A study on null elements in second language acquisition]. Paper presented at the 84th ELSJ annual general meeting: Senshu University, 26 May). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the literature different concepts of compatibility between a projective structure P and a conformal structure C on a differentiable manifold are used. In particular compatibility in the sense of Weyl geometry is slightly more general than compatibility in the Riemannian sense. In an often cited paper (Ehlers et al. in: O'Raifertaigh (ed) General Relativity, Papers in Honour of J.L. Synge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2012) Ehlers/Pirani/Schild introduce still another criterion which is natural from the physical point of view: every light like geodesics of C is a geodesics of P . Their claim that this type of compatibility is sufficient for introducing a Weylian metric has recently been questioned (Trautman in Gen Relativ Gravit 44:1581–1586, 2012); (Vladimir in Commun Math Phys 329:821–825, 2014); as reported by Scholz (in: A scalar field inducing a non-metrical contribution to gravitational acceleration and a compatible add-on to light deflection, 2019). Here it is proved that the conjecture of EPS is correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The title of this paper is taken from the final sentence of the book How People Judge Policing (Waddington et al. [2017]. How People Judge Policing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) which, though it had four authors, was really the brainchild of the late Tank Waddington. The paper picks up the book's final observation and seeks to develop it, examining the problematic core of policing, and using this as a basis for thinking more generally about issues of trust, legitimacy and reform. There now exists an increasing body of research which shows how the delivery of policing can influence perceived procedural justice, the popular legitimacy of the police, and a variety of public behaviours such as compliance with the law and co-operation with the police (Tyler, [2017] Procedural justice and policing: A rush to judgement? Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13, 29–53.). Such work is having increased impact on debates around police conduct and legitimacy and is increasingly seen as central to police reform efforts in Anglo-American policing, and in some other jurisdictions. Though accepting the broad thrust of such research, as well as its importance, this paper suggests that there are dangers in over-reading the potential of procedural justice, not least in forgetting some crucial lessons from the history of police research. The argument here focuses on the inherent complexity of policing and the inevitability of error within it. The simple but often overlooked lesson is that controversy and dissent are the norm rather than the exception in policing, and that much dispute and disagreement rather than reflecting a failure of approach or procedure, derive from the nature of policing itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. "Probability and Coherence Justification." Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463-72, Olsson, E. 2002. "What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?" Journal of Philosophy XCIX (5): 246-72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as 'the impossibility theorems' have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic interpretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to coherence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication, we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of confirmation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried to explain why decisions involving 'sharky' outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera ([2020]. 'Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem.' Philosophical Studies 177: 3549–3565.). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the construction of epistemic injustice in creating and implementing an EMI policy. Drawing on "epistemic injustice" (Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press) and "misframing" (Fraser, Nancy. 2009. Scales of justice: Reimagining political space in a globalizing world. New York: Columbia University Press), we discuss how the EMI policy in Nepal's school education has reinforced the epistemic nature of social injustice. Taking an ethnographic approach, we have analyzed how EMI policies are created, interpreted, and implemented in two public schools located in historically marginalized ethnic minority/Indigenous communities. Our analyses show that the schools misframe and misrecognize Indigenous/ethnic minority parents' and children's linguistic knowledge and awareness of language education policy. While reproducing neoliberal values, EMI policies construct a deficit identity of Indigenous/ethnic minority communities by erasing and stigmatizing their knowledge of mother tongues in school. Such policies not only promote an English-only monolingual ideology but also pose multiple challenges for epistemic access of Indigenous/minority students and affect parents' "party of participation" (Fraser, Nancy. 2009. Scales of justice:Reimagining political space in a globalizing world. New York: Columbia University Press) in policymaking process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing. Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this 'the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis' (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence, B. [2011]. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UP; Schmid, H.-B. [2016]. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP; Rödl, S. [2015]. "Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness." Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 14: 769–779. doi:; Rödl, S. [2018a]. "Joint Action and Pure Self-Consciousness." Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1): 124–136; Rödl, S. [2018b]. Self-Consciousness and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard UP) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures and proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. It then discusses the differences between the proposed approach and those due to Schmid 2016. "On Knowing What We Are Doing Together." In The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, edited by Michael S. Brady, and Miranda Fricker. Oxford: Oxford UP and Laurence 2011. "An Anscombian Approach to Collective Action." In Essays on Anscombe's Intention, edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland. Cambridge: Harvard UPand the reasons why it should be preferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is structure a fundamental and indispensable part of the world? Is the question of ontology a question about structure? Structure is a central notion in contemporary metaphysics [Sider 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. Realism about structure claims that the question of ontology is about the fundamental and indispensable structure of the world. In this paper, I present a criticism of the metaphysics of realism about structure based on a version of Russell's famous regress argument against nominalism [Russell 1911. "On the Relation of Universals and Particular." In Logic & Knowledge. Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin]. First, I argue that the three general tests for the fundamentality of structure proposed by realism about structure rely on a particular empirical test for structure, namely, the so-called 'similarity test for structure.' Second, I argue that the similarity test is not well-founded because it leads to a vicious regress. Third, I argue that the regress affects the whole metaphysics of realism about structure, and that no structural notion can be said to be fundamental in connection with any of the other tests. Lastly, I argue that the question of ontology as a question about structure is not substantive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The counterfactual approach to explainable AI (XAI) seeks to provide understanding of AI systems through the provision of counterfactual explanations. In a recent systematic review, Chou et al. (Inform Fus 81:59–83, 2022) argue that the counterfactual approach does not clearly provide causal understanding. They diagnose the problem in terms of the underlying framework within which the counterfactual approach has been developed. To date, the counterfactual approach has not been developed in concert with the approach for specifying causes developed by Pearl (Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Woodward (Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003). In this paper, I build on Chou et al.'s work by applying the Pearl-Woodward approach. I argue that the standard counterfactual approach to XAI is capable of delivering causal understanding, but that there are limitations on its capacity to do so. I suggest a way to overcome these limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (Time and chance, Harvard University Press, 2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (in: Ernst & Hüttermann (eds) Probability in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, 2010) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (in: Beisbart & Hartmann (eds) Probabilities in physics, Oxford University Press, 2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]