Search

The electoral formulas to choose presidents differ in the degree they restrict the number of parties competing in presidential elections. While simple plurality rule tends toward two-party competitions, qualified plurality and majority rule tends toward multi-party contests for the presidency. This article argues that the bargaining power and the electoral expectations of the political actors with control over constitutional design explain the choice of these rules. Using this analytic framework, the article shows that the recent shift in Latin America from plurality to more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections reflects the risk-averse choice of multiparty assemblies and military rulers. The explanation is supported with data on 35 cases of major constitutional reforms in 18 countries of Latin America and with the study of the most recent reforms in Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A widely accepted argument among students of presidential regimes is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party does not control a majority of seats in congress. This argument, however, fails to take into account three variables that should affect the performance of minority presidential governments: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the strength of the executive veto and the formation of executive coalitions. Based on a new typology of presidential regimes, I propose the hypothesis that the most conflictive form of minority government is that in which the president’s party does not control the median legislator, the president lacks effective veto power, and no majority or median minority executive coalition is formed. This hypothesis is supported by data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1979-2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]