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Since 1997, the Chinese Party-state has engaged in a campaign of transnational repression against the Uyghur diaspora. This campaign has grown in severity since the 2014 declaration of the People's War on Terror and Strike Hard campaigns, which, taken together, involved a program of mass incarceration for the Turkic peoples of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This article examines the everyday impacts of extraterritorial persecution on the Uyghur diaspora and their ability to successfully integrate into their new host societies and exercise their political and cultural agency. The article draws from nineteen in-depth interviews with Uyghurs living around the world and a dataset of over 7,000 incidents of China's targeting of Uyghurs globally since 1997. We examine how Chinese practices and the everyday effects of transnational repression vary between different regime types. We argue that Uyghurs experience both marginalization in their host country and the threat of transnational repression from China, a particularly precarious situation that we term double precarity. This double precarity is felt most acutely in more authoritarian contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental health and psychosocial support for Uyghurs living abroad need to be acknowledged as an important component of the humanitarian response. To formulate appropriate interventions for promoting mental health, a comprehensive understanding of identified problems is needed. However, several challenges - including language barriers, community perceptions of mental health, and mental health services - must be addressed. In this field report, we draw from our experiences of the Uyghur diaspora in relation to mental health to present the challenges which need to be addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on archival materials from late Qing Turpan Prefecture to explore Qing colonialism within the context of mass vaccination efforts in Xinjiang from 1880 to 1911. Following the reconquest of the region in 1877, Xiang Army leaders established official vaccination bureaus across Xinjiang—a colonial administration that encompassed all of East Turkestan—to combat smallpox outbreaks within Musulman (Uyghur) communities and the Qing army garrison. The vaccination bureau in Turpan, although led by Han vaccinators from Inner China, depended heavily on the labor of Musulman graduates from the region's assimilationist Confucian schools. The Turpan Vaccination Bureau reinforced the Xiang Army's broader project of colonial assimilation by training Musulman apprentices in various Chinese medical texts and using them to disseminate these ideas across the prefecture through the medium of vaccination. However, Turpan's Musulmans possessed their own sophisticated body of knowledge regarding epidemics and healing and routinely resisted the imposition of normative Qing/Chinese medical behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, as part of the efforts of the Chinese government first to integrate and, more recently, to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur population into China's mainstream culture and society, the Uyghur language has been marginalized and repressed to an unprecedented extent. The academic literature on Xinjiang's language policy has repeatedly acknowledged that this repression is a major source of concern and discontent among many Uyghurs. However, to date, little has been written about the public response of Uyghurs to this policy and their open efforts to challenge it. In particular, with very few exceptions, little is known about the public response of Uyghur writers and artists. In this article I analyse a large corpus of Uyghur poems and songs that engaged openly with the Uyghur language crisis and were published and disseminated in the Uyghur public sphere between the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s. Unlike some studies that try to assess the condition of certain languages at a certain point in time through objective methodologies, these literary and artistic works provide an insider view on how the Uyghur cultural elite and many other Uyghurs experienced the repression and loss of their native language, and also, how they struggled against this repression. In the article I examine the diverse sentiments, perceptions, and discourses that these literary and artistic expressions communicate, and the different strategies that the Uyghurs used to struggle against the language policy and its consequences. I also explore what these works tell us about the development of Xinjiang's language policy over time, the linguistic reality in the region, and the impact that the language policy has had on Uyghur society. Finally, the article also investigates the broad political meanings of these works and speculates on the link between them and the efforts of the Chinese government to further marginalize the Uyghur language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uyghur Intangible Cultural Heritage is listed under the UNESCO Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, heritage lists of China, and the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, as well as the List of Representative Projects of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Therefore, it is necessary to outline and evaluate the Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Uyghur in terms of the number of their representative elements, their area-categories, their geographical distribution, their inclusion in various lists, the safeguarding action plan for them. In this article, after briefly explaining the history of intangible cultural heritage studies in China and the related studies of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the article will proceed to introduce the Uyghur elements on the UNESCO Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding. These will be specifically discussed. Then, 33 elements of Uyghur culture in the List of Representative Elements of National Intangible Cultural Heritage and the related 61 sub-elements will be discussed one by one, in accordance with the arrangement in the intangible cultural heritage areas identified by UNESCO. Three elements in the field of oral traditions and expressions; eight elements, 20 sub-elements in the field of performing arts; three elements, seven sub-elements in the field of social practices, rituals and feasts; five elements and 10 sub-elements in the field of knowledge and practices related to nature and the universe; 14 elements and 21 sub-elements in the field of handicrafts will be examined one by one. Brief information will be given about the item's name, its category in China, item number, inventory number, approval date, geographic distribution center(s), and item protection agency. Some elements will be defined when necessary. Considering that all studies regarding the Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Uyghur are carried out within the framework of China's Intangible Cultural Heritage studies, Uyghur Intangible Cultural Heritage as a part of China's Intangible Cultural Heritage, suitable evaluations will be made on the studies regarding the Uyghur's elements, and the sub-elements. The Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Uyghur is an indication of the spiritual wealth of the country and humanity. It needs to be introduced in greater detail, more scientific research and more comprehensive evaluation. On the other hand, these kinds of studies, have a special value to China's Belt and Road Initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1949, ethnic minority nationalism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has consistently concerned the People's Republic of China. Most previous studies on nationalism in XUAR focused on organised visible nationalist movements and ignored everyday life, particularly regarding interactions between the government and citizens or between the majority and the minority. This study investigates daily practices of ethnic minority nationalism in XUAR within the framework of everyday nationalism. It explores daily life in Altay City to determine how members of ethnic minority groups produce and maintain their sense of ethnic identity in this context. The article found that members of ethnic minority groups are engaged in a struggle to retain their sense of ethnic identity by resisting state nationalism and expressing antagonism towards Han Chinese in their everyday lives. This study reveals a covert nationalist movement involving almost everyone in XUAR. Ethnic nationalism is central to XUAR society and will continue to shape its social relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The minority Uyghurs in Xinjiang province, China, and Rohingyas in Rakhine State, Myanmar are facing civil and violent persecution by authoritarian governments. These minority ethnic groups are also Muslims. As the world watches in condemnation, there is curiously little traction by Islamist jihadist groups in these countries. That is not to say that their influence is absent in the regions: al-Qaeda in South Asia is taking advantage of the Rohingya refugee crisis and the so-called Islamic State was able to attract Uyghurs to their doomed caliphate. Nevertheless, this paper seeks to understand why jihadists failed to make many inroads in these places when compared to the civil wars in Iraq and Syria. It is important that we understand this phenomenon in order to undermine the influence of jihadists in other parts of the world. Using the framework of ethnic minorities living in Dar al-'Ahd (House of Treaty) this paper argues that the governments in China and Myanmar are oppressing a selective group of Muslims and thus making it difficult to build the case that they are at war with Muslims in general. This argument is based on the classical understanding of jihadism, which is to fight against foreign intrusion in Muslim territories, whereas the call to jihad against one's government is a much more recent and controversial innovation. Therefore, despite different types of persecution by the Chinese and Burmese governments, and the different responses by the locals, there is a comparable relative absence of jihadist movements explained by the limited repression of specific Muslim minorities by governments that have relations with other Muslim countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent vote against the first-ever UN Human Rights Council resolution looking at the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has prompted discussions and concerns over China's increasing grip over UN human rights bodies. Amidst tensions between Chino and the West, China's growing influence within the UN human rights system poses a challenge to progressive Global South governments, who seek to cooperate with Beijing on trade and development, while sharing major divergences on human rights priorities. This paper aims to present the goals and tactics behind China's increasing presence at the UN Human Rights Council, and propose some reflections on its impact for progressive Latin American and other Global South governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "bilingual education" policy in Xinjiang has been one of the most contentious policies implemented in the region in recent decades. Given its negative impact on one of the most important markers of Uyghur ethnic identity, it has been a major cause of Uyghur discontent. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the genesis of this policy and the negotiations that took place around its implementation has been partial at best. Through an in-depth analysis of two essays published in the early and mid-2000s by two prominent Uyghur scholars, a large body of academic publications by other Uyghur scholars, and ethnographic data collected since the early 2000s, this article reexamines part of the conventional academic wisdom that relates to this policy, particularly the role Uyghurs have played in relation to it. The article suggests two main revisions to the existing knowledge. One has to do with the amount and form of Uyghur resistance to the policy, and the other with the role Uyghurs have played in promoting the policy. I argue that at least in its early stages, not only did not all Uyghurs resist the policy, but also, in fact, part of the Uyghur political and academic elite played an active role in promoting it. In addition, contrary to the implicit agreement in the existing scholarship that Uyghurs could resist the policy only in covert forms, in fact a considerable number of Uyghur academics have been engaged for years in persistent and overt struggle against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Uyghurs, who demolished the II. Kokturk Khaganate and established an independent government under the name Otuken Uyghur State, are known for their cultural and religious systems developed within the history of Central Asian Turks. As a result of the trade-based relations with Sogdian, Toharian and the Chinese over the geography, changes have occurred in the Uyghur society structure. Among the innovations that took place in the Turkish society specifically for the Uyghurs, there are changes such as living in settled life, adopting Manichaeism and Buddhism, religions specific to Central Asia, and alphabet change. The most important innovation in the social life of Uyghurs, a warrior and nomadic community, is religious change. Manichaeism, which was made systematic in the founding of Mani in the 3rd century, was accepted as a state religion during the period of Uyghurs by Bögü Khan. This doctrine, which is based on dualities such as light-dark and good-evil, is a belief system that bases its salvation on abiding the Five Commandments and the Three Seals. This doctrine, which prohibits eating meat, killing creatures was adopted by the ruling class in a religious character that was originally adopted by Bögü Khan and his family members, despite the fact that they were in stark contrast with the Turkish social structure. Manichaeism, which is a state religious identity with Uyghurs for the first time, has been an indication of religious freedom in Uyghurs as a belief system that progresses side by side with Buddhism, although it was initially trapped in the Uyghur dynasty. Manichaeism, which developed under the political protection of the Otuken Uyghur State, continued until the destruction of the Uyghurs by the Kyrgyz. The Uyghurs, destroyed by the Kyrgyz in 840, turned to the Tarim Basin and established the Khotco Uyghur State. This period, in which the Buddha religion was built on solid foundations, is seen as a peak period in terms of Turkish Buddhism. Although the period when Buddhism started to be seen among Turks, the adoption of the Buddha religion by the Uyghurs in mass, is dated to the 9th century. The Uyghurs, who preferred the Mahāyāna Buddhism aimed at the liberation of society, learned the belief systems of this doctrine, especially with the help of Sogd and Chinese, and revealed religious works with the Uyghur Alphabet, whose origins were based on the Sogd script. Experiencing the thought systems of these teachings on the basis of Manichaeism and Buddhism, Uyghurs have created a developed social structure especially at the level of these belief systems based on individual and social liberation. Charity culture, which is one of the practices that this religion commands to the civilian people outside the monastery in both Manichaeism and Buddhism, has a conceptual richness on the basis of these teachings. The concept of charity, which ranks first among the Five Commandments, known as the virtues such as not killing living things, not drinking, not adulterous, and righteousness in Manichaeism, is one of the concepts that the Society emphasizes in two groups: Elects and Hearers. The concept of charity, which is also expressed as material aid to the clergy of the civilian people, known as the Hearers class, appears as a tradition in this doctrine, which has been skillfully theorized by the Elects and has promises to attract civilians to religious practices. As with Manichaeism, the practice of charity, which is related to the virtue of generosity that Buddha candidates must have on the way to enlightenment, is known as the sacrifices that Bodhisattvas make to living beings in their own personalities, both material and spiritual (compassion), as an example of charity for the clergy. In this direction, the article is based on the purpose of showing the qualities of the materials related to charity in the Manichean and Buddhist works of Old Uyghurs in line with Manichaeism and Buddhism. In this study, first of all, the view of related teachings on charity concept in terms of Manichaeism and Buddhism, the results of charity practice in the Uyghur period written by various researchers and whether it corresponded in the Old Uyghurs, and the concept of charity on the basis of Manichaeism, Buddhism and Uyghurs, the reasons for the partnerships that developed between Manichaeism and Buddhism in terms of charity culture will be studied by revealing the type, content and benefits it will have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mostly unknown to the public, the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority of some 12 million in northwest China, have gained international prominence since the 2010s. Their Diaspora, headed by the World Uyghur Congress, has managed to convince the West that Beijing's persecution of their kin in Xinjiang amounts to "genocide", prompting condemnations, sanctions and boycotts on China. Not denying Chinese oppression of Uyghurs, I argue that the "genocide" claims are not only false but, moreover, counterproductive. Primarily motivated by an anti-China policy, whatever the findings of "investigation committees" and self-appointed "tribunals", they hardly care about the Uyghurs. Contrary to expectations, no Islamic countries have criticized China; all the condemnations come from Western countries, themselves stained by "real" genocides, incomparably more brutal than what allegedly happened in China. In retrospect, the Uyghurs may have won a virtual, short-term, Pyrrhic victory, but actually failed completely. A real victory should, and perhaps could, have been won quietly and directly, not loudly and offensively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese academics and politicians argue that Xinjiang's 'terrorism' problem can only be solved by 'optimizing' its ethnic population structure. High ethnic minority population concentrations are considered a national security threat. 'Optimizing' such concentrations requires 'embedding' substantial Han populations, whose 'positive culture' can mitigate the Uyghur 'human problem'. Scenarios that do not overburden the region's ecological carrying capacity entail drastic reductions in ethnic minority natural population growth, potentially decreasing their populations. Population 'optimization' discourses and related policies provide a basis to assess Beijing's 'intent' to destroy an ethnic minority population in part through birth prevention per the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention. The 'destruction in part' can be assessed as the difference between projected natural population growth without substantial government interference and reduced growth scenarios in line with population 'optimization' requirements. Based on population projections by Chinese researchers, this difference could range between 2.6 and 4.5 million lives by 2040. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The medium of instruction (MoI) is regulated in the bilingual education of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in two ways. One requires most school subjects to be taught through Mandarin, whereas the other demands that all subjects be delivered with Mandarin as the MoI. A field trip to the capital city, Urumqi, was conducted in 2017 to investigate the implementation of the MoI as stated in the policy. This paper first outlines the history of bilingual education in the region, with a focus on Chinese language education. It then investigates the change of MoI from the ethnic minority language to Mandarin Chinese. The two current modes of bilingual education in Xinjiang are also discussed in detail. The paper further examines the regulations on MoI through interviews with students and teachers from four Urumqi schools. Their understanding of the regulations on MoI usage demonstrates the difficulties of implementing such a policy, one initially proposed with good intentions. Through a thorough examination of official documents as well as interview data, this study shows the discrepancies between national and current regional policies, between planned aim and in-class practice, and between the transitional and balanced types of bilingual education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalists usually emphasise the timeless and primordialist origins of the nation, but states also make conscious efforts to construct nations. Drawing on the case of the Uyghurs, this article shows how states support certain nationalist tendencies and use them – with varying degrees of success – to advance particular ideologies. In the 1930s, as a consequence of Soviet national policy, different ethnicities joined a new Uyghur nation. The state therefore constructed the Uyghurs (together with other ethnic groups) through a political decision. In doing so the state emphasised the primordial aspect of Uyghurdom, however, whereby the nation should have existed from time immemorial and its attributes should be stable and firm. After World War II, both the Chinese government and Uyghur leaders in Xinjiang fighting against that government adopted this Soviet-inspired concept of a united Uyghur nation, and it was also adopted by Uyghurs in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. States have the capacity to construct new nations, but other factors (geographic, political, cultural and intercommunal) can nullify or amplify these efforts. This is evident in southern Kyrgyzstan, where coexistence with Uzbeks has led to the assimilation of the Uyghurs, while in the north the Uyghurs have maintained their cultural characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2009, nearly 200 people were killed in ethnically targeted mass violence between Turkic-speaking Muslim Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi, overshadowing the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). How have ethnic relations between Han and Uyghurs descended into mass violence among ordinary people? This paper argues that the party-state exacerbates ethnic tensions between Han and Uyghurs through ethnocentric security narratives. These narratives frame China's identity as being under threat from Turkic enemies within who are supported by Islamic terrorists and Western "enemies of China" from outside. Discourse analysis of official texts, participant-observation of security practices, and interviews with Han and Uyghurs reveal the interplay between official identity discourses and everyday security practices before, during and after the violence. Since July 2009, one official solution to ethnic violence has been the construction of a shared multi-ethnic identity, officially described as a "zero-sum political struggle of life or death." However, Han-centric conceptualizations of ethnic unity promote Han chauvinism and portray the Uyghur as a security threat. The party-state thus creates hierarchical ethnic relations that exacerbate both Han and Uyghur insecurities and contribute to spirals of violence. China's extra-judicial internment camps in Xinjiang are the logical conclusions of the ethnocentric insecurity cycles analysed in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to present an explanation of why the Muslim governments largely abstained from even bringing up the Uyghur case with China, while the Rohingya issue provoked official condemnations by the governments in many Muslim countries. Although economic factors are most often consulted internationally, this article puts forward political factors as sufficient to explain the Muslim governments' responses to the Xinjiang issue – primarily the domestic politics, and secondarily seeking of strategic alternatives to balance the West. In the context of hybrid political regimes in many Muslim countries, the domestic public opinion played an important role in deciding whether the government would address the issue. Effectively only Turkey presents the case where the public pays attention to the Uyghurs, and the government felt obliged to raise the issue at least to some extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since spring 2017, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented re-education campaign. According to media and informant reports, untold thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims have been and are being detained in clandestine political re-education facilities, with major implications for society, local economies and ethnic relations. Considering that the Chinese state is currently denying the very existence of these facilities, this paper investigates publicly available evidence from official sources, including government websites, media reports and other Chinese internet sources. First, it briefly charts the history and present context of political re-education. Second, it looks at the recent evolution of re-education in Xinjiang in the context of 'de-extremification' work. Finally, it evaluates detailed empirical evidence pertaining to the present re-education drive. With Xinjiang as the 'core hub' of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing appears determined to pursue a definitive solution to the Uyghur question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a secularist state, China has always been highly sensitive about religious traditions, particularly Islam. During the late 1990s and especially after the 9/11 terrorist events, the government rhetoric has been to equate the Islamic knowledge and identity with violent ethnic separatism, and more recently extremism and terrorism (Roberts, 2016, 2018). Thus, the Uyghurs' right to access Islamic knowledge and practice Islam has been increasingly restricted and diminished (Cook, 2017; Millward, 2018). After reviewing the recent history of Chinese rhetoric and policies regarding the religious education in Xinjiang, this article discusses the possible ramifications of such developments, via the lenses of postcolonialism, the Politics of Recognition (Taylor, 1994), the push and pull factors that trigger radicalization, and religious literacy. Meanwhile, through sharing the perspectives of the Uyghur diaspora in Canada, the author also highlights that current Chinese policies and practices could deepen the "us" vs. "them" dichotomy between the Muslim Uyghurs and the majority Han population as well as the Chinese state, therefore creating more tension in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Free fatty acids (FFAs) participate in a variety of physiological functions. FFAs are associated with the development of type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM). Uyghurs and Kazaks have a different prevalence of T2DM, which cannot be explained by traditional risk factors. This study aimed to examine FFAs as potential biomarkers to distinguish between healthy and T2DM Uyghurs and Kazaks. This was a prospective study conducted at the Xianjiang Medical University from 01/2007 to 06/2010 in Uyghurs and Kazaks. The subjects were grouped as T2DM patients (Uyghurs: n = 39; Kazaks, n = 21) and controls (Uyghurs: n = 35; Kazaks, n = 40). Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GCMS) and partial least squares discriminant analysis (PLS-DA) models were used to study the FFA profiles between Uyghurs and Kazaks with T2DM. PLS-DA analysis showed that among Kazaks, T2DM patients had lower C22:6, C18:3 n-6, and C20:3 n-6, but higher C22:0 levels compared with controls. Among Uyghurs, the most important variables to discriminate T2DM patients from controls were higher C22:6 and C20:4 n-6, and lower C22:0, C14:1, C18:3 n6, and C20:3 n6. Kazaks and Uyghurs displayed different FFA profiles between patients with T2DM and controls. These results suggest different risk factors and pathogenesis of T2DM between Kazaks and Uyghurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1949, illiteracy among both Uyghurs and Tibetans was similar to that throughout China and estimated as higher than 90%. Since then, the rate of illiteracy in Xinjiang has shrunk considerably, while in Tibet it has remained the highest in China. This gap can explain the difference between the small volume of literature published annually in Tibet and the extensive literature that appears yearly in Xinjiang. A major reason for the high literacy rate and the emergence of a thriving modern literature in Xinjiang is the system of modern education that developed in the region at the start of the twentieth century. In contrast, in Tibet, the religious conservatism of the Buddhist elite prevented the introduction of modern education in order to retain local cultures. The comparison of the influences of modern education on the creation of literary traditions allows us to examine the continuity of Uyghur and Tibetan cultures in the context of contemporary China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of People’s Republic of China (PRC) counter-terrorism policies targeting Uyghurs since 2001 when the state first asserted that it faced a terrorist threat from this population. In reviewing these policies and their impact, it suggests that the state has gradually isolated and excluded Uyghurs from PRC society. Drawing on the writings of Michael Foucault, it articulates this gradual exclusion of Uyghurs as an expression of biopolitics where the Uyghur people as a whole have come to symbolize an almost biological threat to society that must be quarantined through surveillance, punishment, and detention. Rather than suggesting that these impacts of China’s “war on terror” coincide with the intent of state policy, the article argues that they are inevitable outcomes of labeling a given ethnic population as a terrorist threat in the age of the Global War on Terror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pan-Turkism emerged in the middle of the 19th century as an attempt to uniting all Turkic people along the Silk Road from the Mediterranean to China. After the ascent of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal as well as the Soviet incorporation of Central Asia, pan-Turkism had practically withered - although apparently not as an ideology. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the Central Asia republics have provided for the revival of the pan-Turkism vision, perceived by Beijing as a threat not only to its interests in Central Asia but, moreover, to Xinjiang’s internal stability and China’s sovereignty. While this vision could hardly be accomplished, China’s intensive preoccupation with pan-Turkism has facilitated its artificial resuscitation, though it appears already deceased. Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road initiative aims, among other things, at blocking pan-Turkism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on anthropological fieldwork conducted in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China in 2016 and 2017, this article addresses the meanings of security from subjective perspectives by investigating Uyghur perceptions of marriage, which offer crucial insight into the meanings of security. The Uyghurs, as the major indigenous population in Xinjiang, have encountered securitization, particularly since the 2009 Ürümchi riots, deemed the worst ethnic conflict in the region since 1949. While official security practices based on stability have won the support of most Han Chinese citizens in and outside Xinjiang, these same security practices have penetrated to and influenced intimate Uyghur life, such as marriage. Uyghur participants in this research indicate that marriage is a social field in which the official counter-extremism campaign, individuals’ happiness (bext), and the security (bixeterlik) of the Uyghur collective identity encounter and negotiate with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the development of traditional arts and crafts among Kazakhstan's Uyghurs under the influence of various historical factors. The Uyghurs of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries comprise ethnographic group which developed over the last centuries separated from the main Uyghur population in Xinjiang, China, which resulted in emergence of their particular features. The article argues that the transformation of traditional arts and crafts among the Uyghurs of Kazakhstan occurred under the influence of political events, which changed dramatically the life of the entire population of the Russian Empire. With the establishment of Soviet power, the country's rapid industrialization meant that products produced by individuals in workshops could not compete with less expensive and more practical products manufactures at factories and plants. Thus, blacksmiths, and artisanal producers of leather and cloth declined. Nevertheless, certain types of traditional art crafts (jewellery art, production of musical instruments, working out calabash) survived albeit on a limited scale due to the development of national idea, which requires symbols of ethnic culture. Modern artists exploit fantasy and go beyond traditional frames of ethnicity. The article argues that the arts and crafts of the Uyghurs received a new impetus in the Soviet era, despite the threat of a certain loss of ethnic peculiarities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I would like to show that China's rough treatment of Uyghurs is related not only to domestic tensions in Xinjiang but also to the legacy of Uyghurs' association with the Soviet Union and Russia against China's nationality policy. Both, but particularly Moscow, used the Uyghurs in their virtual propaganda and, moreover, also in actual acts of organizing outfits-mainly civilian but also military-including espionage, sabotage, and even preparations for invasion. While most-if not all-of these attempts failed, the memories of these actions still survive. Behind the apparent friendship between China and Russia today are hidden mutual suspicions as well as unsettled accounts going back as far as the seventeenth century. Given these potential, and occasionally actual, tensions and China's growing economic advantage over Russia, a future conflict is an eventuality that should be taken into consideration, meaning that Uyghurs may become pawns in this playground yet again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explains the intellectual history and ideology of the Turkic insurgency and the East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in 1933–34. Texts in periodicals from the period suggest that the insurgency was defined by its intellectual elites more as a nationalist enterprise than as a religious one. The insurgency's ideologists established important national attributes of the East Turkestani nation, particularly its national name, homeland, symbology, and history, and they also articulated East Turkestani national interests, particularly political independence, representative government, and modernization. Regardless of the arguably low degree of social penetration of the ideas of the elites among common society and the small extent to which policy was actually implemented, the intertwining of East Turkestani national identity and interests with political self-government and modernization was an ideological concept that had a profound impact on all subsequent administrations in Xinjiang. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using survey data (N = 1,600) collected in Urumchi in Xinjiang, China, this paper examines the Han-Uyghur gap in schooling and offers a nuanced account of educational stratification by ethnicity in urban China. Data analysis shows that Han Chinese are more likely than Uyghurs to receive schooling, and the ethnic variation persists when holding main background characteristics constant. However, the differences in schooling between Han and Uyghur men fade away when background characteristics are controlled for, whereas no similar patterns are found among women. Gender roles account for both ethnic parity in schooling between Han and Uyghur men and ethnic inequality in schooling between Han and Uyghur women, which underlies the overall Han-Uyghur gap in educational attainment in Ürümchi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the changing relationship between ethno-national and local narratives in the historiography of Kazakhstan's Uyghurs through the parallel analysis of general and local histories compiled in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Uyghur history writing in the post-Soviet period is discussed in relation to the divided loyalty of the Uyghur community: while interest in writing ethno-nationalist histories is based on the growing feeling of being a part of the broad, transnational category of the Uyghur, deep attachment to the Semirech'e region is expressed in the emerging histories of Uyghur villages and neighbourhoods. In analysing the local histories of Kazakhstani Uyghurs in the post-Soviet period, the author focuses on the gradual transition from Soviet-style local histories praising the uniqueness of the ‘Soviet’ Uyghurs to new local histories emerging ‘from below’ as exemplified by the history of the Sultanqorghan neighbourhood of Almaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article asks: is the cost of being Uyghurs higher for young Uyghurs than for old Uyghurs in Ürümchi? I address this question with data from a survey of 2,947 people conducted in Ürümchi in 2005. The cost of being Uyghurs refers to the extent of economic inequality in the earnings of Han Chinese and Uyghurs. I develop three hypotheses on the effect of age on earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Data analyses show that although young Uyghurs are better educated and earn more than old Uyghurs, they are more likely than old Uyghurs to suffer from being Uyghurs in Ürümchi. This finding has policy implications for the reduction of ethnic disparity in Xinjiang [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of gender roles on earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in Ürümchi, China, using survey data (N = 1,600) from Ürümchi in 2005. It finds sizeable earnings differentials between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. However, the differences in income between Uyghur men and Han men fade away when socioeconomic variables are controlled for. No similar patterns are found among women. Earnings differentials between Uyghur women and Han women and between Uyghurs and Han Chinese disappear after the measures for family responsibilities are introduced into the earnings equation. The differences in socioeconomic status and family responsibilities between Uyghur women and Han women underlie the aggregate income inequality between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the reasons why the politicization of language has not been translated into disruptive forms of ethnic mobilization as opposed to the political salience of religion among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang throughout the 1990s and the Sikhs before and after the creation of Punjab in 1966. The article argues, from a structural-rationalist perspective, that language-based claims in Xinjiang and in Punjab have been accommodated by the respective central governments to a larger extent than religious claims have. Accommodation has taken the form of particular policies as well as greater incorporation of minority elites on the basis of language, which have in turn significantly reduced the possibilities of anti-regime sentiments and the incentives for disruptive forms of pressure on the basis of linguistic claims among the minority group. Religious claims have, however, not been accommodated in a similar way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]