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Corporate elite studies have for long investigated networks of interlocking directorates to test and corroborate key theoretical expectations regarding the cohesive organization of such an elite and their ability and willingness to act on behalf of general business interests. These studies typically collect data on a list of 50, 100, 200 or 500 corporations ranked by economic size, sometimes stratified in sectors. The sampling approach often follows previous studies in order to increase comparability. These relatively arbitrary sampling practices are problematic because they impact the empirical results and our therefore the conclusions drawn from it. Using a sample of 3251 Canada‐based corporations, we establish that indeed different sampling criteria – that is sample size, proportion of financial firms, inclusion of state‐owned enterprises and so on – significantly impacts network properties of corporate elite networks. We establish rather disturbing differences, especially for smaller sample sizes (<100). Subsequently, we develop alternative demarcation criteria of the corporate elite based on a k‐core decomposition. We conclude by emphasizing that the sampling decisions in interlocking directorate studies should much more be carefully be thought through in future research on the topic, both in corporate elite studies and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Internationally, interest in and research on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) have increased significantly, particularly in the developing world, where they play a vital role in national economies. The evolution of Canadian SOEs is, for the most part, largely absent from this literature. This article analyzes and evaluates the performance of three SOEs in the financial sector owned and operated by the federal government: Export Development Canada (EDC), the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) and Farm Credit Canada (FCC). The article seeks to evaluate the performance of these commercially oriented hybrid entities which are policy (and politically) sensitive to the needs of their single shareholder. There is evidence that these firms take on higher‐risk investments than their private sector counterparts, in addition to performing other politically significant policy roles. There is also evidence that, as publicly owned entities, they enjoy some significant advantages over other actors in the sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal government and the four largest provinces in Canada spend about $29 billion a year on business subsidies, delivered through program spending, the tax system, government business enterprises and direct investments by government. These subsidies represent almost half of the corporate income tax revenue collected by the five jurisdictions. Surprisingly, given its reputation as a bastion of free enterprise, Alberta is the most prolific subsidizer. In the 2014-15 fiscal year, per person subsidies were $640 in Alberta, about $100 ahead of the next most generous jurisdiction, Québec. Alberta has probably added to its "lead" through measures introduced in the October 2015 Fiscal Update and the 2016 budget. Alberta also stands out by having the least transparent public reporting of business subsidies. What motivates governments to subsidize business? Abstracting from cynical efforts to win votes, business subsidies have two broad objectives: to improve economic performance and to achieve a social objective by supporting specific firms, industries or regions. On average in the five jurisdictions, the split between the two categories is about 70-30 in favour of economic development measures. Assessing value for money from programs with a social objective is subjective, but measures intended to improve economic performance should be assessed on their ability to raise real income. Business subsidies can only raise real income if markets fail to allocate labour and capital to their best uses. The classic case is R&D. When a firm undertakes R&D, some of the knowledge created inevitably spills over to the benefit other firms. Firms are focused on their own benefits and costs when deciding how much to spend on R&D, not the benefits received by other firms, so society has an interest in encouraging additional R&D. While markets generally do a good job allocating capital to its most productive uses, governments express concern about the ability of small firms to access external financing. Just over half of business subsidies are intended to address these two issues. Governments also provide subsidies in order to create what are often described as "good jobs," meaning employment in high-wage, high-productivity industries. There is ample evidence that wages differ by sector even after differences in worker skills and working conditions are taken into account. That opens up the possibility that subsidizing high-wage jobs will make us better off. Almost 10 per cent of government subsidies are pursuing "industrial policy" objectives. But real income won't necessarily go up, even in these circumstances. Benefit-cost analyses of key programs suggest that, at best, only a third of subsidies intended to raise real income achieve their objective. The main reason these subsidies are unsuccessful is that they have to be funded, either by raising taxes or cutting program spending, both of which harm economic performance. And avoiding the pitfall of excessive subsidization can be challenging. For example, small firms performing R&D get about 43% of their funding from governments, which is substantially beyond an effective level. Industrial policy measures are particularly tricky to get right. Governments have to identify sectors and firms that pay a premium for a given set of skills and working conditions, determine the subsidy that generates a social benefit net of the costs of providing assistance and avoid transferring income from low to high-wage taxpayers. With so much money at play, business subsidies should be reported more transparently and managed more effectively. For greater transparency, governments should prepare a comprehensive annual report on business subsidies delivered through program spending, the tax system and through the activities of government business enterprises. The report would describe the programs, state their objectives and report funding levels. When discussing program objectives, the report should set out in general terms the expected benefits and costs of government intervention and discuss who benefits from the measure and who is expected to pay for it. Making a commitment to set out the expected benefits and costs of all new business subsidies as they are introduced might prevent the worst offenders from being implemented in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Canada becomes more of a destination for Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI), Canada's review policies should incorporate international best practice based on an accurate understanding of the evolving regimes in China governing foreign direct investment FDI and its state-owned enterprises (which account for two-thirds of China's outward investment). This article focuses primarily on Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in both an international and a Chinese context. What is driving their outward investments and those in Canada in particular? Does Canada's policy response accurately account for the evolving regimes in China? This article concludes that China's regimes governing FDI and SOEs are becoming more transparent and market oriented whereas Canada's policies, until late in 2016, have remained opaque and interventionist. However, the investment hub proposal made recently portends some warming and greater transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Canada becomes more of a destination for Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI), Canada's review policies should incorporate international best practice based on an accurate understanding of the evolving regimes in China governing foreign direct investment FDI and its state-owned enterprises (which account for two-thirds of China's outward investment). This article focuses primarily on Chinese stateowned enterprises (SOEs) in both an international and a Chinese context. What is driving their outward investments and those in Canada in particular? Does Canada's policy response accurately account for the evolving regimes in China? This article concludes that China's regimes governing FDI and SOEs are becoming more transparent and market oriented whereas Canada's policies, until late in 2016, have remained opaque and interventionist. However, the investment hub proposal made recently portends some warming and greater transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the privatization of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Canadian governments continue to own and operate numerous Crown corporations in a host of different sectors. Drawing its conclusions from the evolution of six Canadian Crowns, this article will explain both why these firms continue to exist in the public sphere as well as examine how their governance and organizational condition(s) have changed. With one exception, these firms have drastically modernized all aspects of their operations such that they are able to meet the needs of their citizen customers, various stakeholders and, most critically, their single shareholders. Historically imposed institutional variables, the political and policy needs of their respective owners and constraints on the decision-making powers of Canadian governments are key factors for understanding the continued public ownership and institutional development of these SOEs. Canada's limited adoption of New Public Management concepts and neoliberalism, more generally, is an additional pertinent factor that helps to explain their continued presence in the economy as well as the relatively late implementation of modernization programs. Some final thoughts on the value of SOEs and state intervention more generally round out the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although both Canada and the United States review foreign investment for national security concerns, Canada also requires that the investment be of "net benefit" to Canada. Recent investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have prompted the suggestion that the United States should also adopt a net benefit or economic test. This Article argues that the United States should not adopt the Canadian approach. The Canadian approach attempts to screen out foreign public entities and requires that they act in a "commercial" manner. This approach is based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that one can segregate the public foreign interest from private and domestic interests. Second, it assumes that one can adequately define what it means to act in a commercial manner. This Article contends that both assumptions are incorrect due to their dependence upon classical categories such as public/private and domestic/foreign that are of limited value in a postmodern, globalized economy. This Article argues that an approach based on addressing specific harms, regardless of identity of the actor, represents a more sustainable approach towards the risks associated with foreign government-controlled entities. This Article suggests that competition law, through its policy-based regulation of harms by economic entities, can form the basis of a new regulatory structure to address concerns, which in retrospect, are about aggregations of power rather than strictly national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the evolving debate over takeover bids by foreign state-owned and influenced enterprises (SOEs) in the context of CNOOC's successful 2012 acquisition of Nexen Inc., historical debates over foreign investment in Canada and the ongoing adaptation of Canadian trade and investment policies to global shifts in economic activity and power. It views SOE-related policy changes as responses to four broad factors: Canada's adaptation to changing global investment patterns as a small, open economy, efforts to diversify Canada's trade and investment relations while balancing domestic regional and sectoral interests, the extension of trade-related principles of reciprocity to investment policies and competition among governmental and economic interests in the allocation of discretion in corporate governance and related regulatory policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the last few years significant investments in the Canadian resource sector have been made by foreign, state-owned investors. Recent developments in this area have raised concerns that Industry Canada is adopting a more restrictive approach with respect to state-owned enterprises. This article examines the history and evolution of Canada's foreign investment regime against the current regime in place in the energy sector. The article then examines the practical and commercial effects of the recent developments and concludes by providing examples of how to navigate the emerging commercial and regulatory framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political aspects of the publicly owned automobile insurance company, or Crown corporation, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) from 1970 through 2010. An overview of the British Columbia (BC) government's relationship with ICBC, including in regard to the latter's risk management, finance and capital, is provided. The role that the BC party the New Democratic Party (NDP) played in establishing the ICBC is discussed.

Various levels of government contract-out the provision of public services such as health and education to community organizations, which have traditionally received core funding for these services. In recent years, however, with the adoption of neoliberal policies and New Public Management ideals, Canadian federal and provincial governments have increasingly off-loaded the provision of social services to community organizations through a project-funding regime. Community organizations and their workers now find themselves facing new challenges created by this new funding regime. This article explores the ways in which the daily lives of these workers have been organized and influenced by project-funding regime procedures and rules, which benefit the state but create hardships for workers. This analysis draws on staff interviews and focus group data collected from three community organizations in three provinces across Canada. The qualitative analytic approach includes both a thematic analysis and the identification of practices that benefit the institution but complicate worker activities, as identified by the Psycho-Social Ethnography of the Common-Place method, which borrows from Institutional Ethnography. Through the analysis of procedures of increased accountability, short-term funding, hiring on contract, use of information and communication technologies, and forced partnerships, the authors delineate the ways in which a neoliberalized ruling system benefits and manages staff activities while complicating the lives of the workers. Recommendations and responses to this situation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the government-operated gambling in Canada and discusses how to balance gaming responsibilities. According to Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling, 90% of Canadian gambling revenues are from government-operated gaming accounts. It is stated that gambling is good for provincial budgets since gambling netted $6.8 billion for provincial governments in 2006-2007. It is noted that Canada leads the world in gambling research and though it is prohibited in most societies, gambling is now a socially acceptable activity. According to William Eadington, economic professor, gambling has became an important revenue source in Canada and in places like Australia. The government is the benefactor of gambling but is also responsible for protecting gamblers.