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What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1990s, Taiwan and China conducted over twenty rounds of negotiations through the semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) concerning the following issues: notarized papers, registered mail, illegal immigration, fishing disputes, airplane hijacking, and post-1997 shipping links between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Regrouping these issues into rights, law-and-order, and shipping, this study analyzes the differences in the negotiation processes and outcomes through variations of value-interest alignments and their perceived impact on future policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth of Taiwan's manufacturing investments in China has bred an emerging cross-border industrial park development. This paper investigates the processes involved by exploring the interactive relations between the nation-states and actors concerned. In the context of the cross-border political tensions between Taiwan and China, the roles played by the two states are extensively examined. A case study of Kunshan Science Park in Suzhou is also discussed in detail. It is concluded that the industrial park development across Taiwan Strait is socially constructed through the interactions of vertical and horizontal governance within interfirm, intrafirm and extrafirm networks, upon which the states and related political economies across the Strait have imposed particular influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The situation across Taiwan Straits is unique in that it has undergone different phases of conflict, hostility, tension and relaxation, which is linked with interrelations between tourism development and political interactions. The research framework is based on the conceptual and theoretical implications of tourism development among partitioned states raised by two Canadian geographers Richard Butler and Baodi Mao. The methodology adopted by this study includes statistical analysis and historical comparison. The paper examines the interrelations between tourism development and political interactions across Taiwan Straits through relevant literature and current events. It deduces the conceptual model of interactions between tourism development and political relations among partitioned states so as to check the conceptual and theoretical implications raised by Butler and Mao. The conceptual model shows that after the policy allows people to travel between partitioned states, visiting can promote contacts and understanding among people, which contributes to the political relations to be gentle in initial stage, helps facilitate both sides to achieve conciliation in middle period, and creates the advantages of peaceful coexistence in a long term. Tourism is not just the facilitator of peace but the beneficiary of peace. Gentle political relations not only contribute to the sustainable development of tourism, but also strengthen Track Two Diplomacy (people-to-people) and Track One Diplomacy (government-to-government), and then could build the atmosphere which is good to political conciliation and normalized relations. Governments might take measures of warning or limiting people not to go to some particular tourist destinations because of the political taboo, ideology and tourism safety problems. The actions could make people misunderstand each other and lead to tense relationships of the two sides, and furthermore evolve into a situation of confrontation or conflict, thus we can find that tourism displays a political character. There has been no military conflict across Taiwan Straits since 1979; the sum of personnel exchanges was about 7 000 000 in 2011; even though it is not complete peace, the situation is in the reconciliation status. Tourism increased opportunities of contacts between people in stable situation of Taiwan Straits, and accomplished the fact of peace. Political peace is favorable for developing tourism. Tourism can also play a Track Two Diplomacy function in tense situations, provide an alternative channel to increase understanding, and affect Track One Diplomacy gradually. Removing political factors, it is attractive to people between partitioned states to visit another side, especially in those states which have the same consanguinity and culture. Political policies may be able to stop travel exchange temporarily, but when the bans are lifted, tourist flows will increase rapidly. Since June 28, 2011, people from Mainland China can visit Taiwan as individual travelers, the policy has a positive meaning to promote mutual understanding and maintain friendly and peaceful relations between the People of Taiwan and Mainland China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

This paper examines the role the United States has played in the maintenance of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait from a constructivist/institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way has the United States helped preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how has the United States reproduced the status quo arrangement to shape the interests of Beijing and Taipei? It is maintained that a status quo arrangement has developed across the Strait which the United States has helped to construct and which is supported to varying degrees by Beijing and Taipei. This status quo institution has been created and reinforced through direct codification as well through an indirect process of structuration. The three Washington-Beijing joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) form the first stage of institutional development through formal codification which emphasizes the use of peaceful means on both sides for the final resolution of the situation. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the status quo arrangement, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. These policy statements normally uphold such supreme values as "prosperity," "stability," or "peace." They also help sustain the regulative, normative, or cognitive pillars of the status quo institution through the strategies of stigmatization, role conferment, or internalization. The main purpose of the status quo institution, instantiated by repeated policy statements or actions, is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, and interests of Beijing and Taipei. Although Beijing and Taipei are not merely passive and sometimes seek to test the rules or promote alternative norms, this behavior has not been sustained. If they have taken action, it has often been rationalized to ensure that the core values were not directly challenged. As such, it is concluded that the construction and reproduction of the status quo institution has been considerably effective so far, if not completely successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts with a literature review of cross-Strait relations studies. It then evolves into a proposal for an analogical model and a new research agenda. After pointing out the shortcomings of the dominant approaches in the field for not grasping the defining features of Taiwan-mainland relations (power asymmetry and sovereignty claims based on ethnic ties), it then argues that the cross-Strait relations are structurally similar to the relations between the Russian Federation and the "near abroad" countries. Taiwan, like Ukraine or the Baltics, can choose between balancing and bandwagoning under power asymmetry and sovereignty claims by a potential aggressor. Democratization and the resultant rise of Taiwanese nationalism have prompted the government to pursue balancing, while the increasing costs associated with such a strategy have given rise to political forces advocating reconciliation and bandwagoning. The learning curve derived from the Russian case is heuristic in pointing out the possible development of Taiwan's mainland policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that humpback dolphins are found on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Dolphines found in Xiamen, China, and Kinmen, Taiwan, which are situated in adjoining waters within Xiamen Bay, belong to the same population. It provides evidence to prove that they belong to the same population.

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an examination into the cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan, focusing on the political implications of the 2012 Taiwanese elections. Introductory details are given explaining the victory of incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT Party, suggesting that Ma's former policies will likely continue into the next four years. An overview is then given of Ma's policies, noting Taiwan's strategic non-confrontation approach to China in geopolitical and economic areas, its openness to cultural exchange through tourism and education, and its military hedging. Final remarks are also included predicting Chinese continuation of its equivalent policies toward Taiwan.

The article presents an examination into cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China as of 2012, focusing on the paradoxes seen in the overlap shared between domestic and foreign policies of Taiwan. Four paradoxes are named, including the difficulties created by Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995, internal polarization in Taiwanese politics regarding nationalism, Taiwanese economic dependency on Chinese trade and investment, and rapprochement since 2008. Each of these four issues are discussed in turn, citing how each shows both promise for continued relations and continuing difficulties between the two nations.

The US strategic ambiguity versus clarity has been a centerpiece in maintaining cross-strait stability since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Dialogues and debates abound regarding the relative effectiveness of discrete US policy choices. The current thaw in cross-strait relations does not forestall decisively the resurgence in the long run of the cross-strait tensions during 2000-08, rendering the strategic ambiguity/clarity still a relevant issue. This article argues that the discussions on the issue are seriously plagued by the lack of a sufficiently rigorous and commonly shared conceptualization of strategic ambiguity/clarity, and an internal logical contradiction or an inadequate practical utility as a tool to aid policy-making. To address these problems, this article seeks to clarify and elaborate on the conceptual foundation of strategic ambiguity/clarity by differentiating between two distinct analytic levels thereof, and proposing a conceptual framework for a fuller understanding of the US policy along various dimensions. It also reappraises some major issues or problems found in the existing discussions and US practice, and suggests possible solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The southeast coast military operation starting from 1954 took place amid keen antagonism between China and the United States because of the Korean War and America's increasing entanglement in the Taiwan question. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) military actions towards the Chiang-controlled offshore islands had an obvious defensive cast from their conception to their later unfolding in practice. The 1958 Shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy) was part of a plan drawn up by the PLA to seize the islands occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's forces off Mainland China's southeast coastline and a continuance of a military operation that had been evolving since the spring of 1954. This occurred against the backdrop of special domestic and international settings at the time, which were endowed by Mao Zedong with special political significance at some stage. The cautious, defensive nature embodied in both the strategic and operational planning was the key factor leading to the complexity of decision-making motivation and process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses China's diplomatic and military endeavors since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 in an attempt to discourage U.S. involvement in a cross-strait war. It is suggested that the Chinese government has indicated the importance it attaches to resuming control of Taiwan by constructing combat systems capable of holding U.S. naval assets at risk in Asia. It is argued that China's use of coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are a matter of communication and diplomatic signaling rather than military maneuvering of strategic forces. The skillful non-use of military force and the erecting of a "contested zone" are analyzed.

The present study documents the environment, initiation, and evolution of three isolated supercell storms on 19 December 2002, as the first case near Taiwan reported in the literature, mainly using radar data and manual and gridded analyses. In a subtropical environment, the supercells occurred behind a winter cold front that provided a large west-southwesterly vertical wind shear of 6.4 × 10-3 s-1 at 0–3 km. This combined with weak-to-moderate instability (CAPE = 887 J kg-1) above the shallow surface cold air to yield a favorable environment for supercells. An approaching upper-level jet (ULJ) at 200 hPa also provided strong shear through deep layers farther aloft. Prior to storm initiation, significant daytime solar heating occurred over the mountain slopes along the coast of southeastern China, leading to development of local circulation and onshore/upslope winds, resulting in convergence and uplifting. Three storms were initiated about 80 km inland around 1400 LST near the peaks of local terrain with a northeast–southwest alignment. After formation, the three storms evolved into isolated supercells and each experienced multiple splits. The right-moving storms were usually stronger than left-moving ones and traveled eastward rapidly at about 18 m s-1 across the Taiwan Strait. The storms reached their maximum strength over the strait where low-level shear intensified during the day due to cold air surge. The northern storm also registered a peak reflectivity of 72 dBZ, the strongest ever recorded by any radar in Taiwan. Eventually, the three supercell storms made landfall over Taiwan, producing swaths of rain, hail, and property damages. Before they diminished after midnight, each of the three storms had lasted for about 10 h and propagated for over 550 km. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several issues regarding the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China. It explores the factors that contribute to the increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, including the scheduled dual national elections in Taiwan and its decision to join the United Nations which evokes condemnation from Beijing, China and the U.S. for trying to change Taiwan's international status. It is argued that understanding the reason on the change in Taiwan's mood can enable Beijing and the U.S. to act wisely in order to make use of the opportunity to put triangular Taiwan Strait relationship on a declining tension.

GPS observation indicates that the Fujian coastal region of China mainland, the region of Taiwan Strait and northern Taiwan island all show a generally homogenous horizontal motion with weak deformation. Historical earthquake record over more than 800 years and modern instrumental data reveal that there is potential seismic risk in and around Taiwan Strait region. After the National Seismic Zoning Map of China (2001) the expected seismic risk in northern part of the Taiwan Strait is lower than that in middle and southern part. The suggested northern route of the Taiwan Strait passage project seems to be relatively save seismically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long-term political, economic, and military trends are reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in potentially destabilizing ways and undermining the "one China" framework. The United States has become more deeply involved in cross-strait relations to maintain stability and preserve the status quo, but this approach may not be sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, this article models the interactions among the United States, Taiwan, and mainland China in a three-stage sequential game of complete information, and the interactions between Taiwan and mainland China without the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan in a two-stage sequential game of complete information, respectively. By comparing the equilibria of these two games, this article explores theoretically the U.S. role in constructing the balance of threat across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, based on the scenarios yielded by the three-stage sequential game, this article narrates the evolution of security situation across the Taiwan Strait and how the United States has been maintaining the balance of threat in that area. In conclusion, this article speculates on the future of cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the regime change and the People's Republic of China's Taiwan policy in the Democratic Progressive Party era. Context definition of regime change; Information on the historical legacies and maintenance of the One China principle as a firm political principle; Developments in Taiwan and cross-Strait economic integration.

Discusses the presidential election in Taiwan in March 2004 and the political relations across the Taiwan Strait. History of cross-Strait relations; Information on independence and unification in Taiwan; Referendums passed by political parties to change sovereignty in the event of an attack by China.

Explores the questions of whether the growing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait might help in overcoming the deadlock in high politics created by the views of the People's Republic of China and Republic of China on Taiwan on the issue of sovereignty. Theory of how growing integration and social communication create the bases for a community; Description of the economic and social processes linking Taiwan to China; Impact of the periodic crises between Beijing and Taipei.

Focuses on military and nonmilitary confidence-building measures (CBM) for the Taiwan Strait. Relations between Taiwan and China; U.S. government's view of CBM for the strait; Condition for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.

The Taiwan problem is the most enduring and dangerous of the East Asian flashpoints. Conflicting notions of sovereignty, deeply rooted in Taipei and Beijing, preclude a diplomatic breakthrough under present conditions. With cross-Strait tensions likely to persist well into the twenty-first century, Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of maintaining its de facto autonomy in the shadow of growing Chinese economic and military power. The threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC) conquering Taiwan through military invasion or economic coercion is often overstated, but the PRC's determination and capability to bring extreme pressure on Taiwan through military means other than invasion should be respected. Instead of focusing on short-term solutions to the impasse, the best course is a careful management of the status quo, with Taiwan refraining from undue provocation of Beijing, allowing time for a future generation of Chinese to re-evaluate the relationship between formal Taiwanese independence and China's security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the impact of the 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan on the cross-strait relations. Overview of the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan; Goal of China to reunify Taiwan to the mainland; Analysis of the government toward President Chen Shui-bian.

Examines the outcome of the 1998 Koo-Wang Meeting regarding the Taiwan Strait in Taiwan. Conflict between China and Taiwan regarding the ownership of the Taiwan Strait; Threat of China over Taiwan; Investigation on the impact of the change of policy of Taiwan on the issue.

In June 1995 a private visit to the United States by Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui generated a wave of acrimonious rhetoric and bellicose activity by China. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, which by the early 1990s appeared to be at a four-decade low, suddenly escalated In mid 1995 and. early 1996 China conducted missile tests in the waters around Taiwan and conducted large scale military exercises off the Chinese coast in the vicinity of the island But just as suddenly as tensions had heightened, they dissipated following the conclusion of Taiwan's first-ever direct presidential election in March 1996 China acknowledged the result, the re-election of President Lee, and urged Taipei to resume a dialogue with Beijing. The recent confrontation between China and Taiwan is one that is not easily explained or predicted. This article contends that the recent China-Taiwan tensions can best be explained by factoring in ethnicity and irredentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the studies regarding the feasibility of constructing a tunnel under the Taiwan Strait to connect the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Economic aspects of the Taiwan Strait Tunnel; Exploratory discussions about the feasibility work of the Taiwan Strait Tunnel initiated by the Institute for 21st Century Development Research of Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.