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Britain's attempt to distance itself from Israel as London sought to conciliate the Arab world in the aftermath of the Six-Day War has entered the historiography of Anglo-Israeli relations. A neglected aspect of the development of British policy towards Israel has been the intense debates among British decision-makers regarding the supply of tanks to Israel following the 1967 conflict. British reluctance to export the powerful Chieftain tank to Israel stemmed not only from an unwillingness to fuel an arms race in the Middle East, but also from a determination to protect ongoing and extensive British economic interests in the Arab world, especially oil supplies. In keeping with efforts to dissociate itself from Israel, Britain also sought to downplay, and even conceal from the Arab world, ongoing sales of the less sophisticated Centurion tank to Israel. In many ways, British policy towards Israel culminated in the decision during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to maintain an arms embargo to the region which, while not extending to all Arab countries, hit Israel especially hard as it desperately sought ammunition and spares for its Centurion tanks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was launched in the aftermath the Arab Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973 by Nine European countries and the Arabs. The main objective was to create a stable, long-term relationship between the two regions. Despite its political intent, the framework of the Dialogue was restricted to multilateral economic co-operation in selected areas for reciprocal benefits. Due to inevitable obstacles, after almost five years of engagements, the Dialogue seemed to be progressing slowly with the development of only a few practical projects. Nevertheless, the British remained committed to the initiative, which they viewed as supplementary to their successful existing bilateral relationships, as well as an inexpensive but effective way to maintain their political and economic interests in the Arab world. Through historical analysis, this paper examines the British attitude and perspective towards the Dialogue from 1973 to 1978, mainly using archival documents available at the National Archive in England. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Modern armies conduct military operations in urban areas, but rarely do so willingly. Military commanders prefer fighting in open terrain in which forces freely maneuver and use firepower, rather than in urban areas in which obstacles such as tall buildings, narrow streets, and non-combatants hinder control of the battlefield. Most professional military literature recommends refraining from fighting in urban areas and considering urban battles an unfortunate aberration to be avoided in the future. Deliberate choice of an urban battlefield is quite exceptional, deriving mostly from strategic needs or due to the symbolic value ascribed to a particular city or town. Most decisive battles of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 were fought in open areas. However, strategic and political considerations, as well as cultural and sentimental, caused both sides to fight in cities and towns, such as in the case of Jaffa and Tel Aviv metropolitan area, Palestine's major economic center and a main road junction. Both cities also held sentimental value: the dynamically developing modern Jaffa was a symbol of an emerging Palestinian nation while Tel Aviv, the “first Hebrew city,” was the Zionist ideal of urban development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the complex relationship between the British Foreign Office and Israel. It argues that in 1976 was a year of transformation in the relationship as the Foreign Office shifted towards a more critical approach towards Israel following the resignation of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It makes use of newly available documentary sources from the National Archives in London, which illustrate how the Foreign Office used the resignation of the widely perceived pro-Israel Wilson, and the arrival in power of James Callaghan, to quietly shift British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict to fall more into line with the policies of Britain's European Partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks into issues concerning the referral of the Palestinian problem to the United Nations (UN) by Great Britain in 1947. In response to the British government's request, the UN created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Subsequently, UNSCOP recommended the foundation of two independent states, one Jewish and one Arab. The recommendations of UNSCOP were overwhelmingly rejected by the Arabs, alleging that most of the committee members held pro-Zionist views.

Contrary to claims by revisionist historians, far from seeking to promote peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the wake of the 1948 Palestine War, between 1949 and mid-1951 at the very least Britain prevented the Jewish state from making peace with the one Arab state eager to do so: Jordan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]