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Die vergangene Woche war zweifellos eine gute Woche für alle Verfechter:innen von Absenkungen des Wahlalters: Der Landtag in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern hat mit den Stimmen von SPD, Linken, Grünen und FDP (und gegen die Stimmen von CDU und AfD) beschlossen, dass 16- und 17-Jährige dort künftig auch bei Landtagswahlen wahlberechtigt sein werden, was sie bei dortigen Kommunalwahlen ohnehin schon sind. Ob diese Reformwoche auch für die betroffenen jungen Menschen eine gute Woche war, ist dagegen eine ganz andere Frage.

Referendums provide citizens with more control over policy. At the same time, they often entail choices over highly complex policies and are politicised along partisan lines, suggesting that partisan rather than policy considerations will guide voters’ choices. I look to the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum, which was particularly complex and polarised, as an opportunity to test for mechanisms of government accountability in a referendum. Using a national survey of voters, I show that the more negative a respondent’s evaluation of the state of the economy, the lower their likelihood to vote ‘yes’ on the government’s reform proposal. This relationship is remarkably strong: an average respondent with a very positive evaluation of the state of the economy has an 88% probability of supporting the government’s reform proposal compared to only 12% for a respondent with a very negative evaluation. The fact that economic evaluations are a strong determinant of vote choice provides evidence for the existence of an economic vote in a referendum. This further suggests that voters may treat referendums as a sort of second-order election.

Bargaining and coalition building are a central part of modern politics. We argue that majoritarian bargaining is important for the formation of coalitions and that group-identity preferences have an impact on partner selection. We tested the effect of gender, race, and ideological distance in a majority-rule bargaining experiment and found that ideological distance significantly affected the likelihood and amount offered to potential partners. We concluded that formateurs are not necessarily purely rational actors pursuing policy goals and/or the benefits of office. Rather, they also care about the identity of their partners, preferring others who are like themselves.

Economic performance is a key component of most election forecasts. When fitting models, however, most forecasters unwittingly assume that the actual state of the economy, a state best estimated by the multiple periodic revisions to official macroeconomic statistics, drives voter behavior. The difference in macroeconomic estimates between revised and original data vintages can be substantial, commonly over 100% (two-fold) for economic growth estimates, making the choice of which data release to use important for the predictive validity of a model. We systematically compare the predictions of four forecasting models for numerous US presidential elections using real-time and vintage data. We find that newer data are not better data for election forecasting: forecasting error increases with data revisions. This result suggests that voter perceptions of economic growth are influenced more by media reports about the economy, which are based on initial economic estimates, than by the actual state of the economy.