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Doctors’ mental wellbeing is a critical public health issue. Rates of depression, anxiety, and substance use are higher than in the general population. Regulating unwell doctors who pose a public risk is challenging, yet there is little research into how medical regulators balance the need to protect the public from harm against the benefits of supporting and rehabilitating the unwell doctor. We analysed judgments from Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, United Kingdom, Ontario, and Singapore between 2010 and 2020 relating to impaired doctors. We found similarities in how decision-makers conceptualise impairment, how they disentangle impairment from associated conduct or performance complaints, and how regulatory principles and sanctions are applied. However, compared to other jurisdictions, Australian courts and tribunals tended to prioritise deterrence above the rehabilitation of the impaired doctor. Supporting impaired doctors’ recovery, when appropriate, is critical to public protection and patient safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical regulators protect the public from unsafe, unwell, or unscrupulous medical practitioners. To facilitate a swift response to serious allegations, many regulators are equipped with far-reaching emergency powers to immediately suspend, or impose conditions on, medical practitioners' registration before facts are proven. Failing to take urgent action may expose the public to ongoing avoidable harm and may erode public trust in the profession. Equally, imposing immediate action in response to allegations that are not subsequently proven can precipitously and irreparably injure a practitioner's career and emotional wellbeing. This is the second of two articles published in the Journal of Law and Medicine that explores the emerging jurisprudence in relation to these emergency regulatory powers. This article compares the approaches to immediate action in seven countries, providing insights for policy-makers and decision-makers into how modern regulatory frameworks attempt to balance the inherent tensions between the profession, the public and the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction The 1972 case of Canterbury υ Spence [1] ranks among the best-known court decisions in American and international health law. Mr Canterbury, a 19-year-old typist for the Federal Bureau [...]

Background: Compared with other doctors, surgeons are at an increased risk of medicolegal events, including patient complaints and negligence claims. This retrospective study aimed to describe the frequency and nature of complaints involving surgeons compared with physicians. Methods: We assembled a national data set of complaints about surgeons and physicians lodged with medical regulators in Australia from 2011 to 2016. We classified the complaints into 19 issues across four domains: treatment and procedures, other performance, professional conduct and health. We assessed differences in complaint risk using incidence rate ratios (IRRs). Finally, we used a multivariate model to identify predictors of complaints among surgeons. Results: The rate of complaints was 2.3 times higher for surgeons than physicians (112 compared with 48 complaints per 1000 practice years, P < 0.001). Two‐fifths (41%) of the higher rate of complaints among surgeons was attributable to issues other than treatments and procedures, including fees (IRR = 2.68), substance use (IRR = 2.10), communication (IRR = 1.98) and interpersonal behaviour (IRR = 1.92). Male surgeons were at a higher risk of complaints, as were specialists in orthopaedics, plastic surgery and neurosurgery. Discussion: Surgeons are more than twice as likely to attract complaints as their physician peers. This elevated risk arises partly from involvement in surgical procedures and treatments, but also reflects wider concerns about interpersonal skills, professional ethics and substance use. Improved understanding of these patterns may assist efforts to reduce harm and support safe practise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Immediate action" is a powerful regulatory tool available to Medical Boards. It protects the public from harm by restricting a medical practitioner's registration after allegations have been made, but before wrongdoing is proven. This article charts the development of these coercive powers in Australia and examines the legal, socio-political and ethical justification for supplementing a well-defined "public risk" test with a broad and controversial "public interest" test that leaves medical practitioners vulnerable to inconsistent decision-making. Compared to overseas jurisdictions, immediate action powers in Australia offer fewer procedural protections. The regulatory response to perceived threats to public trust and confidence in the medical profession needs to be proportionate, transparent, effective, and consistent, to protect the public while also being fair to practitioners., Competing Interests: The authors have previously conducted research in partnership with AHPRA.

The introduction of a mandatory duty to report health practitioners who engage in notifiable conduct has heightened concerns about the potential for notifications to be motivated by rivalry or spite, rather than genuine concern for patient safety. The research discussed in this article explores the views and experiences of health sector professionals in Australia regarding vexatious and misconceived notifications by doctors against other doctors. Interviewees believed most mandatory reports are made on strong grounds with sound motives. Under-reporting was seen as a more significant problem than over-reporting. Three types of inappropriate reports are identified: misconceived reports resulting from a misunderstanding of the reporting thresholds; vexatious reports made with the intention of causing trouble for another practitioner; and avoidable reports where the threshold for reporting need not have been reached if colleagues or employers provided early appropriate support. In light of recent mandatory reporting laws, this article offers recommendations that may assist in supporting appropriate reports and reducing the number of inappropriate reports.

In the wake of adverse events, injured patients and their families have a complex range of needs and wants. The tort system, even when operating at its best, will inevitably fall far short of addressing them. In Australia and New Zealand, government-run health complaints commissions take a more flexible and expansive approach to providing remedies for patients injured by or disgruntled with care. Unfortunately, survey research has shown that many patients in these systems are dissatisfied with their experience. We hypothesised that an important explanation for this dissatisfaction is an 'expectations gap'; discordance between what complainants want and what they eventually get out of the process. Analysing a sample of complaints relating to informed consent from the Commission in Victoria (Australia's second largest state, with 5.2 million residents), we found evidence of such a gap. One-third (59/189) of complainants who sought restoration received it; 1 in 5 complainants (17/101) who sought correction received assurances that changes had been or would be made to reduce the risk of others suffering a similar harm; and fewer than 1 in 10 (3/37) who sought sanctions saw steps taken to achieve this outcome initiated. We argue that bridging the expectations gap would go far toward improving patient satisfaction with complaints systems, and suggest several ways this might be done.