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In this paper we provide an analysis of the concept of legal personality and discuss whether personality may be conferred on artificial intelligence systems (AIs). Legal personality will be presented as a doctrinal category that holds together bundles of rights and obligations; as a result, we first frame it as a node of inferential links between factual preconditions and legal effects. However, this inferentialist reading does not account for the 'background reasons' of legal personality, i.e., it does not explain why we cluster different situations under this doctrinal category and how extra-legal information is integrated into it. We argue that one way to account for this background is to adopt a neoinstitutional perspective and to update the ontology of legal concepts with a further layer, the meta-institutional one. We finally argue that meta-institutional concepts can also support us in finding an equilibrium around the legal-policy choices that are involved in including (or not including) AIs among legal persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal philosophy of the 20th century has contributed to the development of international criminal law by rethinking fundamental legal concepts and theories concerning the nature of international law, its relation with national laws, the connection between the law and the State, and the very idea of responsibility. This was achieved, in the first place, through the reflection of Hans Kelsen, who put forward the idea of a system of enforceable criminal norms at the international level, directed at individuals and having a positive legal foundation. In the years immediately following the Second World War, a number of legal theorists and, in particular, Gustav Radbruch, argued in favour of a necessary connection between law and morality, on whose basis it could be claimed that the worst atrocities were punishable even when allowed by state norms, and even in the absence of positive international norms. In the last decade, the practice of international criminal law, through ad doc tribunals and the International Criminal Court, has stimulated theoretical reflections on a variety of further fundamental issues, like impartiality, judicial truth, justification of punishment, side-effects of prosecution and transitional justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dialogue focuses on the major issues of the contemporary theoretical debate on judicial review and the Supreme Court's role in American constitutional democracy. The discussion begins with the US Supreme Court's case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, successfully argued by Prof. Katyal last year, and covers important issues such as the separation and balance of powers after 9/11, the legitimacy of the laws of terror, the relation between US constitutional law and foreign law, the counter-majoritarian difficulties posed by the exercise of judicial review, and the legal academy's influence on legal practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]