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Abstract Under what conditions do citizens support coercive public policies? Although recent research suggests that people prefer policies that preserve freedom of choice, such as behavioural nudges, many citizens accepted stringent policy interventions like fines and mandates to promote vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic—a pattern that may be linked to the unusually high effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. We conducted a large online survey experiment (N = 42,417) in the Group of Seven (G-7) countries investigating the relationship between a policy’s effectiveness and public support for stringent policies. Our results indicate that public support for stringent vaccination policies increases as vaccine effectiveness increases, but at a modest scale. This relationship flattens at higher levels of vaccine effectiveness. These results suggest that intervention effectiveness can be a significant predictor of support for coercive policies but only up to some threshold of effectiveness.

We investigate the relationship between education and antisemitism using unique individual-level survey data on antisemitism from more than 100 countries. Our findings show that education is associated with greater favorability toward Jews, but the relationship between education and endorsement of antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy theories varies between countries. In countries that actively supported recent statements condemning Holocaust denial and antisemitism at the United Nations—which we use as a proxy for country-level opposition to antisemitism in education and politics—greater education is associated with reduced endorsement of antisemitic stereotypes. By contrast, more educated people are more likely to endorse antisemitic stereotypes than less educated people in countries that declined to endorse those statements. These descriptive findings provide new evidence about the association between education and intolerance.

Do Americans overestimate economic mobility? Using representative surveys of the public and local government officials, we assess claims of widespread misperceptions about economic mobility by measuring the accuracy of participants’ perceptions of both relative and absolute mobility. Republican members of the public and government officials are more optimistic than are Democrats about poor children’s chances of reaching the highest income quintile (relative mobility) and earning more than their parents (absolute mobility). Democrats also rate race and family wealth as more important to children’s chances than do Republicans. However, partisan tendencies to overestimate or underestimate mobility are roughly symmetric despite differences in optimism; we only observe small and inconsistent differences in belief accuracy by party for both the public and local officials. Finally, accuracy is no greater for perceptions of state and local mobility than at the national level.

The spread of COVID-19 misinformation highlights the need to correct misperceptions about health and science. Research on climate change suggests that informing people about a scientific consensus can reduce misinformation endorsement, but these studies often fail to isolate the effects of consensus messaging and may not translate to other issues. We therefore conduct a survey experiment comparing standard corrections with those citing a scientific consensus for three issues: COVID-19 threat, climate change threat, and vaccine efficacy. We find that consensus corrections are never more effective than standard corrections at countering misperceptions and generally fail to reduce them with only one exception. We also find that consensus corrections endorsed by co-partisans do not reduce misperceptions relative to standard corrections, while those endorsed by opposition partisans are viewed as less credible and can potentially even provoke a backfire effect. These results indicate that corrections citing a scientific consensus, including corrective messages from partisans, are less effective than previous research suggests when compared with appropriate baseline messages.

Since 2016, there has been an explosion of interest in misinformation and its role in elections. Research by news outlets, government agencies, and academics alike has shown that millions of Americans have been exposed to dubious political news online. However, relatively little research has focused on documenting the effects of consuming this content.

Can the media effectively hold politicians accountable for making false claims? Journalistic fact-checking assesses the accuracy of individual public statements by public officials, but less is known about whether this process effectively imposes reputational costs on misinformation-prone politicians who repeatedly make false claims. This study therefore explores the effects of exposure to summaries of fact-check ratings, a new format that presents a more comprehensive assessment of politician statement accuracy over time. Across three survey experiments, we compared the effects of negative individual statement ratings and summary fact-checking data on favorability and perceived statement accuracy of two prominent elected officials. As predicted, summary fact-checking had a greater effect on politician perceptions than individual fact-checking. Notably, we did not observe the expected pattern of motivated reasoning: co-partisans were not consistently more resistant than supporters of the opposition party. Our findings suggest that summary fact-checking is particularly effective at holding politicians accountable for misstatements.

Peffley and Hurwitz’s article “Persuasion and resistance: Race and the death penalty in America” is an influential study demonstrating the effects of race on death penalty attitudes. White respondents were found to increase their approval for capital punishment when informed that it disproportionately affects African-Americans. We present results from two studies, including one conducted on a nationally representative sample, that fail to find support for this finding. Our first study, which was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, consists of an exact replication as well as an additional manipulation that strengthens the treatment by adding information about a specific black (versus a white) defendant to the stimulus. However, we fail to elicit the backlash effect found in the original study using either manipulation despite having nearly three times the sample size. These findings are mirrored by replication data from a Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences survey that closely replicates Peffley and Hurwitz’s race framing treatment. The results from these studies suggest that the relationship between racial stimuli and death penalty support has changed since the original study, that racial backlash effects in this policy domain are not as robust as previously assumed, or both.

Beliefs in conspiracy theories about controversial issues are often strongly influenced by people’s existing beliefs and attitudes. We leverage a prominent football-related controversy – the US National Football League’s “Deflategate” scandal – to investigate how factual perceptions and conspiracy beliefs vary by fan loyalties to sports teams. Using an original survey sample, we explore two key drivers of conspiratorial beliefs about the scandal. First, we analyze how beliefs about Deflategate vary by respondents’ loyalties towards the New England Patriots. We find that beliefs are not only highly polarized by team loyalty but that the gaps are largest among more interested and knowledgeable fans, suggesting that individuals are processing the information they receive in a highly motivated fashion. Second, we find that individuals who endorse unrelated political conspiracy theories are also more likely to endorse two key conspiratorial claims about Deflategate. However, priming group solidarity and elite resentment – two possible motivations for the prevalence of conspiracy theories around controversial issues like Deflategate – does not have a significant effect.