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Building on updated estimates of the social cost of carbon obtained from the most recent literature, this article proposes a social cost of carbon-based benchmark for carbon pricing to drive world countries' carbon pricing policies up to 2050, consistent with the Paris Agreement targets. By using a dataset on net effective carbon rates developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), we firstly compare both explicit and implicit carbon pricing in 2021 in 71 OECD and non-OECD countries with the social cost of carbon benchmark for 2021 and calculate the degree of internalization of the social cost of carbon averagely related to their carbon pricing instruments. We find that there is a serious gap in current climate policies, which are far from creating optimal pricing conditions to reduce global emissions to levels needed by the Paris Agreement. The economic and distributional feasibility of a full implementation of the carbon pricing benchmark is tested in the same set of countries using two indicators, which are calculated for 2025, 2030, 2040 and 2050. Since the test results are income-regressive among income country groups, benchmark implementation by countries within the cooperative approaches of Paris Agreement art. 6 should be accompanied by the creation of an international cooperative fund aimed to recycle at least part of the revenues collected by high-income countries to compensate affected population in lower-income countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study quantified the regional damages resulting from temperature and sea level changes using the Regional Integrated of Climate and Economy (RICE) model, as well as the effects of enabling and disabling the climate impact module on future emission pathways. Results highlight varied damages depending on regional economic development and locations. Specifically, China and Africa could suffer the most serious comprehensive damages caused by temperature change and sea level rise, followed by India, other developing Asian countries (OthAsia), and other high-income countries (OHI). The comprehensive damage fractions for China and Africa are projected to be 15.1% and 12.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2195, with corresponding cumulative damages of 124.0 trillion and 87.3 trillion United States dollars (USD) from 2005 to 2195, respectively. Meanwhile, the comprehensive damage fractions in Japan, Eurasia, and Russia are smaller and projected to be lower than 5.6% of GDP in 2195, with cumulative damages of 6.8 trillion, 4.2 trillion, and 3.3 trillion USD, respectively. Additionally, coastal regions like Africa, the European Union (EU), and OHI show comparable damages for sea level rise and temperature change. In China, however, sea level-induced damages are projected to exceed those from temperature changes. Moreover, this study indicates that switching the damage modules on or off affects the regional and global emission trajectories, but the magnitude is relatively small. By 2195, global emissions under the experiments with all of the damage modules switched off, only the sea level damage module switched on, and only the temperature damage module switched on, were 3.5%, 2.3% and 1.2% higher than those with all of the damage modules switched on, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations have failed to provide adequate protection to climate victims, vulnerable countries as well as non-governmental organizations are actively exploring legal avenues for relief. Bringing resources to compensate for the "Loss and Damage" and in this way, they consider the lawsuits as the reason for directing the UNFCCC negotiations towards predicting and stipulating the resources of this compensation. Emphasizing the necessity of the international community's support for climate damage caused by climate manipulation, especially the damage caused to vulnerable and less developed countries, this article aims to prove the impact of Loss and Damage claims on the UNFCCC negotiations and in a descriptive and analytical way, to examine the viewpoints of the proponents. and the opponents of this idea and their reasons, as well as the elements and institutions effective in this matter, such as nongovernmental organizations and legal networks, finally proves that despite the fact that the mechanism of lawsuits for liability and compensation for climate harms is still in a not very advanced stage, but as a legal way it has a significant capacity to guide the UNFCCC negotiations on the issue of losses and damages, especially the need to "new and additional financial resources" on the two pillars of mitigation and adaptation by the UNFCCC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantifying climate damage is essential to informing rational climate policies, but only a few studies have systematically compared the climate damage estimates made by different models, especially for China. In this study, we used three widely applied integrated assessment models—FUND, RICE, and PAGE—to estimate the damage under coupled shared socioeconomic pathways and representative concentration pathways (RCPs). Results show that the costs of climate damage constitute approximately 1.5% and 0.7% of China's GDP and global GDP per 1 °C temperature rise on average, respectively. Mitigation can reduce climate risk by lowering the average estimate and worst-case effects of climate damage. Compared with business-as-usual emissions (RCP8.5), the 2 °C target will reduce the average estimate of climate damage for China and the world by 93% and 87%, respectively, and by 80% and 84%, respectively, in the worst-case situation. Sectorial analysis of climate damage highlights the inconsistency of sector scope and significant parameter uncertainties in damage modules, requiring further improvement to integrate subfield research advances, particularly for damage related to rising sea levels and cooling energy demand.

Increase of the Earth’s average surface temperature observed in the last century has affected almost all countries of the world. No state has managed to escape the effects of global warming, and scientists predict that no country will escape a further increase in temperature. However, the highest temperature increases are expected in countries with relatively colder climates. The contribution of low-income developing countries, typically located in some of the hottest geographic areas of the planet, to atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations is negligible, both in absolute and per capita terms. This article provides a meta-analysis of quantitative estimates of the damage caused by global climate change occurring on the planet since the last century. A rise in temperature has been shown to decrease per capita production in countries with relatively high average annual temperatures, which include most low-income countries. In these countries, the negative effect has long-term nature and operates through several channels, including decrease in agricultural production and labor productivity in sectors more exposed to weather; reduction in capital accumulation and deterioration of human health. Moreover, as evidence shows, in recent years macroeconomic indicators have not become less sensitive to temperature shocks, which points at significant limitations on countries’ adaptation to climate change. Meta-analysis of climate change damage estimates documented in relevant literature will, first, provide an idea of the scale of such estimates and help to assess the current state of knowledge in this area. In addition, a meta-analysis will demonstrate sensitivity of the results of calculations regarding assessment approach, measurement errors or insufficient data, choice of sample, etc. Finally, systematization of climate damage quantitative estimates is highly likely to be of practical importance for authorities and international organizations responsible for developing measures to deal with climate change and mitigate its effects, especially for developing and poor countries, most affected by the negative effects of global warming.

The quality of democracy in our economy depends on the governance of capital, but Europeans are still deprived of real voice over their retirement money: the single biggest source of capital in the 21st century. This paper outlines three major problems facing EU pensions: precarious retirement, escalating inequality, and mounting climate damage. These problems start with the places where we work, the institutions that control our retirement savings, and the votes on shares that come with them. The central argument is that pensions will only be sustainable once they are democratically, prudently, and loyally governed. First, member states have wide experience with co-determination in capital funds, which can inform the basis of minimum standards in EU law for 'pension fund democracy'. Second, a growing number of investment rules draw upon Member States' fiduciary duties and standards for prudence or care; but, these do not yet codify the requirement that beneficiaries' environmental, social, and governance preferences are followed. Third, votes on shares - bought with pension fund assets - are still being cast by banks and asset managers who manage 'other people's money'. This is a serious problem because banks and asset managers have interests that systematically conflict with the ultimate investors: they vote in companies on other people's money and, at the same time, sell financial products (e.g., pensions) to those companies. The problems are soluble with careful amendments to existing policy that ensure elected representatives of pension beneficiaries are the sole determinants of voting policies, with prudence and no conflicts of interest. A draft EU Directive, based upon emerging best practice, is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Solomon Hsiang's study, which was recently published in Science, has caused extensive discussion by indicating that future climate change may exert influences on the agricultural yield, labor supply, and energy demand, among others of the United States. Based on the above study, we use an optimized input‐output model to evaluate the economic ripple effect (ERE) of the United States on the world due to climate change under Representative Concentration Pathway 4.5 with different increases in the annual mean temperature (AMT; 1, 1.5, and 2°C) between 2020 and 2100. The results show that if a loss of gross domestic product of 0.88% occurs with a 1°C AMT increase in the United States, the ERE of approximately 0.12% will be generated onto the global gross domestic product; with a 2°C increase, the ERE will triple. The time variation trend of the ERE conforms to the future variations in AMT. The degree of this effect on other regions of the world is closely related to the trade links between the United States and economic aggregates. Among these regions, Canada shows the greatest impact, followed by China. The ERE that China suffers may increase by 4.5 times as the AMT in the United States increases from 1 to 2°C. In cold regions, the benefit from global warming will decrease due to the ERE from other regions, which will inhibit their economic development. This paper aims to provide new perspectives and data‐based support for regions around the world to cope with climate change and to develop policies by studying the ERE behind international trade.

The idea of modifying cirrus clouds to directly counteract greenhouse gas warming has gained momentum in recent years, despite disputes over its physical feasibility. Previous studies that analyzed modifications of cirrus clouds by seeding of ice nucleating particles showed large uncertainties in both cloud and surface climate responses, ranging from no effect or even a small warming to a globally averaged cooling of about 2.5 °C. We use two general circulation models that showed very different responses in previous studies, ECHAM6-HAM and CESM-CAM5, to determine which radiative and climatic responses to cirrus cloud seeding in a 1.5 × CO _2 world are common and which are not. Seeding reduces the net cirrus radiative effect for −1.8 W m ^−2 in CESM compared with only −0.8 W m ^−2 in ECHAM. Accordingly, the surface temperature decrease is larger in CESM, counteracting about 70% of the global mean temperature increase due to CO _2 and only 30% in ECHAM. While seeding impacts on mean precipitation were addressed in past studies, we are the first to analyze extreme precipitation responses to cirrus seeding. Seeding decreases the frequency of the most extreme precipitation globally. However, the extreme precipitation events occur more frequently in the Sahel and Central America, following the mean precipitation increase due to a northward shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone. In addition, we use a quadratic climate damage metric to evaluate the amount of CO _2 -induced damage cirrus seeding can counteract. Seeding decreases the damage by about 50% in ECHAM, and by 85% in CESM over the 21 selected land regions. Climate damage due to CO _2 increase is significantly reduced as a result of seeding in all of the considered land regions.

Abstract: Solomon Hsiang's study, which was recently published in Science, has caused extensive discussion by indicating that future climate change may exert influences on the agricultural yield, labor supply, and energy demand, among others of the United States. Based on the above study, we use an optimized input‐output model to evaluate the economic ripple effect (ERE) of the United States on the world due to climate change under Representative Concentration Pathway 4.5 with different increases in the annual mean temperature (AMT; 1, 1.5, and 2°C) between 2020 and 2100. The results show that if a loss of gross domestic product of 0.88% occurs with a 1°C AMT increase in the United States, the ERE of approximately 0.12% will be generated onto the global gross domestic product; with a 2°C increase, the ERE will triple. The time variation trend of the ERE conforms to the future variations in AMT. The degree of this effect on other regions of the world is closely related to the trade links between the United States and economic aggregates. Among these regions, Canada shows the greatest impact, followed by China. The ERE that China suffers may increase by 4.5 times as the AMT in the United States increases from 1 to 2°C. In cold regions, the benefit from global warming will decrease due to the ERE from other regions, which will inhibit their economic development. This paper aims to provide new perspectives and data‐based support for regions around the world to cope with climate change and to develop policies by studying the ERE behind international trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grandfather rights require airlines to operate at least 80 % of their slots, if they are to keep them in the next scheduling period. To prevent losing slots, the airlines may operate slot-rescue flights, an airline strategy called slot hoarding. We model strategies of a monopolistic airline which chooses between long-haul and short-haul flights at a slot-coordinated airport. In cases of a binding use-it-or-lose-it rule, we observe a bias in the airline route network in favor of slot-rescue flights on short-haul distances. Slot-rescue flights reduce airline profits, but raise consumer surplus and airport profits. The overall effect of slot-rescue flights on welfare, however, remains ambiguous. Recently, slot hoarding and its climate impact have received considerable attention during the COVID-19 pandemic. We show that the environmental effects of slot-rescue flights are asymmetric. The climate damage of slot hoarding in the EU is reduced by the EU ETS, whereas CORSIA is rather ineffective. • We model an airline's route network decision at a slot-coordinated airport. • Airlines operate more flights when a use-it-or-loose-it rule is binding. • Model identifies conditions for a route network biased towards short-haul flights. • Slot-rescue flights can be either welfare-increasing or welfare-decreasing. • EU ETS reduces climate damage from slot-rescue flights, whereas CORSIA does not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate damage and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation cost plays important roles in a region's willingness and incentives to join the global climate coalition. Negotiation of climate treaty can be modeled as a cooperative bargaining game of externality provision. The core of this game is a good representation of incentives of the participants. In this paper, we examine the relationship between the shocks of mitigation cost/climate damage and the shifts of the core of cooperative bargaining game of climate negotiation within the framework of RICE [Nordhaus and Yang, 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies. American Economic Review, 86, 741-765], a widely used integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate change. Constructing a method that maps the core allocations onto a convex hull on the simplex of social welfare weights, we describe the scope of the core in simple metrics and capture the shifts of the core representation on the simplex in response to the shocks of mitigation cost and climate damage. A series of simulations are conducted in RICE to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach explored here. In addition, policy implications of methodological results are indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different assumptions and methodologies prompt divergent policy recommendationgs for combatting climate change. Although climate scientists would like to be as precise as possible, policymakers with different attitudes towards climate change will always choose the result that matches their own value judgments. This paper discusses the impact of climate change attitudes on optimal mitigation in 15 regions. The climate change attitude is refined by a meta-analysis of 27 climate damage estimations and distilled into five damage functions. The optimal mitigation is calculated using the non-cooperative scenario of the regional integrated model of climate economy (RICE). The results show that the optimal mitigation paths in developing countries are more sensitive to climate change attitudes than they are in developed countries. In 2100, the range of optimal emissions represents 20% of the average optimal emissions by developing countries, which is twice the value of average optimal emissions by developed countries. The average social carbon cost in developing countries is 20 times higher than that in developed countries. This large uncertainty may be the combined result of high shadow prices of capital and large quantities of future emissions in these developing countries. • Climate change attitudes significantly affect the optimal mitigation path and the social cost of carbon. • Optimal mitigation path and social carbon cost are more sensitive to climate change attitudes in developing countries. • The average social carbon cost in developing countries is 20 times higher than that in developed countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews different approaches to modelling the energy transition towards a zero carbon economy. It identifies a number of limitations in current approaches such as a lack of consideration of out-of-equilibrium situations (like an energy transition) and non-linear feedbacks. To tackle those issues, the new open source integrated assessment model pymedeas is introduced, which allows the exploration of the design and planning of appropriate strategies and policies for decarbonizing the energy sector at World and EU level. The main novelty of the new open-source model is that it addresses the energy transition by considering biophysical limits, availability of raw materials, and climate change impacts. This paper showcases the model capabilities through several simulation experiments to explore alternative pathways for the renewable transition. In the selected scenarios of this work, future shortage of fossil fuels is found to be the most influential factor of the simulations system evolution. Changes in efficiency and climate change damages are also important determinants influencing model outcomes. • New Open Source Energy-Economy-Resources Integrated Assessment Model in Python • Importance of biophysical limits for the massive development of RES • Impact of efficiency and climate change in the energy transition • Raw materials needed for the renewable transition [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]