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Microbial cooperation typically consists in the sharing of secreted metabolites (referred to as public goods) within the community. Although public goods generally promote population growth, they are also vulnerable to exploitation by cheating mutants, which no longer contribute, but still benefit from the public goods produced by others. Although previous studies have identified a number of key factors that prevent the spreading of cheaters, little is known about how these factors interact and jointly shape the evolution of microbial cooperation. Here, we address this issue by investigating the interaction effects of cell diffusion, cell density, public good diffusion and durability (factors known to individually influence costs and benefits of public goods production) on selection for cooperation. To be able to quantify these effects across a wide parameter space, we developed an individual-based simulation platform, consisting of digital cooperator and cheater bacteria inhabiting a finite two-dimensional continuous toroidal surface. Our simulations, which closely mimic microbial microcolony growth, revealed that: (i) either reduced cell diffusion (which keeps cooperators together) or reduced public good diffusion (which keeps the public goods closer to the producer) is not only essential but also sufficient for cooperation to be promoted; (ii) the sign of selection for or against cooperation can change as a function of cell density and in interaction with diffusion parameters; and (iii) increased public goods durability has opposing effects on the evolution of cooperation depending on the level of cell and public good diffusion. Our work highlights that interactions between key parameters of public goods cooperation give rise to complex fitness landscapes, a finding that calls for multifactorial approaches when studying microbial cooperation in natural systems.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

How communication systems emerge and remain stable is an important question in both cognitive science and evolutionary biology. For communication to arise, not only must individuals cooperate by signaling reliable information, but they must also coordinate and perpetuate signals. Most studies on the emergence of communication in humans typically consider scenarios where individuals implicitly share the same interests. Likewise, most studies on human cooperation consider scenarios where shared conventions of signals and meanings cannot be developed de novo. Here, we combined both approaches with an economic experiment where participants could develop a common language, but under different conditions fostering or hindering cooperation. Participants endeavored to acquire a resource through a learning task in a computer-based environment. After this task, participants had the option to transmit a signal (a color) to a fellow group member, who would subsequently play the same learning task. We varied the way participants competed with each other (either global scale or local scale) and the cost of transmitting a signal (either costly or noncostly) and tracked the way in which signals were used as communication among players. Under global competition, players signaled more often and more consistently, scored higher individual payoffs, and established shared associations of signals and meanings. In addition, costly signals were also more likely to be used under global competition; whereas under local competition, fewer signals were sent and no effective communication system was developed. Our results demonstrate that communication involves both a coordination and a cooperative dilemma and show the importance of studying language evolution under different conditions influencing human cooperation.

Selection acting on individuals is not predicted to maximize population persistence, yet examples that explicitly quantify conflicts between individual and population level benefits are scarce. One such conflict occurs over sexual reproduction because of the cost of sex: sexual populations that suffer the cost of producing males have only half the growth rate compared to asexuals. Male behaviour can additionally impact population dynamics in a variety of ways, and here we study an example where the impact is unusually clear: the riddle of persistence of sperm-dependent sexualasexual species complexes. Here, a sexually reproducing host species coexists with an ameiotically reproducing all-female sperm parasite. Sexualasexual coexistence should not be stable because the proportion of asexually reproducing females will rapidly increase and the relative abundance of the sexually reproducing host species will decline. A severe shortage of males will lead to sperm limitation for sexual and asexual females and the system collapses. Male mate choice could reduce the reproductive potential of the asexual species and thus potentially prevent the collapse. In the gynogenetic (spermdependent parthenogenetic) Amazon molly Poecilia formosa and its host (P. latipinna or P. mexicana), males discriminate against asexual females to some extent. Using a population-dynamical model, we examine the population dynamics of this species complex with varying strengths of male discrimination ability and efficiency with which they locate females and produce sperm. The sexual species would benefit from stronger discrimination, thus preventing being displaced by the asexual females. However, males would be required to evolve preferences that are probably too strong to be purely based upon selection acting on individuals. We conclude that male behaviour does not fully prevent but delays extinction, yet this is highly relevant because low local extinction rates strongly promote coexistence as a metapopulation.

Indirect reciprocity is a form of reciprocity where help is given to individuals based on their reputation. In indirect reciprocity, bad acts (such as not helping) reduce an individual's reputation while good acts (such as helping) increase an individual's reputation. Studies of indirect reciprocity assume that good acts and bad acts are weighted equally when assessing the reputation of an individual. As different information can be processed in different ways, this is not likely to be the case, and it is possible that an individual could bias an actor's reputation by putting more weight to acts of defection (not helping) than acts of co-operation (helping) or vice versa . We term this difference ‘judgement bias’, and build an individual-based model of image scoring to investigate the conditions under which it may evolve. We find that, if the benefits of co-operation are small, judgement bias is weighted towards acts perceived to be bad; if the benefits are high, the reverse is true. Our result is consistent under both scoring and standing strategies, and we find that allowing judgement bias to evolve increases the level of co-operation in the population.

The twofold cost of sex implies that sexual and asexual reproduction do not coexist easily. Asexual forms tend to outcompete sexuals but may eventually suffer higher extinction rates, creating tension between short- and long-term advantages of different reproductive modes. The ‘short-sightedness’ of asexual reproduction takes a particularly intriguing form in gynogenetic species complexes, in which an asexual species requires sperm from a related sexual host species to trigger embryogenesis. Asexuals are then predicted to outcompete their host, after which neither species can persist. We examine whether spatial structure can explain continued coexistence of the species complex, and assess the evidence based on data on the Amazon molly (Poecilia formosa). A modification of the Levins metapopulation model creates two regions of good prospects for coexistence, connected by a region of poorer patch occupancy levels. In the first case, mate discrimination and/or niche differentiation keep local extinction rates low, and most patches contain both species; the other possibility resembles host–parasite dynamics where parasites frequently drive the host locally extinct. Several dynamical features are counterintuitive and relate to the parasitic nature of interactions in the species complex: for example, high local extinction rates of the asexual species can be beneficial for its own persistence. This creates a link from the evolution of sexual reproduction to that of prudent predation.

Ever since J.B.S. Haldane proposed the idea, evolutionary biologists are aware that individual level adaptations do not necessarily lead to optimal population performance. A few deeply mathematical models, drawing from a diverse range of systems, even predict that individual selection can lead to the extinction of the whole population, a phenomenon which has become known as evolutionary suicide. Due to the complexity of both following adaptation and determining the exact cause of an extinction, evolutionary suicide has remained untested empirically. However, three recent empirical studies suggest that it may occur, and that suicide should be taken seriously as a potentially important evolutionary phenomenon. Here we ask whether or not evolutionary suicide can occur, briefly reviewing the theoretical and empirical evidence. We further highlight systems which may be used to test whether or not individual level selection can cause extinction.

The widespread evolution of gregarious development in parasitoid wasps presents a theoretical challenge because the conditions under which larval tolerance can spread in an intolerant population are very stringent (the individual fitness of larvae developing together must increase with clutch size). Recent empirical work has suggested that gregarious development can arise through the loss of larval mobility rather than through the gain of tolerant behavior. Using analytical genetic models, we explored whether decreased mobility presents a less stringent route to gregariousness than the gain of tolerance. Reduced mobility can spread under a wide range of conditions. The critical condition for the spread of immobility is much less stringent than that for larval tolerance. In contrast with previous models of tolerance, the criterion for the spread of a rare immobility allele is independent of any bias in the sex ratio and the likelihood of single sex broods. Superparasitism increases the stringency of the criterion for the spread of immobility, whereas double killing relaxes the criterion. Tolerance can subsequently replace immobility if there is any cost to the retention of fighting ability. Our results suggest that asymmetric larval mobility may explain many instances of the evolution of gregarious development. Copyright 2003.

It has recently been proposed that mobile elements may be a significant driver of cooperation in microorganisms. This may drive a potential conflict, where cooperative genes are transmitted independently of the rest of the genome, resulting in scenarios where horizontally spread cooperative genes are favored, whereas a chromosomal equivalent would not be. This can lead to the whole genome being exploited by surrounding noncooperative individuals. Given that there are costs associated with mobile elements themselves, infection with a plasmid carrying a cooperative trait may lead to a significant conflict within the host genome. Here, we model the mechanisms that allow the host to resolve this conflict, either by exhibiting complete resistance to the mobile element or by controlling its gene expression via a chromosomally based suppressor. We find that the gene suppression mechanism will be more stable than full resistance, implying that suppressing the expression of costly genes within a cell is preferable to preventing the acquisition of the mobile element, for the resolution of conflict within a genome.

Reciprocity is often invoked to explain cooperation. Reciprocity is cognitively demanding, and both direct and indirect reciprocity require that individuals store information about the propensity of their partners to cooperate. By contrast, generalized reciprocity, wherein individuals help on the condition that they received help previously, only relies on whether an individual received help in a previous encounter. Such anonymous information makes generalized reciprocity hard to evolve in a well-mixed population, as the strategy will lose out to pure defectors. Here we analyze a model for the evolution of generalized reciprocity, incorporating assortment of encounters, to investigate the conditions under which it will evolve. We show that, in a well-mixed population, generalized reciprocity cannot evolve. However, incorporating assortment of encounters can favor the evolution of generalized reciprocity in which indiscriminate cooperation and defection are both unstable. We show that generalized reciprocity can evolve under both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

Adaptation does not necessarily lead to traits which are optimal for the population. This is because selection is often the strongest at the individual or gene level. The evolution of selfishness can lead to a ‘tragedy of the commons’, where traits such as aggression or social cheating reduce population size and may lead to extinction. This suggests that species-level selection will result whenever species differ in the incentive to be selfish. We explore this idea in a simple model that combines individual-level selection with ecology in two interacting species. Our model is not influenced by kin or trait-group selection. We find that individual selection in combination with competitive exclusion greatly increases the likelihood that selfish species go extinct. A simple example of this would be a vertebrate species that invests heavily into squabbles over breeding sites, which is then excluded by a species that invests more into direct reproduction. A multispecies simulation shows that these extinctions result in communities containing species that are much less selfish. Our results suggest that species-level selection and community dynamics play an important role in regulating the intensity of conflicts in natural populations.

Competition and conflict among individuals can favour exploitative strategies that undermine the common good. Theory suggests that this can lead to a tragedy of the commons and ultimately population extinction, a phenomenon known as evolutionary suicide. Here, I present a model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits. In the simplest form, this supports the notion that selection for high levels of conflict can cause evolutionary suicide. However, as competition comes with survival and fecundity costs, a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct. This suggests that the interaction between population ecology and the evolution of competition and conflict among individuals may be an important mechanism in resolving the level of competition and conflict among individuals.

The population consequences of sexual conflict are relatively unexplored. In a recent paper, Le Galliard et al. now show that males of the common lizard Lacerta vivipara cause such damage to females that male-biased populations decrease in size, posing a real risk to the persistence of local lizard populations. Their study reveals surprising parallels between sexual conflict and the tragedy of the commons, where selfish competition over females destroys the very resource (i.e. the females) over which the males are fighting.

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Background Antibiotic resistance represents a significant public health problem. When resistance genes are mobile, being carried on plasmids or phages, their spread can be greatly accelerated. Plasmids in particular have been implicated in the spread of antibiotic resistance genes. However, the selective pressures which favour plasmid-carried resistance genes have not been fully established. Here we address this issue with mathematical models of plasmid dynamics in response to different antibiotic treatment regimes. Results We show that transmission of plasmids is a key factor influencing plasmid-borne antibiotic resistance, but the dosage and interval between treatments is also important. Our results also hold when plasmids carrying the resistance gene are in competition with other plasmids that do not carry the resistance gene. By altering the interval between antibiotic treatments, and the dosage of antibiotic, we show that different treatment regimes can select for either plasmid-carried, or chromosome-carried, resistance. Conclusions Our research addresses the effect of environmental variation on the evolution of plasmid-carried antibiotic resistance.