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Bu makalede, 20. yüzyılın önemli düşünürlerinden biri olan Friedrich August von Hayek’in sosyal bilimler metodolojisi olarak görülen objektivizm, kolektivizm ve historisizm üzerine eleştirileri ele alınmıştır. Bu üç metodolojik yöntemin mahiyeti Hayek’in düşünce dünyası ve fikirleri etrafında değerlendirilmiştir. Aydınlanma dönemi ile birlikte doğa bilimlerindeki önemli derecede ilerleme ve gelişmeler sonucunda, birçok düşünür tarafından doğa bilimleri metodolojisinin sosyal bilimlere uygun bir yöntem olduğu savunulmuştur. Ancak Hayek, insanın bilgisinin ve aklının yapısal olarak sınırlı olduğu gerekçesiyle sosyal bilimlerde kullanılması düşünülen ‘bilimsicilik’ metodolojisine yönelik eleştirilerde bulunmuştur. Yine Hayek, sosyal bilimlerin öngörülemez, tahmin edilemez ve planlanamaz niteliğinden dolayı, doğa bilimler metodolojisinin sosyal bilimlere uygun olmadığını her fırsatta dile getirmiştir.

In this article, criticism of objectivism, collectivism, and historicism of Friedrich August von Hayek of one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century is discussed. The nature of these three methodological methods has been evaluated around Hayek's thought world and idea. Along with the enlightenment period, significant progress and development in the natural sciences have been stated by many thinkers that the methodology of the natural sciences is a method suitable for social sciences. However, Hayek has criticized the 'scienticism' methodology, which is thought to be used in social sciences because human knowledge and mind are structurally limited. Again, Hayek stated at every opportunity that the methodology of the natural sciences is not suitable for social sciences because of the unpredictable, unpredictable and unpredictable nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institutional analysis promoted by F. A. Hayek seeks to understand how human action and coordination among individuals occur in an environment where the knowledge held by each person is incomplete and not fully transmittable. In such an environment, the institutional framework plays an important role in conditioning, at least partially, the behavior of members within a spontaneously emerging social order. In light of this, the objective of this article is to present Hayek's evolutionary institutional approach by organizing the discussion proposed by the Austrian economist on the subject. To do so, it will discuss Hayek's distinction between critical rationalism and constructivist rationalism. It will also address Hayek's explanation of institutional change and delve into his evolutionary approach to the social sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT The institutional analysis promoted by F. A. Hayek seeks to understand how human action and coordination among individuals occur in an environment where the knowledge held by each person is incomplete and not fully transmittable. In such an environment, the institutional framework plays an important role in conditioning, at least partially, the behavior of members within a spontaneously emerging social order. In light of this, the objective of this article is to present Hayek’s evolutionary institutional approach by organizing the discussion proposed by the Austrian economist on the subject. To do so, it will discuss Hayek’s distinction between critical rationalism and constructivist rationalism. It will also address Hayek’s explanation of institutional change and delve into his evolutionary approach to the social sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences.

ABSTRACT Keynes and Hayek are usually perceived in the history of economic thought as intellectual rivals. Although it is true that in terms of policy recommendations, they have not always seen eye to eye, there are numerous theoretical elements that the two economists tend to share. This is especially true if one follows Axel Leijonhufvud (1976) in considering that Keynes’s fundamental theoretical work is the Treatise and not the General Theory. In the early 1930s, following the works of Wicksell (1989), both explained business cycles as caused by a discrepancy between savings and investment. They considered that in the modern economy the interest rate cannot speedily adjust these two magnitudes. To a certain extent, Keynes and Hayek even agreed on the dynamic sequence of prices in a “normal” depression. By the time the General Theory came out, liquidity preference obscured most of the commonalities between the two economists. Although Hayek introduced liquidity preference as a short run friction in his 1941 Pure Theory of Capital, he could not accept it as a fundamental determinant of the interest rate. However, in the 1970s Hayek began to believe that “normal” Hayekian crises could further degenerate into Keynesian depressions. By focusing on Keynes’s theoretical development prior to the elaboration of the General Theory in parallel with Hayek’s evolution throughout his life, we argue that a selective reading of their works could lead to a theoretical model in which Keynesian and Hayekian scenarios are specific cases of a more general theory.

Keynes and Hayek are usually perceived in the history of economic thought as intellectual rivals. Although it is true that in terms of policy recommendations, they have not always seen eye to eye, there are numerous theoretical elements that the two economists tend to share. This is especially true if one follows Axel Leijonhufvud (1976) in considering that Keynes's fundamental theoretical work is the Treatise and not the General Theory. In the early 1930s, following the works of Wicksell (1989), both explained business cycles as caused by a discrepancy between savings and investment. They considered that in the modern economy the interest rate cannot speedily adjust these two magnitudes. To a certain extent, Keynes and Hayek even agreed on the dynamic sequence of prices in a "normal" depression. By the time the General Theory came out, liquidity preference obscured most of the commonalities between the two economists. Although Hayek introduced liquidity preference as a short run friction in his 1941 Pure Theory of Capital, he could not accept it as a fundamental determinant of the interest rate. However, in the 1970s Hayek began to believe that "normal" Hayekian crises could further degenerate into Keynesian depressions. By focusing on Keynes's theoretical development prior to the elaboration of the General Theory in parallel with Hayek's evolution throughout his life, we argue that a selective reading of their works could lead to a theoretical model in which Keynesian and Hayekian scenarios are specific cases of a more general theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O presente artigo objetiva apresentar as críticas de F. A. Hayek ao positivismo jurídico de Hans Kelsen. As críticas hayekianas se dão sobre a relação estabelecida por Kelsen entre direito e Estado e direito e justiça. Para isso, apresentam-se as concepções de norma jurídica e Estado de Direito para Kelsen e, em seguida, expõem-se as críticas hayekianas sobre a teoria pura kelseniana. A metodologia adotada é exploratória por meio de revisão bibliográfica e a abordagem da pesquisa é qualitativa. Conclui-se que, na leitura de Hayek, o juízo formalista de validade da norma e a identificação do Estado com o direito, conforme proposto pelo modelo positivista kelseniano, formam uma concepção teórica capaz de ameaçar à liberdade individual à medida que o poder do Estado se torna ilimitado na produção de normas jurídicas.

Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y en plena época de triunfo del keynesianismo y del Estado social, F. A. von Hayek llevó a cabo una renovación del pensamiento liberal recurriendo a sus bases teóricas más clásicas. De esta manera, el pensamiento de Hayek se ha convertido con el tiempo en el inspirador de la teoría y práctica neoliberal.

Throughout his career, Ludwig M. Lachmann theorized about how economies and societies achieve order in an uncertain world full of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneous production factors, and multilayered subjectivity. This article traces how he began his research agenda by expanding the conventional equilibrium framework of the 1930s to include (potentially diverging) expectations but gradually abandoned price coordination as the sole source of order in an economy. Instead, he set out to formulate an institutional theory of socially embedded plan coordination, which transcended the traditional division between commerce and community. This article illustrates this shift in Lachmann's focus by using two of his neglected German publications. Additionally, it lays out how Lachmann's effort in the "thinking in orders" tradition was principally rooted in his dissatisfaction with approaches to economics that reduced it to a "pure logic of choice." Lachmann instead conceived of his discipline as being something closer to Max Weber's "socioeconomics," and in this he was strongly influenced by the German historical school. This article explains how, ironically, this tradition, which historically positioned itself in stark opposition to the Austrian school, has—through the mediation of Lachmann—had considerable influence on the recent history of the Austrian school in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Review of: Wendy Brown (2019) In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West. New York: Columbia University Press. 249 pp.

Hayek’s theory of business cycles has been criticized for its unfeasible policy prescriptions, weak empirical support, and lack of technical rigor. Although the theory can be defended against these criticisms, it violates the rational expectations hypothesis, a criterion by which economists tend to judge the quality of economic arguments. Since Hayek and his followers failed to remedy the violation, the theory in its present form cannot capture the interest of the economics profession. This outcome might be avoidable. However, to change it, Hayek’s theory either needs a satisfactory restatement, or it must wait until economists change their criteria for judging the quality of arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines William Stanley Jevons's approach to human "improvement" in comparison with that of Carl Menger. In Jevons's view, people are relatively static when left to their own devices. Thus, to "attack" the "citadel of poverty" they must be improved by those who know what is "best" for them. Menger's view of people as planners, by contrast, is one in which people are capable of improving themselves. Jevons was a social reformer who placed great faith in education, and painful training and instruction, broadly defined, as key mechanisms of reform. Less frequently acknowledged but no less important, Menger also foresaw "the improvement of mankind" from within, as consumers came to better understand how best to attain their wants and needs over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O presente artigo objetiva discutir alguns aspectos da reflexão e contribuição de Merquior, especialmente, seu liberalismo social, em contraste com o liberismo de F. A. Hayek. A importância desse trabalho se dá em dois sentidos. Em primeiro lugar, o pensamento e obra de Merquior tem singular importância, já que, como um ativista e intelectual político brasileiro, refletiu sobre a tradição, premissas e propostas do liberalismo clássico para o Estado brasileiro, historicamente marcado por um viés patrimonialista e estatizante. Seu cuidado e amplo conhecimento da história nacional o levou do liberismo de Von Mises e Hayek ao liberalismo social. Em segundo lugar, é possível afirmar que, no Brasil, a produção intelectual de Merquior não é tão difundida e estudada nas ciências sociais, possibilitando que esse texto contribua na divulgação do pensamento do sociólogo brasileiro. Em contraste, porém, estabelecer-se-á uma relação crítica entre o liberalismo social de Merquior com o liberismo de Hayek. À década de 80, o autor brasileiro, assumidamente liberal, criticou vários aspectos do pensamento do economista austríaco, devido a suas considerações sobre as implicações de um liberismo hayekiano ser aplicado no Brasil. Considerar-se-á a importância da ação estatal na promoção de oportunidades para a expansão de uma liberdade efetiva em um país marcado pela desigualdade. O liberalismo social que pressupõe a tradição liberal como uma cosmovisão e que percebe o Estado como promovedor, ao lado do mercado, da liberdade, faz contraste ao liberismo hayekiano que reduz o liberalismo à liberdade econômica. É, assim, que as obras de Merquior e Hayek, suas convergências e divergências, constituem-se como um objeto de estudo singular para o contexto hodierno brasileiro.

Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) was pessimistic regarding capitalism's ability to survive. He predicted that large firms would crowd out start-up entrepreneurs--the ones inspiring creative destruction. These entrepreneurs, he thought, would be unable to obtain sufficient funds to launch products on a competitive scale. Since 1950, a venture capital industry has emerged, which now inspires creative destruction on an unprecedented scale. Our retrospective analysis reveals that the venture capital industry evolved in Schumpeterian fashion. Finally, we argue that had Schumpeter taken Knight (1921) and Hayek (1945) into account, he might not have made the claim that capitalism requires creative destruction to endure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a reassessment of the policy measures taken to combat the effects of COVID-19. It addresses the following question: does the threat of pandemic justify the sacrifice of legal and political principles for the sake of expediency? We do so by filtering the unintended consequences of price controls through the lens of constitutional political economy as understood by James Buchanan and F. A. Hayek. We argue that constitutional rules provide rules for reason. The reason for constitutional rules is not only to provide constraints on arbitrary discretion, but also to provide the epistemic preconditions that harness and guide the creative powers of individuals required for recovery from pandemic. We illustrate this point by reframing price controls as a violation of the U. S. Constitution, particularly the First Amendment. Thus, if prices are understood to be a form of communication across individuals, then upholding constitutional principles should not be abandoned but reinforced during times of crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Waldron has argued that Berlin ignored the importance of institutions and constitutions and worked with an impoverished conception of social and political design. Political structures, legal and political institutions, constitutional design, mechanisms of representation and the rule of law: all this remained untouched by Berlin, who seemed, in Waldron's opinion, largely uninterested in the actual political institutions of liberal society. In this essay, I argue that what may be missing in Berlin—close and sustained attention to, and interest in, institutions and social context—can be found in the works of his prominent contemporary, Raymond Aron (1905-1983), who also wrote about liberty during the Cold War. As such, Aron's An Essay on Liberty can and should be read as a complement to Berlin's essay "Two Concepts of Liberty." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will investigate the relationship between aspects of Whiteheadian process thought and political theology in Walter Lippmann and Friedrich von Hayek. While scholars have noted the differences between later actual existing neoliberalism and Lippmann's text, important continuities remain. One of these continuities is the way political boundaries police, and yet serve, economic relations. It will be argued that the unknowability of complex economic relations, thought with the help of Whitehead, gives way to a way of theoretically fencing politics and economy from one another. For Hayek, this boundary marking exercise serves to police the space of individual liberty, for it is the collectivist impulse to interfere with the unknowable and sublime object, the market, which leads to the chaos of German political life in the wartime period in which he writes. Hayek and Lippmann collapse the mystery of sovereignty into economy, and consequently legitimatise a legal architecture serving only to guard this mystery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friedrich Hayek's research focus shifted from a formal analysis of the capital structure in the early 1930s to the study of the economy of knowledge in 1945. He never, as it is too often said, abandoned economics. The abandonment narrative impedes understanding of Austrian economics generally and Hayek's works more specifically. Toward correcting the false narrative, we explore connections between his 1945 thesis and the price fan simile he set out in 1931 to facilitate understanding of the role played by emerging input prices as more capitalistic methods of production are adopted. Expanding on the price fan simile, we also seek to deepen the understanding of the allocative marvel that prices achieve in the free market system, and, consequently, the utter impracticality of using socialist calculation in place of the free market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I take up the scope and nature of information in its relation to thought. To be precise, I argue that information constitutes the contemporary image of thought and, although information has become ubiquitous, we can date its arrival to Hayek's 1945 essay "The Use of Knowledge in Society." Information is no longer merely a metaphor for thinking about or describing thought, I suggest; rather, information is, at bottom, the sole content of thought and thinking is nothing other than the processing of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theoretical foundations of bitcoin have been frequently traced back to the Austrian school of economics. To the extent that cryptocurrencies are not issued by a centralized authority and do not rely on an official legal tender status for their acceptance, they may indeed appear as a dramatic departure from the historical trend that has led, over the past few centuries, to the making of national money and as a decisive step toward the "denationalization of money" advocated by F. A. von Hayek. This article investigates to what extent bitcoin truly embodies the principles of stable money prescribed by Hayek and whether the proliferation of cryptocurrencies constitutes a Hayekian monetary competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I compare two views of the equilibrium concept: one from F. A. Hayek and the other from Fritz Machlup. I argue that Machlup's equilibrium concept is price-theoretic, that is, it is a tool of problem-based, comparative static analysis. In contrast, Hayek's equilibrium concept approximates the social order observed in reality. While the Hayekian equilibrium is an explanandum, the Machlupian equilibrium forms a part of the explanans. Further, Hayek's approach is more descriptivist than problem-based. I argue that the two equilibrium concepts are not mutually exclusive alternatives. In particular, the adequacy of the Machlupian equilibrium for price-theoretic analysis is unrelated to the adequacy of the Hayekian equilibrium for analyzing the social order. In fact, I show that the two types of analysis can be seen as complementary. I conclude that the main issue is not to decide whether the equilibrium concept is useful in general but to determine the proper sphere of application of a particular equilibrium concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I read E. P. Stringham’s book on private governance against the background of Morris Hoffman’s account of the evolution of legal punishment. This allows us to see how the evolution of private governance moves through three levels of punishment: the first-party punishment of conscience and guilt, the second-party punishment of retaliation and revenge, and the third-party punishment of retribution. This suggests that neither pure anarchism nor pure statism is possible, because every social order shows some form of governance, and no authoritarian state can ever hold an absolute monopoly on governance to the exclusion of private governance. One can also see that liberal states leave lots of room for private governance, which allows for adaptive flexibility in solving public problems in ways that promote peace and prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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O presente artigo apresenta e qualifica como heterodoxa e robusta a mainline economics, uma agenda de pesquisa existente ao longo da evolução do pensamento econômico que abre mão de um conceito central à mainstream economics, o de equilíbrio, sob uma perspectiva liberal. Procura-se argumentar, também, que a crítica heterodoxa da teoria econômica convencional não deve ser confundida com a crítica do próprio sistema capitalista. Para isso, é discutido o que se entende por economia heterodoxa e é apresentado criticamente o papel do equilíbrio na abordagem estática convencional em Economia. Em seguida, mostra-se que a mainline economics adota a abordagem de processo de mercado e de emergência de coordenação sem comando central, sob uma perspectiva liberal. Destaque é dado para as contribuições oferecidas por F. A. Hayek.

Hayek's social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek's dismissal of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses F. A. Hayek's views of his own work, as expressed in sixteen hours of interviews from 1978. It covers his thoughts on writing "The Uses of Knowledge in Society" and his discovery of the utilization of dispersed knowledge; the functioning of our capitalist system; the differing reactions of the Americans and the British to The Road to Serfdom and the book's intended audience; why he felt optimistic in the late 1970s despite all the problems of the time; and more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este trabalho discute o debate sobre a teoria do capital entre Frank H. Knight e Friedrich A. Hayek ocorrida na década de 1930. Busca-se realizar uma reconstituição histórica dessa controvérsia entre Hayek e Knight, tentando entendê-la em seus próprios termos através da sumarização dos argumentos de ambos os participantes da mesma e situando cada artigo que a compõe no contexto dos desenvolvimentos teóricos correntes desses autores. Além disso, identifica-se a forma com que a teoria do capital de cada um dos autores é influenciada ou influencia as demais posições defendidas pelos mesmos em outros temas relacionados, em especial, o escopo e método da ciência econômica.

Many writers--most famously F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman--have posited a relationship between economic freedom and political freedom and/or civil liberties. Despite sustained interest, this relationship has been the subject of little empirical study. I estimate the short-run effect of a measure of economic freedom (using the Economic Freedom of the World index) on measures of civil liberties (using the CIRI Human Rights Dataset). In contrast to most previous studies using Freedom House's Freedom in the World index, I treat civil liberties as distinct from political freedom and consider several fundamental liberties separately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

InRobust Political Economy, Mark Pennington argues for a minimal state founded not on neoclassical economic principles but on a return to classical liberalism. Pennington makes his case on the basis of Hayek’s “knowledge” problem and public-choice theory’s “incentive” problem. While this is a welcome start, classical liberalism is a promising agenda for a new economics, and for the “reform of capitalism,” only if it is accompanied by an explicit rejection of Milton Friedman’s subordination of normative to positive economics, and by a move beyond the traditional division of the economy into twin spheres (the state and the market) to embrace a third element: the domestic sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For nearly 80 years, the field of macroeconomics has largely been shaped by the aftermath of the Keynesian revolution. Many economists have argued that this revolution and the subsequent internal and external disputes it has sparked have had the unfortunate side effect of crowding out much of what was good in macro-level analysis before it, leading to the dissatisfactory state of macroeconomics we have today. In the search for alternative paths for macroeconomics, I focus on two separate but compatible traditions: monetary disequilibrium (MD) theory and the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). I argue that scholars in these traditions employed a far richer micro-theoretic explanation for the business cycle well before Keynes's General Theory. Unfortunately, their ideas were not united in time to mount a sufficient counterattack to the Keynesian crusade. My goal is to unite the best elements of these two traditions by providing what I believe is the "missing link" that can help connect these alternative paths: free banking theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek's monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek's positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek's allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of the contributions of the Austrian school of economics, with specific emphasis on post-WWII developments. We provide a brief history and overview of the original theorists of the Austrian school in order to set the stage for the subsequent development of their ideas by Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek. In discussing the main ideas of Mises and Hayek, we focus on how their work provided the foundations for the modern Austrian school, which included Ludwig Lachmann, Murray Rothbard and Israel Kirzner. These scholars contributed to the Austrian revival in the 1960s and 1970s, which, in turn, set the stage for the emergence of the contemporary Austrian school in the 1980s. We review the contemporary development of the Austrian school and, in doing so, discuss the tensions, alternative paths, and the promising future of Austrian economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter explores the ways in which cybernetics influenced the works of F. A. Hayek from the late 1940s onward. It shows that the concept of negative feedback, borrowed from cybernetics, was central to Hayek's attempt to explain the principle of the emergence of human purposive behavior. Next, the chapter discusses Hayek's later uses of cybernetic ideas in his works on the spontaneous formation of social orders. Finally, Hayek's view on the appropriate scope of the use of cybernetics is considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artigo busca apresentar as ideias de Hayek a partir da identificação de um tema unificador, presente em diversas de suas teorias. O sistema explanatório do autor trata da liberdade como parte de um mecanismo descentralizado de aprendizado capaz de contornar as limitações do conhecimento humano necessário para coordenar as ações em sistemas progressivamente mais complexos. O artigo trata de diversos problemas interpretativos a partir da perspectiva que enfatiza a centralidade do conhecimento falível e de estruturas complexas em sua obra.

Desde seu renascimento no início dos anos 1970, o que veio a se chamar de “Economia Austríaca” tem sido considerado, pela maior parte de seus adeptos contemporâneos, como a continuação de uma tradição unificada que pode ser rastreada até Carl Menger. Este artigo desafia essa perspectiva e argumenta que, de fato, duas tradições muito diferentes emergiram do trabalho de Menger. Uma tradição pode ser rastreada, através da obra de F. A. Hayek, a Friedrich Wieser, um dos dois seguidores mais proeminentes de Menger. A outra tradição emana dos escritos do outro discípulo principal de Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, e inclui seu aluno Ludwig von Mises. Este ensaio defende a tese de que essas duas tradições separadas existem e foram confundidas pelos austríacos modernos.

F. A. Hayek took two trips to Chile, the first in 1977, the second in 1981. The visits were controversial. On the first trip he met with General Augusto Pinochet, who had led a coup that overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973. During his 1981 visit, Hayek gave interviews that were published in the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio and in which he discussed authoritarian regimes and the problem of unlimited democracy. After each trip, he complained that the western press had painted an unfair picture of the economic situation under the Pinochet regime. Drawing on archival material, interviews, and past research, we provide a full account of this controversial episode in Hayek's life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This lecture, given by James Buchanan in February of 1979, examines the meaning of F.A.Hayek's career path in the context of the development of economics in the 20th century, and argues for the importance of financial support of scholars like Hayek, and their academic research into the values of a free society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-evaluates the orthodox understanding of the role which the 1974 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to F.A. Hayek had on the revival of Austrian Economics in the later part of the 20th century. The orthodox view, which focuses exclusively on the sociological role of the award on returning Austrian economists to the conversation among academic economists, omits the critical role of purely doctrinal developments. In particular, the work done in the decade 1937-1948 is argued to be central to the Austrian revival. In this decade, both Hayek and Mises independently developed new clarifications of Austrian thought which represented an extension of the subjectivist tradition in economics: Mises' emphasis on human entrepreneurial action and Hayek's exploration of the role of knowledge in the market process. The interest of a generation of younger academics to the ideas developed in that critical decade is thus understood to be the true cause of the Austrian revival, with the award of the Nobel Prize serving a catalytic rather than causative role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These edited remarks explore the relationship of the thought of F.A. Hayek to the development of experimental economics and related programs in economic design. Particularly emphasized are the insights of Hayek with respect to competition and their importance to the theoretical justification for, and empirical results derived from, the experimental study of market behavior. These remarks include some personal commentary on experimental methods, from the early double auctions of the 1960s through more recent work exploring the nature of business cycles. Finally, the intellectual history of the market structures examined in Vernon Smith's work is discussed, comparing the exploration of the double auction to the horse market of Bohm-Bawerk, as well as the general insight of Adam Smith that causality stems from the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange to the discovery of specialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I trace the influence of a group of Scottish political and moral philosophers on F. A. Hayek's thinking on liberty and classical liberalism. David Hume is the most notable; the list also includes Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, and Adam Smith. In many cases, we have Hayek's own words on these moral philosophers' influence. I look at the Scots through Hayek's eyes to understand their influence on him. My purpose is to present this important strand of classical liberal thought and its influence on Hayek's own political and legal framework for liberty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In his famous book Freedom and the Law, originally published in 1961, Italian lawyer and economist Bruno Leoni asked whether, over the long run, a society and legal system premised primarily on legislative lawmaking could sustain a system of individual liberty, or whether such a system required a common-law-style foundation to support it. In this article, I evaluate Leoni's challenge and find that his predictions about the nature of a legislative-centered legal system not only are more relevant than ever, but that recent tendencies toward extreme and arbitrary law-making by executive edict are consistent with the trends and intellectual principles that Leoni identified more than fifty years ago. Because modern legal developments reflect the working out of the jurisprudential principles that Leoni identified fifty years ago, Leoni's warnings are more relevant today than ever before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek's well-known dismissal of the concept of 'social justice' is examined and questioned. While basically agreeing with Hayek's critique, the author argues that we should not entirely reject this concept, although it is often used in a vague and emotional way - 'social justice talk'. Drawing on the tradition of classical liberalism and Catholic social teaching, he makes the case for the true meaning of social justice, which applies to the basic legal and institutional framework of a society rather than the distributional outcomes of market processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction provides an overview of the papers in the symposium on Hayekian themes in The Order of Public Reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an introductory essay to a symposium on the monetary and banking systems and their relation to the state. The essay briefly summarizes the three papers. It links the arguments of the papers, one of which is itself a historical piece, to ones extending back to the eighteenth century. Classical political economists were suspicious of fiat currency because of the historical record of debasement and resulting inflation. In the nineteenth century, writers searched for sound money, which was typically commodity money. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, economists search for a monetary constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study aims to introduce the structure of Hayek's evolutionism and proceeds in the following steps: (i) A historical and systematic exposition of the theory of evolution's influence on Hayek's philosophy is the starting point. Emphasis is placed on the timeline of the development of his system of ideas and the systematic differentiation between the explanans and the explanandum in his theory of science. (ii) The way Hayek develops his methodology of science is also analyzed. In relation to this, the thesis that Hayek's take on methodological dualism is a direct result of the influence of the theory of evolution is affirmed. The theory of evolution is portrayed as a tool of explanation, specifically as a so-called explanation of pattern. (iii) Hayek's take on society in context of the theory of evolution is presented. Society is interpreted as an order of action wiThemphasis on Hayek's assumption that society is an order evolving along with the human mind. (iv) The last part of the text elaborates on Hayek's perspective on the mind. This theory is rooted in connectionism. I argue against the traditional view of Hayek's philosophy as an elaboration on Kant's philosophy. The final summary reviews the fundamental points of Hayek's evolutionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek's original 1945 University College Dublin lecture outlined the origins and evolution of two different interpretations of 'individualism', comparing and contrasting what Hayek terms 'true' and 'false' individualism notwithstanding the misleading contemporary interpretations and distorted perceptions of the assumptions underlining 'true' individualism. Hayek developed and extended the Scottish Enlightenment theory of spontaneous order originally formulated by Adam Ferguson's maxim that social order was the result of unintended human action rather than the result of deliberate human design in order to explain the origin of complex social structures, which originated in a Cromwellian maxim. The origination and inspiration for the title of Hayek's lecture is also considered, as is the influence of other thinkers; Mandeville, Tocqueville, Mill, Acton and Schatz that Hayek cites in his Dublin lecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-examines Hayek's insights into the problem of knowledge in markets, and argues that his analysis remains pertinent but has serious flaws. His central thesis--that the market price system is essential for communicating information and coordinating transactions wherever knowledge is dispersed and innovation renders the future uncertain--remains a potent explanation for the failures of central economic planning. His analysis that aggregate statistics necessarily abstract from contextual and tacit knowledge has important but widely ignored implications for the contemporary use of statistics in financial risk models. The recent financial crisis, however, shows that market prices can give very misleading signals for long periods, and it represents a key example of ways in which Hayek's thesis is incomplete. In particular, Hayek's analysis falls short by ignoring the role of dominant narratives, analytical monocultures, self-reinforcing emotions, feedback loops, information asymmetries and market power in distorting the wisdom of prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]