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Although studies have shown China's growing influence on developing countries' policies, little empirical work has considered the relationship between Chinese overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) and host countries' online digital freedom. Considering as many as 112 developing countries from 2003 to 2019, and using a two-stage least squares selection modeling approach, we find an association between Chinese FDI and four types of limits on online digital freedom. Conversely, when we substitute global FDI (excluding Chinese FDI), we obtain different results, suggesting there is something unique about Chinese multinational corporations and online digital freedom. Our research indicates that China and host states' domestic leaders mutually benefit by restricting online digital freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the effects of US sanctions on Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI). Using data for up to 112 developing countries from 2005 to 2015, we find that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to invest in countries threatened or targeted with US sanctions relative to Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs) because they have the Chinese government's backing and are larger in number and size, motivating them to invest in higher-risk states. The Chinese government also reaps political benefits by Chinese SOEs investing abroad, enhancing China's economic strength and decreasing its rivals' influence. We obtain similar results for Chinese SOEs and POEs regardless of the investment sector and conduct additional robustness checks that further reinforce the main findings. Our study provides insights into how China's overseas FDI increases its economic and political reach across the globe at the possible expense of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares Chinese public and private overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) to determine how political risk affects an authoritarian developing country. Using panel data for up to 118 developing countries from 2003 to 2017, and studying different economic investment sectors (i.e. primary, secondary, and tertiary; energy/non-energy), we find that political risk has varying effects on Chinese overseas FDI. Chinese state firms appear to invest in higher political risk countries regardless of the economic sector, while Chinese private firms tend to invest in states who share similar political ideologies when investing in the energy/primary sector. We also find that both public and private Chinese firms choose geographically proximate countries for economically riskier investments. Our sectoral investment study offers insights into differences in Chinese public and private firms' political risk tolerance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature, studies show that investors prefer low-risk host states. However, the research focuses on investors from developed country democracies, such as the United States, ignoring the rise of China, an authoritarian developing country that engages in public and private investment. This paper investigates Chinese state and private FDI in 127 developing countries from 2003 to 2017 to determine the effects of political risk on FDI. We find that, as with US FDI, low-risk developing countries attract more Chinese state FDI, except in the case of natural resource investment, where Chinese investors appear to disregard risk concerns. For Chinese private FDI, on the other hand, political institutions seem to play no significant role, but political affiliations matter. Our work suggests that similarities between US and Chinese state FDI are increasing, while the investment strategies of Chinese private and state firms appear to be growing farther apart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recently Chinese investment in the USA has grown exponentially, it has not flowed equally among the US states. Controlling for popular explanations in the foreign direct investment literature, we carry out subnational analysis to assess the determinants of Chinese investment in the USA. Using a panel dataset for all states from 2006 to 2016, we find that Chinese firms are more attracted to states where Republican governors hold office. Republican-governed states particularly attract greenfield investments from Chinese firms. However, we also find that US national security concerns and Chinese goals appear to affect investment flows in high-technology states, limiting the role of partisanship. Our results indicate that it is too soon to dismiss the importance of politics on foreign direct investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]